GERMAN 
SEA-POWER 


ITS  RISE,  PROGRESS  AND 
ECONOMIC    BASIS 


<     BERKELEY 

LIBRARY 

UNWWSITY  Of 
V^^     CALIFORNIA 


GERMAN    SEA-POWER 
ITS  RISE,  PROGRESS,  AND  ECONOMIC  BASIS  j 


GERMAN  SEA-POWER 

ITS  RISE,  PROGRESS,  AND  ECONOMIC 
BASIS 

BY  ARCHIBALD  HURD  AND 
HENRY  CASTLE 


WITH  MAPS  AND  APPENDICES  GIVING  THE 
FLEET  LAWS,  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES  SCRIBNERS  SONS 

597-599  FIFTH  AVENUE 
1914 


J    i    o 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTION             -.                -                 -                 -                -  •         vii 

CHAPTER 

I.    GERMAN    MARITIME   ASCENDANCY    IN    THE    PAST  -            I 

II.    THE    FIRST    HOHENZOLLERN    FLEET    AND    COLONIES  -         49 

III.    THE    GERMAN    NAVY    IN    THE    NINETEENTH    CENTURY  -          7 1 

->pV.    BRITISH  INFLUENCE  ON  GERMAN   NAVAL  DEVELOPMENT         97 

'j^y.    THE    GERMAN    NAVY   ACTS            -                  -                  -  -       I08 

-^VJ.    GERMAN    SHIPS,    OFFICERS,    AND    MEN    -                  -  *       ^52 

''VII.    WILLIAM    II.    AND    HIS    NAVAL    MINISTER                -  "177 

VIII.    THE   ECONOMIC   BASIS   OF   GERMAN    NAVAL   POLICY  -      214 

IX.    PARLIAMENT    AND    GERMAN    NAVAL    POLICY        -  -256 

X.  Germany's  maritime  interests        -            -  -     287 


APPENDICES 

I.    GERMAN    NAVAL    LEGISLATION  -  -  -  -      328 

II.    MEMORANDUM      APPENDED      TO      THE      GERMAN      NAVY 

BILL,    1900  ------       246 

III.  Germany's  shipbuilding  resources  -  -     361 

IV.  AREA,    slips,    REPAIRING-SLIPS,    DOCKS,     AND    NUMBER 

OF   EMPLOYEES   OF   THE   CHIEF    GERMAN    SHIPYARDS 

IN    I912         ------ 

-'°V.    BRITISH    AND    GERMAN    SHIPBUILDING    PROGRAMMES       - 
','   VI.    GUN    AND    TORPEDO   ARMAMENT    OF    THE    BRITISH   AND 

GERMAN    FLEETS,    MARCH,    I913         - 
VIL    NAVAL    EXPENDITURE,    ETC.,    OF    GREAT     BRITAIN    AND 

GERMANY  IN  EACH  OF  THE  YEARS  19OI-O2  TO  I913-I4 
VIII.    EXTENT    OF    BRITISH    AND    GERMAN    EMPIRES     - 


372 
374 

375 

376 

378 


INDEX 


-  379 


Map  of  the  World,  showing  Cables,  Coaling  Stations,  etc,  and 
the  possessions  of  the  British  and  German  peoples. 

Map  of  the  North  Sea,  showing  Naval  Bases,  Distances,  etc. 


INTRODUCTION 

Anglo-German  rivalry  is  definitely  shaping  under  our 
very  eyes  the  political  conceptions  and  the  defensive 
machinery  of  all  the  peoples  within  the  British  Empire. 
Already  this  hardly  concealed  antagonism  between 
the  world's  greatest  naval  Power  and  the  world's  most 
formidable  military  Power,  and  all  that  it  connotes, 
has  completely  changed  the  course  of  British  foreign 
policy  and  led  to  a  regrouping  of  the  nations  of  Europe 
on  the  one  hand,  while  on  the  other  it  is  the  deter- 
mining factor  in  the  policy  of  Japan  and  the  United 
States.  To  many  political  prophets  we  appear  to  have 
reached  the  opening  phase  of  a  long  struggle  which 
will  decide  whether  British  or  German  civilization  is 
to  dominate  the  world  in  future.  This  Anglo-German 
antagonism  finds  its  most  acute  expression  in  naval 
policy,  and  it  is  believed  in  many  quarters  that  the 
struggle  will  eventually  be  decided  by  naval  conflict. 
Whether  this  anticipation  is  well  based  or  is  merely 
the  unfounded  belief  of  politicians  and  philosophers 
who  are  prone  to  believe  in  war  as  the  only  solution 
of  international  difficulties  time  alone  can  show. 

Whatever  may  be  the  outcome  of  the  naval  problem 
which  is  now  so  frequently  the  subject  of  controversy 
in  both  countries,  it  is  of  paramount  importance  that 
the  people,  not  only  of  the  United  Kingdom,  but  of  the 
whole  British  Empire,  should  comprehend  at  any  rate 
the  main  factors  underlying  the  remarkable  expansion 
of  the  German  Fleet  which  has  occurred  since  the 
Navy  Act  of  1900  was  adopted.    These  are  the  matters 

vii 


viii  INTRODUCTION 

examined  in  the  present  volume  with  a  completeness 
which  it  is  believed  has  not  been  attempted  before. 
There  could  be  no  more  opportune  moment  for  a  study 
of  the  maritime  development  of  Germany.  This  year 
the  Emperor  will  celebrate  the  twenty-fifth  year  of 
his  accession,  and  191 3  happens  to  be  the  centenary 
of  the  freedom  of  Germany,  secured  at  a  heavy  cost 
on  the  battlefield  of  Leipzig  on  October  18  and   19, 

1813. 

In  the  course  of  the  study  of  Germany's  political 
and  economic  conditions  and  her  maritime  develop- 
ment, not  a  few  popular  conceptions  firmly  rooted  in 
the  English  mind  must  be  challenged,  while  it  may  be 
that  Germans  themselves  will  obtain  from  these  pages  a 
juster  comprehension  of  the  British  position.  The 
book  has  been  written  without  any  political  object  in 
view,  but  with  an  honest  desire  to  set  forth  the  truth. 
If  it  succeeds  in  dispelling  some  of  the  misconceptions 
which  exist  in  both  countries,  this  examination  of 
the  rise  and  progress  of  German  sea-power,  and  its 
economic  and  political  bases,  will  not  have  been 
undertaken  in  vain. 

The  present  antagonism  between  the  two  countries 
and,  in  particular,  the  anxiety  with  which  the  British 
people  watch  the  development  of  German  naval  arma- 
ments, rest  upon  no  inherent  antipathy  between  the 
two  peoples.  As  Mr.  Balfour  pointed  out  recently' 
in  his  article  in  Nord  itnd  Sild,  the  German  nation  has 
never  been  the  enemy  of  the  British  nation.  In  the 
long  series  of  wars  in  which  Britain  has  been  involved 
between  the  revolution  of  1688  and  the  peace  of  181 5, 
German  States  were  our  allies,  and  on  many  Con- 
tinental battlefields  English  and  German  soldiers  have 
fought  in  the  same  cause.  Moreover,  Englishmen  do 
not  forget  the  debt  which  the  world  owes  to  German 
genius  and  German  learning,  and  down  to  a  compara- 
tively recent  period  the  two  nations  were  united  in 
their  political  policy.  When  the  present  Emperor 
came  to  the  throne,  and  for  man}^  years  afterwards, 


INTRODUCTION  ix 

England    and    Germany  were    on    terms   of   closest 
friendship. 

It  is  only  during  the  past  fifteen  years,  a  period 
marked  by  the  rapid  growth  of  the  German  Fleet,  that 
the  relations  between  the  two  countries  have  become 
strained  and  even  embittered.  No  responsible  states- 
man on  either  side  of  the  North  Sea  can  desire  that 
the  present  animosity  should  be  perpetuated,  and 
nothing  can  tend  to  eliminate  occasions  of  misunder- 
standing better  than  an  impartial  review  of  Germany's 
maritime  history  and  development  in  the  effort  to  dis- 
cover the  real  causes  which  have  led  to  the  growth  of 
her  war  fleet. 

If  the  expansion  of  Germany's  naval  power  were 
purely  an  artificial  expression  of  her  desire  to  dominate 
the  seas,  if  behind  it  lay  no  economic  justification, 
then,  indeed,  the  future  of  the  two  countries  would  be 
dark,  and  those  who  believe  a  war  to  be  inevitable 
could  be  doubly  sure  that  this  was  the  only  solution  of 
the  present  controversy.  But  the  growth  of  the  Ger- 
man Navy,  if  it  is  not  completely  explained  and  justified 
by  the  development  of  German  maritime  interests,  is 
at  any  rate  not  an  exotic  policy.  If  Englishmen  desire 
to  understand  the  standpoint  of  the  German  people 
they  must  recognize  historical  facts.  The  belief  that 
Germany  has  no  maritime  past  and  no  spontaneous 
maritime  instincts  is  completely  disposed  of  by  the 
remarkable  record  of  the  Hanseatic  League,  which 
achieved  a  moral  and  economic  victory  in  the  only  war 
in  which  we  engaged  with  it.  Moreover,  Englishmen 
would  do  well  to  disabuse  their  minds  of  the  idea  that 
until  recent  times  there  has  been  no  movement  in 
Germany  to  possess  what  may  be  described  as  a 
political  navy  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  colonies — 
places  of  settlement  in  which  German  emigrants  may 
preserve  their  German  nationality  and  their  distinctive 
German  habits  and  customs.  It  is  only  necessary  to 
recall  the  days  of  the  Great  Elector  to  comprehend 
that  this  belief  is  unfounded. 


X  INTRODUCTION 

On  the  other  hand,  an  examination  of  the  course 
which  German  history  has  run  during  the  past  quarter 
of  a  century  reveals  the  fact  that,  however  keenly  the 
Emperor  William  II.  may  have  sympathized  with  and 
encouraged  the  movement  for  naval  expansion,  he 
cannot  be  regarded  as  its  creator.  In  the  early  days 
of  the  naval  agitation  the  Emperor  took  a  prominent 
part  in  educating  politicians  and  the  public,  but  in 
recent  years  the  direction  of  naval  policy  has  passed 
largely  beyond  his  control  under  the  influence  of  a 
campaign  engineered  by  the  Navy  League,  which  is, 
it  is  true,  kept  closely  informed  of  the  Imperial  point 
of  view,  and — perhaps  more  important — by  those  news- 
papers which  reflect  the  views  and  ends  of  the  real 
creator  of  the  modern  German  Fleet,  Grand-Admiral 
von  Tirpitz.  This  sailor,  who  until  a  dozen  years  or 
so  ago  was  almost  as  unknown  to  the  German  people 
as  to  Englishmen  generally,  has  for  some  considerable 
time  controlled  the  development  of  German  naval 
policy,  and  also  in  no  small  measure  Germany's  foreign 
policy,  keeping  the  latter  in  just  those  channels  calcu- 
lated to  feed  the  special  interests  which  he  has  made 
it  his  life's  work  to  create.  Chancellors,  Foreign 
Secretaries,  and  other  Ministers  may  come  and  go — 
and  have  come  and  gone — but  the  Naval  Secretary 
has  remained  in  office,  and  still  remains,  as  the 
personal  embodiment  of  the  aims  and  ambitions  of 
the  school  of  thought  which  dominates  the  Admiralstab 
in  Berlin. 

Admitting  the  domination  of  German  naval  policy 
by  this  sailor-statesman,  admitting  also  that  naval 
policy  has  outrun  Germany's  present  economic  de- 
velopment, and  far  exceeds  the  needs  of  German 
maritime  interests,  it  yet  remains  a  fact  that  Germany 
has  a  great  stake  on  the  seas,  and  therefore  that  the 
development  of  the  German  Fleet  cannot  be  con- 
demned as  an  exotic  policy  prompted  solely  by  am- 
bitions of  aggrandizement  and  greed.  Nothing  will 
conduce  better  to  an  understanding  between  the  two 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

peoples  than  the  realization  by  Englishmen  that 
Germany  has  great  and  valuable  interests  afloat  which 
justify  the  accumulation  of  considerable  naval  arma- 
ments, though  they  cannot  excuse  the  Anglophobe 
tendency  of  German  public  opinion  and  the  final  and 
aggressive  expression  of  German  policy  embodied  in 
the  Navy  Act  of  1912. 

There  is  complete  assurance  that  German  naval 
expansion  is  not  a  type  of  hypertrophy,  in  a  financial 
sense,  and  that  the  existence  of  a  strong  German  Fleet 
must  be  regarded  as  a  permanent  factor  in  world 
politics,  because  it  is,  in  some  measure  at  least,  the 
expression  of  a  natural  and  legitimate  need.  An 
examination  of  German  economic  development  reveals 
the  fact  that,  though  German  expenditure  on  military 
and  naval,  and  particularly  naval,  armaments  in  recent 
years  has  been  in  excess  of  her  financial  resources,  it 
has  not  seriously  affected  her  economic  strength.  If 
the  political  conditions  remain  unchanged,  she  will 
before  long  be  able  to  bear  much  heavier  burdens 
than  she  bears  to-day  without  suffering  economic 
injury. 

But  will  those  conditions  remain  unchanged  ?  The 
present  naval  policy  of  the  German  Empire  rests 
upon  a  state  of  unstable  political  equilibrium.  If 
that  equilibrium  is  disturbed,  as  it  well  may  be  within 
the  next  few  years,  German  naval  policy  can  hardly 
remain  unaffected.  But  for  the  present  it  is  well  to 
recognize  that  that  polic}^ — embodied  in  definite  legis- 
lation, which  can  be  checked  only  by  other  legislation 
— holds  the  field,  and  that,  until  a  radical  change  occurs 
in  the  political  conditions,  and  this  finds  expression  in 
constitutional  change,  it  will  continue  to  operate  from 
year  to  year  with  unfaltering  persistency  until  the  naval 
legislation  has  been  translated  into  ships  and  men  co- 
ordinated for  the  purposes  of  war  in  accordance  with 
the  principle  repeatedly  enunciated  by  Grand-Admiral 
von  Tirpitz  and  those  who  have  supported  him  in  the 
Press  and  on  the  platform.    We  have  to  assume  that  in 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

1920  German}' will  possess  61  capital  ships — battleships 
or  battle-cruisers — 40  unarmoured  cruisers,  144  de- 
stroyers, and  ^2  submarines,  representing  an  accumu- 
lation of  naval  armament  which  in  the  days  of  their 
greatest  pride  the  British  people  never  possessed. 

Is  it  surprising  to  the  German  people  that  this 
development  of  naval  policy  by  the  most  formidable 
military  Power  in  Europe  should  occasion  acute 
anxiety,  not  only  in  the  United  Kingdom,  but  in  all 
the  Dominions  overseas?  It  is  only  necessary  to 
compare  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  Empires, 
their  populations,  and  geographical  distribution,*^ to 
appreciate  the  British  standpoint,  and  to  under- 
stand the  development  of  British  policy  which  has 
occurred  within  the  past  few  years.  The  world 
has  witnessed  a  strengthening  of  the  ties  hitherto 
existing  between  England  and  her  oversea  Dominions, 
and  a  determination  on  the  part  of  those  young  States 
to  help  bear  the  burdens  of  Empire  which  it  has 
appeared  to  them  might  in  a  few  years'  time,  owing  to 
the  acute  pressure  in  Europe,  prove  too  much  even  for 
the  Old  Country's  broad  shoulders.  The  armament 
movement  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  in  which 
Germany  has  been  in  the  forefront,  bids  fair  to  cement 
the  British  Empire  into  a  close-knit  confederation  for 
defensive  purposes.  Not  only  have  the  Dominions 
adopted  measures  for  defending  their  territories  by 
adequately  drilled  citizen  soldiers,  but  they  have  not 
hesitated  to  lend  their  aid  to  the  defence  of  British 
interests  afloat.  Australia  has  founded  a  navy  which 
it  is  intended  shall  be  a  branch  of  the  ancient  fleet 
of  the  United  Kingdom  ;  the  Canadian  Government 
has  decided  to  present  three  large  capital  ships  to 
the  Royal  Navy  as  an  emergency  contribution,  and 
is  about  to  elaborate  a  permanent  policy  of  co- 
operation with  the  Mother  Country  in  naval  defence. 
The    Dominion    of   New   Zealand    has  given  to  the 

*  See  Appendix  VIII. 


INTRODUCTION  -      xiii 

Mother  Country  a  battle-cruiser  of  the  Dreadnought 
type,  and  a  yet  more  costly  armoured  ship  has  been 
voted  by  the  Federated  Malay  States,  which  are  not 
even  part  of  the  British  Empire,  but  which,  never- 
theless, in  recognition  of  British  protection  in  the  past, 
have  shown  that  they  share  in  the  feeling  of  anxiety 
as  to  the  future  which  casts  its  shadow  over  the 
British  Empire. 

It  may  be  said  that  this  anxiety  is  exaggerated,  but 
what  are  the  conditions  which  exist  and  which  will 
continue  ?  We  cannot  do  better  than  quote  the  follow- 
ing passage  from  Mr.  Balfour's  admirable  study  of  the 
Anglo-German  problem  to  which  reference  has  already 
been  made : 

"  The  external  facts  of  the  situation  appear  to  be  as 
follows  :  The  greatest  military  Power  and  the  second 
greatest  naval  Power  in  the  world  is  adding  both  to 
her  Army  and  to  her  Navy.  She  is  increasing  the 
strategic  railways  which  lead  to  frontier  States — not 
merely  to  frontier  States  which  themselves  possess 
powerful  armies,  but  to  small  States  which  can  have 
no  desire  but  to  remain  neutral  if  their  formidable 
neighbours  should  unhappily  become  belligerents. 
She  is  in  like  manner  modifying  her  naval  arrange- 
ments so  as  to  make  her  naval  strength  instantly 
effective.  It  is  conceivable  that  all  this  may  be  only 
in  order  to  render  herself  impregnable  against  attack. 
Such  an  object  would  certainly  be  commendable, 
though  the  efforts  undergone  to  secure  it  might  (to 
outside  observers)  seem  in  excess  of  any  possible 
danger.  If  all  nations  could  be  made  impregnable  to 
the  same  extent,  peace  would  doubtless  be  costly, 
but  at  least  it  would  be  secure.  Unfortunately,  no 
mere  analysis  of  the  German  preparations  for  war  will 
show  for  what  purpose  they  are  designed.  A  tre- 
mendous weapon  has  been  forged  ;  every  year  adds 
something  to  its  efficiency  and  power;  it  is  as 
formidable  for  purposes  of  aggression  as  for  purposes 
of  defence.  But  to  what  end  it  was  originally  de- 
signed, and  in  what  cause  it  will  ultimately  be  used, 
can  only  be  determined,  if  determined  at  all,  by  extra- 
neous considerations. 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

"  I  here  approach  the  most  difficult  and  delicate  part 
of  my  task.  Let  me  preface  it  by  saying  that  ordinary 
Englishmen  do  not  believe,  and  certainly  I  do  not 
believe,  either  that  the  great  body  of  the  German 
people  wish  to  make  an  attack  on  their  neighbours 
or  that  the  German  Government  intend  it.  A  war  in 
which  the  armed  manhood  of  half  Europe  would  take 
part  can  be  no  object  of  deliberate  desire  either  for 
nations  or  for  statesmen.  The  danger  lies  elsewhere. 
It  lies  in  the  coexistence  of  that  marvellous  instru- 
ment of  warfare  w^hich  embraces  the  German  Army  and 
Navy,  with  the  assiduous,  I  had  almost  said  the 
organized,  advocacy  of  a  policy  which  it  seems  im- 
possible to  reconcile  with  the  peace  of  the  world  or 
the  rights  of  nations.  For  those  who  accept  this 
policy  German  development  means  German  territorial 
expansion.  All  countries  which  hinder,  though  it  be 
only  in  self-defence,  the  realization  of  this  ideal,  are 
regarded  as  hostile ;  and  \var,  or  the  threat  of  war,  is 
deemed  the  natural  and  fitting  method  by  which  the 
ideal  itself  is  to  be  accomplished." 

These  decisive  words  reflect  with  perfect  accuracy 
the  British  point  of  view.  Great  Britain  is  the  centre 
of  a  vast  maritime  Empire  of  which  the  seas  are  the 
lines  of  communication.  If  the  people  of  the  United 
Kingdom  were  not  dependent  for  almost  all  their  food 
and  raw  material  upon  the  free  passage  of  merchant 
ships  to  and  from  their  shores,  if  the  Dominions  over- 
seas had  no  oversea  commerce  growing  from  year  to 
year,  still  the  necessity  would  exist  for  the  mainten- 
ance by  the  British  people  of  an  unchallengeable 
supremacy.  It  is  the  most  natural  thing  that  they 
should  regard  with  jealous  anxiety  the  growth  of  a 
great  war  fleet,  when  that  war  fleet  has  behind  it 
vast  land  forces  to  which  the  ships  can  give  transport 
and  a  policy  which  is  too  frequently  represented  by 
leading  Germans  as  being  aimed  at  British  security. 
The  only  hope  for  the  disappearance  of  the  antagon- 
ism between  the  two  peoples  lies  in  a  comprehension 
of  each  other's  economic  and  strategical  necessities ; 
and  if  this  volume  succeeds  in  giving  to  Englishmen 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

a  truer  conception  of  German  policy  and  German 
economic  and  maritime  development,  and  to  Germans 
a  better  appreciation  of  the  position  of  the  British 
people  as  the  guardians  of  an  Empire  to  which  un- 
challengeable sea-power  is  a  necessity,  it  will  have 
done  something  to  dispel  those  dark  clouds  which  still 
hang  menacingly  on  the  political  horizon. 


GERMAN  SEA-POWER 

ITS    RISE    AND    PROGRESS    AND 
ECONOMIC  BASIS 

CHAPTER  I 

GERMAN  MARITIME  ASCENDANXY  IN  THE  PAST 

Among  the  many  popular  errors  which  exist  with 
regard  to  Germany,  none  is  farther  from  the  truth 
than  the  behef  that  her  fleet  is  the  arbitrary  and 
artificial  creation  of  the  Emperor  William  II,,  and  but 
for  him  would  never  have  attained  formidable  dimen- 
sions. This  idea  is  not  only  erroneous,  but  exceed- 
ingly mischievous,  for  it  is  likely  to  lead  to  false 
conclusions  as  to  the  probable  development  of 
Germany's  position  in  the  world  and  her  future 
relations  to  other  naval  Powers.  If  Germany's  naval 
expansion  depended  entirely,  or  even  mainly,  on  the 
conviction  or  caprice  of  a  single  man,  it  might  reason- 
ably be  expected  to  cease  or  slacken  with  the  passing 
of  his  stimulating  will.  But,  much  as  William  II.  has 
done  to  accelerate  the  pace  of  his  country's  naval 
progress,  the  German  Fleet  has  its  tap-roots  in  the  soil 
of  history,  and  has  drawn  sustenance  from  geographical, 
economic,  and  political  conditions,  of  which  it  is  the 
natural  and  inevitable  product.  It  is,  in  fact,  but  the 
deferred  logical  outcome  of  a  slow  secular  process,  and 
will  have  a  tendency  to  increase  so  long  as  that  process 
continues. 

Like   the   foundation   of    the   Empire   in    1870,   the 
formation  of  the  modern  German  Fleet  is  the  result  of 


2    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

a  movement  that  had  its  origin  among  the  people  and 
not  among  the  Princes  of  the  country.  And  this  naval 
movement  sprang  up  and  reached  its  greatest  vigour 
in  those  sea-board  districts  that  still  sedulously  keep 
alive  the  splendid  tradition  of  the  Hanseatic  League, 
which,  as  the  strongest  maritime  Power  of  its  day,  for 
centuries  almost  monopolized  the  trade  of  Northern 
and  Western  Europe,  and,  with  the  word  "  sterling," 
a  corruption  of  "  Easterling,"  the  name  popularly  given 
to  its  members,  has  left  on  Great  Britain  the  indelible 
stamp  of  its  former  mercantile  domination.  For  the 
coin  of  the  Hanse  towns,  by  reason  of  its  unimpeach- 
able quality,  was  once  universally  sought  after  in 
England,  and  thus  became  the  standard  of  monetary 
excellence. 

The  memories  of  the  Hansa  are  the  '*  historical 
foundation  "  on  which  are  based  Germany's  present 
claims  to  a  leading  place  among  the  maritime  nations, 
and  they  have  played  a  prominent  part  in  every  agita- 
tion for  the  increase  of  her  fleet.  Why,  it  is  asked, 
should  she  not  again  assume  upon  the  seas  that 
dominating  position  which  she  once  undoubtedly 
held  ?  Why,  with  her  expanding  population,  trade, 
and  wealth,  should  she  not  reclaim  that  maritime 
ascendancy  which  she  forfeited  to  Holland  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  and  which  a  hundred  years 
later  passed  to  Great  Britain  ?  Why  should  she  not 
realize  that  dream  which  was  in  the  mind  of  Friedrich 
List  when  he  wrote  :  "  How  easy  it  would  have  beeii 
for  the  Hanse  towns,  in  the  epoch  of  their  rule  over 
the  sea,  to  attain  national  unity  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  the  imperial  power,  to  unite  the  whole 
littoral  from  Dunkirk  to  Riga  under  one  nationality, 
and  thus  to  win  and  maintain  for  the  German  nation 
supremacy  in  industry,  trade,  and  sea-power !" 

It  is,  moreover,  not  without  significance  that  the 
Hansa  itself  was,  in  a  sense,  democratic,  and  that,  at  a 
time  when  Germany,  as  a  national  unit,  was  rendered 
impotent   in   the   world    by   her    superabundance   of 


I 


NAPOLEON  AND  GERMANY  3 

Princes,  her  citizens  were  able,  on  their  own  initiative, 
and  by  their  own  energies,  to  assert  their  power  and 
capacity  as  a  maritime  people. 

When  that  portion  of  Central  Europe  which  is 
to  -  day  inhabited  by  the  German  -  speaking  races 
emerged  from  the  Dark  Ages,  it  was  as  a  complex  and 
chaotic  mosaic  of  principalities,  spiritual  and  temporal, 
loosely  held  together  by  that  grandiose  figment  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  of  w^hich  Voltaire  very  aptly 
said  that  it  was  neither  holy,  Roman,  nor  an  empire. 
No  other  form  of  misgovernment  which  has  ever 
existed  in  the  Western  w^orld  did  so  much  as  this 
venerable  imposture  to  retard  the  development  of  the 
peoples  living  under  its  rule.  It  was  only  after 
Napoleon  had  freed  the  ground  of  its  tottering  ruins 
that  the  erection  of  Modern  Germany  became  possible. 
He  was  no  less  necessary  to  clear  the  site  than 
Bismarck  was  to  raise  the  structure.  To  this  extent 
Napoleon  may  be  looked  upon  as  the  founder  of  the 
German  Empire. 

When  the  conqueror's  legions  marched  across 
Europe,  sweeping  away  unnatural  and  injurious 
frontiers,  the  German  people  had  for  a  millennium 
incessantly  been  called  upon  to  pay  the  price  of  the 
selfish  feuds  of  its  ruling  dynasties.  In  the  earlier 
phases  of  these  devastating  quarrels,  the  towns 
gradually  acquired  a  position  of  actual  or  qualified 
independence.  With  their  ramparts  and  bastions,  they 
were  like  rocks  rising  out  of  a  raging  sea.  Within 
their  defences  industry  and  trade  progressed,  while 
without  all  was  storm  and  strife.  By  adroit  bargaining 
with  the  impoverished  Princes  in  whose  territories 
they  were  situated,  they  little  by  little  enlarged  their 
immemorial  liberties,  till  they  eventually  became — in 
fact,  where  not  in  law — independent  municipal  republics. 
Many  of  them  were  admitted  to  the  rank  of  "imperial 
cities,"  and  owed  allegiance  to  none  but  the  Emperor. 
Of  these,  three — Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Ltibeck — which 
were  also  among  the  most  prominent  members  of  the 


4    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

Hansa,  and  are  still  called  the  "  Hanse  Towns,"  even 
now  retain  that  measure  of  independence  which  is  left 
to  the  federated  States  known  in  their  entirety  as  the 
German  Empire.  When  the  Hanseatic  League  was  at 
its  zenith,  the  towns  which  stood  at  its  head  and 
directed  its  policy  would  suffer  little  interference  with 
their  management  of  their  own  affairs,  external  as  well 
as  internal.  The  eleventh  century  witnessed  the  rise 
of  the  German  towns,  the  twelfth  the  development  of 
their  spirit  of  independence,  the  thirteenth  their  first 
serious  attempts  at  combination  for  mutual  defence, 
the  fourteenth  the  final  triumph  of  the  principle  of 
federation  in  the  ascendancy  of  the  Hanseatic  League- 
It  was  the  natural  ideal  of  the  German  towms  of  the 
early  Middle  Ages  to  be  self-sufficing  in  all  things,  for 
in  that  epoch  of  violence  and  tumult  it  was  an  obvious 
disadvantage  to  be  dependent  upon  the  outside  world 
for  any  of  the  necessities  of  existence,  and  they  accord- 
ingly inclined  strongly  to  a  policy  of  exclusive  protec- 
tion. There  were,  however,  many  commodities,  which, 
for  climatic  or  other  reasons,  they  were  unable  to  pro- 
duce within  the  compass  of  their  own  walls.  For  the 
raw  materials  of  their  handicrafts,  the  silks  and  spices 
of  the  East,  the  woollen  fabrics  of  Flanders,  the  furs 
of  Russia  and  Scandinavia,  the  dried  or  salted  fish  pre- 
scribed for  fast  days  by  the  Church,  the  towns  were  com- 
pelled to  rely  upon  external  trade,  which  increased  in 
volume  with  the  growth  of  their  prosperity  and  the  rise 
of  their  standard  of  life.  But  the  journeys  which  their 
merchants  undertook  to  adjacent  States,  or  across  the 
seas  to  distant  countries  that  had  a  natural  or  acquired 
monopoly  in  the  commodities  which  they  sought,  were 
perilous  adventures.  Even  when  not  actually  in  the 
anarchical  conditions  which  medieval  warfare  brought 
in  its  train,  the  trade  routes  were  infested  by  robbers 
of  every  kind,  whether  gangs  of  outlaws  evading  in 
the  forests  the  retribution  for  earlier  crimes,  dis- 
banded soldiery  awaiting  enrolment  by  a  new  master, 
or  predatory  nobles  who,  in  large  numbers,  provided 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  HANSEATIC  LEAGUE     5 

for  the  carousals  in  their  strongholds  by  plundering 
transports  of  merchandise,  or  levying  heavy  duties 
upon  them  for  the  right  of  passage  through  their 
domains.  On  the  ocean  a  very  similar  state  of  affairs 
obtained.  Not  only  did  the  seas  swarm  with  veritable 
pirates,  but  a  naval  war  was  inevitably  accompanied 
by  innumerable  gross  outrages  on  neutral  vessels  by 
both  belligerents. 

In  such  circumstances  a  single  traveller  with  a  rich 
baggage  had  but  little  chance  of  reaching  a  distant 
destination  in  safety,  and  it  became  the  custom  for  the 
merchants  of  every  town  to  make  their  journeys,  by 
land  or  sea,  in  large  parties,  under  the  protection  of  an 
escort  of  armed  retainers.  The  fellowship  engendered 
by  the  companionship  of  the  journey,  and  the  experience 
of  common  perils  and  adventures,  as  well  as  the  uses 
of  mutual  support  in  a  strange  land,  kept  them  together 
when  they  reached  their  foreign  destinations,  and  in 
this  way  grew  up  those  settlements  known  as  "  guild- 
halls," "  hanses,"  **  factories,"  or  "counting-houses," 
which,  at  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  were  the  head- 
quarters of  German  trade  in  other  countries.  By 
degrees  this  principle  of  co-operation  was  extended 
from  individual  citizens  of  a  single  town  to  the  towns 
themselves,  and  culminated  in  the  Hanseatic  League, 
upholding  w^ith  its  fleets  and  armies  a  practical  mon- 
opoly of  the  trade  of  Northern  and  Western  Europe. 

The  story  of  the  Hansa  is  full  of  strange  anomalies 
and  antitheses.  Historians  differ  by  centuries  as  to 
the  date  at  which  the  existence  of  the  League  com- 
menced, and  just  as  it  never  had  a  definite  beginning, 
so  it  has  never  had  a  formal  end,  for  to  this  day  two 
of  the  Hanse  towns — Hamburg  and  Bremen — have 
certain  institutions  in  common,  such  as  their  supreme 
law  courts  and  their  diplomatic  representation  in 
Prussia.  For  hundreds  of  years  the  Confederation 
acted,  and  was  treated  by  foreign  Governments,  as  an 
independent  State  and  a  great  Power,  but  its  composi- 
tion was  never  certain  and  always  fluctuating.     From 


6    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

first  to  last  the  names  of  no  fewer  than  ninety  cities 
and  towns  were  entered  upon  its  rolls,  but  it  is  im- 
possible to  say  of  each  of  them  how  often  and  when 
it  joined  or  left  the  League.  Foreign  rulers,  and 
especially  the  English  monarchs,  made  repeated 
attempts  to  obtain  from  the  Hansa  an  official  list  of 
its  members,  but  compliance  with  their  demands  w^as 
systematically  evaded  on  one  pretext  or  another.  The 
League's  policy  was,  as  far  as  possible,  to  assert  the 
claims  of  its  members,  and  to  disown  responsibility  for 
those  made  against  them.  This  policy  is  pretty  clearly 
expressed  in  the  following  answer  returned  by  the 
League  in  1473  to  complaints  put  forward  on  behalf 
of  English  merchantmen  who  had  suffered  through 
the  depredations  of  the  Dantzic  privateer  or  pirate, 
Paul  Beneke :  "The  towns  of  the  Hansa  are  a  corpus 
in  the  possession  of  the  privileges  they  hold  in  any 
realms,  lands,  or  lordships,  and  when  their  privileges 
are  infringed,  they  are  accustomed  to  meet  and  consult^ 
and  then  to  issue  for  all  of  them  ordinances  against 
all  goods  from  the  countries  in  which  their  privileges 
have  been  infringed,  that  they  shall  not  be  suffered  in  the 
commonalty  of  towns.  But  they  were  not  making  war 
against  England  ;  only  some  of  the  towns  of  the  Hansa, 
which  had  been  injured  by  England,  had  determined 
upon  it  at  their  own  venture,  win  or  lose,  which  did 
not  take  place  in  the  name  of  the  Hanse  commonalty." 
The  theory  of  the  Federation  was,  in  fact,  that  it  existed 
for  the  purpose  only  of  taking,  and  not  of  giving,  and 
it  refused  to  imply  a  corporate  responsibility  by  pub- 
lishing its  membership  rolls.  Fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
century  lists  of  Hanse  towns  are  extant  in  considerable 
numbers,  but  none  of  them  can  claim  an  official  character, 
and  they  present  many  discrepancies.  The  most  com- 
plete of  them  contains  seventy  names.  It  would  ap- 
pear that  membership  of  the  Hansa  was  synonymous 
with  participation  in  the  rights  of  its  guildhalls  and 
factories  abroad,  and  that  these  privileges  were  often 
acquired;  though  no  doubt  irregularly,  by  individuals 


THE  HANSE  PARLIAMENT  7 

as  well  as  by  municipalities.  Among  the  Hanse  towns 
themselves  two  distinct  classes  seem  to  have  existed 
— namely,  those  which  were  entitled  to  take  part  in 
the  League's  conventions,  or  "  Tagfahrten,"  and  those 
which,  without  themselves  possessing  this  right,  were 
permitted  to  make  their  washes  known  at  these  assem- 
blies through  the  delegate  of  one  of  the  fully  quahfied 
municipalities. 

The  League  had,  apart  from  its  establishments 
abroad,  no  definite  constitution  or  set  of  statutes,  no 
fixed  headquarters,  no  permanent  body  of  officials  or 
system  of  finance.  Its  legislative  procedure  was 
governed  by  customs  and  traditions  which  had 
gradually  established  themselves,  but  which  never 
acquired  the  binding  force  of  law.  For  example,  it 
became  the  rule  at  the  height  of  the  League's  power 
to  hold  the  Tagfahrten  once  every  three  3^ears,  but  the 
practice  was  soon  broken  with,  and  these  gatherings 
took  place  very  irregularly.  They  were,  in  fact, 
seldom  convened  unless  some  special  circumstances 
had  arisen  on  which  it  was  desirable  to  take  the 
opinion  of  the  members  of  the  Federation ;  and  during 
the  second  half  of  the  fifteenth  century  a  period  of 
eleven  years  was  allowed  to  elapse  without  a  Hanse 
parhament  coming  together.  The  legislation — if  it  may 
be  called  so — of  the  League  took  the  form  of  resolutions, 
or  ''recesses,"  which  were  adopted  at  the  close  of  the 
deliberations  of  the  Tagfahrten.  Of  these  decisions 
large  numbers  are  still  extant,  and  they  constitute  the 
most  important  source  of  our  knowledge  of  Hanse 
history.  The  earliest  of  them  that  has  come  down  to 
us  embodies  the  Greifswald  Agreement  of  1361,  of 
which  more  hereafter.  No  regular  meeting-place  was 
appointed  for  the  Tagfahrten,  though  they  were 
generally  held  in  Liibeck.  The  delegates,  however, 
always  assembled  in  a  seaport  town,  which  was  never 
west  of  Bremen  or  east  of  Stralsund.  Perhaps  the 
nearest  approach  to  a  common  headquarters  per- 
manently possessed  by  the  Hansa  was  the  ''Trese," 


8    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

a  vault  beneath  St.  Mary's  Church  at  Lubeck,  where 

its  charters  were  deposited,  and  where  they  still  repose. 
Only  once  in  the  course  of  its  history  did  the  League 
boast  of  a  permanent  staff.  That  was  in  the  years 
following  1552,  when  a  legal  official,  called  the  "Syndic," 
was  appointed  to  look  after  certain  of  its  affairs.  The 
innovation  does  not  seem  to  have  been  a  success,  for 
the  first  occupant  of  the  post  was  also  the  last.  Nor 
had  the  Hansa  a  permanent  common  treasury  and 
system  of  finance.  It  is  true  that,  towards  the  end  of 
the  fifteenth  century,  efforts  were  made  to  establish  the 
principle  of  regular  matricular  contributions  from  the 
partners  in  the  League,  but  they  met  with  only  partial 
success,  and  appear  to  have  been  soon  abandoned. 
The  fact  is  that,  as  the  foreign  agencies  of  the  Hansa 
were  self-supporting,  it  had  little  need  of  a  permanent 
administrative  machine. 

While  the  Hansa  declared  war  and  concluded  peace, 
there  never  was  an  occasion  on  which  all  its  members 
took  the  field  simultaneously.  The  actual  fighting  was 
generally  confined  to  a  few  towns  specially  qualified 
to  equip  fleets  or  raise  bodies  of  mercenaries,  and  the 
others  participated  in  the  campaign  only  by  a  monetary 
contribution,  which  they  levied  by  an  imposition  of 
tonnage  or  poundage  dues  on  the  commerce  of  their 
citizens.  It  was  also  by  no  means  an  uncommon  thing 
for  one  or  more  of  the  Hansa  towns  to  be  separately 
involved  in  hostilities  in  which  none  of  the  others  had 
either  share  or  interest  of  any  sort.  Lubeck,  while 
regarded  by  Europe  as  the  head  of  the  Confederation, 
waged  war  single-handed  in  pursuance  of  its  own 
private  and  special  ambitions.  And  though  the 
differences  of  the  Hanse  towns  never  degenerated 
into  formal  armed  conflict  among  themselves,  there 
were  cases  in  which  some  of  them,  as  neutrals,  suffered 
severely  at  the  hands  of  others  who  happened  for  the 
moment  to  be  belligerents. 

The  power  of  the  Hansa  seems  all  the  more  remark- 
able when  we  consider  the  territorial  diffusion  of  the 


"THE  BIGGEST  CAPITALIST  OF  EUROPE"    9 

towns  united  by  its  loose  organization.  Though  they 
were  for  the  most  part  situated  either  on  the  sea-coast 
or  the  banks  of  the  Rhine,  the  Weser,  the  Elbe,  or  the 
Oder,  the  League's  ramifications  extended  to  Dinant  in 
the  south-west  and  to  Cracow  in  the  south-east,  and 
took  in  places  of  such  thoroughly  inland  character  as 
Dortmund,  Paderborn,  and  Gottingen.  While  it  was 
throughout  essentially  German,  and  all  its  establish- 
ments in  foreign  States  displayed  the  imperial  eagle  in 
their  coats  of  arms,  it  included,  at  various  epochs,  towns 
lying  altogether  outside  the  frontiers  of  the  Empire. 
Both  the  Order  of  the  Teutonic  Knights  and  the 
inhabitants  of  the  extensive  regions  which  it  had 
wrested  from  the  Slavs  during  its  advance  in  the 
twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries  into  what  is  now  the 
north-east  of  Germany,  enjoyed  the  privileges  and 
prerogatives  of  Hanse  membership.  The  Order  itself 
has  been  called  "the  biggest  capitalist  of  Europe"  in 
the  fourteenth  century.  It  built  ships,  and  freighted 
them  to  destinations  as  remote  as  Spain  and  Portugal, 
and  it  traded  in  almost  every  article  of  commerce  that 
was  either  produced  or  consumed  in  the  territories 
under  its  sway.  Moreover,  it  had  arrogated  to  itself 
proprietary  rights  over  all  the  amber  found  on  the 
shores  of  its  dominions,  and  thus  possessed  in  Europe 
a  practical  monopoly  of  this  valuable  commodity. 

The  appearances  of  the  Hansa  as  a  "great  Power" 
marked  only  the  supreme  crises  in  its  fortunes.  Its 
normal  and  enduring  activity  was  the  promotion  of 
the  commercial  interests  of  its  members  through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  guildhalls  and  factories  which 
it  maintained  in  foreign  lands.  Of  these  establish- 
ments by  far  the  oldest  and  most  important  was  the 
Steelyard  in  London. 

Just  as  obscure  as  the  derivation  of  the  name  is  the 
origin  of  the  Steelyard  itself.  It  is  thought  not  im- 
probable that  a  co-operative  settlement  of  German 
merchants,  trading  the  wines  of  the  Rhine  for  the 
wool  and  tin  of  England,   existed  at  London  in  the 


lo    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

latter  da3's  of  the  Roman  occupation.  At  the  time 
of  Ethelred  (979-1016)  "the  people  of  the  Emperor" 
were  granted  in  London  the  same  trading  rights  as 
were  enjoyed  by  natives,  for  the  sHght  consideration 
of  a  gift  at  Christmas  and  Easter  of  two  pieces  of  grey 
and  one  of  brown  cloth,  ten  pounds  of  **  pepper"  (a 
word  then  applied  to  spices  of  all  kinds),  two  pairs 
of  men's  gloves,  and  two  kegs  of  vinegar.  A  century 
and  a  half  later  the  merchants  of  Cologne,  which  has 
been  called  "  the  only  seaport  of  the  early  German 
Empire,"  received  a  pledge  for  the  protection  of  their 
"house  in  London,"  and  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
privileges  it  had  been  endowed  with  in  the  past. 

In  one  sense  this  "house  in  London"  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  authentic  germ  from  which  the  Hanseatic 
League  developed.  It  was  apparently  in  England  that 
the  word  "  Hanse "  was  first  used  to  designate  an 
association  or  guild  of  merchants,  and  with  this  mean- 
ing it  was  also  applied  to  the  community  of  German 
merchants  regularly  trading  in  London.  They,  in  their 
turn,  seem  to  have  adopted  it  and  carried  it  to  their  own 
country.  The  term,  "  the  merchants  of  the  Hanse  of 
the  Germans,"  appears  in  contemporary  English 
records  as  early  as  1282,  and  it  was  not  till  more 
than  half  a  century  later  that  it  had  passed  into 
general  currency  on  the  Continent.  Until  the  reign 
of  Henry  III.,  Cologne  alone  of  the  German  towns 
had  the  right  to  maintain  a  *'  Hanse  "  in  England,  but 
the  privilege  was  extended  to  "  the  merchants  of  Goth- 
land "  in  1237,  to  Hamburg  in  1266,  and  to  Liibeck  in 
1267.  Towards  the  close  of  the  thirteenth  century,  the 
four  establishments  were  united  to  form  what  was 
afterwards  known  as  the  Steelyard. 

When  the  Hanseatic  League  was  at  the  height  of 
its  power — from  the  last  quarter  of  the  fourteenth  to 
the  first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century — the  Steelyard 
constituted  in  England  little  less  than  a  State  within  the 
State.  It  occupied  a  site  now  covered  by  the  Cannon 
Street  Station,  extending  from  Thames  Street  to  the 


THE  STEELYARD  IN  LONDON  ii 

river,  and  bounded  to  the  east  and  west  respectively 
by  All  Hallows  and  Cousins  Lanes.  Strong  walls,  like 
those  of  a  fortress,  surrounded  it,  and  were  more  than 
once  necessary  to  protect  the  inmates  from  the  fury 
of  the  London  mob.  In  the  sixteenth  century  the 
principal  structure  within  the  ramparts  was  a  building 
of  several  stories,  with  three  large  doorways  upon  the 
street,  two  of  which  had  been  walled  up,  while  the 
third  was  kept  jealously  guarded  to  prevent  the  en- 
trance of  undesirable  visitors.  Carved  upon  the  lintels 
were  Latin  inscriptions  from  the  pen  of  Sir  Thomas 
More.  One  of  these  made  the  announcement :  "  Glad 
is  this  house  and  alwa3^s  filled  with  good ;  here  dwell 
peace,  tranquillity,  and  honest  joy."  The  second  was 
to  this  effect:  ''Gold  is  the  father  of  happiness  and 
the  child  of  pain ;  to  do  without  it  is  hard,  to  possess 
it  brings  fear."  The  third  ran  :  "  Whoever  refuses  to 
obey  the  good  avoids  the  smoke  but  falls  into  the  fire." 
Behind  the  main  building  was  a  garden,  in  which  vines 
and  fruit-trees  were  cultivated.  An  important  feature 
of  the  settlement  was  the  "  Rhenish  wine  house,"  where 
ministers,  nobles,  and  men  of  fashion  were  accustomed 
to  assemble  to  sip  the  choicest  vintages  of  the  Rhine, 
and  try  the  flavours  of  caviare  and  other  delicacies 
of  Eastern  Europe.  That  this  tavern  was  a  favourite 
rendezvous  would  appear  from  an  allusion  in  Webster's 
"  Westward  Ho,"  where  a  servant  bids  one  of  the 
characters  "  meet  his  master  at  the  Rhenish  wine 
house  in  the  Stilyard."  Possibly  it  was  here  that 
Shakespeare  first  discovered  that  caviare  is  not  for 
"  the  general." 

The  commercial  community  that  dwelt  within  the 
precincts  of  the  Steelyard,  and  in  the  neighbouring 
houses,  which,  in  course  of  time,  it  was  found  necessary 
to  rent  for  the  accommodation  of  its  growing  numbers, 
was  governed  with  monastic  severity.  No  married  man 
was  allowed  to  reside  on  the  premises,  nor  was  any 
woman  to  enter  them  ;  the  gates  were  shut  regularly  at 
nine  o'clock  in  the  evening ;  heavy  fines  were  imposed 


12    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

for  breaches  of  morals  and  good  manners  ;  brawling, 
gambling,  and  even  "  games  of  ball "  were  rigorously 
repressed.  The  brotherhood  dined  at  a  common  table 
in  the  great  hall,  which  was  adorned  with  a  rich  display 
of  plate,  and  in  its  latter  days  hung  with  the  pictures 
of  Holbein  representing  the  triumphs  of  wealth  and 
poverty. 

The  Steelyard  was  administered  by  an  alderman, 
with  the  assistance  of  two  adjuncts  and  nine  councillors. 
All  the  members  of  this  governing  body  were  elected 
annually  on  New  Year's  Eve,  and  they  met  for  consul- 
tation every  Wednesday  evening.  The  community 
also  acquired  the  right  to  choose  an  alderman  of  the 
City  of  London,  whose  duty  it  was  to  safeguard  their 
interests,  and  whose  services  were  recognized  every 
Christmas  by  a  present  of  a  pair  of  gloves  and  fifteen 
gold  nobles.  Some  uncertainty  exists  as  to  the  duration 
of  his  tenure  of  office,  but  it  was  held  without  interrup- 
tion by  one  occupant  for  a  period  of  eighteen  years. 
Not  infrequently  the  Lord  Ma3^or  himself  accepted  the 
position,  and  this  was  regarded  by  the  Steel3^ard  as  of 
great  benefit  to  its  interests.  Both  the  English  and  the 
German  alderman  seem  to  have  possessed  certain 
rights  of  jurisdiction  over  the  members  of  the  settle- 
ment in  criminal  as  well  as  in  civil  cases,  but  there  is 
some  doubt  as  to  the  limits  of  their  powers  in  this 
respect.  Even  in  cases  that  came  before  the  Royal 
Courts,  a  member  of  the  Steelyard  could,  except  when 
indicted  for  a  capital  offence,  claim  that  half  the  jury 
should  be  of  German  speech.  The  current  business 
of  the  settlement  was  transacted  by  paid  officials, 
called  "  secretaries  "  or  "  clerks,"  whose  experience  and 
knowledge  of  the  details  of  Hanse  relations  to  England 
lent  considerable  importance  to  their  position.  They 
were  often  entrusted  with  weighty  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions. The  Steelyard  exercised  supervision,  and  to 
some  extent  also  control,  over  the  subsidiary  colonies 
of  Hanse  merchants  in  England,  which  are  known  to 
have  existed  at  Hull,  Boston,   Lynn,  Yarmouth,  and 


THE  EASTERLINGS  AND  BISHOPS  GATE    13 

Ipswich,  and  which,  in  all  probability,  were  also  to 
be  found,  at  one  time  or  another,  in  Newcastle- 
on-Tyne,  York,  Norwich,  Colchester,  Sandwich, 
Southampton,  and  Bristol,  since  German  merchants 
had  extensive  dealings  with  all  these  places.  These 
branch  establishments  contributed  to  the  upkeep 
of  the  Steelyard,  and  occasionally  sent  delegates  to 
London  for  joint  deliberation  on  matters  of  interest 
to  all  of  them.  The  expenses  of  both  the  headquarters 
and  the  provincial  *'  Kontors  "  were  defrayed  by  dues 
levied  on  all  Hanse  merchandise  entering  or  leaving 
England. 

In  State  and  civic  pageants,  the  alderman,  councillors, 
and  merchants  of  the  Steelyard  took  part  as  a  cor- 
poration, marching  in  the  processions  immediately 
behind  the  representatives  of  the  City  of  London. 
At  such  times,  too,  it  was  no  unusual  thing  for  thirsty 
citizens  to  be  regaled  with  a  largesse  of  wine  and 
beer  from  the  cellars  of  the  Rhenish  Tavern,  and  for 
the  settlement  to  be  brilliantly  illuminated  in  the 
evenings  by  flaming  tar-barrels  and  hundreds  of 
candles,  made  from  that  Russian  or  Polish  wax  which 
was  one  of  the  principal  articles  of  the  Hanse  trade. 

The  quite  exceptional  nature  of  the  position  occupied 
by  the  Easterlings  in  London  is  evident  from  the  fact 
that  they  were  burdened  with  the  obligation  of  main- 
taining and,  in  case  of  need,  assisting  to  defend,  the 
Bishop's  Gate.  The  origin  of  this  custom  also  seems 
lost  in  the  obscurity  of  antiquity,  but  a  suit  which 
came  up  for  decision  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  thirteenth 
century  showed  that  it  had  the  validity  of  law.  In 
1275  the  Gate  had  fallen  into  a  ruinous  condition,  and 
the  civic  authorities  demanded  that  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Steelyard  should  restore  it.  This  they  refused 
to  do,  and  some  years  elapsed  before  the  dispute  was 
settled,  before  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  by  a  com- 
promise, under  which  the  Steelyard,  in  return  for  one 
of  the  innumerable  confirmations  of  its  privileges, 
covenanted  to  pay  the  sum  of  ^240  for  the  necessary 


14    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

repairs  to  the  Gate,  and  thereafter  to  maintain  it  in 
a  proper  state,  besides  contributing  one-third  of  the 
cost  and  of  the  guard  required  for  its  defence.  Weapons 
for  this  purpose  were  stored  in  the  settlement,  and 
every  member  was  bound  by  the  statutes  to  keep  in 
his  private  apartment  a  full  equipment  of  arms  and 
armour  for  his  own  use.  When  the  City  walls  were 
renewed  in  1477,  it  was  German  money  that  rebuilt 
the  Bishop's  Gate,  and  it  was  only  in  the  reign  of 
Edward  VI.  that  the  Easterlings  were  relieved  of  the 
duty  of  defending  it. 

The  Steelyard  itself  was  consumed  in  the  Great  Fire 
of  1666,  and  though  it  was  subsequently  re-erected,  the 
new  premises  were,  in  consonance  with  the  diminished 
prestige  and  business  of  its  owners,  of  a  much  less 
imposing  character  than  the  old  ones.  They  were 
finally  sold  in  1853  for  the  sum  of  ;^72,5oo.  Ten  years 
later  the  *'  House  of  the  Easterlings  "  at  Antwerp  was 
also  disposed  of,  and  with  it  disappeared  the  last 
possession  of  the  Hansa  on  foreign  soil. 

Before  further  reference  is  made  to  the  political  and 
commercial  dealings  of  the  Hanseatic  League  with 
England,  it  will  be  as  well  to  cast  a  glance  at  the 
events  in  Northern  Europe  which  raised  the  Con- 
federacy to  the  status  of  a  great  sea -power.  The 
development  of  the  Hanse  navy  was  as  gradual  as 
that  of  its  trading  establishments  abroad,  and  likewise 
extends  back  to  the  age  of  historical  darkness.  But 
while  it  was  Cologne  that  took  the  lead  in  the  move- 
ment which  culminated  in  the  Steelyard,  it  was  Lubeck 
that  showed  the  way  in  the  building  up  of  the  Hanse 
fleet,  and  so  gained  a  political  predominance  in  the 
League  which  it  maintained  for  centuries. 

The  old  town  on  the  Trave,  with  its  thirteenth  and 
fourteenth  century  brick  churches  and  its  quaint, 
timbered  houses,  has,  at  the  present  day,  little  more 
than  an  antiquarian  importance ;  but  five  hundred 
years  ago  it  was  not  merely  the  chief  seaport  and  the 
first  ship-building  centre  of  Northern  Europe,  but,  to 


TOWNS  ''BUILT  ON  HERRINGS"         15 

all  intents  and  purposes,  the  veritable  mistress  of  the 
Baltic.  The  mere  number  of  its  inhabitants  shows 
the  leading  position  it  had  then  attained  to.  Even 
after  the  ravages  of  the  Black  Death,  which  struck  it 
with  particular  severity,  so  that  its  ships  were  often 
found  drifting  before  the  wind  and  wave  manned  only 
by  the  dead  bodies  of  their  crews,  its  population  was 
80,000,  or  very  nearly  as  large  as  it  is  at  the  present 
time ;  whereas  at  the  very  height  of  the  Hanse  power 
the  now  mighty  mercantile  metropolis  of  Hamburg 
was  a  town  of  not  more  than  21,000  inhabitants. 

Lubeck  first  acquired  the  independence  of  an  im- 
perial city  in  the  year  1226,  and  at  once  entered  on 
that  sempiternal  struggle  with  the  Scandinavian 
kingdoms  which  at  first  brought  it  power  and  glor}^ 
but  ultimately  contributed  largely  to  the  acceleration 
of  its  decay.  Eight  years  later  the  ships  of  its  citizens 
burst  through  a  boom  laid  across  the  entrance  to  their 
harbour  by  the  Count  of  Holstein,  and,  sailing  round 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Warnow,  won  "  the  first  victory 
of  a  German  fleet,"  capturing  or  burning  five  large 
vessels,  one  of  which,  we  are  told,  had  400  armed  men 
on  board. 

It  has  been  said  that  Amsterdam  was  "  built  on 
herrings,"  and  the  remark  might  with  equal  truth  be 
applied  to  Lubeck.  Indeed,  the  herring  was  a  very 
essential  element  in  the  prosperity  and  significance  of 
the  entire  Hanseatic  Federation.  In  the  thirteenth 
and  fourteenth  centuries,  the  west  coast  of  Scania  (the 
southerly  projection  of  what  is  now  Sweden)  was  the 
chief  centre  of  the  herring  fishing  and  curing  indus- 
tries of  Europe.  Late  in  the  summer  the  fish  appeared 
in  the  Sound  in  vast  shoals,  which  sometimes  ex- 
tended in  every  direction  without  a  break  as  far  as  the 
eye  could  reach,  and  which  were  so  dense  that  they 
**  raised  boats  out  of  the  water."  The  herrings  were 
caught  by  Danish  fishermen,  and  landed  at  places 
along  the  shore  of  Scania,  where  they  were  salted  and 
packed.     The  curing  and  wholesale  trade  were  almost 


i6    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

exclusively  in  the  hands  of  merchants  from  the  German 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  towns,  who  eventually  succeeded 
in  driving  away  their  English,  French,  and  Flemish 
rivals,  and  in  erecting  a  legal  bulwark  round  the 
monopoly  which  they  had  gradually  built  up  on  a 
prescriptive  basis.  The  headquarters  of  the  herring 
industry  was  the  triangular  peninsula  on  which  stand 
the  towns  of  Skan5r  and  Falsterbo,  and  in  the  season 
this  patch  of  land  was  one  of  the  busiest  spots  in 
Europe.  Rude  huts  on  an  island  close  to  the  shore 
afforded  shelter  to  the  numerous  assemblage  of  fishers, 
and  a  special  site  on  the  mainland  was  allotted  to  each 
of  the  towns  engaged  in  the  trade,  for  the  accommoda- 
tion of  the  temporary  dwellings,  offices,  packing-rooms, 
and  warehouses  of  its  citizens.  The  merchants  of 
Lubeck  alone  owned  a  group  of  as  many  as  fifty 
wooden  buildings,  which  were  situated  between  Fal- 
sterbo and  the  sea.  In  the  train  of  those  immediately 
engaged  in  the  catching,  curing,  and  marketing  of  the 
herrings,  came  handicraftsmen  and  traders  of  every 
description — coopers,  shoemakers,  butchers,  bakers, 
and  publicans — to  minister  to  their  various  wants ; 
and  one  summer  it  was  estimated  that  no  fewer  than 
20,000  of  these  season  visitors  were  congregated  in  the 
vicinity. 

It  was  mainly  for  the  sake  of  the  Sound  herrings 
that  the  Hansa  undertook  against  the  Scandinavian 
States  the  numerous  campaigns  by  which  it  won  the 
keys  of  the  Baltic,  and  kept  them  in  its  possession 
for  so  many  generations.  As  early  as  1248,  Lubeck 
entered  upon  a  war  against  Denmark  in  defence  of  its 
Scanian  privileges,  plundering  Copenhagen,  and  wreak- 
ing its  vengeance  with  so  little  discrimination  that,  on 
the  complaints  of  the  Church,  whose  property  had 
suffered  in  the  sack,  it  was  compelled  to  submit  to 
a  temporary  diminution  of  its  franchises.  English 
merchants  at  Copenhagen  were  also  despoiled  by  the 
reckless  looters^  and  their  grievances  led  to  temporary 
difficulties  for  the  German  traders  in  London. 


FOUNDATION  OF  THE  HANSA  17 

An  alliance  between  Lubeck  and  Hamburg  in  1255, 
under  which  the  two  towns  pledged  themselves  to 
stand  by  one  another  against  all  who  should  do  injury 
to  either  of  them,  is  regarded  by  many  as  the  real 
foundation  of  the  Hansa,  and  was  perhaps  more 
intimate  in  its  nature,  and  more  far-reaching  in  its 
scope,  than  any  of  the  similar  coalitions  that  had 
preceded  it.  Half  a  century  later,  a  defensive  and 
offensive  alliance  was  contracted  by  Lubeck,  Wismar, 
Rostock,  and  Greifswald,  the  signatories  undertaking 
to  support  one  another  in  the  protection  of  their  rights 
on  sea  and  land,  and  to  begin  no  war  without  consul- 
tation with  their  confederates.  Though  the  compact 
was  at  first  made  for  a  term  of  only  three  years,  the 
community  of  interests  which  existed  between  these 
towns  remained  the  groundwork  of  all  the  more 
extensive  subsequent  operations  of  the  Hansa. 

It  was,  hovv^ever,  by  the  war  which  culminated  with 
the  Peace  of  Stralsund  in  1370  that  the  League  raised 
itself  to  the  rank  of  a  first-class  sea -power.  This 
conflict  was  of  so  high  an  importance  for  the  subse- 
quent position  of  the  Hansa  and  for  its  relations  to 
the  rest  of  Europe,  that  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  arose  and  was  decided  deserve  to  be  con- 
sidered in  some  detail.  And,  first,  it  will  be  advisable 
to  take  note  of  the  general  situation  in  Europe  at  that 
time,  and  of  the  preoccupations  which  then  absorbed 
the  attention  and  energies  of  what  are  now  its  leading 
States. 

At  the  date  of  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Stral- 
sund, England  and  France  were  deeply  involved  in 
the  throes  of  the  Hundred  Years'  War.  The  recent 
bright  memories  of  Crecy  and  Poitiers  were  in  a  few 
years'  time  to  be  blurred  by  the  lo«ss  of  all  the  French 
dominions  of  the  English  Crown,  with  the  exception 
of  Calais,  Bordeaux,  and  Ba3''onne.  '*  It  was,"  says 
Green,  "a  time  of  shame  and  suffering  such  as  England 
had  never  known.  Her  conquests  were  lost,  her 
shores  insulted,  her  fleets  annihilated,  her  commerce 


18    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

swept  from  the  seas  ;  while  within  she  was  exhausted 
by  the  long  and  costly  war,  as  well  as  by  the  ravages 
of  pestilence."  The  regions  which  now  form  Germany 
and  Austria  were  in  a  state  of  well-nigh  hopeless 
chaos.  The  Holy  Roman  Empire  was  so  far  from 
representing  a  national  unity  that  Edward  III.  was 
actually  chosen  as  its  head  by  the  electors,  anxious 
above  all  things  that  no  strong  and  energetic  authority^ 
ever  present  on  the  spot,  should  curtail  their  preroga- 
tives and  repress  their  licence.  It  was  only  after  the 
English  monarch,  acceding  to  the  protest  of  Parlia- 
ment, had  refused  the  ambiguous  honour,  that  the 
King  of  Bohemia  was  able  to  ascend  the  German 
throne  as  Charles  IV.  Generations  of  anarchy  were 
soon  to  culminate  in  a  fierce  war  between  federations 
of  towns  and  leagues  of  nobles  that  filled  all  Central 
Germany  with  turmoil  and  devastation.  Russia  was 
still  but  a  congeries  of  mutually  hostile  States,  paying 
tribute  to  the  Tartar  Khans  of  the  Golden  Horde,  and 
the  process  by  which  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars  crystal- 
lized round  the  principality  of  Moscow  was  only  in  its 
earliest  stages.  Such  was  the  general  European  back- 
ground to  the  great  conflict  between  the  Hansa  and 
the  Scandinavian  States. 

In  Scandinavia  itself,  something  like  order  had  been 
re-established  by  Valdemar  IV.,  who  had  been  elected 
to  the  Danish  throne  by  a  Congress  of  Princes  held  at 
Lubeck  in  1340.  For  twenty  years  he  had  applied 
himself  with  great  energy  and  astuteness  to  the 
restoration  of  the  former  frontiers  of  his  kingdom,  and 
among  the  regions  which  he  won  back  were  the 
Scanian  provinces  beyond  the  Sound,  which  had  been 
acquired  by  Magnus  of  Sweden  in  1332.  In  his  work 
of  consolidation,  he  had  received  material  assistance 
from  the  Hanse  towns,  whose  herring  merchants  had 
not  received  from  the  Swedish  master  of  Scania  the 
benevolent  treatment  which  they  considered  to  be 
their  due.  Denmark  was  once  more  a  pov/erful  and 
respected  State  when  the  events  occurred  which  were 


WAR  WITH  DENMARK  19 

to  reduce  it  almost  to  the  level  of  a  dependency  of  the 
Hanseatic  League. 

The  trouble  arose  in  the  first  instance  out  of  the 
betrothal  of  Magnus's  son  Hakon,  King  of  Norway,  to 
Valdemar's  eight-year-old  daughter  Margaret.  This 
match  was  opposed  by  the  nobility  of  Sweden,  who 
feared  that  in  the  union  of  the  three  Scandinavian 
kingdoms,  in  which  it  seemed  likely  to  result,  they 
would  be  overshadowed  by  the  more  cultured  and 
influential  aristocracy  of  Denmark,  and  they  Vv^ere  suc- 
cessful in  forcing  Magnus  to  repudiate  the  agreement, 
and  to  promise  his  son's  hand  to  Elizabeth,  the  daughter 
of  Count  Gerhard  of  Holstein. 

Valdemar  sought  to  avenge  himself  for  this  rebuff  by 
overrunning  the  island  of  Gothland  with  fire  and 
sword.  The  island  itself  was  a  dependency  of  Svv^eden, 
but  its  chief  town,  Visb}^,  had  acquired  the  very  con- 
siderable importance  that  it  then  possessed  solely  as 
the  central  point  of  the  Baltic  trade  of  the  Hanseatic 
towns,  which  were  supreme  within  its  walls. 

To  trace  the  rise  of  Visby  as  a  commercial  centre,  it 
is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  earliest  days  of  naviga- 
tion, when  Gothland  was  the  beacon  by  which  trading 
vessels    felt   their  way   across    the    Baltic.     From  a 
harbour  of  refuge  and  a  port  of  call,  Visby  became 
in  the  Baltic  very  much  what  a  coaling  station  in  the 
Pacific  is  to  the  Oriental  merchantmen  of  to-day.     It 
might,  indeed,  not  unfitly  be  compared  with  Shanghai, 
for  it  was  virtually  ruled  by  the  Hanse  merchants  who 
resided  there,  and  who  must  have  been  very  numerous, 
since  even  in  the  thirteenth  centur}^  no  fewer  than  thirty 
towns,  from  Reval  in  the  east  to  Cologne  in  the  Vv^est, 
were  represented  in  its  German  guild.     With  its  20,000 
inhabitants  and  its  massive  ramparts,  Visby  was  a  sea- 
port and  fortress  of  absolutely  first  rank,  which  gave 
its  name  to  a  code  of  maritime  tradition — it  could  hardly 
be   called   law — that   for   some   time   was   recognized 
throughout   Northern   Europe.     To-day  the   town   is 
shrunk  to  less  than  half  its  former  size,  but  the  ancient 


20    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

walls,  with  their  forty-eight  square  towers — many  in 
an  excellent  state  of  preservation — and  the  impressive 
ruins  that  remain  of  its  eighteen  medieval  churches, 
still  tell  a  tale  of  its  earlier  glory.  How  high  its  repute 
stood  among  the  contemporaries  of  its  prosperity  is 
indicated  by  an  old  rhyme,  according  to  which  its 
citizens  weighed  gold  by  the  hundredweight,  while 
their  children  played  games  with  precious  stones,  their 
wives  spun  with  spindles  of  gold,  and  their  swine  ate 
out  of  silver  troughs. 

Valdemar  seems  to  have  had  no  immediate  quarrel 
with  the  Hansa  at  that  time,  but  in  the  blind  fury  of  his 
vengeance  he  confounded  the  Germanized  town  in  a 
common  doom  with  the  Swedish  island.  Possibly 
Visby  would  have  escaped  his  wrath  if  its  citizens  had 
awaited  his  attack  behind  their  lofty  walls,  but  they 
rashly  ventured  out  into  the  open  field  against  him, 
and  the  stone  cross  which  commemorates  the  slaughter 
that  overtook  them  is  to  be  seen  to  this  day.  The 
town  was  burnt  and  sacked,  and  was  never  able  to 
recover  from  the  blow.  Tradition  says  that  the  ships 
in  which  the  Danish  King  was  carrying  his  rich  booty 
home  were  sunk  on  the  passage,  and  that  two  enormous 
carbuncles,  which,  blazing  from  the  summit  of  the  tower 
of  St.  Nicholas's  Church,  had  for  generations  lighted 
seamen  to  the  harbour,  can  still  be  seen  on  dark  nights 
sparkling  beneath  the  waves. 

The  news  of  the  pillage  of  Visby  found  the  burgo- 
masters of  the  chief  Hanse  towns  assembled  in  con- 
ference at  Greifswald,  and  before  they  dispersed  they 
entered  into  an  agreement  with  Magnus  and  Hakon, 
both  of  whom  came  to  the  place  of  their  meeting  in 
person,  to  make  common  cause  against  Valdemar. 
The  compact  was  signed  by  Liibeck,  the  so-called 
Wendish  towns  (Wismar,  Rostock,  Stralsund,  and 
Greifswald),  Stettin,  Kolberg,  and  Anklam,  but  the 
alliance  was  afterwards  strengthened  by  the  adhesion 
of  Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Kiel,  as  well  as  of  the  Duke 
of  Schleswig  and  the  Counts  of  Holstein.     Moreover, 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  HANSEATIC  FLEET  21 

the  Prussian  towns  undertook  to  contribute  to  the 
costs  of  the  campaign  by  levying  special  poundage 
dues. 

A  fleet  of  fifty-two  ships,  manned  by  2,740  fighters, 
was  fitted  out  by  the  Hanse  towns,  and  put  to  sea  under 
the  chief  command  of  the  Burgomaster  of  Lubeck, 
Johann  Wittenborg.  After  once  more  burning  Copen- 
hagen, it  proceeded  to  Helsingborg  to  reinforce  the 
Norwegian  and  Swedish  armies  engaged  in  the  siege  of 
that  fortress.  Here,  to  give  more  vigour  to  the  land 
operations,  the  ships  were  incautiously  denuded  of 
their  crews,  and  while  they  were  in  a  defenceless 
condition,  they  were  attacked  by  Valdemar's  fleet, 
and,  almost  without  exception,  captured  or  destroyed. 
Numerous  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Danish 
King,  who  is  said  to  have  derisively  adorned  with 
the  golden  figure  of  a  goose  the  tower  in  which  the 
bulk  of  them  were  confined. 

Immediately  after  the  disaster  to  his  fleet,  Witten- 
borg had  concluded  a  truce  with  Valdemar,  and  it  was 
in  expiation  of  this  act,  no  less  than  of  his  defective 
generalship,  that  his  head  fell  on  the  block  in  the 
Lubeck  market-place.  Possibly,  if  the  terms  of  the 
arrangement  had  been  carried  out,  his  life  would  not 
have  been  forfeited,  for  he  had  secured  an  undertaking 
that  the  Hanse  merchants  should  be  allowed  to 
pursue  their  occupation  unmolested  within  Valdemar's 
dominions ;  but  the  King  was  not  the  man  to  trouble 
himself  about  his  pledged  word  when  it  stood  in  the 
way  of  his  ambitions,  and  a  lucky  chance  placed  him,  as 
he  thought,  in  a  position  to  break  his  promise  with 
complete  impunity.  While  on  the  voyage  to  Sweden, 
Elizabeth  of  Holstein,  the  bride-elect  of  Hakon,  was 
driven  ashore  on  the  coast  of  Scania  and  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Valdemar,  who  used  his  power  over  her  to 
effect  a  reconciliation  with  his  two  royal  enemies. 
The  upshot  of  the  incident  was  that  his  daughter 
Margaret  was  married  to  the  Norwegian  monarch  at 
Copenhagen  on  April  9,  1363,  and  the  bride,  then  only 


22     MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

eleven  years  old,  lived  to  bring  about  the  amalgamation 
of  the  three  Scandinavian  kingdoms  by  the  Union  of 
Calmar,  and  so  earn  the  title  of  the  "Semiramis  of  the 
North." 

The  Sw^edish  nobles,  however,  v^rere  not  prepared 
to  submit  to  the  dreaded  fusion  without  a  struggle, 
and,  taking  up  arms  against  Magnus,  they  called  upon 
his  nephew  Albert,  son  of  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg, 
to  assume  the  Crown  in  his  stead.  Magnus  was 
deposed  in  1364,  and  was  completely  defeated  and 
captured  when  he  attempted  to  regain  the  throne  in 
the  following  year.  Valdemar  now  determined  to 
take  advantage  of  Sweden's  exhaustion  to  extend  his 
own  dominions  at  her  expense,  and,  after  a  successful 
invasion,  he  extorted  from  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  a 
treaty,  in  which  the  latter,  on  behalf  of  his  son,  under- 
took to  cede  the  island  of  Gothland,  the  provinces  of 
Halland  and  Blekinge,  and  considerable  portions  of  the 
provinces  of  Smaaland  and  West  Gothland.  Albert, 
however,  refused  to  surrender  the  regions  which  his 
father  had  signed  away,  and  before  Valdemar  could 
take  effective  steps  to  enforce  his  rights,  a  quite 
different  complexion  was  given  to  the  struggle  by  the 
intervention  of  the  Hanse  towns,  which  thought  that 
the  time  had  come  to  wipe  out  the  stain  of  Helsingborg. 

On  November  19,  1367,  the  most  celebrated  of  all 
Tagfahrten  assembled  in  the  chamber  of  the  Cologne 
Rathaus,  which  is  still  known  as  the  "  Hanse  Hall," 
and  solemnly  declared  war  against  Valdemar.  The 
treaty  which  the  delegates  of  the  towns  subscribed  is 
known  as  the  "Cologne  Confederation,"  and  is  regarded 
as  the  most  momentous  decision  in  Hanse  history. 
The  towns  which  were  actually  represented  at  the 
gathering  were  only  eleven  in  number,  but  they 
pledged  themselves  to  furnish  forty-one  ships  and  1,950 
armed  men.  Between  thirty  and  forty  other  towns 
were  invited  to  join  in  the  operations,  but  most  of 
them  were  compelled  by  their  inland  situation  to  con- 
fine their  participation  to  a  money  contribution.     It  is 


HUMILIATION  OF  DENMARK  23 

a  curious  fact  that  Hamburg  and  Bremen,  later  the 
Hanse  towns  ;^ar  excellence^  took  no  active  share  in  the 
most  important  campaign  in  the  history  of  the  League, 
the  municipality  in  each  case  excusing  itself  on  the 
ground  of  some  special  circumstances. 

Valdemar  was  now  threatened  by  a  very  formidable 
coalition,  for  Sweden,  Mecklenburg,  and  the  Hansa 
were  joined  by  Count  Heinrich  of  Holstein,  and  at  this 
critical  juncture  he  was  taken  in  the  rear  by  a  rising 
of  the  nobles  of  Jutland.  Losing  heart,  he  fled  to 
Pomerania,  and  the  allies,  following  a  carefully  pre- 
arranged plan  of  campaign,  carried  all  before  them. 
Having  yet  again  possessed  themselves  of  Copenhagen, 
the  forces  of  the  Baltic  Hanse  towns  united  with  the 
Swedish  army  in  Scania,  where  all  the  fortresses  w^ere 
besieged,  and,  one  by  one,  compelled  to  surrender. 
Recrossing  the  Sound,  the  allies  seized  the  islands  of 
Moen,  Falster,  and  Laaland,  which  were  ravaged  from 
end  to  end.  Against  Norway  the  North  Sea  members 
of  the  League  w^ere  equally  successful,  reducing  the 
Royal  Court  at  Bergen  to  a  heap  of  ashes.  The  Hansa 
had  taken  the  lead  throughout  the  war,  and  the  towns 
now  found  themselves  for  the  moment  masters  of 
Scandinavia. 

In  the  negotiations  w^hich  were  concluded  by  the 
Peace  of  Stralsund  (May  24,  1370),  the  League  imposed 
on  Denmark  crushing  and  humiliating  conditions.  In 
addition  to  insisting  on  the  restoration  of  all  privileges 
and  facilities  its  members  had  ever  possessed  in  Scania, 
it  demanded  and  secured,  as  an  indemnification  for  the 
expense  it  had  been  put  to,  half  the  revenues  of  Malmo, 
Helsingborg,  Skanor,  and  Falsterbo,  and  of  seven 
neighbouring  bailiwicks,  for  a  term  of  fifteen  years. 
As  a  guarantee  for  payment,  it  was  stipulated  that  the 
fortresses  at  the  places  named  should  in  the  meantime 
be  garrisoned  by  the  League.  It  was  further  agreed 
that,  on  the  death  of  Valdemar,  a  successor  to  the 
Danish  throne  should  not  be  appointed  till  he  had 
received  the  approval  of  the  Hansa. 


24    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

It  is  impossible  here  to  consider  in  detail  the  subse- 
quent relations  of  the  Federation  to  the  Scandinavian 
kingdoms,  but  one  further  development  of  them  must 
be  recorded,  if  only  on  account  of  its  importance  as  a 
source  of  strife  between  the  Hansa  and  England.     On 
the  death  of  Valdemar,  in  1375,  commenced  the  forty 
years'   domination   of   his    daughter    Margaret,   who, 
nominally  as  the  guardian  of  her  son  Olaf,  and,  later, 
of  her  grand-nephew,  Eric  of  Pomerania,  became  the 
autocratic  ruler  of  all  Scandinavia,  which  was  legally 
consolidated  by  the  Union  of  Calmar.     A  necessary 
step  towards  this  consummation  was  the  expulsion  of 
Albert   of  Mecklenburg  from    Sweden,   and   he   was 
crushingly  defeated  and  taken  prisoner  at  the  Battle 
of  Falkoping  in  1389.     But  for  some  years  afterwards, 
Stockholm,  which  had  been  prominent  in  offering  him 
the  throne,  held  out  in  his  behalf,  and  the  attempts 
made  to  relieve  the  besieged  town  resulted  in  a  recru- 
descence of  piracy  that  for  generations  to  come  was 
to    prove    a    terrible    scourge    to    the     Baltic    and 
North  Sea.    The  Hanse  towns  Rostock  and  Wismar 
were  mainly  responsible  for  this  outcome.     For  once 
in  a  way  espousing  the  dynastic  cause  of  the  duchy 
in    which    they  were   situated,   they  struck   out    on 
a  line  of  policy  distinct  from  that  of  the  Hansa  as 
a  whole,    and   issued   letters   of   marque,   known   as 
"charters  of  robbery,"  to  all  who  would  undertake 
the  task  of  supplying  Stockholm  with  provisions  and 
munitions  of  war.     The  prospects  of  plunder  opened 
out  by  these  licences  called  to  the  sea  a  motley  rabble 
of  adventurers  and  soldiers  of  fortune,  who,  however, 
numbered  in  their  ranks  the  owners  of  such  now  illus- 
trious names  as  Moltke  and  Manteuffel. 

Under  the  specious  titles  of  the  **  Victualling 
Brothers "  and  the  "  Equal  Sharers,"  which  were 
respectively  derived  from  their  supposititious  mission 
and  their  manner  of  disposing  of  their  booty,  these 
buccaneers  fell  upon  every  defenceless  merchantman 
that  came  their  way  and  stripped  it  to  the  ribs.     By 


OUTRAGES  ON  ENGLISH  SHIPPING      25 

degrees  they  organized  themselves  into  a  formidable 
piratical  community,  which  for  some  time  had  a  regular 
fortified  capital  in  Visby,  where  they  had  established 
themselves.  From  this  stronghold  they  were  ulti- 
mately ejected  by  an  expedition  led  against  them  by 
the  Grand  Master  of  the  Teutonic  Order,  and  they 
thereupon  transferred  the  scene  of  their  operations  to 
the  North  Sea,  where  they  could  always  take  refuge 
from  pursuit  among  the  shoals  and  islands  off  the 
Frisian  coast.  They  made  Emden  their  new  head- 
quarters, and  their  depredations  were  not  effectively 
checked  till  1433,  when  Hamburg  captured  the  town, 
which  it  kept  in  its  possession  for  twenty  years.  Con- 
temporary ideas  of  the  fabulous  treasures  amassed  by 
the  Victualling  Brotherhood  may  be  gathered  from  the 
tradition  that  Glaus  Stortebeker,  one  of  the  most 
redoubtable  of  these  freebooters,  when  captured  off 
Heligoland  by  a  fleet  belonging  to  merchants  of  Ham- 
burg, offered  to  lay  a  chain  of  solid  gold  right  round 
their  town  if  they  w^ould  allow  him  his  life.  The 
legend  must  not  be  taken  too  literally,  for  it  continues 
that,  though  this  bargain  was  refused,  Stortebeker 
was  granted  his  further  petition,  that  as  many  of  his 
followers  as  he  could  run  past  after  he  had  been  decapi- 
tated should  be  spared,  and  that  he  had  already  saved 
five  of  his  men  in  this  way,  when  the  executioner  flung 
a  stick  between  his  legs  and  brought  his  headless 
corpse  to  the  ground. 

Since  the  Victualling  Brothers  had  been  called  into 
existence  by  two  of  the  leading  Hanse  towns,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  in  England  the  League  itself  was 
blamed  for  the  innumerable  outrages  committed  by 
these  corsairs  on  English  shipping.  It  was  largely  to 
the  misdeeds  of  this  piratical  sodality  that  were  due 
the  quarrels  between  the  English  Government  and  the 
Hansa,  which  continued  almost  without  intermission 
from  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Stralsund  till 
Queen  Elizabeth  shut  up  the  Steelyard  and  expelled 
its  inmates  from  the  country.     At  the  same  time,  it 


26    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

must  be  admitted  that,  with  the  exception  ot  Rostock 
and  Wismar,  whither  the  privateers  repaired  to  dis- 
pose of  their  spoils,  the  Hanse  towns  themselves 
probably  suffered  nearly  as  much  as  anyone  else 
through  this  plague  of  piracy. 

By  its  triumph  over  Valdemar  the  Hansa  secured 
a  practical  monopoly  of  the  shipping  and  trade  of  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea,  which  it  held  almost  unimpaired 
for  nearly  two  hundred  years.  In  the  words  of  Gustav 
VVasa,  "the  three  good  (Scandinavian)  Crowns  remained 
small  wares  of  the  Hansa  up  to  the  sixteenth  century," 
and  as  long  as  this  was  so  the  commercial  and  maritime 
supremacy  of  the  League  was  practically  unchallenge- 
able. The  manner  in  which  the  Easterlings  availed 
themselves  of  the  ascendancy  they  had  now  acquired 
is  a  classic  example  of  the  ruthless  and  unscrupulous 
exploitation  of  political  power  for  the  purposes  of 
purely  material  gain,  for  they  wxre  actuated  by  no 
national  or  ideal  aims,  but  solely  by  the  desire  to 
enrich  themselves.  Favoured  by  the  confusion  and 
chaos  prevailing  in  the  lands  of  their  potential  rivals, 
they  becamiC  the  exclusive  brokers  through  whose 
mediation  the  spices  of  the  Orient,  the  wines  of 
France,  the  cloth  of  Flanders,  the  tin,  wool,  hides,  and 
tallow  of  England,  were  exchanged  for  the  dried  cod  of 
Norway,  the  ores  of  Sweden,  the  wheat  of  Prussia,  the 
honey  and  wax  of  Poland,  the  furs  of  Russia,  and  the 
myriads  of  herrings  w^hich  every  summer  were  caught 
in  the  Sound,  and  salted  and  packed  on  the  coast  of 
Scania.  What  they  aimed  at,  and  what  for  long  years 
they  substantially  obtained,  was  the  disappearance  of 
all  flags  but  their  own  from  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Baltic.  Moreover,  a  great  part  of  the  carrying  trade 
between  England  and  France  also  fell  to  their  lot. 

The  Hanseatic  League  had  sprung  from  the  need 
of  mutual  protection  and  support,  and  at  the  outset 
had  had  a  purely  defensive  character.  By  its  early 
efforts  for  the  suppression  of  piracy,  highway  robbery, 
and  the  infamous  "beach  law," under  which  a  wrecked 


THE  LEAGUE  AND  ENGLISH  TRADERS    27 

ship  became  the  property  of  the  owner  of  the  foreshore 
where  it  stranded,  it  had  incidentally  performed 
valuable  services  to  hum.anity.  Unfortunately,  where- 
ever  and  whenever  it  became  sufficiently  powerful  to 
do  so,  it  adopted  aggressive  tactics,  and  established 
a  commercial  tyranny  which  could  be  upheld  only 
by  violence  or  fraud.  Its  methods  were  in  principle 
exceedingly  simple  :  they  consisted  in  the  extortion 
of  exclusive  privileges  from  others,  and  in  absolute 
refusal  to  reciprocate ;  and  the  League  not  only  deter- 
mined the  commercial  policy  of  its  ow^n  members,  but, 
through  its  establishments  at  Bruges,  Bergen,  and 
Novgorod,  exercised  a  decisive  influence  on  that  of 
other  countries.  The  Sound  was  repeatedly  closed 
to  all  but  Hanse  ships  ;  foreigners  other  than  Germans 
were  forbidden  to  reside  in  Russia,  even  with  the 
object  of  learning  the  language  ;  and,  while  the  Easter- 
lings  were  amassing  in  their  hands  the  whole  of 
England's  trade  with  Northern  and  Western  Europe, 
English  merchants  were,  by  their  servants  or  at  their 
instance,  expelled  from  Bergen,  Dantzic,  and  other 
emporia  of  the  Baltic,  if  they  were  not  actually 
plundered  and  massacred.  Recesses  passed  by  the 
Tagfahrten  at  various  times  forbade  the  citizens  of 
Hanse  towns  to  sell  ships  to  foreigners,  to  enter  into 
partnership  with  an  Englishman,  to  consign  goods 
to  a  micrchant  in  England  who  was  not  affiliated  to  the 
Steelyard,  to  export  British  manufactured  wares. 

The  Hanseatics  were  neither  the  first  nor  the  last 
to  profit  from  the  quarrels  of  others,  but  they  played 
the  part  of  tertius  gatidens  with  a  persistency  for 
which  it  would  be  hard  to  find  a  parallel,  and  nowhere 
was  their  policy  more  successful  than  in  England, 
whose  foreign  wars  and  internal  embarrassments  they 
turned  to  account  with  equal  promptitude  and  skill. 
From  the  earliest  days  of  their  settlement  in  London, 
we  find  them  shrewdly  exploiting  the  predicaments 
of  the  English  Crown.  When,  for  example,  Richard 
Coeur    de    Lion    was    returning    from    his    Austrian 


28    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

oaptivity,  the  merchants  of  Cologne  rendered  him 
valuable  assistance  in  the  raising  of  the  ransom  which 
was  the  price  of  his  liberty,  and  in  recompense  they 
received  a  charter  acquitting  them  of  the  rent  of  their 
guildhall,  and  of  all  royal  dues  on  their  persons  and 
wares  in  England.  It  was  apparently  Hanseatic 
influence  which  gained  for  Richard  of  Cornwall, 
brother  of  Henry  HI.,  the  doubtful  dignity  of  "  German 
King  " ;  and  a  couple  of  years  after  his  coronation  at 
Aix,  "  the  merchants  of  Alemannia,  who  own  in  London 
the  house  which  is  usually  called  the  *  Guildhall  of  the 
Germans'"  obtained  the  confirmation  of  all  the  "  free- 
doms and  usages  "  they  had  enjoyed  in  the  reigns  of 
the  English  monarch  and  his  predecessors.  From 
Edward  HI.  Hanse  citizens  took  the  Crown  jewels 
into  pawn,  being  allotted  the  revenues  of  the  wool 
duties  and  the  royal  tin-mines  in  Cornwall  till  the 
pledges  had  been  redeemed  ;  and  the  King,  in  gratitude 
for  their  help,  extended  their  privileges,  so  that  by  the 
middle  of  the  fourteenth  century  they  were  actually 
trading  in  England  on  more  favourable  terms  than  the 
native  merchant. 

It  was,  however,  only  after  the  Peace  of  Stralsund 
that  the  Federation  entered  into  regular  diplomatic 
relations  with  England.  Till  that  event  changed  the 
international  status  of  the  League,  the  Steelyard  had 
been  left  to  make  for  itself  the  best  terms  it  could 
as  a  mere  association  of  foreign  traders,  dependent 
on  their  own  resources  for  the  securing  of  favours. 
Now  a  radical  alteration  took  place  in  the  conditions, 
and  the  Hanse  settlement  in  London  became  an 
important  political  mission  as  well  as  a  commercial 
agency.  The  adoption  of  fresh  methods  was  the 
necessary  expression  of  a  modification  of  policy,  which 
was  undoubtedly  the  direct  outcome  of  the  success  of 
the  League  in  the  Scandinavian  campaign.  So  far  the 
Hanseatics  had  gained  their  ends  chiefly  by  guile,  but 
they  now  felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  bully,  and 
the  unintermittent  controversies  and  quarrels  between 


STEELYARD'S  UNFAIR  COMPETITION     29 

England  and  the  League,  which,  almost  exactly  a 
hundred  years  after  the  signature  of  the  Stralsund 
Treaty,  culminated  in  open  warfare,  were  but  a  natural 
sequel  of  the  humbling  of  Valdemar. 

It  was  characteristic  of  these  disputes  that  grievances 
were  invariably  brought  forward  by  both  sides.  The 
ultimate  basis  of  the  Hanse- complaints  was,  in  nearly 
all  cases,  the  Carta  Mercatoria,  which  had  been  issued 
to  the  Steelyard  by  Edward  I.  in  1303.  By  this  charter 
the  King,  in  consideration  of  the  acquiescence  of  the 
foreign  merchants  trading  in  England  in  a  substantial 
increase  of  the  export  duties,  which  in  the  cases  of 
wool  and  hides  amounted  to  50  per  cent.,  granted  them 
far-reaching  liberties  and  privileges.  In  the  succeed- 
ing reign  it  was  confirmed  to  the  Germans  alone,  and 
henceforth  it  formed  the  legal  title  to  which  the  Easter- 
lings  always  appealed  in  their  differences  with  the 
English  Government.  What  they  claimed  was  that 
legally  they  could  not  be  called  upon  to  pay  duties  at 
higher  rates  than  were  fixed  in  the  charter,  and  that 
consequently  they  were  entitled  to  exemption  from 
any  additional  taxation  that  might  be  imposed  in  Eng- 
land. Whenever  fresh  financial  burdens  were  placed 
on  the  shoulders  of  the  people  of  England,  whether 
in  the  form  of  augmented  export  duties,  poundage, 
tonnage,  "  subsidies,"  or  poll-taxes,  the  merchants  of 
the  Steelyard  raised  protests,  and  sometimes  flatly 
refused  payment.  Not  infrequently  their  resistance 
was  crowned  with  success,  and,  in  so  far  as  this  oc- 
curred, they  were  given  an  advantage'over  the  English- 
man, which  enabled  them  to  crush  his  commercial 
competition. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  English  merchant  had  much 
to  complain  of  in  addition  to  this  favouring  of  the 
foreigner  in  his  own  country.  One  of  the  first  acts  of 
the  Federation  on  entering  on  its  fifteen-year  tenancy 
of  Scania,  was  the  issue  of  a  decree  forbidding  British 
subjects  to  salt  herrings  in  that  province.  At  the 
same  time  the  bailiffs  responsible  for  public  order  in 


so    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

the  Hanse  settlement  round  Falsterbo  and  Skanor 
were  restrained  by  a  penalt}^  of  fifty  marks  from  allow- 
ing foreigners  to  reside  within  the  areas  under  their 
jurisdiction,  while  a  few  years  later  they  were  expressly 
enjoined  to  afford  such  intruders  no  protection  against 
robbery,  outrage,  and  murder.  Similar  measures  were 
enforced  in  Bergen,  with  the  object  of  making  residence 
there  intolerable  to  all  aliens  who  did  not  rejoice  in 
the  qualification  of  Hanse  membership.  It  was  at  this 
period,  too,  that  Prussia  first  systematically  placed 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  merchants  from  England. 
Close  commercial  dealings  between  the  two  countries 
had  sprung  out  of  the  participation  of  English  nobles 
in  the  crusades  of  the  Teutonic  Knights  against  the 
Lithuanians — Henry  IV.,  as  Prince  of  Wales,  fought  in 
two  of  these  campaigns — but  the  enterprising  rivalry 
of  the  English  traders  seems  by  degrees  to  have  become 
irksome  to  the  citizens  of  the  prosperous  towns  that 
had  arisen  on  the  conquered  territories.  At  any  rate, 
the  Grand  Master  adopted  a  much  less  hospitable 
attitude  than  heretofore  towards  his  English  visitors, 
and  Prussia  occasionally  took  the  lead  in  urging  upon 
the  Hansa  a  ruthless  and  uncompromising  policy 
towards  England.  The  commercial  factors  in  the 
antagonism  were  naturally  less  disturbing  than  the 
wholesale  piracies  of  the  Victualling  Brothers,  and  the 
League,  for  its  part,  repeatedly  raised  the  charge  that 
its  merchantmen  had  been  plundered  by  English  war- 
ships engaged  in  the  operations  against  France.  That 
unjustifiable  accusations  were  made  on  both  sides  is 
more  than  likely,  for  at  that  epoch  the  lines  of  de- 
marcation which  separated  regular  war  vessels  from 
privateersmen,  and  these  from  pirate  ships,  were  very 
indefinite,  and  it  was  a  common  practice  for  neutrals 
to  hire  out  their  craft  for  belligerent  purposes.  It  is 
also  highly  probable  that  the  Hansa  was  sometimes 
held  responsible  for  the  violence  of  those  who  had 
been  federated  to  it  yesterday,  and  would  be  so  again 
to-morrow,  but  had  no  official  connection  with  it  on 


ENVOYS  IN  LONDON  31 

the  to-day  of  their  transgressions.  At  the  same  time^ 
it  had  none  but  itself  to  blame  for  the  doubt  that 
existed  in  the  world  as  to  the  extent  of  its  member- 
ship. 

The  visit  of  two  Hansa  envoys  to  London  in  1373, 
as  the  spokesmen  of  a  Tagfahrten  which  had  met  at 
Liibeck,  seems  to  have  been  the  first  attempt  to  estab- 
lish direct  diplomatic  relations  between  the  League 
and  England.  The  mission  found  on  its  arrival  that 
its  purpose  had  gone,  for  a  truce  had  been  arranged 
between  England  and  France,  and  the  subsidies  from 
which  it  hoped  to  obtain  exemption  for  the  inmates  of 
the  Steelyard  had  been  dropped.  Five  years  later  the 
League  again  found  it  advisable  to  despatch  a  couple 
of  envoys  to  England.  Their  errand  on  this  occasion, 
their  manner  of  fulfilling  it,  and  its  issue,  are  very 
typical  of  Anglo-Hanse  relationships  at  that  time.  On 
the  accession  of  Richard  II.,  as  at  the  commencement 
of  every  fresh  reign,  the  English  merchants  petitioned 
that  the  Hanse  privileges  should  not  be  confirmed  till 
their  own  grievances  against  the  League  had  been 
redressed.  In  particular  they  demanded  greater  liberty 
for  their  commerce  at  Bergen  and  in  Scania,  and  their 
case  was  supported  by  Parliament.  Eventually  the 
renewal  of  the  Steelyard  charters  was  promised  on 
the  acceptance  of  the  following  conditions :  Freedom 
for  English  trade  in  Prussia  and  in  the  Hanse  towns, 
repeal  of  the  obnoxious  regulations  at  Bergen  and  in 
Scania,  exemption  of  Englishmen  in  the  Hanseatic 
territories  from  liability  for  the  debts  and  misdoings 
of  their  countrymen,  and  disclosure  of  the  names  of  all 
the  members  of  the  League.  With  suspicious  em- 
phasis the  representatives  of  the  Federation  flatly 
refused  even  to  consider  these  conditions.  Ultimately 
the  stipulations  with  regard  to  Bergen  and  Scania 
were  dropped  altogether,  and  the  English  merchants 
had  to  be  satisfied  with  a  general  undertaking  that 
they  would  receive  in  Hanse  lands  like  treatment  to 
that  accorded  to  the  League's  members  in  England. 


32    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

With  the  exception  that  this  provision  of  **  like  treat- 
ment "  was  subsequently  altered  to  the  still  vaguer 
and  more  worthless  promise  of  "treatment  according 
to  ancient  usage,"  the  negotiations  were  exemplary  in 
occasion,  course,  and  result,  for  many  which  succeeded 
them.  For  nearly  two  centuries  not  a  year  passed  in 
w^hich  grievances  were  not  being  nursed,  or  discussed, 
or  submitted  for  decision  by  one  side  or  the  other,  or  by 
both.  As  a  rule,  a  period  of  retaliations  and  reprisals 
intervened  between  the  occurrence  which  formed  the 
original  bone  of  contention  and  the  actual  negotiations; 
ships  and  goods  were  confiscated  by  complainant  as 
by  defendant ;  English  merchants  were  expelled  from 
German  towns  and  German  merchants  were  flung  into 
prison  in  England  ;  spontaneous  violence,  born  of 
hatred  and  the  sense  of  wrong,  burst  out  here  as 
there,  and  outrage  was  often  enough  requited  with 
outrage. 

On  neither  side,  it  must  be  admitted,  was  there  very 
much  of  either  constancy  of  view  or  consistency  of 
action.  The  policy  of  the  English  Crown  varied  with 
the  vicissitudes  of  the  long  struggle  with  France  and 
wdth  those  of  its  recurring  internal  troubles,  of  which 
the  Wars  of  the  Roses  were  only  the  most  violent  and 
prolonged.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Hansa  was  often 
crippled  by  its  perpetual  embroilment  in  Scandinavia; 
and  by  its  very  nature  and  the  diversity  of  the  interests 
which  it  represented  it  was  prevented  from  pursuing 
a  definite  and  fixed  line  of  action.  The  towns  of  the 
West  had  not  the  same  stake  as  those  of  the  East  in 
the  exclusion  of  strangers  from  the  Baltic ;  the  Nor- 
w^egian,  the  Scanian,  and  the  Russian  preserves 
were  not  of  equal  importance  to  all  members  of  the 
League.  More  than  once  Hanse  Parliaments  decreed 
the  suspension  of  all  Baltic  trade  with  England,  but 
these  measures  proved  so  injurious  to  some  of  the 
confederates,  that  they  were  speedily  either  revoked, 
ignored,  or  evaded.  While  such  prohibitions  were  in 
force,  pitch,  tar,  and  potash  w^ere  smuggled  westward 


FEDERATION'S  INTERNAL  TROUBLES     33 

in  beer  barrels,  and  English  cloth  still  penetrated  to 
Prussia  in  large  quantities  by  way  of  Scandinavia. 
The  Hansa,  in  fact,  suffered  even  more  from  the  recoil 
of  such  commercial  blockades  than  England  did  from 
the  original  blow.  By  taking  advantage  of  dissen- 
sions arising  from  the  lack  of  complete  unity  of  aim 
in  the  League,  the  English  Government  sometimes 
succeeded  in  effecting  separate  settlements  with  its 
main  component  parts. 

Like  England,  the  Federation  was  weakened  by 
internal  troubles.  The  government  of  the  Hanse 
towns  had  by  this  time  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  few 
"patrician"  families,  which  were  exclusively  engaged 
in  the  business  of  buying  and  selling,  and  the  rule  laid 
down  by  the  Lubeck  statute,  that  only  "  those  who 
do  not  earn  their  bread  by  the  work  of  their  hands  " 
should  sit  in  the  Council,  was  of  almost  universal 
prevalence.  As  the  councils  were  constituted  by  co- 
optation  by  their  own  members,  and  not  by  popular 
election,  they  had  no  difficulty  in  maintaining  this  rule 
so  long  as  it  was  not  challenged  by  violence.  But  at 
the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century  the  grov/ing 
and  intelligent  class  of  handicraftsmen  was  in  many 
quarters  asserting  its  right  to  a  voice  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  towns,  and  these  movements  often  resulted 
in  long  and  sanguinary  struggles  that  incapacitated 
the  municipalities  from  taking  an  active  interest  in  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  League.  Lubeck,  the  diplomatic 
and  naval  head  of  the  Hansa,  was  for  some  time  gravely 
embarrassed  by  one  of  these  constitutional  conflicts. 
Another  event  of  sinister  omen  for  the  future  of  the 
Federation  that  occurred  at  this  epoch  was  the  Battle 
of  Tannenberg  (1410),  in  which  the  rising  State  of 
Poland  completely  defeated  the  Teutonic  Order,  deal- 
ing it  a  blow  fatal  to  its  power  and  prestige.  These 
occurrences  temporarily  enfeebled  the  League  to  such 
a  degree  that  when,  in  141 7,  an  English  fleet  seized  a 
number  of  Hanse  ships  returning  from  the  Bay  of 
Biscay,  the  aggrieved  German  merchants,  distrusting 

3 


34    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

their  own  strength,  appealed  for  mediation  to  their 
supreme  sovereign,  Sigismund,  "  King  of  the  Romans," 
who  had  contracted  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance 
with  England.  It  was  characteristic  of  the  attitude  of 
the  German  Emperors  towards  the  towns,  that,  when 
the  conference  of  English  and  Hanse  delegates,  which 
was  convened  by  Sigismund  at  Constance  and  presided 
over  by  him  in  person,  failed  to  reach  an  agreement, 
the  monarch  turned  on  the  envoys  of  the  League  with 
the  rough  exclamation  that  he  regarded  as  an  enemy 
anyone  who  attacked  his  ally.  That  the  Hansa's  powers 
c/  commercial  resistance  also  flagged  at  this  time  is 
shown  by  the  German  complaints  that  in  one  season 
the  English  had  bought  up  almost  the  entire  supply 
of  Russian  wax  brought  to  Prussia,  and  that  in  two 
separate  years  a  Lynn  merchant  had  penetrated  into 
the  interior  of  Poland  and  bought  where  they  grew 
the  yew-trees  from  which  the  famous  long  bows  of 
England  were  made. 

The  negotiations  between  England  and  the  Hansa 
took  place  sometimes  in  London,  sometimes  in  Ltibeck 
or  another  of  the  League  towns,  sometimes  at  Bruges 
or  on  other  neutral  ground.  An  important  success 
was  obtained  for  the  Federation  in  1437  by  the  Burgo- 
masters of  Liibeck,  Hamburg,  and  Cologne,  who  visited 
London,  and,  according  to  German  historians,  bribed 
Cardinal  Beaufort  with  the  present  of  a  handsome 
mansion,  and  so  induced  him  to  persuade  Henry  VI. 
that  the  demands  of  the  English  merchants  for  the 
limitation  of  the  privileges  of  the  Steelyard  were 
illegal,  and  that  the  Hanse  trade  was  indispensable  to 
England.  All  the  League's  freedoms  were  on  this 
occasion  confirmed  without  restriction  ;  it  was  assured 
exemption  from  all  dues  not  specified  in  the  Carta 
Mercatoria,  and  an  undertaking  was  given  that  certain 
compensations,  the  justice  of  which  had  been  admitted 
in  a  treaty  concluded  at  The  Hague  thirty  3^ears  earlier, 
should  at  last  be  paid.  The  only  satisfaction  received 
by  the  English  merchants  was  the  familiar  and  abso- 


SUCCESS  OF  ENGLISH  PRIVATEERS      35 

lutely  valueless  promise  that  they  should  be  treated 
within  Hanseatic  jurisdiction  ''according  to  ancient 
custom." 

It  was  because  the  spirit  of  this  vague  and  elastic 
provision  was  never  observed  that  the  1437  Treaty 
failed,  like  all  its  predecessors,  to  establish  permanent 
friendly  relationships  between  England  and  the  Hanse 
towns.  As  they  were  interpreted,  all  the  engagements 
between  the  two  parties  were  quite  one-sided ;  the 
give  was  all  on  the  part  of  England,  the  take  all  on 
that  of  the  Hansa.  The  treaty  was  succeeded  by  the 
usual  period  of  complaints  by  English  merchants  and 
petitions  by  Parliament,  Hanseatic  countercharges, 
arbitrary  attempts  to  execute  justice  for  themselves 
by  the  aggrieved  merchants  on  both  sides,  retaliations — 
private  as  well  as  governmental — and  unsuccessful 
overtures  for  negotiation.  At  length  it  was  agreed 
to  confer  at  Deventer  in  June,  145 1,  but  the  arrange- 
ment was  thwarted  by  the  action  of  a  privateering 
fleet  fitted  out  by  the  English  East  Coast  ports,  which 
seized  in  the  Channel  an  enormous  convoy,  said  to 
have  contained  108  vessels.  Half  of  these  belonged 
to  members  of  the  League,  for  the  most  part  to 
merchants  of  Lubeck  and  Hamburg,  and  were  carried 
off  to  be  sold  as  prizes.  At  about  the  same  timic,  a 
number  of  Hanse  ships  were  plundered  as  they  lay  at 
anchor  in  the  harbour  of  Boston. 

These  occurrences  precipitated  an  acute  crisis.  The 
injured  towns  at  once  confiscated  all  the  English  goods 
discoverable  within  their  boundaries,  and  Henry  retali- 
ated by  giving  the  merchants  thus  despoiled  permission 
to  indemnify  themselves  from  the  wares  accumulated 
in  the  Steelyard.  The  King  attempted  to  ignore  the 
existence  of  the  League,  and  sent  a  mission  to  Prussia 
to  conclude  a  partial  settlement  with  the  Grand  Master, 
but  his  envoys  were  captured  off  Skagen  by  ships  of 
Lubeck,  and  carried  off  as  prisoners  to  that  town.  It 
was,  however,  again  found  impossible  to  reconcile  the 
divergent  views  of  the  Hanseatics,   While  the  Prussian 


36    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

and  Rhenish  towns  advocated  a  conciliatory  attitude, 
Liibeck  was  all  for  ruthless  self-assertion,  and,  follow- 
ing a  line  of  its  own,  sent  out  privateers  to  snap  up 
the  cargoes  of  cloth  that  attempted  to  evade  the 
closure  of  the  Baltic  to  English  goods  which  had  been 
declared  by  Christian  of  Denmark.  Nevertheless,  the 
moderation  of  the  other  members  of  the  Federation 
ultimately  prevailed,  Lubeck  recalled  its  privateers, 
and  in  1456  a  truce  was  concluded  with  England,  now 
deeply  preoccupied  with  the  Wars  of  the  Roses,  for  a 
period  of  eight  years. 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  disentangle  the  intricate 
knot  of  Hanse  dealings  wdth  England  during  the  long 
struggle  between  the  houses  of  York  and  Lancaster. 
Both  parties  were  in  turn,  and  sometimes  simul- 
taneously, helped  by  the  League,  or  by  its  individual 
members,  with  ships  or  money.  When  fortune  frowned 
upon  them,  neither  hesitated  to  apply  to  the  Hansa 
for  assistance,  promising  in  return  the  confirmation  of 
the  privileges  of  the  Steelyard ;  and  the  federated 
towns  were,  as  usual,  guided  in  their  policy  solely  by 
their  anticipations  of  material  benefit.  But  the  most 
interesting  incident  of  this  period  was  that  the  Hansa, 
with  the  encouragement  of  England's  domestic  em- 
barrassments, took  heart  to  wage  open  war  against 
her  for  the  first  and  last  time  in  its  history,  and, 
as  the  issue  will  show,  came  out  of  the  conflict 
victorious. 

The  war  was  the  outcome  of  a  series  of  mutual 
aggravations  and  provocations,  of  which  the  first  of 
any  importance  was  the  attack  by  Warwick  on  a 
convo}^  of  eighteen  large  Hanse  vessels  putting  up  the 
Channel  for  Livonia,  with  wine  and  salt  from  France. 
After  a  stubborn  fight  for  six  hours  the  Kingmaker 
withdrev/  to  Calais,  of  which  port  he  was  then 
Governor,  with  six  prizes,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
German  flotilla  continued  its  voyage  claiming  the 
victory.  Warwick's  action,  w^hich  is  said  to  have  had 
no  better  justification  than  the  refusal  of  the  convoy  to 


STEELYARD  IN  LONDON  STORMED   37 

salute  the  English  flag,  was  regarded  by  the  Hansa  as 
a  flagrant  breach  of  the  truce  of  1456,  and  Lubeck  at 
once  recommenced  its  naval  guerilla.  It  was,  however, 
unable  to  induce  the  other  towns  to  follow  the  example, 
and  seems  to  have  decided  to  recall  its  ships  and 
await  the  development  of  events  in  England,  rather 
than  carry  on  the  operations  alone. 

The  quarrel  might  have  simmered  down,  especially 
as  Edward  IV.  had  provisionally  confirmed  the  Steel- 
yard privilege,  had  it  not  been  complicated  by  an 
English  grievance  of  a  similar  character.  This  was 
the  seizure  in  the  Sound  of  seven  English  vessels  laden 
with  cloth  for  Prussia.  There  seems  no  doubt  that  the 
ships  which  effected  this  coup  belonged  to  Dantzic, 
but,  according  to  the  German  case,  they  v/ere  at  the 
time  in  the  pay  of  Christian  of  Denmark,  and  were 
exacting  reparation  for  the  murder  by  Lynn  sailors 
and  fishermen  of  an  Iceland  bailiff.  The  Danish  King, 
indeed,  went  so  far  as  to  certify  that  the  Hansa  was 
entirely  devoid  of  guilt  in  the  matter.  In  England, 
however,  the  League  was  blamed,  and  the  Steelyard 
was  accused  of  having  notified  it  of  the  departure  of 
the  confiscated  ships.  The  English  Government  in 
this  case  acted  with  great  promptitude,  the  Privy 
Council  ordering  the  imprisonment  of  all  German 
merchants  in  London  till  satisfaction  had  been  given 
for  the  outrage.  It  was  decided  by  the  Courts  that  the 
League  was  guilty,  and  that  the  property  of  the  Steel- 
yard members  should  be  valued  and  divided  among  the 
aggrieved  English  merchants.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Cologne  traders,  who  had  long  been  drawing  away 
from  the  League  and  pursuing  a  more  accommodating 
policy  of  their  own,  were  released  from  prison,  and 
installed  in  the  Steelyard  as  its  sole  masters  and  the 
exclusive  beneficiaries  of  its  privileges  and  freedom.s. 
Feeling  seems  to  have  run  very  strongly  against  the 
foreigners  in  London,  for  the  Steelyard  was  stormed 
by  a  mob  and  partially  destroyed,  and  a  courier  from 
the  Emperor,  to  whom  the  Hansa  had  appealed  for 


38    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

mediation,  was  attacked  in  the  streets  and  very 
seriously  maltreated. 

In  April,  1469,  delegates  of  twenty-three  Hanse 
towns  assembled  to  consider  the  situation  thus  created, 
and  agreed  to  break  off  all  relations  with  England  unless 
the  distrained  goods  were  restored  to  their  original 
owners  by  June  24.  As  this  condition  was  not  complied 
with,  the  merchants  of  the  German  colony  at  Bruges 
and  the  town  of  Dantzic  sent  out  privateers  into  the 
North  Sea  to  prey  on  British  commerce.  Two  of  these 
naval  condottieri — Paul  Beneke  and  Martin  Bardewick 
— wrought  great  havoc  among  English  shipping,  and  by 
the  daring  of  their  exploits  won  for  themselves  a  place 
of  fame  in  the  sparse  chronicle  of  German  maritime 
history.  It  was  not,  however,  till  the  following  year 
that  the  Hansa  as  a  whole,  at  an  unusually  well- 
attended  Tagfahrt — the  conflict  with  England  had  had 
the  effect  of  healing  the  dissensions  in  the  League — 
decided  upon  common  measures  in  defence  of  its 
interests.  The  merchants  of  the  Steelyard  were  in- 
structed to  return  to  their  native  towns,  and  it  was 
gareed  to  urge  the  Kings  of  Denmark  and  Poland  to 
join  in  a  comprehensive  boycott  of  English  cloth.  At 
the  same  time,  the  ban  of  "  Verhansung "  was  pro- 
nounced against  Cologne,  which  meant  that  the 
members  of  the  Federation  pledged  themselves  to 
have  no  further  commercial  dealings  with  that  city. 

Almost  at  the  very  moment  at  which  the  assembly 
was  passing  these  recesses,  Edward  IV.  was  in 
imminent  peril  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Hansa 
as  he  fled  across  the  North  Sea  to  Flanders,  after  the 
landing  of  Warwick  in  England.  The  vessel  in  which 
the  King  and  his  brother,  the  Duke  of  Gloucester, 
afterwards  Richard  III.,  had  taken  passage,  was  so 
hotly  chased  b}^  Hanseatic  privateers,  that,  as  the 
only  method  of  escape,  her  captain  ran  her  ashore  on 
the  Dutch  coast,  trusting  that  she  would  refloat  on  the 
turn  of  the  tide,  and  that  in  the  meanwhile  the  pursuers 
would  have  put  out  to  sea  again  in  search  of  readier 


EDWARD  IV.  AND  THE  HANSA  39 

booty.  The  Germans  were,  however,  not  so  easy  to 
choke  off,  for  they,  too,  beached  their  ships ;  and  had 
not  partisans  of  the  Duke  of  Burgundy  succoured  the 
distressed  vessel  from  the  land  side,  the  royal  party 
would  certainly  have  become  prisoners  of  the  Hansa, 
and  a  decisive  change  might  have  been  brought  about 
in  the  course  of  English  history.  For  Queen  Margaret 
had  already,  in  flattering  terms,  appealed  to  Liibeck 
for  assistance,  and  made  solemn  promises  that,  if  it 
were  successfully  granted,  she  would  become  an 
advocate  of  the  Hanse  cause  in  England.  At  an 
earlier  date,  it  may  be  remarked,  she  had  received 
substantial  financial  aid  from  Cologne.  As  things 
turned  out,  Edward,  too,  now  became  a  suitor  for 
Hanse  favours,  and,  through  the  mediation  of  Duke 
Charles,  effected  a  provisional  and  informal  reconcilia- 
tion with  members  of  the  League.  It  was  on  Dantzic 
ships,  in  Burgundian  service,  and  manned  by  Shakes- 
peare's "  hasty  Germans  and  blunt  Hollanders,"  that 
the  King  and  his  adherents  returned  to  England  to 
win  the  Battle  of  Barnet. 

It  would  be  tedious  and  unprofitable  to  follow  the 
details  of  the  desultory  hostilities  between  England 
and  the  Hansa  which  occupied  the  next  two  years. 
On  neither  side  could  the  war  be  waged  with  vigour 
and  determination.  England  was  engrossed  with  her 
domestic  feud,  and  the  Hanse  towns  were  at  one 
neither  on  the  broad  lines  of  their  policy  nor  on  the 
measures  expedient  for  carrying  it  out.  Though 
Poland  and  Denmark  had  closed  their  frontiers  to 
English  cloth,  the  blockade  against  it  could  not  be 
rendered  effective,  as  that  profitable  article  of  com- 
merce was  still  smuggled  into  the  Baltic  in  large 
quantities.  The  League  members  aggravated  their 
dissensions  by  mutually  accusing  one  another  of 
carrying  on  the  contraband  trade.  The  naval  opera- 
tions of  the  League  were  equally  lacking  in  system, 
persistency,  and  vigour.  At  times  a  Hanse  flotilla 
would  descend  upon  the  East  Coast  of  England,  and 


40    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

disembark  a  force  to  burn  and  plunder  for  miles  inland. 
At  other  times  the  conduct  of  the  war  would  be  left 
to  one  or  two  particularly  reckless  and  enterprising 
privateers,  who  strung  up  to  the  yard-arm  all  the 
English  sailors  who  fell  into  their  clutches,  and  had 
only  the  like  treatment  to  expect  if  they  w^ere  ever 
captured  in  their  turn.  During  the  last  year  of  the 
struggle,  the  dashing  Paul  Beneke,  in  a  large  ship 
purchased  from  Dantzic  by  citizens  of  Hamburg,  was 
practically  the  sole  representative  of  the  Hanse  naval 
power  in  the  North  Sea,  but  his  presence  there  was 
enough  to  keep  the  English  mercantile  marine  in  a 
state  of  trepidation. 

In  spite  of  the  half-heartedness  of  its  naval  measures, 
however,  the  Hansa  refused  to  agree  to  an  armistice 
when  overtures  for  negotiations  were  made  in  the 
spring  of  1472  by  the  English  Envoy  at  the  Burgundian 
Court,  and  it  was  not  until  a  conference  had  been 
definitely  agreed  upon,  a  year  later,  that  the  League's 
letters  of  marque  were  finally  revoked.  The  peace 
envoys  met  at  Utrecht  in  July,  1473.  On  the  one  side 
were  delegates  of  the  towns  of  Ltibeck,  Hamburg, 
Bremen,  Dantzic,  Dortmund,  Munster,  Deventer,  and 
Kampen,  as  well  as  of  the  Hanseatic  settlements  at 
London,  Bruges,  and  Bergen ;  on  the  other  were 
representatives  of  the  English  King,  the  Dukes  of 
Burgundy  and  Brittany,  the  rulers  of  Bergen-op- 
Zoom,  Holland,  Zeeland,  and  Friesland,  and  of  the 
towns  of  Cologne,  Antwerp,  Mechlin,  and  Dinant. 
The  congress  lasted  nearly  a  year,  and  three  separate 
series  of  negotiations  w^ere  necessary  before  the  indi- 
vidual quarrel  between  England  and  the  League  could 
be  composed.  The  English  delegates  declared  at  the 
end  that  they  would  rather  negotiate  with  all  the 
monarchs  of  the  world  than  try  another  bout  with 
such  hard  bargainers  as  the  Hanse  burgomasters. 

As  the  sequel  show^ed,  the  League  either  was  better 
represented  or  pla3^ed  with  stronger  cards,  for  in  all 
essentials   it  carried  the  day.     It  secured   the  unre- 


STEELYARD'S  PRIVILEGES  CONFIRMED    41 

stricted  confirmation  of  its  privileges,  the  annulment 
of  the  judgment  pronounced  against  its  citizens  in 
1468,  and  an  indemnity  of  ;^io,ooo,  without  prejudice 
to  private  claims  for  compensation.  Edward  struggled 
hard  before  he  consented  to  abandon  Cologne  to  its 
fate,  and  refused  to  ratify  the  original  treaty,  in  which 
that  town  was  expressly  mentioned  by  name  as  having 
forfeited  its  right  to  the  franchises  of  the  Steelyard. 
Eventually  another  version  of  the  treaty,  which  pro- 
vided merely  that  no  town  that  had  been  excluded  from 
the  League  should  enjoy  Hanse  privileges  in  England, 
was  ratified,  and  the  ejection  of  Cologne  from  the 
Steelyard  was  stipulated  in  a  separate  instrument. 
Other  benefits  obtained  by  the  League  were  the  full 
freehold  of  its  establishments  in  London,  Boston,  and 
Lynn,  and  the  renewal  of  a  series  of  agreements  with 
the  City  of  London  extending  back  to  the  thirteenth 
century. 

England  once  more  did  a  great  deal  of  giving  and 
very  little  taking.  All  that  Edward's  envoys  could 
obtain  was  a  repetition  of  the  worthless  provisions 
with  regard  to  English  trade  with  Hanse  lands  that 
had  been  contained  in  the  treaty  of  1437.  Even  this 
slender  concession  almost  broke  up  the  peace  con- 
ference, so  obstinately  was  it  contested  by  some  of 
Hanseatics,  and  on  its  account  Dantzic  deferred  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty  for  two  years,  while  some 
of  the  other  towns  chose  to  quit  the  League  rather 
than  undertake  to  comply  with  it.  More  than  a  year 
elapsed  before  Cologne,  thoroughly  humbled  and 
penitent,  w^as  readmitted  to  the  ranks  of  the  Hansa. 

Till  the  close  of  his  reign,  Edward,  unlike  the  other 
contracting  parties,  faithfully  observed  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty,  and  the  Hanse  trade  with  England 
advanced  by  leaps  and  bounds.  The  Easterlings' 
export  of  English  cloth,  which  had  been  4,464  pieces 
in  1423,  and  6,159  in  1461,  rose  by  1500  to  21,389.  But 
as  soon  as  the  battle  of  Bosworth  put  a  final  end  to 
the  Wars  of  the  Roses,  the  outcry  against  the  Hansa 


42     MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

became  louder  and  more  insistent  than  ever.  The 
preferential  conditions  which  the  League  enjoyed  in 
England  could,  in  fact,  be  maintained  only  so  long  as 
the  country  was  embarrassed  by  foreign  campaigns 
or  internecine  strife.  Immediately  after  the  accession 
of  Henry  VII.,  another  epoch  of  complaints,  outrages, 
confiscations,  and  reprisals  was  commenced.  The 
popular  feeling  in  London  against  the  Hansa  showed 
itself  in  attacks  on  German  merchants  in  the  streets, 
and  in  a  determined  attempt  by  a  large  body  of  appren- 
tices to  storm  the  Steelyard  and  rifle  its  warehouses. 
Henry  was  by  no  means  blind  to  the  disadvantages 
under  which  the  industry  and  the  trade  of  his  kingdom 
were  labouring,  and  he  struck  hard  blows  at  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  League  by  statutes  prohibiting  the 
export  of  unshorn  cloth,  and  the  import  of  certain 
commodities,  except  in  British  bottoms,  as  well  as  by 
subsidizing  shipbuilding  and  granting  a  charter  to  the 
Corporation  of  Merchant  Adventurers.  He  also  nego- 
tiated a  treaty  with  Denmark,  w^hich  secured  for 
British  trade  in  that  country  what  were  practically 
most-favoured-nation  terms.  Notwithstanding  these 
and  other  measures  with  the  object  of  stimulating 
English  industrial  and  commercial  life,  and  his  declara- 
tion that  '*  our  merchants  must  be  as  free  in  Prussia 
and  all  other  places  belonging  to  the  Hanse  towns  as 
the  merchants  of  the  Hansa  are  in  England,"  he  seems 
to  have  been  actuated  by  a  sincere  desire  to  give  the 
members  of  the  League  their  lawful  due.  A  provisional 
prolongation  of  the  Utrecht  Treaty  was  agreed  to  by 
a  conference  at  Antwerp  in  149 1,  and  the  grievances 
on  both  sides  for  many  years  past  were  also  discussed 
at  Bruges  in  1499,  but  no  understanding  promising  a 
permanent  settlement  of  the  points  at  issue  was 
reached.  However,  until  the  end  of  this  reign,  no 
further  serious  friction  arose. 

Nor  had  the  Hansa  much  ground  of  complaint  for 
the  first  few  years  after  the  crown  fell  to  Henry  VI 1 1., 
who  refused  to  listen  to  charges  of  piracy  brought 


WOLSEY'S  FIRM  POLICY  43 

against  the  League  by  English  merchants,  and  also 
turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  proposals  of  John  of  Denmark, 
that  he  should  combine  with  him  in  crushing  it.  He  also 
confirmed  the  Peace  of  Utrecht,  besides  giving  repeated 
assurances  that  the  Steelyard  privileges  should  not  be 
impaired  by  Acts  of  Parliament.  It  v^as  only  on  the 
rise  of  Wolsey  to  power  that  a  change  in  this  respect 
took  place  in  English  policy.  The  immediate  pretext 
was  the  seizure  by  Stralsund,  then  engaged  in  v:r.r 
with  Denmark,  of  an  English  ship,  which  was  answered 
by  the  imprisonment  of  the  merchants  of  the  Wendish 
towns  residing  in  London,  and  the  confiscation  of  their 
wares.  The  Hansa  had  so  far  fallen  from  its  former 
arrogance,  that  it  induced  Stralsund  to  consent  to 
make  reparation,  and  to  send  to  London  a  peacemaker, 
who,  however,  achieved  nothing.  A  couple  of  years 
were  wasted  in  futile  efforts  to  agree  to  a  rendezvous 
for  a  conference,  Wolsey  refusing  to  send  envoys  to 
the  Continent,  and  the  Federation  rejecting,  as  humilia- 
ting, his  proposal  that  the  negotiations  should  take 
place  in  London.  Eventually  a  meeting  was  arranged 
at  Bruges  in  July,  1520,  and  this  time  the  English  dele- 
gates absolutely  insisted  on  being  supplied  with  a  list 
of  the  members  of  the  Federation.  After  protracted 
attempts  at  evasion,  they  were  furnished  with  the 
names  of  forty-five  towns.  The  bulk  of  the  time  of 
the  congress  was  consumed  in  legal  arguments  as  to 
the  validity  of  the  Hanse  privileges,  and,  in  the  end, 
it  was  announced,  that  Wolsey  had  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  by  law  these  were  forfeit,  and  that  the 
Steelyard  was  dependent  for  exceptional  treatment 
entirely  on  the  grace  of  the  King.  The  negotiations 
produced  no  definite  result,  the  position  of  the  Hansa 
in  England  became  more  precarious  than  ever,  and 
the  merchants  of  the  Steelyard  were  secretly  advised 
by  the  heads  of  the  League  to  remain  in  London  as 
long  as  possible,  but  to  put  their  charters,  jewels, 
and  plate  in  a  place  of  safety.  Nevertheless  the 
danger  blew  over  once  more,  and  in  the  later  years 


44    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

of  his  reign  Henry  VIII.  found  the  friendship  of  the 
Federation  useful  both  in  his  ecclesiastical  policy  and 
in  his  matrimonial  projects.  For  some  time  the  most 
cordial  relations  existed  between  him  and  Liibeck, 
and  it  would  indeed  appear  that  a  treaty,  by  which  that 
town  was  to  have  undertaken  to  make  over  to  him 
the  Kingdom  of  Denmark  and  to  furnish  him  with 
warships,  was  actually  drafted  for  signature. 

Fresh  bickerings  arose  soon  after  Henry's  death, 
and  the  Easterlings  were  cited  before  the  Privy  Coun- 
cil to  answer  the  charges  of  a  number  of  English  mer- 
chants, whose  agents  had  been  subjected  to  ill-usage 
at  Dantzic  and  Stralsund.  The  proceedings  elicited 
the  interesting  fact  that  in  the  previous  year  the  Hansa 
had  exported  44,000  pieces  of  English  cloth,  whereas 
the  export  of  all  other  traders,  native  and  foreign,  had 
amounted  to  no  more  than  1,100  pieces.  The  decision 
of  the  Council  was  to  the  effect  that  the  Steelyard  was 
not  a  legal  corporation,  and  had  forfeited  all  the  rights 
and  privileges  conferred  upon  it.  The  final  execution 
of  a  decree,  placing  its  members  on  exactly  the  same 
footing  as  other  foreign  merchants  in  England,  was, 
however,  prevented  by  the  death  of  Edward  VI.,  and 
the  brief  rule  of  Mary  brought  the  Hansa  yet  another 
respite.  The  League  did  its  utmost  to  deserve  the 
favour  of  the  new  ruler.  When  Philip  of  Spain  entered 
London  to  lead  her  to  the  altar,  the  Steelyard  spent 
^1,000 — no  inconsiderable  sum  at  that  date — in  cele- 
bration of  the  event,  and  not  long  after,  Liibeck,  to 
gratify  the  Catholic  Queen,  drove  from  its  gates  in  the 
full  rigour  of  winter  the  Protestant  refugees  from 
England  who  had  sought  its  protection. 

The  complete  emancipation  of  England  from  the 
Hansa  yoke  was  the  work  of  that  virile  woman.  Queen 
Elizabeth.  How  blind  the  League  was  to  the  signs  of 
the  times  was  shown  by  the  events  which  occurred  at 
Hamburg  in  the  opening  years  of  her  reign.  The 
Elbe  port  had  evidently  realized  that,  in  the  changed 
conditions  of  the  world,  the  policy  of  unqualified  exclu- 


QUEEN  ELIZABETH'S  EXPULSION  ORDER   45 

sion  could  not  be  upheld,  and,  in  1567,  permitted  the 
Merchant  Adventurers  to  establish  a  factory  within 
its  walls.  The  concession  was  granted  for  a  term  of 
ten  years,  and  before  two  of  them  had  elapsed  the 
turnover  of  the  settlement  had  attained  the  sum  ot 
three  and  a  half  million  thalers.  At  the  instigation  of 
the  Hansa,  a  prolongation  of  the  concession  w^as  refused, 
and  the  League,  no  longer  in  a  position  to  enforce  its 
wishes  by  its  own  strength,  appealed  to  the  Emperor 
and  Reichstag,  who  issued  a  decree  prohibiting  the 
settlement  of  the  Merchant  Adventurers  in  Germany. 

The  final  catastrophe  of  the  Steelyard  was  precipi- 
tated by  England's  war  with  Spain,  to  whom  the 
Easterlings,  in  spite  of  Elizabeth's  emphatic  warnings, 
systematically  furnished  supplies.  No  sooner  had  the 
Armada  been  scattered,  than  Drake  and  Norris  appeared 
in  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus,  and  seized  sixty  German 
vessels,  laden  with  ships'  stores,  which  were  lying  at 
anchor  there.  The  perplexity  and  vacillation  which 
the  Hansa  displayed  when  confronted  by  this  action 
are  clear  signs  of  the  decay  and  impotence  that  had 
fallen  upon  it.  Only  Wismar  seems  to  have  advocated 
the  use  of  force  to  obtain  redress;  the  other  towns 
were  unable  to  agree  as  to  the  course  to  be  followed, 
and  man}^  of  them  were  now  openly  disregarding  the 
order  for  the  expulsion  of  Englishmen  from  their 
territories.  While  a  suspension  of  the  conve3"ance  of 
grain  to,  and  of  cloth  from,  England  was  being  debated, 
Philip  II.  himself  intervened,  and  procured  the  issue 
of  an  imperial  decree  (August  i,  1597)  ordering  all 
Englishmen  to  leave  German  soil  within  three  months. 

With  commendable  promptitude,  Elizabeth  retaliated 
by  expelling  the  Hanse  merchants  from  England.  The 
term  for  their  departure,  originally  fixed  at  fourteen 
days,  w^as  prolonged  to  a  few  months,  but  on  July  25, 
1598,  the  Lord  Mayor  and  Sheriffs  were  charged  by 
the  Privy  Council  to  take  possession  of  the  Steelyard, 
and  ten  days  later  its  members,  headed  by  their 
Alderman,  filed  out  of  their  premises  in  melancholy 


46    MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

procession.  Though  the  Hansa's  property  in  London 
was  restored  to  it  under  James  I.,  its  expulsion  by 
Elizabeth  was  the  final  doom  of  its  power  in  England. 

But  for  the  Hundred  Years'  War  with  France  and 
the  struggle  between  the  houses  of  York  and  Lancaster, 
the  Hansa  would  never  have  been  able  to  win  and 
maintain  its  mercantile  ascendancy  in  England.  As 
soon  as  the  island  kingdom  was  at  peace  at  home  and 
abroad,  the  exactions  of  the  Easterlings  were  felt  to 
be  intolerable.  But  while  its  position  in  England  was 
being  undermined,  the  Hansa  was  steadily  losing 
ground  elsewhere.  The  decline  of  the  German  orders, 
whose  conquests  it  had  exploited  commercially;  the 
extension  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  to  the  sea;  the 
rise  in  Sweden  of  that  most  capable  of  ruling  families, 
the  Wasas  ;  the  independence  of  Holland  ;  the  suppres- 
sion by  the  Princes  of  Moscow  (1478)  of  the  Republic 
of  Novgorod,  which  had  been  the  centre  of  Hanseatic 
trade  in  Russia,  w^ere  all  important  factors  in  bringing 
about  the  collapse  of  the  League.  Everywhere  the 
arrogance,  selfishness,  and  unscrupulousness  of  its 
commercial  policy  raised  it  up  enemies,  who  seized 
the  first  opportunity  of  throwing  off  its  yoke.  Many 
of  the  towns  which  had  once  been  members  of  the 
League,  and  especially  those  of  Brandenburg,  now 
under  the  Hohenzollerns,  had  lost  their  independence 
as  the  German  Princes  waxed  in  power,  and  vv^ere  no 
longer  allowed  to  send  delegates  to  the  Tagfahrten. 
Those  that  remained  free  had  been  weakened  by  the 
revolt  of  the  handicraftsmen  against  the  oligarchic 
rule  of  the  captains  of  commerce,  and  by  religious 
strife.  Moreover,  the  diversity  of  interest  that  existed 
among  the  Hanse  tow^ns  in  consequence  of  their 
geographical  difl'usion  and  their  commercial  difi'er- 
entiation,  had  always  tended  to  become  acuter. 

In  its  commercial  policy  in  the  narrower  sense,  the 
Hansa  showed  an  extraordinary  inability  to  adapt  itself 
to  a  fresh  set  of  conditions.  Instead  of  recognizing 
that  the  world  had  changed,  and  that  the  new  wine 


THE  HANSA'S  NAVAL  FORCES  47 

could  not  be  put  into  the  old  bottles,  it  acted  as  if 
the  circumstances  which  had  favoured  its  ascent  had 
remained  unaltered,  and  wore  itself  out  in  futile 
struggles  to  uphold  the  privileges  it  had  extorted  from 
the  weakness  of  rivals  now  become  strong.  The 
discovery  of  America  and  the  opening  up  of  the 
inexhaustible  resources  of  the  New  World  found  it 
incapable  of  grappling  with  that  great  opportunity. 
Finally,  that  most  fickle  of  fish,  the  herring,  which  had 
done  so  much  to  promote  the  shipping  and  trade  of  the 
Hansa,  deserted  it  in  the  hour  of  its  sorest  need. 
During  the  course  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  shoals 
gradually  abandoned  the  track  which  had  brought  them 
to  the  Sound,  and  appeared  instead  on  the  British  and 
Dutch  coasts,  thus  favouring  the  two  nations  which 
were  successively  to  occupy  the  place  so  long  held  by 
the  League. 

In  conclusion,  a  word  may  be  said  as  to  the  naval  and 
military  forces  of  the  Hansa.  At  the  outset  of  its 
career,  its  warships  w^ere  manned  by  the  burghers 
themselves,  but  as  the  fleet  increased  in  size — it  was 
quadrupled  during  the  first  half  of  the  fifteenth 
century — recourse  to  mercenaries  became  more  and 
more  general.  The  commanders  of  the  ships  were 
invariably  citizens  of  the  towns  which  had  equipped 
them,  and  were  frequently  members  of  the  governing 
council,  while  the  admiral  of  a  fleet  was  always  a 
councillor,  and  usually  a  burgomaster.  The  oflicers 
of  the  land  forces,  which  were  raised  as  occasion 
demanded,  were  principally^  drawn  from  the  im- 
poverished nobility,  whose  members  welcomed  any 
opportunity  of  repairing  their  shattered  fortunes  by 
martial  adventure.  Of  the  naval  resources  of  the 
League,  some  idea  can  be  formed  from  the  fact  that, 
in  the  war  against  the  three  Scandinavian  Kingdoms 
in  1426,  it  sent  out  a  fleet  of  260  ships,  manned  by 
12,000  sailors  and  fighting  men.  For  the  exhausting, 
if  not  inglorious,  seven  years'  w^ar  against  Gustav 
VVasa's  successor,  Lubeck  alone  fitted  out  18  men-of- 


48     MARITIME  ASCENDANCY  IN  THE  PAST 

war,  of  which  one,  the  Adlcr  carried  400  sailors, 
500  fighting  men,  and  150"  constables."  Her  armament 
consisted  of  8  carthouns,  6  demi-carthouns,  26  culverins, 
and  many  smaller  pieces  of  ordnance.  Among  her 
munitions  were  6,000  cannon-balls  and  300  hundred- 
weight of  powder.  Such  was  the  type  of  vessel  with 
which  Germany  "last  armed  for  a  naval  war." 

It  is  an  interesting  fact,  in  view  of  modern  con- 
troversies, that,  in  its  naval  wars,  the  Hansa  asserted 
the  principle  that  hostile  ships  make  hostile  goods  and 
that  hostile  goods  make  hostile  ships. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET  AND  COLONIES 

In  one  of  the  window  niches  on  the  ground  floor  of 
the  Military  Museum  (Zeughaus)  at  Berlin  lies  an  old 
and  dilapidated  8-pounder  gun.  In  its  deep  and  dis- 
figuring coat  of  rust  it  is  an  inconspicuous  object,  and, 
amid  that  rich  and  varied  collection  of  artillery  from 
all  the  ages,  the  eye  of  the  casual  visitor  will  not  rest 
upon  it  for  more  than  a  disparaging  moment.  And 
yet  few  of  the  treasures  of  the  museum  have  a  more 
interesting  history  to  tell,  for  it  is  the  sole  remaining 
relic  of  the  first  serious  experiment  in  naval  and 
colonial  policy  ever  made  by  a  German  ruler.  On 
an  elevation  rising  from  the  beach  of  Cape  Three 
Points,  on  the  Gold  Coast,  now  British  territory,  are 
still  to  be  seen  the  crumbling  ruins  of  the  fort  of 
Gross-Friedrichsburg,  built  there  by  the  Elector  of 
Brandenburg  in  1681,  and  when  the  German  corvette 
Sophie  visited  the  spot,  with  pious  purpose,  in  1884, 
this  corroded  gun  was  unearthed  from  beneath  the 
weeds  and  brushwood  that  have  overgrown  the 
decayed  ramparts. 

Frederick  William,  the  Great  Elector,  has  been 
exemplary  for  many  of  his  successors.  Frederick  the 
Great  rightly  considered  him  the  most  able  of  the 
previous  Princes  of  the  house  of  Hohenzollern,  while 
the  present  German  Emperor  has  made  a  special  cult 
of  his  memory,  and  assuredly  had  a  symbolic  intention 
when  he  appeared  at  a  fancy-dress  ball  disguised  as 
the  first  of  his  ancestors  who  equipped  a  fleet  and 
founded  a  colony. 

49  4 


50     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

When  Frederick  William  was  called  to  the  Branden- 
burg throne  in  1641  at  the  age  of  twenty,  Germany  was 
still  in  the  throes  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  and  no  part 
of  the  Empire  had  suffered  more  than  his  Electorate 
from  the  consequences  of  that  unspeakable  calamity. 
Of  all  the  causes  which  have  contributed  to  impede 
the  normal  development  of  the  painstaking  and  indus- 
trious German  race,  none  had  so  malign  an  influence 
as  that  stupendous  conflict.  It  not  merely  dela^^ed 
civilization,  but  over  vast  tracts  of  country  positively 
exterminated  it.  At  the  close  of  the  war  many  once 
flourishing  towns  had  absolutely  disappeared  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  and  where  formerly  a  numerous 
peasantry  had  tilled  its  fertile  fields  a  howling  wilder- 
ness extended  in  all  directions  as  far  as  the  eye  could 
reach.  In  North  Germany  to-day  an  apparently  pur- 
poseless pond,  or  a  detached  clump  of  venerable  trees, 
still  shows  where  once  a  village  stood,  and  bears  mute 
witness  to  the  ruthless  barbarity  with  which  the  re- 
ligious partition  of  Central  Europe  was  brought  about. 

When  an  end  was  put  to  the  bloodshed  and  rapine 
by  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  (1648),  the  population  of 
Germany  had  been  reduced  to  one  half — in  some  dis- 
tricts to  one  tenth — of  its  former  dimensions.  Many 
portions  of  the  Empire  are  even  to-day  not  so  thickly  in- 
habited as  they  were  before  the  war.  Industry  and  com- 
merce had  migrated  to  England,  France,  and  Holland; 
and  Leipzig  and  Frankfort  were  the  only  German  towns 
that  had  retained  any  trade  worthy  of  mention.  The 
Hansa,  with  its  fleets  of  warships  and  merchantmen,  was 
but  a  memory  of  the  past.  Konigsberg  had  no  longer 
a  ship  of  its  own ;  the  trade  of  Dantzig  and  Stettin 
was  almost  entirely  carried  in  foreign  bottoms;  and 
even  Hamburg,  which  directly  had  been  but  compara- 
tively little  touched  by  the  thirty  years  of  chaos  and 
turmoil,  and  had  benefited  from  its  exceptional  con- 
nection with  England,  was  left  commercially  crippled. 
At  a  Hanse  Parliament  held  in  1630,  only  Hamburg, 
Lubeck,  and  Bremen  were  represented.     Germany  had 


THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  WAR  51 

been  so  drained  of  money  that  barter  had  generally 
taken  the  place  of  purchase  by  coin  ;  wages  were  paid 
in  the  products  of  labour,  grain,  ore,  and  manu- 
factured goods,  and  even  state  officials  in  some  cases 
received  their  salaries  in  kind. 

Even  before  the  war  broke  out,  Brandenburg,  a 
country  of  barren  soil  and  few  natural  resources,  had 
stood  far  below  the  rest  of  Germany  both  materially 
and  intellectually.  In  1600  the  twin  towns,  Berlin 
and  Coin,  which  faced  one  another  from  opposite 
banks  of  the  Spree,  and  have  since  been  merged  to 
form  the  colossal  capital  of  the  new  Empire,  contained 
together  no  more  than  14,000  souls.  Brandenburg 
and  Frankfort-on-Oder  each  had  a  population  of  10,000. 
Only  two  other  towns,  Stendal  and  Salzwedel,  could 
boast  more  than  5,000  inhabitants.  And  it  was  of  the 
mere  ruins  of  this  country  that  Frederick  William 
formed  the  foundation-stone  of  the  Prussian  Kingdom 
and  of  the  German  Empire  of  to-day. 

If  the  Thirty  Years'  War  had  produced  any  form  of 
national  consolidation,  if  it  had  increased  the  authority 
of  the  Empire  or  resulted  in  the  absorption  of  the 
smaller  States  by  the  larger,  that  would  at  least  have 
been  some  compensation  to  Germany  for  its  long  and 
terrible  ordeal.  But  exactly  the  opposite  was  the  case. 
The  w^ar  ceased  simply  because  no  one  had  the  will  or 
the  strength  to  continue  it,  and  a  miserable  com- 
promise was  the  result.  The  only  gainers  were  the 
Princes,  who,  as  the  wielders  of  the  armed  forces,  had 
been  able  to  enhance  their  power,  and  now  acquired  a 
larger  measure  of  independence  in  their  relationships 
to  the  Emperor.  Their  number  remained  legion. 
In  the  Germany  mapped  out  by  the  Westphalian 
negotiators  there  were  eight  electors,  sixty-nine 
spiritual  and  ninety-six  temporal  Princes,  sixty-one 
imperial  towns,  and  a  multitude  of  Counts  and  Barons 
exercising  various  degrees  of  sovereign  power. 

Frederick  William's  claim  to  the  title  "  Great,"  which 
was  bestowed  upon  him  by  his  own  generation,  has 


52     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

been  contested,  but  may  be  allowed  to  pass.  As 
military  leader,  diplomatist,  organizer,  and  adminis- 
trator, he  certainly  had  unusual  gifts.  Above  all,  he 
excelled  in  duplicity  and  treachery.  The  most  eminent 
living  German  historian  has  said  of  him  that  "  both 
in  internal  and  external  politics  he  acted  with  an 
unscrupulousness  so  manifest  that  it  cannot  be  pal- 
liated," and  can  find  no  better  excuse  for  his  many 
deeds  of  ''faithlessness"  and  "double-dealing"  than 
that,  in  this  respect,  he  was  merely  "  the  master  of  the 
diplomatic  art  of  his  day."  The  Elector  was  actuated 
solel}^  by  his  own  personal  and  dynastic  interests,  and 
was  utterly  devoid  of  "  German "  patriotism,  for  in 
return  for  the  liberal  subsidies  on  which  he  prospered, 
he  undertook,  in  a  secret  treaty,  to  support  a  candi- 
dature of  the  French  King  or  Dauphin  for  the  Imperial 
German  throne,  and  he  was  mainly  responsible  for  the 
truce  which  left  Strasburg  in  French  hands  for  nearly 
two  centuries.  During  the  incessant  wars  which  filled 
up  most  of  his  reign  he  fought  both  with  and  against 
every  other  belligerent.  His  sword  w^as  always  at 
the  disposal  of  the  highest  bidder,  either  of  hard  cash 
or  of  territorial  extension,  and  by  adroit  choice  of  the 
moment  for  changing  sides  he  generally  made  a  profit- 
able bargain.  True,  he  was  obliged  to  restore  the 
western  portion  of  Pomerania  w^hich  he  had  con- 
quered from  the  Swedes,  but  he  obtained  a  much 
more  important  acquisition — the  recognition  of  his  full 
sovereignty  in  what  is  now  East  Prussia. 

That  region  had  been  wrested  from  the  Slavs  by  the 
German  orders  of  chivalry,  founded  at  the  time  of  the 
Crusades,  and  had  subsequently  become  an  evan- 
gelical duchy,  ruled  by  a  junior  branch  of  the  house 
of  Hohenzollern,  as  a  fief  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland. 
On  the  extinction  of  the  Ducal  line,  it  had  reverted  to 
the  rulers  of  Brandenburg,  and  by  a  timely  sale  of  his 
military  assistance,  first  to  the  Swedes  and  then  to  the 
Poles,  the  Great  Elector  induced  both  to  admit  his 
unrestricted  and  unqualified  rights  of  sovereignty  in 


THE  ELECTOR'S  DREAMS  OF  SEA-POWER    53 

the  duchy.  His  successor  persuaded  the  Emperor  to 
agree  to  his  assumption  of  the  kingly  title  for  this 
territor}^,  and  it  is  an  interesting  fact — especially  in 
view  of  the  last  development  of  the  German  Empire, 
which  in  its  present  constitutional  form  and  in  much 
else  is  dependent  upon  Catholic  support — that  this 
elevation  was  largely  brought  about  by  the  interven- 
tion of  two  Jesuit  fathers.  It  was  from  the  Kingdom 
of  Prussia,  which  was  thus  established,  and  which  was 
a  completely  independent  State,  altogether  outside  the 
competencies  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  that  arose 
the  Hohenzollern  ascendancy  in  Germany,  and  round 
it  that  the  new  German  Empire  crystallized.  For  this 
reason  the  episode  is  quite  germane  to  our  present 
purpose. 

The  Germans  excel  as  diligent  pupils  and  patient 
imitators,  and  the  Great  Elector  was  no  exception  to 
this  rule.  From  his  fourteenth  to  his  eighteenth  year 
he  had  been  educated  under  the  care  of  Frederick 
Henry,  the  Statthalter  of  Holland,  then  the  chief  Sea- 
Power  of  the  world,  from  whom  he  had  imbibed  many 
ideas  as  to  the  importance  of  navies,  colonies,  and  sea- 
borne trade.  His  connection  with  the  Netherlands 
was  maintained  and  strengthened  by  his  marriage 
with  an  Orange  Princess,  the  aunt  of  William  HI.  of 
England,  and  many  Dutchmen  entered  his  service. 
Among  them  was  an  ex-admiral,  Gijsels  by  name,  who 
assiduously  kept  alive  the  dreams  of  sea-power  which 
the  Elector  had  brought  back  with  him  from  Holland. 
It  was  on  his  prompting  that,  in  1659,  when  Frederick 
William  was  embroiled  with  the  Swedes,  and  found 
his  operations  hampered  by  the  lack  of  a  fleet,  an 
enquiry  as  to  the  possibility  of  remedying  this  de  - 
ficiency  was  ordered  by  the  Elector.  The  investiga- 
tion resulted,  for  the  time  being,  onh^  in  the  compilation 
of  a  memorandum  as  to  a  "  Brandenburg-Imperial 
admiralty,"  and  some  fruitless  attempts  to  obtain  ships 
in  the  Netherlands. 

But  Gijsels'  projects  went  far  beyond  a  mere  fleet. 


54     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

All  the  world  was  then  discussing  the  colonizing 
activity  of  the  western  European  States,  and  Frederick 
William's  predecessor  on  the  Electoral  throne  had 
conceived  abortive  plans  for  founding  an  East  Indian 
trading  company.  What  the  ex-admiral  proposed  to 
the  Elector  in  1660  was,  that  Brandenburg,  Austria, 
and  Spain  should  combine  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
a  colonial  ascendancy,  which  was  to  be  arrived  at  by 
playing  off  England,  France,  and  Holland  against  one 
another.  Negotiations  to  this  end  seem  actually  to 
have  been  commenced,  but  they  broke  down  over  the 
jealous  suspicions  of  the  diplomatists  approached,  and 
the  perpetual  turning  of  the  European  kaleidoscope. 

During  the  next  fifteen  years  the  idea  of  a  Branden- 
burg navy  appears  to  have  been  allowed  to  sleep.  In 
the  meantime  a  very  remarkable  book  had  been  pub- 
lished, which  should  be  mentioned  here  because  it 
contains  the  essential  elements  of  the  programme  of 
the  most  modern  naval  agitation  in  Germany.  The 
author  was  Johann  JBecher,  by  profession  a  chemist, 
but  in  his  leisure  a  political  seer  of  the  type  of  Fried- 
rich  List,  whose  great  forerunner  he  was.  His  work^ 
"  Political  Discourse  on  the  Causes  of  the  Rise  and 
Decline  of  Towns  and  Countries,"  was  published  in 
1667.     Becher  had  travelled  much,  and  he  wrote: 

"  In  Germany  there  is  hardly  any  longer  trade  or 
commerce ;  all  business  is  going  to  ruin  ;  no  money  is 
to  be  found  with  either  great  or  small;  on  the  other 
hand  look  at  Holland,  how  rich  she  is  and  how  she 
grows  richer  every  day;  that  could  not  be  if  she 
feared  the  sea  as  much  as  our  nation  of  High  Germany." 

Becher  then  addressed  to  his  countrymen  the 
following  impassioned  exhortation : 

"  Up,  then,  brave  German;  act  so  that  on  the  map, 
besides  New  Spain,  New  France,  New  England,  there 
shall  in  the  future  be  found  also  New  Germany.  You 
are  as  little  lacking  as  other  nations  in  the  intelligence 
and  resolution  to  do  such  things ;  yea,  you  have  all 


X 


THE  BRANDENBURG  NAVY  FOUNDED  55 

that  is  necessary ;  you  are  soldiers  and  peasants,  alert, 
laborious,  diligent,  and  indefatigable." 

Becher  had  held  positions  at  various  German 
Courts,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  his  appeal  fell 
upon  sympathetic  ears  among  the  entourage  of  the 
Great  Elector.  But  however  that  may  be,  the  war 
of  Denmark  and  Brandenburg  against  Sweden,  which 
broke  out  in  1675,  did  actuall}^,  for  the  first  time  in 
history,  witness  a  fleet  at  the  disposal  of  a  member 
of  the  dynasty  that  now  occupies  the  imperial  throne 
in  Germany.  True,  it  was  not  yet  the  actual  property 
of  the  Elector,  but  of  Benjamin  Raule,  an  enterprising 
Dutch  merchant,  who  had  migrated  to  Denmark,  and 
now  laid  a  naval  project  before  the  Brandenburg 
sovereign.  His  proposals  were  readily  acceded  to, 
and  he  received  permission  to  fit  out  a  flotilla  of  tw^o 
frigates  and  ten  smaller  vessels,  and  to  operate  with 
them  under  the  Brandenburg  flag  against  the  Swedes. 
The  Elector  merely  stipulated  that  he  should  receive 
6  per  cent,  of  the  value  of  all  prizes  captured.  Raule's 
vessels  rendered  substantial  service  in  the  capture  of 
Stettin,  and  of  that  much-coveted  strip  of  the  Pome- 
ranian coast  which  was  so  essential  to  the  reali- 
zation of  Frederick  William's  maritime  aspirations. 

The  Elector's  hopes  were  disappointed  by  the 
Treaty  of  St.  Germain,  under  which  he  was  compelled 
to  restore  this  precious  booty  to  the  intrusive 
Scandinavians,  but  in  the  meantime  his  naval  plans 
had  taken  a  wider  scope  in  fresh  contracts  with  the 
resourceful  Dutchman.  In  the  first  of  these,  Raule 
undertook,  for  a  monthly  subsidy  of  5,000  thalers,*  to 
maintain  a  fleet  of  eight  frigates  and  a  fire-ship, 
mounting  altogether  182  guns.  Shortly  afterwards 
the  terms  of  the  agreement  were  extended,  and  at  the 
commencement  of  the  year  1680,  twenty-eight  ships 
of  war,  with  a  total  of  502  guns,  were  flying  the  red 
eagle  of  Brandenburg. 

*  Thaler  then  =  about  4s.  6d. 


56     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

Though  robbed  by  the  peace  of  the  coast-hne  and 
seaports  on  which  he  had  counted  as  the  base  of  his 
maritime  power  and  the  recruiting  ground  for  his 
fleet,  the  Elector  did  not  allow  himself  to  be  discour- 
aged, and  he  very  soon  found  fresh  work  for  his  little 
flotilla  to  do.  The  greatest  master  of  German  mercen- 
aries at  that  date,  he  had,  a  few  years  previously, 
hired  a  portion  of  his  army  to  Spain  for  use  against 
the  French.  As  repeated  applications  for  the  price  of 
this  support  had  proved  unavailing,  he  now  determined 
to  collect  the  debt,  which  amounted  to  1,800,000  thalers, 
by  forcible  distraint. 

Accordingly  six  ships,  which  were  followed  at  an 
interval  of  some  months  by  three  others,  were  sent 
out  to  attempt  to  intercept  the  silver  fleet  on  its  way  to 
the  Spanish  Netherlands.  The  vessels  were  almost 
without  exception  commanded  by  Dutchmen,  but  were 
mainly  manned  by  Germans,  though  the  crew^s  included 
many  English,  Dutch,  Danish  and  Norwegian  sailors. 
Naturally  the  soldiers  carried  on  board  were  drawn 
from  the  Brandenburg  army  ;  and  orders  were  given 
that  they  should  be  trained  in  ship's  work  "because 
we  are  disposed  to  use  the  same  permanently  for  the 
nav3^" 

Though  the  flotilla  did  not  fulfil  either  its  immediate 
or  its  ultimate  purpose,  the  expedition  was  notable  for 
two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  a  large  Spanish  war- 
ship, the  Carolus  Seciindus^  with  a  valuable  cargo  of 
lace  on  board,  was  captured,  and  so  became  the  first 
war  vessel  that  w^as  actually  the  property  of  a  Hohen- 
zoUern  State.  In  the  second  place,  the  quest  of  the 
Spanish  silver  resulted  in  a  sea-fight,  which,  in  respect 
both  of  the  force  engaged  and  the  losses  sustained, 
still  heads  the  record  of  naval  warfare  under  a  Hohen- 
zoUern  flag. 

A  detachment  of  four  ships,  cruising  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Cape  St.  Vincent,  sighted  a  fleet  of  a  dozen 
Spanish  frigates,  which  had  put  out  for  the  special 
purpose  of  chasing  the  Germans  from  the  sea.     The 


A  GERMAN  NAVAL  DEFEAT      57 

Brandenburg  commander,  thinking  that  this  was  the 
anxiously-expected  silver  flotilla,  bore  down  upon  it, 
and  did  not  realize  his  mistake  till  it  was  too  late  to 
avoid  something  of  a  conflict.  Before  he  could  succeed 
in  manoeuvring  his  ships  out  of  range  of  his  over- 
whelmingly superior  enemy,  he  had  lost  ten  men  killed 
and  thirty  wounded ;  and  since  that  day  Germany  has 
fought  no  more  terrible  battle  on  the  sea. 

Another  section  of  the  Elector's  fleet  cruised  for 
several  months  in  West  Indian  waters  without  achiev- 
ing much  result,  while  the  retaliatory  measures  adopted 
by  the  Spaniards  secured  a  safe  passage  for  the  silver 
ships  and  rendered  it  prudent  for  Frederick  William  to 
abandon  his  daring  and  risky  enterprise. 

Meanwhile  the  Elector  had  allotted  his  infant  navy  a 
task  of  a  different  character.  Soon  after  entering  the 
service  of  Brandenburg,  Raule  had  drawn  up  plans  of 
colonization,  and  in  the  same  year  in  which  the  fruitless 
search  for  the  silver  convoy  began,  he  obtained  per- 
mission to  try  his  luck  on  the  Gold  Coast,  and  got 
together  a  syndicate  to  finance  the  undertaking.  The 
Elector  was  wary,  and  declined  to  risk  pecuniary 
participation,  but  he  ordered  that  "twenty  good 
healthy  musketeers,  together  with  two  non-commis- 
sioned officers,"  should  be  placed  under  Raule's  com- 
mand. One  of  the  principal  objects  of  the  expedition 
was  to  secure  a  share  in  the  profitable  trade  in  slaves 
which  was  then  carried  on  between  the  West  Coast 
of  Africa  and  North  America,  but  modern  German 
historians  for  the  most  part  ignore  this  feature  of  the 
enterprise. 

The  two  vessels  despatched  on  this  errand  reached 
the  Gold  Coast  in  safet}^,  but  aroused  the  resentment 
of  the  Dutch  already  settled  there,  who  confiscated  one 
of  them,  and  compelled  the  other  to  quit  African 
waters.  However,  the  leader  of  the  expedition  had 
by  that  time  managed  to  conclude  what  served  the 
purposes  of  a  treaty  with  certain  native  chiefs,  who 
thereby  placed  themselves  under  the  suzerainty  of  the 


58     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

Elector,  and  consented  to  the  erection  of  a  fort  in  the 
district  under  their  control. 

On  the  strength  of  this  questionable  document,  an 
"  African  Company  "  for  the  "  improvement  of  shipping 
and  commerce  wherein  the  best  prosperity  of  a  country 
consists,"  was  called  into  existence  in  the  year  1682. 
In  the  charter  of  incorporation,  the  Elector  promised 
to  protect  the  Company  against  "  all  and  everyone 
who  may  undertake  to  trouble,  incommode,  or  to  any 
extent  injure  the  same  in  its  actions  in  free  places  on 
the  coasts  of  Guinea  and  Angola  ";  but  both  the  naval 
and  the  military  commanders  were  charged  to  keep 
at  a  respectful  distance  from  "  all  Dutch  Company 
fortresses,  as  well  as  those  of  other  potentates,  such 
as  England,  France,  Denmark,  etc."  The  capital  of  the 
Company  was  the  modest  sum  of  50,000  thalers.  Of 
this  Frederick  William  contributed  only  8,000,  and  the 
Electoral  Prince  2,000  thalers,  while  almost  half  of  the 
total  was  supplied  by  Raule,  who  had  by  now  become 
"Director-General  of  the  Brandenburg  Navy." 

The  two  frigates  in  which  the  second  Gold  Coast 
expedition  shipped  cast  anchor  off  Cape  Three 
Points  on  December  27,  1682,  but  some  difficulty  was 
experienced  in  finding  the  chiefs  who  had  ''signed" 
the  provisional  treaty  and  who  were  each  to  have 
received  a  ratification  engrossed  in  letters  of  gold, 
"a  silver-gilt  cup,  and  a  portrait  of  his  Electoral  High- 
ness." Frederick  William  had  also  issued  instruc- 
tions that  his  black  allies  and  their  wives  were  to  be 
entertained  on  board  the  warships. 

After  a  great  deal  of  trouble,  some  other  chieftains 
of  the  "  Moors,"  as  they  are  called  in  the  official  corre- 
spondence relating  to  this  matter,  were  hunted  out 
and  induced  to  contract  a  second  and  definitive  treaty; 
and  on  January  i,  1683,  with  due  ceremony  and  much 
beating  of  drums,  blowing  of  trumpets,  and  firing  of 
guns,  the  Brandenburg  flag  was  hoisted  over  "  the 
first  German  colony."  The  flagstaff'  had  been  planted 
on  a  little  eminence,  which  was  subsequently,  with  all 


"ADMIRALTY"  AT  BERLIN  FOUNDED     59 

speed,  transformed  into  the  fort  Gross-Friedrichsburg, 
and  no  doubt  the  rusty  cannon  now  in  the  Zeughaus 
at  Berlin  is  one  of  the  half-dozen  which  had  been 
mounted  on  the  hill  on  the  previous  day  in  preparation 
for  the  great  occasion. 

In  the  following  3^ear  the  headquarters  of  the  African 
Company  was  removed  from  Pillau  to  Emden.  This 
latter  town  was  not  situated  on  Brandenburg  soil,  and 
the  manner  in  which  the  Elector  secured  a  footing  in 
it  is  both  instructive  and  characteristic  of  his  easy 
methods  of  intervening  and  making  a  good  bargain 
wherever  an  opportunity  presented  itself.  It  chanced 
that  at  that  time  the  Estates  of  East  Frisia  were  at 
loggerheads  with  their  ruler,  and  they  appealed  to 
Frederick  William  for  assistance.  Nothing  loth,  he 
landed  a  force  by  night,  and  by  a  surprise  attack  seized 
the  castle  of  Greetsiel,  which  thus  became  his  naval 
base.  By  an  agreement  with  the  town  of  Emden  he 
subsequently  acquired  the  right  to  station  within  its 
walls  a  "compagnie  de  marine"  for  the  service  of  the 
African  Corporation.  This  force,  which  was  gradually 
increased  to  three,  and  temporarily  to  four,  companies, 
and  ultimately  received  the  name  of  the  "  Marine 
Battalion,"  was  drawn  upon  to  man  both  the  ships  and 
the  forts  in  Africa. 

The  transfer  to  Emden  brought  other  advantages 
besides  an  ice-free  port,  a  base  on  the  North  Sea,  and 
an  abbreviation  of  the  route  to  Gross-Friedrichsburg 
for  the  East  Frisian  Estates  and  the  Elector  of  Cologne 
were  both  persuaded  to  invest  largely  in  the  African 
Company  in  consequence  of  the  change. 

In  the  year  of  the  Emden  agreement,  the  Branden- 
burg Navy  was  formally  founded  by  the  estabhshment 
of  an  "Admiralty"  at  Berlin.  The  Cabinet  order  by 
which  this  institution  was  created  shows  that  the  fleet 
then  in  full  possession  of  the  State  comprised  10  ships, 
with  240  guns,  while  Raule  was  still  under  contract  to 
provide  17  further  vessels.  The  permanent  personnel 
consisted    of    i    vice-commodore,    5    naval    captains, 


6o     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

3  officers  of  Marines,  12  mates,  and  120  seamen.  In 
1686,  the  Elector  took  the  Company  entirely  into  his 
own  hands,  and  simultaneously  acquired  a  station  on 
the  island  of  St.  Thomas,  in  the  West  Indies,  as  a  place 
of  call  for  the  ships  engaged  in  the  slave  traffic.  He 
had  also  at  that  time  made  preparations  for  forming  an 
East  Indian  trading  company  (at  a  much  earlier  date  he 
had  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  acquire  Tranquebar, 
on  the  Coromandel  Coast,  from  the  Danes)  and  for 
fitting  out  an  expedition  to  China  and  Japan.  These 
schemes,  however,  came  to  nothing. 

The  settlement  at  Cape  Three  Points  had  by  no 
means  an  easy  existence.  Fever  made  fearful  ravages 
among  the  garrison,  which,  when  the  first  reliefs  ar- 
rived, after  an  interval  of  nearly  a  year  and  three- 
quarters,  had  been  reduced  by  sickness  from  ninety 
to  sixteen  men.  Everything  that  was  needed  for  the 
construction  of  the  fort,  even  building-stone,  had  to 
be  brought  thousands  of  miles  across  the  sea  from 
Germany.  The  Dutch  traders  in  the  neighbourhood 
had  at  once  raised  objections  to  the  new  colony,  and, 
as  their  protests  were  unheeded,  stirred  up  the  natives 
against  its  members.  It  was  only  after  prolonged 
negotiations  at  The  Hague  that  the  Elector  secured 
a  full  recognition  of  his  right  to  the  settlement.  And 
none  the  less  the  Dutch  West  India  Company  con- 
tinued to  harass  the  German  colonists,  appropriating 
their  ships,  and  turning  them  out  of  a  couple  of  sub- 
sidiary fortifications  which  they  had  erected  at  other 
points  along  the  coast.  Gross-Friedrichsburg  and 
Taccroma,  another  of  the  four  Brandenburg  stations 
on  the  Guinea  littoral,  for  several  years  maintained 
themselves  only  by  the  menace  of  their  guns.  These 
untoward  events  are  believed  to  have  preyed  upon  the 
mind  of  the  Great  Elector,  and  to  have  hastened  his 
end.  At  the  time  of  his  death,  in  April,  1688,  Branden- 
burg and  Holland  were  on  the  brink  of  war  over  the 
Gold  Coast  affair. 

His  successor  on  the  Electoral  throne  in  one  very 


FAILURE  OF  COLONIAL  ENTERPRISE     6i 

important  respect  reaped  what  Frederick  William  had 
sown,  for  he  obtained  the  title  of  King  of  Prussia,  by 
virtue  of  which,  far  more  than  from  any  specifically 
imperial  prerogatives,  William  II.  holds  his  present 
power  in  Germany.  Frederick  I.  was  a  vain  man, 
who  was  more  interested  in  appearances  than  in 
realities,  and  cared  more  for  the  pomp  and  ceremonies 
of  Court  life  than  for  the  solid  business  of  colonization 
and  slave-trading.  As  a  source  of  revenue,  with  which 
to  defray  the  cost  of  his  empty  extravagances,  the 
African  undertaking  was  feebly  encouraged  to  con- 
tinue its  w^ork ;  but,  deprived  of  the  directing  brain 
and  the  stimulatmg  enthusiasm  of  its  founder,  it  soon 
sickened  and  languished.  Accada  and  Taccarary,  the 
two  settlements  which  had  been  seized  by  the  Dutch, 
were  delivered  up  after  a  lengthy  squabble,  but  the 
fortifications  of  the  latter  had  been  destroyed,  and 
they  were  not  rebuilt. 

At  first  the  trade  of  the  colony,  which  had  called 
into  existence  a  flourishing  shipyard  at  Havelberg, 
near  the  junction  of  the  Havel  and  the  Elbe,  was 
fairly  satisfactory,  and  the  spirit  of  the  Brandenburg 
Navy  was  raised  by  the  successful  operations  of  a 
couple  of  its  frigates  against  French  merchantmen, 
but  in  1697  the  Company  fell  upon  evil  days.  It 
suffered  pecuniary  loss,  both  through  the  capture 
of  some  of  its  ships  by  the  French  and  through 
the  peculations  of  several  officials,  whose  multiple  dis- 
honesty hints  at  a  scandalous  laxity  of  control.  The 
invaluable  Raule,  too,  fell  into  disfavour,  and  spent 
four  years  in  gaol,  though  he  was  reinstated  in  his 
position  on  being  liberated.  At  last  the  Company 
was  no  longer  able  to  send  out  ships  of  its  own,  and 
for  eight  years,  during  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succes- 
sion, the  garrison  of  Gross-Friedrichsburg  was  left 
entirely  to  itself  For  a  considerable  portion  of  that 
time  five  large  Brandenburg  ships  of  war  were  rotting 
in  the  harbours  of  Emden  and  Hamburg,  when  they 
might  have  been  much  more  profitably  employed  in 


62     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

attempting  to  keep  up  communications  with  the 
perishing  colonists.  When  at  last  reliefs  reached 
Gross-Friedrichsburg  only  seven  men  out  of  an  original 
force  of  1,700  were  fit  for  duty. 

What  little  credit  attaches  to  the  last  days  of  the 
first  German  colony  is  the  due  of  Jan  Cuny,  a  native 
chief,  who  had  placed  himself  under  Brandenburg 
protection,  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
support  against  the  English  and  Dutch  settlements 
of  the  vicinity,  with  both  of  which  he  was  at  feud.  It 
is  characteristic  of  the  period  that,  while  Prussians  were 
fighting  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  English  and  Dutch 
on  the  continent  of  Europe,  they  were  in  open  conflict 
with  them  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa.  Frederick  I. 
at  one  time  thought  it  necessary  to  protest,  through 
his  Minister  at  London,  against  the  difficulties  which 
the  English  were  causing  him  on  the  Gold  Coast. 

All  the  trouble  seems  to  have  arisen  out  of  the 
demand  made  by  a  Dutch  official  at  Axim  for  the 
surrender  of  a  female  relative  of  Cuny  whom  he 
claimed  as  his  slave.  Jan  was  evidently  a  man  of  con- 
siderable parts.  He  led  his  army  with  great  discretion 
and  resourcefulness,  and  no  doubt  the  Prussians 
at  Gross-Friedrichsburg  thought  it  to  their  advan- 
tage to  be  on  good  terms  with  so  formidable  a 
warrior,  especially  as  he  w^as  the  sworn  foe  of  their 
jealous  European  neighbours.  At  any  rate,  the  relations 
between  Cuny  and  the  fort  became  both  cordial  and 
confiding,  and  when  the  last  Governor  of  Gross- 
Friedrichsburg,  Du  Bois,  discouraged  by  the  indiffer- 
ence and  neglect  of  the  home  authorities,  sailed  for 
Emden  to  enter  remonstrances,  he  entrusted  the  pro- 
tection of  the  colony  to  his  black  ally. 

Du  Bois  arrived  in  Europe  only  to  find  that  the  doom 
of  Gross-Friedrichsburg  was  already  irrevocably  sealed. 
The  parsimonious  Frederick  William  I.,  the  father  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  had  ascended  the  Prussian  throne, 
and  his  careful  mind,  completely  absorbed  by  plans  of 
immediate   economy,   was    incapable   of   taking  such 


SALE  OF  GERMANY'S  FIRST  COLONY     63 

flights  into  the  distance  and  the  future  as  were 
necessary  for  the  appreciation  of  the  value  of  colonial 
policy.  The  African  settlements  had  been  doing  badly 
and  had  become  unremunerative,  and  his  only  thought 
was  to  dispose  of  them  as  speedily  as  possible  for  hard 
cash,  which  could  be  either  hoarded  or  spent  on  his 
solitary  extravagance — seven-foot  grenadiers.  Im- 
mediately after  his  accession,  he  instructed  his 
representative  in  London  that  he  was  prepared  to 
**  transfer  his  forts  on  the  coast  of  Guinea  to  anyone 
else  upon  easy  conditions."  He  was  not  long  in  finding 
a  purchaser  in  that  very  Dutch  West  India  Company 
which  had  from  the  outset  been  a  thorn  in  the  side  of 
the  Great  Elector's  colonial  enterprise.  On  November 
22,  1717,  Gross-Friedrichsburg  and  its  dependent 
territory  passed  from  Hohenzollern  rule  for  the  sum 
of  6,000  ducats  and  twelve  negro  boys,  of  whom  it 
was  stipulated  that  six.  should  be  adorned  with  golden 
chains. 

The  signing  of  the  contract  and  its  execution  were, 
however,  two  very  different  things.  The  redoubtable 
Jan  Cuny  had  not  been  reckoned  with,  and  when  two 
Dutch  vessels  arrived  to  take  over  the  fort  they  found 
him  in  possession  and  fl3nng  the  Prussian  flag.  The 
order  for  the  transfer  of  the  fort  was  shown  to  his 
emissaries,  who,  after  a  good  deal  of  delay,  were  sent 
on  board  the  ships,  but  this  he  flatly  refused  to  recog- 
nize, declaring  that  he  would  yield  up  his  trust  only  to 
a  vessel  belonging  to  the  King  of  Prussia.  The  com- 
mander of  the  Dutch  expedition.  Captain  van  der 
Hoeven,  thought  he  would  make  short  work  of  this 
insolent  chieftain,  and  landed  a  body  of  fifty  men  to 
take  the  fort  by  storm.  But  Cuny  once  again  showed 
the  generalship  which  had  raised  him  to  the  eminence 
of  a  Prussian  deputy-governor.  A  force  of  1,800  natives 
fusilladed  the  landing  party  from  an  ambuscade  and 
killed  nearly  every  one  of  them.  Hoeven  was  only 
able  to  save  himself  by  swimming  back  to  his  ship, 
with  three  bullets   in   his  body,  and   retired   to   the 


64     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

nearest  Dutch  settlement  to  excogitate  a  fresh  plan  of 
campaign. 

Cuny,  however,  was  flushed  by  his  success,  and  not 
at  all  inclined  to  give  up  the  prestige  which  he  derived 
from  a  fortress  bristling  w^ith  guns  and  well  furnished 
with  small  arms  and  ammunition.  For  seven  long 
years  he  held  out,  repulsing  the  repeated  attacks  of  the 
Dutch,  and  it  was  only  when  his  supplies  were  ex- 
hausted and  an  overwhelming  force  had  been  put  into 
the  field  against  him,  that  he  withdrew  from  his 
defences  and  vanished  into  the  jungle  from  which  he 
had  come. 

Simultaneously  with  Gross-Friedrichsburg,  there 
was  transferred  from  the  Prussian  King  to  the  Dutch 
Company  yet  another  African  Colony,  of  which  micntion 
has  yet  to  be  made.  This  was  the  island  of  Arguin, 
which  lies  off  the  coast  of  what  is  now  French  territory 
to  the  south  of  Cape  Blanco,  and  in  some  maps  is  given 
the  ominous  name  of  Agadir.  The  islet,  which  was 
one  of  the  principal  centres  of  the  gum  trade,  had  been 
first  occupied  by  the  Portuguese  in  1441,  but  had  passed 
by  conquest  to  Holland,  and  from  the  latter  to  France. 
After  the  Peace  of  Nymegen,  in  1678,  however,  the 
French  Senegal  Company  found  itself  unable  to  main- 
tain a  garrison  in  Arguin,  and  obtained  permission  from 
Louis  XIV.  to  blow  up  the  fort  which  had  been  erected 
there.  The  island  then  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  native 
ruler  of  Arguin,  on  the  mainland,  and  remained  subject 
to  him  till  two  ships  of  the  Great  Elector  appeared  off 
its  coasts  in  October,  1685. 

On  the  strength  of  a  treaty  concluded  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  expedition  with  the  King  of  Arguin, 
Frederick  William  seems  to  have  claimed  jurisdiction 
right  along  the  coast  of  Africa  from  the  Canary  Isles 
to  the  Senegal  River.  These  pretensions  were  not 
allowed  to  pass  undisputed,  and,  towards  the  end  of 
1687,  a  couple  of  French  vessels  appeared  off  the  fort 
and  demanded  its  evacuation  by  the  Germans.  As 
this  w^as  refused  they  made  an  attempt  to  seize  it  by 


THE  LOST  COLONIES  AND  THE  FLEET    65 

force,  but,  meeting  with  a  stubborn  resistance,  aban- 
doned the  attack,  and,  after  an  unsuccessful  endeavour 
to  assert  their  rights  during  the  peace  negotiations 
at  Ryswick,  the  French  seemed  to  reconcile  them- 
selves to  the  new  situation,  for  they  even  proposed 
commercial  co-operation  with  the  occupants  of  the 
Arguin  fort. 

After  the  death  of  the  Great  Elector,  Arguin  suffered, 
like  Gross-Fried richsburg,  through  the  indifference 
of  his  successor,  and  the  difficulty  of  communication 
arising  from  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession. 
When  a  relief  ship  arrived  in  17 14,  it  found  that  the 
Governor  had  been  captured  by  the  natives,  with 
whom  he  had  quarrelled;  and  the  remnant  of  the 
Arguin  garrison  was  in  so  deplorable  a  condition, 
that  "in  a  few  days  they  must  have  perished  of 
hunger." 

The  transfer  of  Arguin  to  the  Dutch  proved  as 
difficult  as  that  of  Gross-Friedrichsburg.  In  1717 
the  French  had  renewed  their  claims  to  the  island, 
and,  a  few  years  later,  the  Senegal  Company,  landing 
700  men  and  heavy  guns,  laid  siege  to  the  fort.  After 
holding  out  for  a  few  weeks,  the  commander,  Jan 
Wynen,  a  Dutchman,  withdrew  secretly  by  night 
with  his  force  in  order  to  escape  the  humiliation 
of  a  formal  surrender,  and  when  its  new  owners 
at  last  arrived  to  take  possession  of  it  the  colony 
was  actually  in  French  hands.  It  was  in  both 
cases  a  foreigner  who  last  kept  the  flag  flying  over 
what  were  to  be  the  only  German  colonies  established 
till  the  final  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century.  With 
the  colonies  disappeared  the  force  with  which  they 
had  been  won,  the  fleet,  and  it  too  had  to  wait  long, 
though  not  quite  so  long,  before  it  experienced  a 
revival. 

It  is  interesting  to  reflect  how  the  history  of  the 
world  might  have  been  changed  if  the  Great  Elector's 
two  immediate  successors  had  united  to  his  far-reach- 
ing schemes  of  '*  world-policy "  his  determination  in 

5 


66     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

carrying  them  out,  and  had  bequeathed  to  the  greater 
Frederick  prosperous  colonial  possessions  and  a 
formidable  navy.  As  it  was,  the  naval  episodes  of 
the  reign  of  this  gifted  monarch  only  show  how 
pitifully  and  completely  the  dawning  sea-power  of  his 
grandfather  had  passed  away. 

In  the  Seven  Years'  War,  the  shores  of  Prussia 
were  continually  ravaged  by  Swedish  frigates,  and  as 
nothing  could  be  effected  by  the  armed  fishing  boats 
and  coasting  vessels  which  were  all  that  could  be 
pitted  against  them,  Field-Marshal  Lehwald,  to  whom 
the  protection  of  that  part  of  Prussia  had  been  en- 
trusted, appealed  for  help  to  the  corporation  of 
merchants  at  Stettin.  That  body  responded  with 
energy  and  promptitude,  and,  with  great  haste,  a 
flotilla  of  four  galliots,  four  large  fishing  boats,  and 
four  coasting  vessels  were  transformed  into  "  ships  of 
war."  In  August,  1759,  this  improvised  fleet  ventured 
out  of  the  Oder  to  attack  the  Swedes,  but  it  was  so 
completely  overthrown,  after  several  days'  fighting, 
that  the  experiment  was  never  repeated. 

In  the  meanwhile  Frederick  had  been  inveigled 
into  another  maritime  adventure,  which  was  to  prove 
just  as  barren  of  positive  results.  Early  in  the 
war  several  Englishmen  communicated  to  the  King 
their  readiness  to  fit  out  privateers  to  prey  on  the 
commerce  of  Austria  and  Sweden,  both  of  which 
countries  had  seized  Prussian  merchantmen.  They 
protested  in  all  cases  that  their  principal  motive  was 
a  desire  to  serve  the  cause  of  a  monarch  whom  they 
admired  and  revered,  and  who  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
at  that  time  the  ally  of  England.  But  at  the  same  time 
they  promised  him  "  prodigious  profits "  from  the 
enterprise,  and  it  was  admittedly  the  latter  considera- 
tion which  induced  the  King  to  listen  to  their  pro- 
posals. Though  his  own  Ministers  expressed  strong 
doubts,  and  the  English  Government  urged  that  he 
would  run  the  risk  of  embroiling  himself  with  neutral 
States,  he  issued  a  number  of  letters  of  marque.     The 


AN  ANGLO-GERMAN  DIFFICULTY       6j 

advice  which  had  been  given  him  proved  to  have  been 
only  too  well  founded.  Not  only  were  there  no 
"prodigious  profits,"  but  the  blunders  of  the  royal 
officials  and  the  indiscretions  of  the  ships  under  his 
flag  involved  the  King  in  voluminous  diplomatic 
correspondence  and  long  and  fruitless  litigation. 

To  accelerate  the  process  of  destroying  the  enemy's 
trade,  a  number  of  blank  letters  of  marque,  ministerially 
signed  and  stamped  with  the  royal  seal,  were  sent  out 
to  the  Prussian  Minister  in  London,  and  he  somewhat 
imprudently  lent  a  couple  of  these  to  an  interesting 
adventurer,  named  Erskine  Douglas,  who  said  that  he 
wished  to  show  them  to  shipowners  with  whom  he 
was  in  treaty  for  the  equipment  of  privateers. 
Douglas  claimed  to  be  a  relative  of  the  Prussian 
Field-Marshal  Keith,  who  was  of  Scottish  origin,  and 
he  brought  letters  of  introduction  from  well-known 
members  of  the  English  nobility,  so  the  Minister  may 
perhaps  be  excused  for  entrusting  the  documents  to 
him.  But  his  confidence  was  gravely  abused,  for 
Douglas,  having  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  firm 
of  Dunbar  and  Eyre,  filled  in  the  forms  on  his  own 
responsibility,  and  two  privateers  were  sent  out  with 
these  fraudulent  credentials. 

Shortly  afterwards,  one  of  these  ships,  the  Lissa^ 
put  into  Emden  with  a  rich  Swedish  prize.  Lying  in 
the  harbour  was  an  English  man-of-war,  and  the 
captain  of  this  ship,  declaring  that  the  English  sailors 
on  board  the  Lissa  were  all  either  deserters  or  men 
who  had  bound  themselves  to  serve  in  the  British 
Navy,  required  that  they  should  be  given  up  to  him. 
As  compliance  was  refused,  he  went  on  board  the  Lissa 
with  an  armed  escort,  and,  disregarding  all  the  protests 
of  its  captain,  took  away  with  him  twenty-six  members 
of  the  crew.  This  action  was  regarded  by  Frederick 
as  an  infraction  of  Prussian  rights  of  sovereignty,  and 
representations  to  that  effect  were  made  in  London 
before  it  was  discovered  in  how  irregular  a  manner 
the  Lissa  had  become  possessed  of  her  papers.     The 


6Z     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

matter  was  then  discreetly  allowed  to  drop.  The 
Swedes,  for  their  part,  contested  the  legality  of  the 
capture,  but  the  Prussian  Government  ruled  that  the 
letter  of  marque  was  valid,  although  it  had  not  actually 
been  issued  by  royal  authority.  At  the  same  time 
Prussia  advanced  the  strange  view  that,  in  the  event  of 
the  owners  of  the  Lissa  having  had  cognizance  of  the 
deception  which  had  been  practised.  King  Frederick 
was  entitled  to  the  whole  value  of  the  prize.  Instruc- 
tions were,  however,  given  that  the  Lissa  should  be 
deprived  of  her  charter,  but  before  they  could  be 
executed  she  had  sailed  for  England. 

Another  of  Douglas's  privateersmen,  the  Prince 
Ferdinand,  under  a  Captain  Merryfield,  had  betaken 
herself  to  the  Mediterranean,  where,  in  a  nine-months' 
cruise,  she  captured  thirteen  prizes,  but  caused  so  much 
confusion  that  the  King  thought  it  wiser  to  put  a  stop 
to  the  whole  undertaking.  The  immediate  ground  for 
this  step  was  the  complaints  of  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment, with  which  Frederick  was  negotiating  with  a  view 
to  obtaining  its  support  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 
The  appropriation  of  a  couple  of  female  negro  slaves 
belonging  to  a  pasha,  who  were  on  board  one  of  the 
ships  captured  by  Merryfield,  seems  to  have  had  at  least 
as  much  weight  in  the  Turkish  grievance  as  the  more 
substantial  losses  of  the  merchants  of  Salonika.  As 
Prussia  had  no  territory  and  very  little  diplomatic 
representation  on  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean, 
Merryfield  was  obliged  to  take  his  prizes  into  neutral 
harbours  and  place  them  in  the  custody  of  the  English 
Consuls.  They  were  the  subjects  of  endless  law  suits, 
tedious  international  wrangling,  and  practically  no 
profits.  Merryfield's  wild  career  was  terminated  by  a 
charge  of  secretly  selling  neutral  goods  from  one  of 
his  prizes  to  his  own  advantage.  At  the  instance  of 
the  Prussian  Government  he  was  flung  into  gaol  at 
Malta.  He  remained  in  prison  five  years,  and  even 
at  the  end  of  that  term  would  not  have  regained  his 
liberty  if  the  Grand  Master  of  the  Maltese  Knights 


FRUITLESS  POLICY  OF  PRIVATEERING    69 

had  not  refused  to  pay  for  his  maintenance  any 
longer. 

Hardly  less  chequered  were  the  fortunes  of  Captain 
Wake,  the  only  regularly  accredited  Prussian  privateer 
of  whom  anything  is  known.  The  operations  of  his 
ship,  the  Embderi,  in  the  Mediterranean  also  resulted  in 
ceaseless  bickerings,  and  he  was  delayed  in  Cagliari 
for  two  years  by  disputes  of  one  sort  or  another.  At 
last,  growing  weary,  he  set  off  to  Berlin  to  prosecute 
his  claims  to  a  Swedish  ship  w^hich  he  had  seized, 
but  of  which  the  authorities  at  Cagliari  would  not 
permit  him  to  dispose.  Four  and  a  half  years  after 
the  capture,  she  was  adjudged  his  good  prize ;  but 
before  he  could  enter  into  possession  of  her  she  was 
sunk  at  her  moorings  by  a  violent  storm. 

The  total  gain  of  the  Prussian  Government  from  the 
activity  of  these  three  privateers  was  quite  negligible ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  trouble  and  annoyance 
caused  by  them  was  immeasurable.  The  anticipations 
that  the  seas  would  be  swept  of  Austrian  and  Swedish 
commerce  by  a  swarm  of  vessels  under  the  Prussian 
flag  proved  to  have  been  quite  illusory,  and  it  was  a 
particular  disappointment  to  Frederick  that  the  German 
shipowners  looked  askance  at  the  whole  business,  and 
in  no  single  instance  applied  for  letters  of  marque. 

A  noteworthy  feature  of  the  episode  is  that  Frederick's 
Government,  reversing  the  practice  of  the  Hansa,  laid 
down  for  its  privateers  the  rule  that  a  neutral  flag 
covered  the  enemy's  goods,  and  that  neutral  goods 
were  safe  from  capture  even  when  under  the  enemy's 
flag.  This,  it  is  maintained,  has  ever  since  been 
Prussian  tradition. 

A  final  word  is  due  to  the  "Societe  de  Commerce 
Maritime" — now  under  the  name  "  Seehandlung,"  the 
State  bank  of  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia — which  was 
established  by  Frederick  the  Great  in  1772,  "to  carry 
on  shipping  under  the  Prussian  flag,  and  trade  with 
the  ports  of  Spain  and  all  other  places  where  reason- 
able and  certain  prospects  of  substantial  profits  from 


70     THE  FIRST  HOHENZOLLERN  FLEET 

imports  and  exports  are  to  be  found."  It  was  vessels 
of  this  corporation  which,  towards  the  close  of  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  bore  a  German 
flag  for  the  first  time  round  the  world,  and  its  founda- 
tion shows  that  the  Great  Elector's  ideas  were  only 
dormant  and  not  dead. 

Frederick's  immediate  purpose  was  to  open  up  the 
markets  of  South  America  to  Silesian  linen,  but,  in 
consequence  of  the  rigid  protectionist  policy  of  Spain, 
it  was  only  possible  to  do  this  by  transhipment  at 
Spanish  ports.  The  original  capital  of  the  company 
was  1,200,000  thalers,  in  shares  of  500  thalers  each, 
and  of  these  2,100  were  the  property  of  the  King.  The 
Societe  was  granted  the  exclusive  right  of  trading  in 
English,  French,  and  Spanish  salt,  and  in  Polish  wax, 
and  was  also  endowed  with  many  other  privileges.  It 
did  not  at  first  prove  a  very  profitable  venture,  and  its 
early  days  were  also  clouded  over  by  the  defalcations 
of  one  of  its  managers.  In  course  of  time  it  became 
little  more  than  a  branch  of  the  Royal  Treasury  and 
the  negotiator  of  State  loans,  but  in  the  thirties  of  last 
century  it  passed  under  the  control  of  a  man  who 
determined  to  restore  to  it  something  of  its  original 
character,  and  laid  out  a  considerable  capital  in 
English-built  ships.  At  that  period  German  mer- 
chantmen seldom  ventured  beyond  Bordeaux  and 
Lisbon ;  but  the  vessels  of  the  Seehandlung  re- 
peatedly encircled  the  globe,  showed  their  flag  in  the 
remotest  harbours  of  Orient  and  Occident,  and  estab- 
lished directly  that  export  to  South  America  of  the 
wares  of  the  Riesengebirge  which  Frederick  the 
Great  had  in  his  mind  when  he  called  the  company 
into  existence. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  GERMAN  NAVY  IN  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY 

Though  the  sword  of  Napoleon  completed  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  which  had  done  so 
much  to  hamper  the  development  of  the  Teutonic  race, 
the  Vienna  Congress,  rearranging  the  map  of  Europe 
after  his  overthrow,  left  Germany  still  divided  into 
thirty-nine  different'states.  There  were  four  kingdoms, 
one  electorate,  seven  grand  duchies,  ten  duchies,  ten 
principalities,  one  landgraviate,  and  the  four  free 
towns — Hamburg,  Bremen,  Liibeck,  and  Frankfort-on- 
Main.  These  states  were  loosely  united  in  the  German 
Confederacy. 

The  people  of  Germany,  and  especially  those  who 
had  risen  against  Napoleon,  had  expected  a  more  com- 
plete unity  on  a  democratic  basis,  and  the  disappoint- 
ment of  their  hopes  was  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the 
revolution  which,  in  1848,  broke  out  simultaneously  in 
nearly  every  one  of  the  federal  capitals.  This  movement 
took  the  Governments  by  surprise,  and  so  overwhelm- 
ing was  the  popular  demand  for  unity,  that  they  offered 
but  little  opposition  to  the  convening  of  a  National 
Assembly,  which  met  at  Frankfort-on-Main  on  May  18, 
1848,  and  appointed  the  Austrian  Archduke  Johann 
provisional  "Administrator  of  the  Empire."  It  is 
generally  asserted  that  the  failure  of  this  serious 
attempt  to  weld  Germany  together  was  an  inevitable 
consequence  of  the  jealousy  existing  between  Austria 
and  Prussia,  but  none  can  say  with  certainty  what  the 
sequel  might  not  have  been,  had  not  Frederick 
William  IV.,  the  grand-uncle  of  the  present  German 

71 


72      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

Emperor,  refused  the  imperial  crown  when  it  was 
offered  to  him  by  the  National  Assembly.  It  is  very 
well  conceivable  that,  if  that  monarch  had  been  less 
fully  persuaded  of  the  divine  rights  of  Kings  and  of  the 
incompetence  of  popular  representatives  to  bestow 
crowns,  the  work  v/hich  Bismarck  did  in  the  next 
twenty  years,  with  so  grievous  an  expenditure  of  blood 
and  iron,  might  have  been  accomplished  by  peaceable 
means,  and  that  the  world  might  to-day  have  been 
confronted  with  the  problem  of  a  much  larger,  much 
richer,  and  much  more  united  Germany.  Possibly  those 
who  would  not  regard  German  domination  in  Europe 
as  an  unmixed  blessing  have  reason  to  be  thankful  for 
Frederick  William's  archaic  theories  on  the  relation- 
ships of  Princes  to  their  peoples. 

And  those  who  care  to  amuse  themselves  by  following 
up  the  grand  alternatives  of  history  must  not  forget 
that  1848  saw  the  birth  of  the  modern  German  Fleet, 
which  was  the  fruit  of  a  purely  popular  movement. 
Indeed,  the  patriots  of  the  Frankfort  Parliament  found 
in  the  "imperial  fleet,"  which  they  actually  founded, 
the  necessary  symbol  of  that  national  unity  which 
was  the  goal  of  their  aspirations. 

Strong,  spontaneous,  and  almost  universal  as  was 
the  German  naval  movement  ol  1848,  it  did  not  attain 
its  actual  dimensions  without  an  effective  external 
stimulus.  In  the  very  month  in  which  the  revolu- 
tionaries were  defending  their  barricades  in  the  streets 
of  Berlin  and  other  German  capitals,  Frederick  VII. 
had  declared  his  intention  of  incorporating  Schleswig 
in  Denmark;  and,  while  an  informal  convention  was 
arranging  the  preliminaries  for  the  National  Assembl}^, 
the  Danish  fleet  was  blockading  the  coasts  of  Prussia 
in  retaliation  for  the  military  support  afforded  by  that 
Kingdom,  as  the  mandatory  of  the  German  Confedera- 
tion, to  the  rebellious  duchies.  Nothing  was  better 
calculated  than  an  incident  of  this  sort  to  bring  home 
to  the  German  mind  the  importance  of  sea-power. 
That  the  ships  of  a  little  country  like  Denmark  should 


A  POPULAR  NAVAL  MOVEMENT         73 

be  able,  with  impunity,  to  forbid  the  sea  to  a  great 
military  Power,  seemed  to  every  German  who  reflected 
upon  it  a  grotesque  inversion  of  the  natural  order  of 
events. 

Though  the  National  Assembly,  at  one  of  its  first 
sittings,  appointed  a  permanent  committee  to  grapple 
with  the  naval  question,  the  impatient  interest  of  the 
public  displayed  itself  in  schemes  and  suggestions 
which  poured  in  from  every  side.  In  many  places 
com.mittees  were  formed  to  help  to  raise  the  funds 
necessary  for  the  equipment  of  a  fleet.  It  is  signifi- 
cant of  the  widespread  nature  of  the  movement  that 
the  raftsmen  of  Gernsbach,  in  the  Black  Forest,  offered 
to  transport  down  the  River  Murg  free  of  cost  the 
timber  required  for  the  building  of  Germany's  war- 
ships. The  seaports,  which  felt  most  keenly  the 
insulting  pressure  of  the  Danish  blockade,  took  the 
leading  part  in  the  agitation.  A  congress  of  delegates 
from  the  German  coast  towns  came  together  at 
Hamburg  and  nominated  a  "naval  com-aiission,"  on 
which,  in  addition  to  the  Governments  most  imme- 
diately concerned,  a  number  of  pri^^ate  committees 
w^ere  represented.  This  body  wasted  no  time  in  talk^ 
but  set  to  work  with  feverish  activity.  As  warships 
were  not  to  be  had  ready-made,  several  merchant 
vessels  were  purchased  and  hastil}^  armed  with  guns, 
furnished  by  Hanover;  and  at  the  beginning  of  July, 
the  Federal  Government  was  notified  that  these 
extemporized  men-of-war  were  read}^  to  put  out  and 
attack  the  enem}^  But  at  the  moment  the  negotia- 
tions with  Denmark  for  a  truce  had  already  begun, 
and  for  the  time  being  the  squadron  remained 
peacefully  at  its  moorings. 

Meanwhile,  even  before  an  Imperial  Executive  had 
been  got  together,  the  Frankfort  Parliament  had  voted 
for  naval  purposes  a  sum  of  6,000,000  thalers,*  half  of 
v/hich  was  to  be  spent  immediately  and  the  remainder 

*  Thaler  =  about  3s. 


74      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

as  necessity  might  arise.  Part  of  the  money  was  to  be 
taken  from  the  fortress  fund  of  the  old  Confederacy, 
and  the  remainder  raised  by  levies  in  due  proportion 
on  the  various  states  of  the  union.  The  question  of 
these  "  matricular  contributions,"  which  in  some  cases 
were  altogether  refused,  and  in  others  only  paid  after 
much  hesitation  and  vacillation,  was  one  of  the  chief 
reasons  for  the  ultimate  dissolution  of  the  first 
''German"  Navy. 

In  November  an  imperial  naval  authority  was  con- 
stituted under  the  control  of  the  Minister  of  Com- 
merce, who  was  at  the  same  time  deputy  for  Bremen. 
An  advisory  commission  of  experts  was  also  appointed, 
and  the  chair  in  this  body  was,  at  the  personal  request 
of  the  Archduke-Administrator,  taken  by  the  man 
who,  in  one  sense,  may  be  regarded  as  the  father  of 
the  present  German  Fleet,  Prince  Adalbert  of 
Prussia,  and  to  whom,  for  this  reason,  more  detailed 
reference  must  be  made  hereafter.  The  commission 
submitted  a  scheme,  in  which  it  was  recommended 
that  Germany  should,  for  the  present,  make  no  attempt 
to  gain  a  place  in  the  ranks  of  the  first-class  naval 
Powers,  but  content  herself  with  the  protection  of  her 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  coasts  and  her  sea-borne  trade. 
These  purposes,  it  was  held,  could  be  fulfilled  by  a 
fleet  of  fifteen  sixty-gun  sailing  frigates — if  possible 
with  auxiliary  engines  —  five  steam  frigates,  twenty 
steam  corvettes,  ten  despatch-boats,  five  schooners, 
and  thirty  gun-sloops. 

During  the  winter,  officials  were  despatched  to 
England  to  purchase  and  order  ships,  and  to  America 
to  induce  the  United  States  Government  to  allow  some 
of  its  naval  officers  to  enter  temporarily  into  the 
German  service.  These  latter  negotiations  at  first 
promised  success,  but  in  the  end  the  Government  at 
Washington  declared  itself  unable  to  entertain  the 
request.  With  the  purchase  of  material  the  German 
emissaries  had  better  luck,  and  when  the  truce  with 
Denmark  expired  in  the  spring  of  1849,  the  Navy  List 


"THE  FIRST  GERMAN  ADMIRAL"        75 

already  contained  the  names  of  twelve  vessels,  though, 
it  is  true,  hardly  one  of  them  was  yet  fit  for  action. 
A  Commander-in-Chief  had  also  been  found  in  the 
person  of  Karl  Bromme,  a  native  of  Leipzig,  whose 
name  had  been  permanently  anglicized  into  "  Brommy  " 
while  he  was  learning  seafaring  in  the  American 
merchant  service.  This  man,  "  the  first  German 
Admiral,"  had  followed  Cochrane  to  Greece,  where 
he  was  successively  Flag  Captain  to  Admiral  Miaulis, 
organizer  in  the  Ministry  of  Marine,  and  Commandant 
of  the  Military  School  at  the  Piraeus.  From  there  he 
was  tempted  away  to  become  "  Imperial  Com- 
missioner" to  the  incipient  German  Navy,  and  after 
taking  part  in  the  sittings  of  the  commission  of 
experts,  he  was  sent  in  that  capacity  to  Bremerhaven 
to  supervise  the  formation  of  the  fleet  and  to  found 
a  naval  arsenal. 

On  June  4  Brommy,  with  a  steam  frigate  and  two 
steam  corvettes,  attacked  a  Danish  frigate,  which  was 
lying  becalmed  off  Heligoland.  Hardly,  however,  had 
the  engagement  commenced  before  a  signal  shot  from 
the  island  warned  the  belligerents  that  they  w^ere 
within  British  territorial  waters,  and  must  suspend 
hostilities.  Soon  afterwards  the  Danish  blockading 
squadron  approached  the  scene,  and  the  German  ships 
hurried  back  to  their  harbour.  This  was  the  only 
opportunity  the  German  Fleet  had  of  showing  its 
quality.  Brommy-  was  promoted  to  Rear -Admiral 
later  in  the  year. 

Insignificant  as  the  Heligoland  skirmish  was  in 
itself,  it  had  a  sequel  which  has  played  a  great  part 
in  all  subsequent  movements  for  increasing  the  German 
Fleet.  Brommy's  ships  had  fought  under  the  black-red- 
and-gold  that  were  to  be  the  colours  of  the  new  Empire. 
But  this  Empire  had  then  no  legal  existence,  and,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  never  did  have  one,  and  no  doubt  Pal- 
merston  was  only  giving  expression  to  recognized 
principles  of  international  law  when  he  wrote  that 
vessels    committing   acts  of   belligerency  under   the 


76      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

black -red -and -gold  flag  would  render  themselves 
liable  to  be  treated  as  "pirates."  The  Frankfort 
Government,  a  product  of  excitement  and  inex- 
perience, made  many  mistakes  which  the  ripe  tradi- 
tion of  an  old-established  administration  would  have 
T voided,  and,  in  its  haste  to  assert  itself  on  the  seas, 
doubtless  did  not  give  sufficient  thought  to  the  re- 
strictions imposed  upon  it  by  its  own  anomalous 
status.  The  hoisting  of  the  black-red-and-gold  on 
a  flotilla  of  warships  w^as  undeniably  a  questionable 
proceeding,  and  one  which  justified  the  view  pro- 
pounded by  the  British  Foreign  Minister.  At  the 
same  time,  his  words  belong  to  the  category  of  things 
which  had  better  have  been  left  unsaid.  The  word 
"pirate"  rankled  then,  and  has  ever  since  continued 
to  rankle,  and  the  Palmerstonian  note  has  been  cited 
ten  thousand  times,  and  is  still  cited,  as  the  supreme 
example  of  the  tyrannous  arrogance  with  which  Britain 
rules  the  waves.  Much  will  have  been  gained  when 
British  politicians  get  to  understand  the  German 
psychology,  which  is  exceedingly  sensitive,  and  realize 
how  much  depends,  in  dealing  with  Germans,  on  a 
careful  choice  of  w^ords. 

A  fortnight  after  Brommy's  one  exploit  as  a  German 
naval  commander,the  remnant  of  the  National  Assembly 
was  dispersed  by  military  force  at  Stuttgart,  where  it 
had  taken  refuge,  and  Germany  relapsed  into  the  con- 
dition of  a  loosely-jointed  federation  of  mutually  jealous 
and  suspicious  Princes,  whose  rival  claims  had  to  be 
settled  on  the  battlefield  before  the  great  work  of 
unification  could  be  accomplished.  The  infant  navy, 
which  had  been  the  work  of  a  popular  movement  and 
a  popular  Parliament,  proved  a  source  of  dissension 
and  embarrassment  to  the  Confederacy  Governments. 
Several  of  the  inland  states  were  altogether  opposed 
to  the  idea  that  Germany  needed  a  navy.  A  strong 
party  advocated  that  one  fleet  should  be  provided  by 
Austria  for  the  Adriatic,  a  second  by  Prussia  for  the 
Baltic,  and  a  third  by  the  remaining  German  states  for 


AUCTION  SALE  OF  GERMAN  WARSHIPS    ^^ 

the  North  Sea.  The  last  point  of  this  project  was  the 
subject  of  special  negotiations,  and  at  one  time  there 
seemed  some  chance  of  Hanover  assuming  the  office 
of  "  Federal  Admiral." 

In  the  end,  however,  divergent  interests  and  irre- 
concilable rivalries  produced  the  only  possible  result, 
and,  in  February,  1852,  the  Confederated  Governments 
decided  to  cut  the  Gordian  knot.  The  promising  Ger- 
man Navy  was  dissolved.  Admiral  Brommy  received 
his  discharge  (he  was  subsequently  employed  for  some 
time  as  Chief  of  the  Technical  Department  of  the  Aus- 
trian Admiralty),  and  an  Oldenburg  official,  whose 
unforgettable  name  has  helped  to  brand  his  memory 
with  the  whole  infamy  of  a  transaction  for  which  he 
was  in  nowise  responsible,  was  appointed  '*  Commis- 
sioner of  the  Germanic  Confederation  charged  with 
the  regulation  of  naval  affairs."  This,  at  least,  is  the 
designation  appended  to  his  signature  on  the  adver- 
tisement which,  in  the  German,  English,  and  French 
languages,  announced  to  all  the  world  that  the  German 
Navy  was  forthwith  to  be  knocked  down  to  the  highest 
bidder.  It  is  the  form  rather  than  the  fact  of  the  sale 
which  is  taken  so  ill  in  Privy  Councillor  Hannibal 
Fischer,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  else  he  could 
have  done.  He  made  efforts  to  dispose  of  the  ships 
by  private  treaty,  and  actually  sold  some  of  them  to 
Prussia  and  others  to  English  firms,  but  a  residue 
remained  for  which  no  purchaser  could  be  found  in 
this  way,  and  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  put  them 
up  to  public  auction.  There  thus  came  under  the 
hammer  two  steam  frigates,  six  steam  corvettes,  a  sail- 
ing frigate,  and  twenty-seven  gunboats  propelled  by 
oars.  Of  the  eight  steamers  three  had  been  built  at 
Bristol,  and  one  each  at  Glasgow,  Leith,  New  York, 
Hamburg,  and  Bremen.  Except  in  the  case  of  the 
American  vessel,  the  engines  were  all  of  British  make. 
It  must  be  conceded  that  the  progress  which  Gern  any 
made  in  this  respect  during  the  next  half-century  was 
nothing  less  than  prodigious. 


78      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

Concurrently  with  the  abortive  efforts  to  found  a 
German  Navy,  Prussia  had  taken  independent  action, 
and  laid  the  real  foundation  of  the  great  fleet  w^hich 
now  aspires  to  contest  the  British  mastery  of  the  seas. 
At  that  time  there  was  not  even  the  slenderest  basis 
for  the  kingdom  to  work  upon.  The  task  had  to  be 
undertaken  from  the  very  beginning.  During  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  it  is  true,  the  advis- 
ability of  building  a  navy  had  more  than  once  been 
exhaustively  discussed  by  the  Prussian  Government. 
In  the  general  resettlement  of  i8i5,the  island  of  Rugen 
and  the  strip  of  Pomeranian  coast  opposite  to  it  had 
passed  from  Sweden  to  Prussia,  and  included  in  the 
transfer  were  six  gun-sloops  and  a  Swedish  ofHcer, 
Captain  Christian  Lange,  who  was  summoned  to  Berlin 
to  report  to  the  War  Ministry  on  the  utility  of  the 
little  flotilla.  As  the  result  of  his  representations,  he 
was  commissioned  to  submit  plans  and  estimates  for  a 
war  schooner,  and  for  an  armed  rowing  boat  for  use 
on  the  rivers.  These  vessels  were  eventually  built, 
with  the  express  idea  that  they  were  to  serve  as  ex- 
periments and  models  for  the  construction  of  a  regular 
fleet.  In  great  haste  prescriptions  as  to  a  naval  uniform 
were  issued,  and  the  questions  of  dockyards  and 
harbour  works  were  also  deliberated.  But  the  only 
issue  of  all  this  work  was  the  conviction  that  the 
national  resources  were  not  yet  equal  to  the  financial 
strain  which  would  have  been  entailed  by  the  creation 
of  a  navy.  Similar  investigations  and  discussions  in 
the  years  1825  and  1832  were,  for  the  same  reason, 
equally  fruitless.  At  the  commencement  of  the  revo- 
lutionary year,  the  only  vessels  in  the  possession  of 
the  Prussian  Government  were  a  corvette,  which  was 
employed  as  a  Navigation  School,  a  paddle  steamer, 
which  conveyed  the  mails  between  Stettin  and  St. 
Petersburg,  and  which,  under  the  terms  of  the  contract 
for  its  construction,  was  to  be  adaptable  to  the  purposes 
of  an  "  auxiliary  cruiser,"  and  a  couple  of  armed  yawls. 

By  the   autumn  of   1848  a  Prussian  flotilla  of  ten 


"THE  FATHER  OF  THE  GERMAN  NAVY"  79 

sloops  and  yawls,  three  of  which  had  been  built  with 
the  funds  collected  by  private  committees,  was  ready 
for  operations  against  the  Danes.  It  was  placed  under 
the  command  of  a  Dutch  ex-naval  captain  named 
Schroder.  The  crews  provided  for  him — 465  men  in  all 
— were  a  strange  medley  of  active  soldiers,  reservists, 
and  seamen  from  the  merchant  service.  For  various 
reasons,  not  the  least  weighty  of  which  was  the  doubt- 
ful status  of  the  black-red-and-gold  flag,  the  squadron 
sailed  under  the  Prussian  colours.  While  it  was  fitting 
out,  the  first  steps  were  taken  towards  the  establish- 
ment of  a  naval  organization  and  the  training  of  a 
corps  of  officers. 

By  the  following  summer  the  Prussian  fleet  could 
already  boast  two  steamers,  one  sailing  corvette,  and 
twenty-one  gun  sloops,  with  a  total  complement  of 
thirty-seven  officers  and  1,521  men,  and  mounting  in 
all  sixty-seven  guns.  But  only  once  did  this  primitive 
navy  have  the  satisfaction  of  taking  part  in  a  pitched 
naval  engagement.  This  was  a  duel  between  a  Prus- 
sian steamer  and  a  Danish  brig,  which  fought  for  five 
hours  off  the  island  of  Rugen.  The  encounter  was 
terminated  by  the  fall  of  darkness,  and  before  day 
broke  again  another  Danish  corvette  arrived  on  the 
scene  and  put  the  Prussians  to  flight.  But,  in  spite  of 
a  lack  of  fighting,  the  presence  of  Commodore  Schro- 
der's force  along  the  coast  undoubtedly  did  much  to 
relieve  the  pressure  of  the  blockade. 

The  peace  with  Denmark  in  1850  ushered  in  a  period 
of  assiduous  and  systematic  labour  at  the  task  of  build- 
ing up  a  Prussian  fleet.  Throughout  this  important 
period,  the  moving  spirit  was  the  man  who  has  already 
been  described  as  the  father  of  the  German  Navy,  Prince 
Adalbert  of  Prussia.  This  enthusiastic  and  indefatigable 
sailor  was  a  first  cousin  of  King  Frederick  William  IV., 
who  refused  the  imperial  crown  as  a  democratic  gift, 
and  of  the  Emperor  William  I.,  who  finally  won  it  on 
the  battlefields  of  France.  In  his  boyhood,  Prince 
Adalbert  had  had  the  doctrine  of  the  vital  importance 


8o      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

of  sea-power  implanted  in  his  mind  by  a  veteran 
soldier,  Field-Marshal  Gneisenau,  and  he  never  forgot 
the  lesson.  At  the  age  of  twenty-one  he  paid  a  visit 
of  two  months'  duration  to  England,  where  he  was 
cordially  welcomed  into  naval  circles,  and  where  his 
passion  for  the  sea  was  inflamed  by  the  conversation 
of  men  who  had  fought  under  Nelson  at  Trafalgar. 
He  lost  no  opportunity  of  inspecting  war  vessels, 
shipyards,  and  docks,  and  returned  to  Germany  with 
note-books  crammed  with  information  as  to  all  he  had 
seen  and  heard.  A  British  admiral  is  said  to  have 
declared  that  the  Prince  knew  more  about  the  war- 
ships of  Great  Britain  than  many  of  their  own  officers, 
and  one  of  the  last  acts  of  this  sailor  Hohenzoilern 
was  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  English  dockyards  to 
familiarize  himself  with  the  latest  novelties  in  naval 
construction. 

Four  years  after  his  first  journey  to  England,  one  of 
those  naval  enquiries  already  alluded  to  was  held  at 
Berlin,  and  a  commission  was  appointed  to  advise  as 
to  the  type  of  vessel  to  be  chosen  for  the  fleet  which 
the  Prussian  Government  contemplated  building  at 
some  indefinite  future  date.  Prince  Adalbert  was  a 
member  of  this  body,  but  when  asked  for  his  views  on 
the  subject  he  satisfied  himself  with  laying  before  his 
colleagues  the  opinion  of  his  friend.  Captain  Mingaye, 
a  British  naval  officer,  who  advised  that  the  triumph 
of  steam  over  sails  and  oars  presented  Prussia  with 
a  splendid  opportunity  to  create  sea-power  which 
should  be  "mighty"  from  the  outset.  Curiously 
enough,  the  War  Minister,  von  Ranch,  inferred  from 
this  suggestion  that  naval  construction  was  passing 
through  a  transition  stage  of  doubtful  issue,  and  it  was 
used  by  him  as  a  pretext  for  postponing  the  considera- 
tion of  the  whole  question ;  for,  he  argued,  Prussia 
could  not  afi'ord  to  squander  money  on  uncertain 
experiments.  In  the  succeeding  years,  the  Prince 
cruised  the  Mediterranean  in  an  Austrian  ship  with 
his  friend  the  Archduke  Johann,  afterwards  the  Imperial 


GERMANY'S  NAVAL  POLICY  8i 

Administrator,  and  made  in  Sardinian  and  British 
war  vessels  several  longer  voyages,  during  which  he 
devoted  himself  with  a  whole  heart  to  the  study  of 
seamanship  and  navigation.  He  also  added  materiall}^ 
to  his  knowledge  while  on  board  one  of  the  ships  of 
the  British  Mediterranean  Squadron,  which  at  the 
time  was  engaged  in  manoeuvres.  On  his  return  home 
from  these  experiences,  he  secured  the  appointment 
of  Schroder  to  the  Navigation  School  ship  Amazon, 
always  with  the  idea  that  the  vessel  would  be  the 
training  -  ground  of  the  officers'  corps  of  a  future 
Prussian  Navy.  As  we  have  seen,  the  Prince  was 
chosen  as  chairman  of  the  Frankfort  advisory  com- 
mittee on  naval  questions.  Some  months  previously 
he  had  addressed  to  the  National  Assembly  a 
"  Memorandum  as  to  the  Formation  of  a  German 
Fleet."  This  document,  which  was  printed  and  pub- 
lished, not  only  is  a  remarkable  testimony  to  the 
author's  insight  into  the  true  nature  of  naval  problems, 
but  also  contains  a  clear  enunciation  of  the  principles 
which  guide  Germany's  naval  policy  at  the  present 
day.  Pointing  to  the  humiliation  of  the  Danish  block- 
ade he  wrote : 

"And  this  Germany — united  Germany — must  calmly 
submit  to,  precisely  at  the  great  moment  when,  after 
long  years,  it  once  more  feels  itself  a  whole,  a  Power 
of  forty  millions  of  people.  But  the  Fatherland 
recognizes  the  oppressive  nature  of  its  situation;  it 
demands  a  remedy  all  the  more  speedy  because,  after 
these  events,  it  foresees  with  certainty  how  much  rnore 
painful  its  position  might  some  day  be  if  it  w-ere  pitted 
against  one  of  the  great  Sea-Powers,  a  Powder  against 
which  the  German  ships  would  not  be  secure  even  in 
their  own  harbours,  a  fleet  w^hich  could  menace  our 
coasts  with  debarkations  on  a  much  more  extensive 
scale  than  is  possible  to  our  present  foe.  United 
Germany,  however,  wishes  to  see  her  territories 
energetically  protected,  her  flag  respected,  her  trade 
once  more  flourishing,  and  in  the  future  to  have  some 
influence  on  the  sea." 


82       ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

Prince  Adalbert  then  weighed  the  three  alternatives  : 
(a)  Defensive  coast  protection ;  (b)  ofifensive  coast  pro- 
tection; and  (c)  an  independent  German  sea-pov^er; 
and  finally  reached  the  conclusion : 

"  Germany  must  either  build  no  battleships  or  at  once 
build  so  many  that  she  can  act  towards  her  neighbours 
as  an  independent  Sea- Power.  Anything  intermediate 
would  be  a  useless  expense,  an  empty  pretension,  and 
would  arouse  in  the  nation  expectations  which,  in  the 
moment  of  danger,  our  sea-power  would  not  be  able  to 
fulfil. 

"  If  we  now  ask  what  would  be  the  smallest  number 
of  battleships  which  would  allow  us  to  act  in  European 
waters  as  an  independent  fleet,  especially  against  the 
ever-ready  Russian  Baltic  fleet,  I  think  we  must  take 
twenty  battleships  as  the  minimum  that  would  be  able 
to  measure  itself  with  it.  But  such  a  fleet  would  make 
Germany  fourth  among  the  Sea-Powers  of  first  rank, 
and  place  her  incontestably  in  a  position  to  play  a 
great  role  on  the  sea,  a  role  which  would  be  worthy  of 
her  position  in  Europe.  For  with  her  twenty  battle- 
ships she  would  be  able  to  throw  an  enormous  weight 
into  the  scales,  turn  the  balance  by  her  adherence  to 
an  alliance,  and  consequent!}^  be  as  much  sought  after 
as  an  ally  on  account  of  her  sea-power  as  on  account 
of  her  land-power." 

The  Prince  accordingly  proposed  that  the  German 
building  programme  should  include  20  battleships  with 
auxiliary  screws,  10  frigates,  30  steam  cruisers,  40  gun- 
boats, and  80  gun-sloops ;  and  that  the  construction  of 
these  vessels  should  be  spread  over  a  period  of  ten 
years.  In  this  project  we  have  that  same  principle  of 
the  gradual  working  up  to  a  fixed  standard  of  strength 
which  has  characterized  all  modern  German  naval 
legislation.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  Prince  Adalbert's 
plans  were  appreciably  less  ambitious  than  those  of 
Admiral  Tirpitz. 

However,  the  Prince  did  not  manage  to  persuade  the 
Frankfort  technical  commission  to  adopt  his  scheme  in 
its  entirety,  though  the  programme  approved  went  a 


SHIPBUILDER'S  VISIT  TO  THE  THAMES    83 

long  way  towards  meeting  his  views.  Why  this  pro- 
gramme was  never  carried  out  has  already  been  seen. 
In  the  Memorandum  just  quoted  from,  Prince  Adalbert 
had  written  :  "  The  entire  nation  unanimously  demands 
a  German  war  fleet,  for  German,  absolutely  German,  it 
must  be,  a  true  representative  of  the  new-born  unity 
of  the  Fatherland;"  and  it  must  have  been  with  a 
heavy  heart  that  he  saw  his  vision  melt  away,  and 
went  back  to  Berlin  to  employ  his  gifts  in  a  more 
restricted  and  less  promising  field. 

The  difficulties  which  opposed  themselves  to  the 
realization  of  the  Prince's  ideas  will  be  appreciated, 
when  it  is  stated  that  the  man  who  built  the  first 
warship  of  any  size  which  had  been  launched  from 
a  German  yard  since  the  days  of  the  Hanseatic  League 
is  still  alive.  Wilhelm  Schwarm,  now  ninety-four 
years  of  age,  was  employed  as  a  young  man  in 
Klawitter's  shipyard  at  Dantzic,  and  at  the  time  when 
the  air  was  filled  with  talk  of  a  future  German  Navy, 
the  firm  very  shrewdly  sent  him  over  to  the  works  of 
Robinson  and  Russell,  on  the  Thames,  to  learn  the  art 
of  constructing  vessels  of  larger  size  than  were  then 
built  on  the  Baltic.  He  brought  back  with  him  the 
plans  for  a  paddle  corvette,  which  was  built  under  his 
supervision  on  the  Klawitter  slips,  fitted  with  English 
engines,  and,  under  the  name  of  Dantzig,  was  an  im- 
portant addition  to  the  Prussian  fleet. 

At  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War  this  vessel  showed 
the  Prussian  flag  at  Constantinople  for  the  first  time  in 
history,  and  it  was  also  with  her  that  Prince  Adalbert 
experienced  a  rather  grotesque  adventure  in  the 
Mediterranean  in  1856.  In  the  previous  year  a 
German  ship  had  been  plundered  by  the  Riff  pirates, 
and  the  Prince,  happening  to  be  in  those  parts  with 
the  Dmiizig,  made  a  reconnaissance,  in  one  of  the  ship's 
boats,  of  the  coast  of  Cape  Tres  Forcas,  where  the 
outrage  had  occurred.  The  natives,  as  was  their 
custom,  fired  on  the  party  from  the  shore.  Annoyed 
by  this  molestation,  Prince  Adalbert   determined   to 


84      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

teach  the  Arabs  a  severe  lesson.  Having  manned  and 
armed  all  his  boats,  he  stormed  the  steep  and  rocky 
shore  and  planted  the  Prussian  flag  on  the  summit  of 
the  cliffs.  His  triumph  was,  however,  a  very  brief 
one,  for  the  enemy  immediately  returned  to  the  attack, 
and  drove  the  landing  party  back  to  the  boats  with 
the  loss  of  seven  killed  and  twenty-three  wounded. 
Official  panegyrists  extol  this  rash  escapade  as  an 
"  heroic  deed,"  and  declare  that  it  did  much  to  raise 
the  confidence  of  the  young  Prussian  Navy.  As  the 
Riff  pirates  were  no  doubt  also  exultant  over  their 
victory,  the  affair  must  have  been  one  of  those  rare 
encounters  with  the  issue  of  which  both  sides  were 
equally  satisfied.  The  Dantzig  was  sold  a  few  years 
later  in  England,  in  the  belief  that  her  timbers  were 
unsound,  and  was  then  passed  on  to  Japan,  where  she 
was  run  ashore  and  burnt  by  her  own  crew  during  an 
engagement  in  the  civil  war. 

The  problem  of  obtaining  properly  qualified  per- 
sonnel for  the  corps  of  naval  officers  was  not  less 
difficult  to  solve  than  that  of  building  efficient  war- 
ships. England  would  have  been  the  natural  source 
on  which  to  draw  for  instructors,  but  for  political 
reasons  it  was  decided  not  to  seek  assistance  from 
that  most  competent  of  all  quarters,  and  the  services 
of  three  officers  of  the  Swedish  Navy  were  secured. 
For  similar  reasons  a  Swedish  naval  constructor  was 
engaged.  A  few  years  later,  however,  permission  was 
asked  and  obtained  for  a  number  of  cadets  to  learn 
their  profession  on  British  men-of-war. 

The  3^ear  1852  brought  an  event  of  the  utmost 
importance  for  the  development  of  the  Prussian  Navy 
— the  acquisition  of  Wilhelmshaven  as  a  North  Sea 
base.  At  that  time  Prussia  did  not  possess  an  inch  of 
coast-line  on  the  North  Sea,  and  could  obtain  access  to 
it  only  through  the  Belt  and  the  Sound,  then  under 
the  control  of  the  superior  naval  power  of  Denmark. 
Among  the  innumerable  projects  with  which  the 
National  Assembly  had  been  deluged,  was  the  scheme 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WILHELMSHAVEN  85 

of  three  citizens  of  Rendsburg  for  the  construction  of 
a  water-way  pretty  much  along  the  line  subsequently 
followed  by  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal.  This  plan 
w^as,  however,  based  on  the  false  assumption  that 
Schleswig-Holstein  would  at  once  become,  and  ever 
afterwards  remain,  German  territory.  It  had  also 
been  proposed  to  the  Frankfort  Government  by  an 
Oldenburg  official  that  the  Jade  Bay  should  be  chosen 
as  the  North  Sea  base  for  the  fleet,  and  this  suggestion 
seems  to  have  fixed  the  attention  of  Prince  Adalbert 
on  the  inlet  which  is  now  the  chief  naval  headquarters 
of  the  German  Empire.  The  Grand  Duke  of  Olden- 
burg was  approached,  and  he  consented  to  cede  to 
Prussia  the  piece  of  marshy  land  which  has  since  been 
covered  by  the  harbours,  docks,  shipyards,  workshops, 
barracks,  and  fortifications  of  Wilhelmshaven.  Prussia 
paid  a  sum  of  500,000  thalers  for  this  invaluable  pos- 
session, and  at  the  same  time  took  upon  herself  the 
protection  of  the  coast  and  sea-trade  of  the  duchy. 

Herculean  efforts  and  inexhaustible  patience  were 
required  to  adapt  Prussia's  acquisition  on  the  Jade  to 
its  destined  purposes.  Years  had  to  be  spent  in  a 
careful  survey  of  the  bed  of  the  harbour,  in  order  to 
ascertain  how  far  the  channel  was  affected  by  the 
movements  of  sand  and  mud  under  the  influence  of 
the  tide.  Further  years  were  consumed  by  the  task 
of  sinking  piles  in  the  treacherous  peaty  soil  to 
obtain  a  sohd  foundation  for  dock  and  harbour  wails. 
Frequently  a  storm  or  a  spring  tide  destroyed  in  a  few 
hours  the  fruits  of  months  of  strenuous  labour.  As 
Hanover  refused  to  allow  the  construction  of  a  railway 
across  her  territory,  which  lay  between  Prussia  and 
Oldenburg,  it  was  necessary  to  convey  all  the  building 
materials  to  the  spot  by  the  long  and  tedious  sea-route. 
At  first  not  even  drinking-water  was  to  be  had  on  the 
desolate  site,  and  prolonged  and  costly  exertions  were 
needful  before  it  could  be  procured  in  sufficient  quanti- 
ties. Sixteen  years  elapsed  before  the  new  harbour 
was  formerly  declared  open  by  the   Prussian   King, 


S6      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

afterwards  the  Emperor  William  I.,  in  the  presence  of 
British  ships,  the  officers  of  which  probably  regarded 
the  works  with  indulgent  curiosity,  and  little  guessed 
the  significance  which  Wilhelmshaven  would  Jone  day 
possess  for  their  own  country. 

When  the  second  war  with  Denmark  broke  out  in 
1864,  Prussia's  fleet  was  still  absurdly  inadequate  to 
deal  with  the  naval  force  opposed  to  it.  The  ship 
establishment  at  the  close  of  1863  was  composed  as 
under : 

-""   steamships  with  Fighting  Value. 

3  corvettes,  mounting  27  or  28  guns  each. 
I  corvette,  mounting  17  guns. 

Steamships  with  little  Fighting  Value, 

4  first-class  gunboats,  mounting  3  guns  each. 

17  second-class  gunboats,  mounting  2  guns  each. 
3  despatch-boats,  mounting  together  8  guns. 

Steamship  without  Fighting  Value. 

1  corvette,  mounting  9  guns. 

S.nling  Ships  with  little  or  no  Fighting  Value. 

3  frigates,  mounting  a  total  of  112  guns. 
3  brigs,  mounting  a  total  of  4  guns. 

2  schooners,  mounting  a  total  of  4  guns. 

Also  without  Fighting  Value, 
40  rowing-boats,  mounting  a  total  of  76  guns. 

Denmark,  on  the  other  hand,  had  31  steam  war 
vessels,  among  which  were  i  battleship,  5  frigates, 
3  corvettes,  and  4  armoured  craft.  Even  with 
the  assistance  of  a  number  of  Austrian  ships,  which 
arrived  in  the  North  Sea  from  the  Mediterranean, 
the  Prussian  fleet  could  contribute  nothing  decisive 
towards  the  issue  of  the  war.  At  the  most  it  prevented 
the  Danish  blockade  of  the  German  coast-line  from 
being  effective.  The  Prussian  Government  attempted 
to  reduce  its  inferiority  by  hiring  merchant  vessels, 
and    hurriedly    purchased    warships    in    France    and 


ENGLAND  AND  THE  WAR  OF  1864        87 

England.  One  of  these  latter,  the  monitor  ArminiuSj 
which  was  of  English  build,  was  almost  entirely  paid 
for  with  the  voluntary  contributions  which  had  con- 
tinued to  flow  in.  This  fact  shows  how  steady  and 
keen  the  interest  of  a  large  section  of  the  population 
in  the  development  of  the  navy  already  was,  and  how 
erroneous  it  is  to  ascribe  the  naval  enthusiasm  in 
Germany  of  recent  years  entirely  to  the  official  agita- 
tion. Peace  was  concluded  before  the  new  ships  could 
be  made  ready  for  sea. 

The  war  of  1864  was  one  of  the  great  cross-roads  of 
British  history.  Difficult  as  it  is  to  **  overlook  the 
cards  of  Providence,"  as  Bismarck  put  it,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  we  took  the  wrong  turning.  The 
great  German  Chancellor  candidly  admitted  that 
the  possession  of  Kiel  and  a  strategic  canal  through 
Holstein  were  two  of  the  principal  objects  which 
Prussia  had  in  view  when  she  drew  the  sword.  The 
two  leading  members  of  the  British  Cabinet  were  in 
favour  of  backing  up  Denmark ;  and  one  of  them, 
Palmerston,  used  language  in  Parliament  which  might 
well  have  led  that  country  to  count  upon  our  support. 
A  strong  body  of  English  public  opinion  also  warmly 
espoused  the  Danish  cause.  But  Queen  Victoria, 
largely  influenced  by  the  sympathy  for  Germany 
which  she  had  imbibed  from  the  Prince  Consort, 
threw  all  the  weight  of  the  Crown  into  the  opposite 
scale. 

There  are  few  more  agitated  passages  to  be 
found  in  the  records  of  diplomacy  than  those  letters 
to  Lord  Granville  in  which  she  argued,  threatened, 
entreated,  and,  finally  falling  back  on  the  last  strength 
of  woman,  her  weakness,  complained  that  she  was 
**  completely  exhausted  by  anxiety  and  suspense,"  and 
"  so  tired  and  unwell  she  can  hardly  hold  up  her  head 
or  hold  her  pen."  Her  will  prevailed  in  the  end,  and 
she  was  able  to  congratulate  herself  that,  "owing  to 
the  determined  stand  she  had  made  against  her  two 
principal  ministers,  she  had  saved  the  country  from  an 


88       ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

unnecessary  war."  When  Prussia,  completely  revers- 
ing her  attitude,  made  those  very  claims  of  the  Danish 
King  which  she  had  contested  by  force  of  arms  her 
pretext  for  annexing  the  two  duchies  under  the  '*  rights 
of  conquest,"  the  Queen  suffered  a  bitter  disillusion- 
ment, and,  on  her  instructions  General  Grey  wrote 
to  Lord  Granville,  that  "  Prussia  should  at  least  be 
made  aware  of  what  she  and  her  Government  and 
every  honest  man  in  Europe  must  think  of  the  gross 
and  unblushing  violation  of  every  assurance  and 
pledge  that  she  had  given  which  Prussia  had  been 
guilty  of."  It  will  hardly  be  contended  now  that  a 
war  which  should  have  left  Schleswig-Holstein  in  the 
hands  of  Denmark  would  have  been  anything  but 
exceedingly  advantageous,  economical,  and  opportune 
for  Great  Britain. 

Even  before,  in  the  formal  division  of  the  spoils, 
Prussia  had  obtained  Austrian  recognition  of  her 
right  to  Kiel,  she  had  occupied  that  port  and  trans- 
ferred her  naval  headquarters  thither  from  Dantzic. 
The  construction  of  the  North  Sea  Baltic  Canal  was 
delayed  many  years,  mainly  by  the  opposition  of 
Count  Moltke,  who  argued  that  its  cost  would  be  so 
great  that  it  would,  on  the  whole,  be  cheaper  to  build 
a  second  fleet  with  the  money.  He  further  urged  that 
the  canal  would  be  navigable  only  in  the  summer,  and 
that  in  the  event  of  a  war  the  army  would  be  weakened 
by  the  necessity  of  providing  for  its  defence.  But  for 
the  doubts  and  jealousies  of  the  sister  service,  the 
German  Navy  might  already  be  enjoying  the  benefits 
of  that  prolongation  of  the  Canal,  contemplated  by 
Bismarck,  which  would  have  allowed  its  ironclads  to 
steam  from  Kiel  to  Wilhelmshaven  without  putting 
out  into  the  open  sea. 

In  the  hope  that  the  lessons  of  the  war  would  have 
produced  the  desirable  effect  on  the  public  mind,  the 
Prussian  Government,  in  1865,  laid  before  its  Parlia- 
ment a  bill  that  may  be  considered  as  the  definite 
inauguration  of  the  naval  policy  which  Germany  has 


NAVAL  PROGRAMME  OF  1865  89 

ever  since  pursued.  In  the  Memorandum  submitted 
to  the  House  with  the  measure,  it  was  contended 
that  the  time  had  come  for  Prussia  to  join  the  ranks 
of  the  Sea-Powers,  in  order  that  she  might  be  in  a 
position  to  protect  her  own  and  the  other  German 
coasts  and  maritime  trade,  and,  for  all  future  time,  to 
assert  her  European  position  as  against  such  States 
as  were  accessible  only  by  water.  '*  For  the  present," 
it  was  stated,  "  she  is  unable  to  enter  into  rivalry  with 
the  first-class  naval  Powers,  but  she  must  occupy  a 
position  commanding  esteem  among  those  of  the 
second-class." 

Accordingly,  the  Government  asked  for  authority 
to  build  10  armoured  frigates  of  the  highest  efficienc}^, 
an  equal  number  of  armoured  vessels  of  the  cupola 
or  turret  type  for  coast  defence,  16  corvettes  for  the 
protection  of  sea-borne  trade,  6  despatch-boats,  and 
at  least  4  transports.  It  was  calculated  that  ten  years 
would  be  necessary  for  the  execution  of  this  plan, 
but  rather  for  the  training  of  the  personnel  and  the 
provision  of  the  indispensable  harbour  works  than 
for  the  actual  construction  of  the  ships.  The  cost  of 
the  proposed  fleet  was  estimated  at  34,500,000  thalers, 
that  of  its  annual  maintenance  at  about  5,000,000  thalers. 
In  recommending  the  scheme  to  the  Diet,  Bismarck  used 
the  following  words,  which  contain  very  noteworthy 
implications  :  "  During  the  last  twenty  years  no 
question  has  so  unanimously  interested  pubhc  opinion 
in  Germany  as  precisely  the  naval  question.  We 
have  seen  associations,  the  press,  and  the  Diets  give 
expression  to  their  sympathy,  and  this  sympathy 
exercised  itself  in  the  collection  of  comparatively  im- 
portant sums.  The  Government  and  the  Conservative 
party  have  been  reproached  with  the  slowness  and 
parsimony  with  which  action  has  been  taken  in  this 
direction.  It  was  particularly  the  Liberal  parties 
which  carried  on  this  agitation.  We  believe,  there- 
fore, that  we  are  doing  you  a  great  pleasure  with  this 
Bill." 


90      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

But  the  Liberal  majority,  then  exclusively  pre- 
occupied with  the  constitutional  struggle  against  the 
masterful  and  autocratic  Minister-President,  threw 
out  the  Bill,  and  modified  naval  estimates  were  given 
the  force  of  law  by  royal  decree.  The  attitude  of 
the  Prussian  Liberals  of  that  epoch  was  very  similar 
to  that  of  the  Socialists  of  to-day,  and  many  of  those 
who  now  support  the  latter  would  undoubtedly 
weaken  in  their  hostility  to  army,  navy,  and  colonial 
votes  if  concessions  were  made  to  them  in  other 
directions. 

In  the  brief  war  of  1866,  the  Austrian  fleet  was 
tied  down  to  the  Mediterranean  by  the  superior  sea- 
power  of  Italy,  and  the  operations  of  the  Prussian 
ships  were  confined  to  a  few  cheap  victories  over  the 
antiquated  coast  and  river  fortifications  of  Hanover. 
As  the  result  of  the  war,  Prussia  was  rounded  off 
by  the  incorporation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Hanover, 
Electoral  Hesse,  Nassau,  and  the  old  imperial  town 
of  Frankfort-on-Main.  She  thus  secured  for  herself 
the  entire  German  North  Sea  littoral,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  coast-line  of  Oldenburg,  which  by  treaty 
was  already  hers  in  fact  if  not  in  law.  Immediatel}^ 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  all  the  States  to  the 
north  of  the  Main  were  closely  welded  together  in 
the  North  German  Confederation,  the  first  decisive 
step  towards  the  creation  of  the  Empire.  An  article 
in  the  Federal  Constitution  ran:  "The  Federal  Navy 
is  one  and  indivisible  under  the  command  of  Prussia. 
Its  organization  and  composition  fall  to  His  Majesty 
the  King  of  Prussia,  who  nominates  the  officials  and 
officers  of  the  navy,  and  to  whom  they,  as  well  as 
the  crews,  must  take  the  oath  of  fealty.  Kiel  Harbour 
and  the  Jade  Harbour  are  federal  war  harbours.  The 
expenses  necessary  for  the  establishment  and  main- 
tenance of  the  fleet  and  the  institutions  connected 
therewith  will  be  borne  by  the  Federal  Treasury." 

Two  years  later  a  fresh  naval  programme  was 
submitted    to,  and  approved   by,  the   North   German 


EFFECT  OF  THE  FRENCH  WAR  91 

Reichstag.      It  laid  down  that  within   ten  years  the 
fleet  should  be  brought  up  to  the  subjoined  strength  : 


16  large  and  small  armoured 

ships. 
20  corvettes. 
8  despatch-boats. 


3  transports. 
22  steam  gunboats. 
7  school-ships. 


The  new  vessels  actually  needed  for  the  attainment 
of  this  establishment  were  12  armoured  ships,  12  cor- 
vettes, 6  despatch-boats,  2  transports,  and  i  school- 
ship.  As  native  ship -builders  had  so  far  had  no 
experience  in  the  construction  of  ironclads,  only  one 
vessel  of  this  type  was  placed  in  Germany,  the  State 
yard  at  Dantzic  being  experimentally  entrusted  with 
the  work,  while  the  rest  were  purchased  or  ordered  in 
England  or  France.  No  fact  could  illustrate  more 
vividly  the  tremendous  progress  which  Germany  has 
since  made  in  this  respect. 

Oddly  enough,  the  great  war  with  France  was 
succeeded  by  a  marked  cooling-off  of  the  popular 
enthusiasm  for  the  navy  in  Germany.  The  reasons 
for  this  appear  to  have  been  disappointment  with 
what  the  fleet  actually  accomplished  and  the  complete 
overthrow  of  the  enemy  without  its  assistance.  Even 
if  all  the  federal  ships  had  been  in  perfect  trim  and 
manned  by  thoroughly  trained  crews,  they  were  con- 
fronted by  so  overwhelming  a  superiority  of  force  that 
at  best  they  could  have  achieved  little  or  nothing.  But 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  coincided  with  a  series  of 
accidents  which  temporarily  disabled  several  of 
Germany's  best  war  vessels,  and  at  that  time  there 
was  not  a  single  dock  in  the  country  in  which  they 
could  be  repaired.  Officers  and  crews  were,  too, 
imperfectly  trained  and  insufficiently  familiar  with 
both  engines  and  guns,  the  harbour  equipments  were 
inadequate,  and,  in  fact,  everything  was  in  a  state  of 
unpreparedness. 

That  the  French,  with  their  great  naval  superiority, 
effected  so  little,  and  did  not  even  make  a  deter- 
mined  attempt    to    force   the  Jade  and    destroy  the 


92       ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

works  at  Wilhelmshaven,  can  only  be  ascribed  to  their 
lack  of  initiative  and  the  paralyzing  operation  of  their 
crushing  defeats  on  land.  The  only  regular  engagement 
fought  at  sea  during  the  war  was  an  encounter  of 
uncertain  issue  between  a  small  German  gunboat  and 
a  PVench  despatch-boat  off  the  coast  of  Cuba.  But  in 
spite  of  the  odds  against  the  federal  fleet,  public  opinion 
in  Germany  protested  that  it  should  have  shown  more 
dash  and  enterprise,  and  in  some  way  have  crowned 
itself  with  laurels.  Even  more  prejudicial  to  the  popu- 
larity of  an  ambitious  naval  policy  was  the  patent  fact 
that  the  hereditary  and  most  formidable  foe  had  been 
thoroughly  and  rapidly  humbled  by  a  purely  land 
campaign,  and  that  his  superiority  on  the  sea  had 
availed  him  practically  nothing.  To  such  considerations 
must  be  attributed  a  large  share  of  the  indifference 
with  which  many  Germans  regarded  their  navy  during 
the  next  thirty  years. 

The  prevalent  views  were  reflected  in  the  Memo- 
randum with  which,  in  1872,  the  Minister  of  Marine, 
Lieutenant-General  von  Stosch,  ushered  in  the  first 
naval  programme  of  the  new  German  Empire.  This 
document  stated  that  in  a  long  war  Germany  must 
leave  the  offensive  to  her  land  force,  and  that  the  proper 
task  of  her  navy  was  to  assert  the  power  of  the  Empire 
where  smaller  interests  were  at  stake  in  places  to 
which  the  army  could  not  penetrate.  An  increase  in 
the  fleet  was,  however,  stated  to  be  necessary  on  the 
ground  of  the  growth  of  German  sea-borne  trade,  and 
it  was  proposed  that  the  following  vessels  should  be 
available  by  the  year  1882  : 


8  armoured  frigates. 

6  armoured  corvettes. 

7  armoured  monitors. 
2  armoured  batteries. 

20  cruisers. 


6  despatch-boats. 
18  gun-boats. 
28  torpedo-boats. 

5  sciiool-ships. 


The  cost  of  these  vessels  was  estimated  at  73,000,000 
thalers,  that  of  their  maintenance  in  the  year  1882  at 
1,300,000  thalers.      The  plan,  which  was  much  more 


THE  FIRST  ROYAL  REVIEW  93 

modest  in  its  pretensions  than  its  predecessors,  and  in 
principle  constituted  a  retirement  from  the  position 
formerly  taken  up,  was  approved  by  the  first  Parlia- 
ment of  the  new  Germany. 

The  first  ro3^al  review  of  the  German  Fleet  took  place 
in  the  Warnemunde  roads  in  1875.  The  ships  present 
were  four  ironclads,  a  despatch-boat,  and  four  school- 
ships  ;  their  total  complements  2,862  officers  and  men. 

When  the  year  1883  arrived,  General  von  Stosch 
published  a  Memorandum  on  the  execution  of  his 
plan.  It  is  significant  of  the  change  that  had  come 
over  public  opinion  that  the  Government  had  not 
dared  to  ask  the  Reichstag  for  a  substitute  for  the 
armoured  frigate  Grosser  Ktirfilrst,  which  was  lost  in 
collision  off  Folkestone,  and  that  consequently  one  of 
the  eight  vessels  of  her  type  was  lacking.  The  last  of 
the  six  armoured  corvettes  had  yet  to  be  built,  and 
instead  of  five  monitors  thirteen  armoured  gunlDoats 
had  been  constructed,  because  it  was  thought  that  the 
latter  class  of  ship  was  better  suited  for  the  defence  of 
the  Jade,  Weser,  and  Elbe.  It  had  been  decided  not 
to  build  the  floating  batteries,  which  would  have  been 
an  easy  prey  to  the  fish  torpedo,  introduced  as  a  weapon 
of  naval  warfare  since  they  were  projected.  One  out 
of  th^  twenty  corvettes,  and  eight  large  and  nine  small 
torpedo  craft  were  also  still  wanting.  German  national 
vanity  had,  however,  scored  a  questionable  triumph  : 
the  Empire  was  now  entirely  independent  of  foreigners 
so  far  as  its  warships  were  concerned.  But  if  Germany 
had  continued  to  purchase  some  of  her  warships  in 
England  while  she  was  still  but  a  tyro  in  the  art  of 
naval  architecture,  she  would  have  saved  much  money, 
and  have  reached  her  present  efficiency  even  more 
rapidly  than  has  been  the  case. 

General  von  Stosch  simultaneously  presented  another 
Memorandum,  dealing  with  the  future  development  of 
the  navy.     In  it  he  laid  stress  on  the  reasons  which 
could  be  adduced  againstthe  principle  hitherto  followed 
and  since  readopted,  of  fixing  the  building  programme 


94      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

in  advance  for  a  longer  period,  and  advised  that  it  w^as 
inexpedient  to  look  farther  ahead  than  three  or  four 
years.  While  admitting  that  "  the  seas  are  ever  more 
ceasing  to  separate  the  nations,"  and  that  "  the  course 
of  history  seems  ever  more  to  indicate  that  a  State 
cannot  withdraw  from  the  sea  if  it  is  striving  to  main- 
tain for  itself  a  position  in  the  w^orld  beyond  the 
immediate  future,"  he  laid  down  the  axiom  that  "  naval 
battles  alone  seldom  decide  the  destinies  of  States,  and 
for  immeasurable  time  the  decision  of  every  war  will 
for  Germany  lie  with  her  land  army."  Thus,  though 
he  admitted  the  desirability  of  "a  concentrated  high 
sea  fleet  always  ready  for  action,"  he  considered  it 
best  to  defer  the  construction  of  battleships  till  further 
experience  had  shown  w^hether  their  functions  could 
not  be  equally  well  performed  by  vessels  of  a  smaller 
type.  The  conclusion  reached  by  the  Memorandum 
was  that  it  was  necessary  to  add  without  delay  to  only 
one  class  of  vessel — namely,  that  which  served  the 
purposes  of  coast  defence.  In  this  connection  the 
following  w^ords  were  used  : 

"  Here  it  is  the  torpedo-boat,  which,  especially  when 
used  in  large  numbers  at  night,  will  render  the  carry- 
ing through  of  a  blockade  almost  impossible.  Every 
night  the  blockading  ships  would  be  compelled  to 
withdraw  to  a  distance  under  steam.  Their  coal  con- 
sumption would  thereby  be  much  increased,  the  tension 
of  the  crews,  in  consequence  of  the  need  for  unremitting 
vigilance,  would  become  intolerable,  and  at  night  the 
blockaded  harbours  would  be  accessible.  Even  when 
in  motion,  the  blockading  ships  would  not  be  safe  at 
night.  The  torpedo-boats  would  follow  them  and 
recognize  their  aim  by  the  lights  which  the  enemy 
would  not  be  able  to  do  without  when  steaming  in 
squadron  formation.  The  torpedo-boat  is  a  weapon 
which  is  of  special  advantage  to  the  weaker  on  the  sea. 
A  few  States  already  possess  a  considerable  strength 
in  torpedo  craft.  For  the  German  Navy  150  torpedo- 
boats  are  considered  necessary,  and  of  these  thirty-five 
will  be  ready  for  service  shortly." 


ACCESSION  OF  WILLIAM  11.  IN  1888       95 

It  was  while  the  German  Fleet  was  still  impotent 
for  all  serious  purposes  that  the  Empire  acquired  the 
mass  of  its  colonies :  South-West  Africa,  Togo,  the 
Cameroons,  German  New  Guinea,  the  Bismarck  Archi- 
pelago, and  the  Marshall  Islands  were  all  annexed  in 
1884.  The  decisive  step  towards  the  acquisition  of 
German  East  Africa  was  taken  in  the  following  year. 
The  political  and  commercial  value  of  these  possessions 
will  be  considered  in  a  later  chapter. 

William  I.  lived  just  long  enough  to  lay  the  founda- 
tion-stone of  the  Kiel  Canal,  which  had  been  one  of 
the    dreams    of   the    Frankfort   patriots    forty   years 
earlier.     His  death  was  followed  after  an  interval  of 
three  months  by  that  of  Frederick   I.,  and  with  the 
accession  of  William    II.,  in   1888,  the   latest   era  of 
German  naval  policy  may  be  said  to  have  commenced. 
Until,  however.  Admiral  Tirpitz  was  put  in  charge  of 
the  Ministry  of  Marine,  in  1897,  practically  nothing 
was  done  to  add  to  the  fighting  strength  of  the  fleet. 
Any  progress  which  was  made  in  connection  with  the 
navy  was  confined  to  developments  of  organization, 
and  to  the  exchange  of  German  rights  in  Zanzibar  and 
Witu   for  the  islet   of  Heligoland.     This  transaction 
was  scoffed  at  by  Bismarck,  then  in  retirement,  who, 
however,  only  contemplated  the  possibility  of  a  naval 
war  with    France,   and  it  was   bitterly   resented   by 
German  public  opinion,  and  especially  by  that  heated 
section  of  it  which  poses  as  the  pioneer  on  the  paths  of 
militarism,  navalism,  and  colonism.     Only  during  the 
last  three  or  four  years  has  the  conviction  gradually 
begun  to  gain  ground,  that  perhaps,  after  all,  Germany 
did  not  make  such  a  bad  bargain,  and  Heligoland  has 
simultaneously  taken  an  ever  more  and  more  promi- 
nent place  in  the  speculations  of  political  prophets  as 
to  the  probable  outcome  of  an  Anglo-German  war. 

The  keen  interest  of  the  Emperor  WiHiam,  and  his 
ambition  to  play  the  leading  part  on  the  stage  of  the 
world,  would  not,  in  themselves,  have  sufficed  to  bring 
about  the  change  which  has  been  wrought  during  the 


96      ITS  NAVY  IN  THE  LAST  CENTURY 

past  fifteen  years.  The  decisive  personal  factors  here 
have  been  the  fixed  purpose,  the  steady  v^ill,  the  un- 
flagging energy,  the  inexhaustible  patience,  the  pro- 
found political  insight,  and  the  rare  diplomatic  skill  of 
Admiral  Tirpitz,  the  nearest  approach  to  a  really 
great  man  that  German}^  has  produced  since  Bismarck. 
He  is  the  true  creator  of  the  German  fleet  that  is  and 
is  to  be. 


CHAPTER  IV 

BRITISH  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  GERMAN  NAVY 

In  a  very  special  sense  the  German  Navy  is  the  child 
of  the  British  Navy,  which  is  the  mother  of  all  the 
great  naval  forces  of  the  world  to-day.  From  the  very 
first  it  has  been  no  secret  that  the  German  Fleet  has 
been  definitely  planned  on  the  model  furnished  by  the 
many  centuries'  development  of  the  British  Navy,  and 
the  Emperor  William  has  been  one  of  the  principal 
agencies  through  which  this  formative  influence  has 
been  exerted  in  more  recent  years."^  He  came  to  the 
throne  at  a  moment  when  naval  sentiment  in  Germany 
was  at  its  lowest  point,  and  he  assisted  in  the  initial 
revival  which  occurred  before  Grand  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  came  on  the  scene. 

Old  residents  of  Portsmouth  still  remember  a  boy 
whom  they  occasionally  saw  walking  about  the  dock- 
yard looking  at  the  ships  with  admiration  and  rapt 
attention.  His  greatest  delight  seemed  to  be  to  watch 
the  great  ironclads  moving  in  and  out  of  Spithead. 
Sometimes  he  would  find  his  way  on  board  vessels  oi 
the  Royal  Navy.  This  lad  was  none  other  than  the 
present  German  Emperor.  As  a  grandson  of  Queen 
Victoria,  he  was  a  frequent  visitor  in  his  boyhood  and 
early  manhood  to  his  grandmother  during  the  summer 
months  when  she  was  in  residence  at  Osborne,  and 
on  one  occasion  his  father  and  mother,  then  Crown 
Prince  and  Princess  of  Germany,  rented  Norris  Castle, 
on  the  outskirts  of  Cowes,  and  lived  there  for  several 
months  with  their  children.     Prince  William,  who  was 

*  Cf.  also  p.  80. 

97  7 


98      BRITISH  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  NAVY 

a  great  favourite  of  the  late  Queen,  thus  not  only  be- 
came an  eager  spectator  of  the  naval  pageants  in 
the  Solent  directly  under  the  v^indows  of  Osborne 
House  and  Norris  Castle,  but  watched  with  interest 
the  gay  assemblage  in  Cowes  roadstead  for  the  regatta 
from  year  to  year. 

At  this  time  the  newly-created  German  Empire 
had  practically  no  fleet.  During  the  Franco-Prussian 
War  the  few  ships  which  flew  the  flag  of  the  North 
German  Confederation  were  so  w^eak  that  they  could 
take  no  part  in  the  conflict.  The  memory  of  these 
recent  events  was  still  fresh  in  the  mind  of  the  future 
Emperor  when  he  visited  England  and  watched  the 
activities  of  the  British  Navy,  whose  far-flung 
squadrons  performed  the  double  task  of  protecting 
the  Motherland  from  fear  of  invasion,  and  safeguard- 
ing all  her  oversea  possessions.  He  determined  that 
he,  too,  would  have  a  great  fleet  when  he  succeeded 
to  the  throne  of  the  German  Empire. 

This  is  no  imaginary  picture  of  the  ideas  which  were 
taking  root  in  the  mind  of  the  ruler  of  the  German 
Empire  to-day.  Years  afterw^ards — in  fact,  in  1904 — 
addressing  King  Edward,  on  the  occasion  of  His 
Majesty's  visit  to  the  Kiel  Regatta,  the  Emperor  paid 
a  tribute  to  the  power  and  traditions  of  the  British 
Navy,  with  which,  he  added,  he  became  acquainted  as 
a  youth  during  visits  which  he  paid  to  England.  He 
recalled  that  he  had  had  many  a  sail  in  the  Dolphin 
and  Alberta^  old  British  yachts,  and  had  seen  mighty 
ironclads  constructed  which  had  since  served  their  time 
and  disappeared  from  the  Navy  List.  "  When  I  came 
to  the  throne  I  attempted  to  reproduce  on  a  scale 
commensurate  with  the  resources  and  interests  of  m.y 
own  country  that  which  had  made  such  a  deep  im- 
pression on  my  mind  when  I  saw  it  as  a  young  man 
in  England." 

When  he  first  advocated  the  construction  of  a  big 
navy,  the  German  people  viewed  his  dreams  witn 
indifference  and  distrust.     Shackled  bv  a  svstem  of 


THE  EMPEROR'S  FRUITLESS  EFFORTS    99 

conscription  in  order  to  provide  the  Empire  with  its 
huge  army,  they  asked  what  it  would  profit  them  if  to 
the  burden  of  a  great  army  they  added  the  vast  expense 
of  a  fleet  capable  not  merely  of  defending  their  coasts, 
but  of  operating  on  the  offensive  in  distant  seas.  At 
first  the  Emperor  made  little  progress  in  educating 
public  opinion;  but  he  still  nursed  those  dreams  of 
sea-power — very  moderate  dreams  at  this  date,  before 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz  came  on  the  scene — which  had 
first  taken  shape  in  his  mind  when  he  wandered  about 
Portsmouth  Dockyard,  and  viewed  from  the  grounds 
of  Osborne  House  the  coming  and  going  of  mighty 
British  warships.  In  the  early  days  of  the  present 
century  he  referred  with  some  pride  to  the  persistency 
with  which  he  had  pursued  his  aims  in  spite  of  popular 
disfavour.  At  the  launch  of  the  Kaiser  Karl  der  Grosse 
he  said  :  '*  If  the  increase  in  the  navy  which  I  had 
demanded  with  urgent  prayers  had  not  been  consis- 
tently refused  me  during  the  first  eight  years  of  my 
reign — I  did  not  even  escape  derision  and  mocking  at 
the  time — in  how  different  a  manner  should  we  now 
be  able  to  promote  our  prosperous  commerce  and  our 
interests  overseas !"  He  had  to  wait  for  many  years 
before  he  saw  his  dreams  reaching  fruition. 

As  the  British  Parliament  is  the  mother  of  all 
popular  representative  institutions,  so  the  British 
Navy  is  the  mother  of  navies.  If  the  records  of  most 
of  the  great  fleets  of  the  world  are  searched,  it  will  be 
found  that  in  greater  or  less  degree  they  owe  their 
birth  to  the  more  or  less  direct  assistance  of  British 
naval  officers,  ofttimes  acting  with  the  direct  authority 
of  the  British  Admiralty  ;  while  in  almost  every  fleet  in 
the  world  even  to-day  may  be  found  ships  designed  by 
British  brains  and  constructed  of  British  material  by 
the  skilled  craftsmen  of  these  islands.  It  was  to 
England  that  Peter  the  Great  came  to  watch  the  ship- 
building on  the  Thames,  and  it  was  with  a  large  body 
of  British  mechanics  that  he  returned  to  Russia  to 
create  a  fleet  with  which  to  defend  his  empire  and  ex- 


100    BRITISH  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  NAVY 

tend  its  borders  at  the  point  of  the  gun.  The  prestige 
of  the  Russian  Navy  in  the  seventeenth  century  was 
due  entirely  to  the  skill  and  daring  of  Scotsmen.  The 
Greigs  of  four  generations,  Admiral  Elphinstone, 
Lord  Duffus  Gordon,  and  a  number  of  other  Scotsmen 
entered  the  Navy  of  the  Czar  and  did  splendid  service; 
and  some  of  the  descendants  of  these  pioneers  of  the 
Russian  Navy  may  still  be  traced  in  the  fleet  of  to-day. 
The  American  Navy  was,  of  course,  of  distinctly 
British  origin ;  so  were  the  fleets  of  many  of  the  South 
American  Republics ;  while,  as  everybody  knows,  the 
seeds  of  the  sea-power  of  Japan  were  sown  by  British 
naval  officers,  including  first  and  foremost  Admiral 
Sir  Archibald  Douglas,  and  her  ships  were  mainly  built 
in  England.  The  excellence  to  which  the  Chinese  Navy 
once  attained  was  also  due  to  British  instruction  under 
another  Scotsman,  Admiral  Lang ;  and  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal shipyards  of  Italy,  as  well  as  her  gun  factory,  is  of 
British  origin,  and  is  still  linked  with  its  British  parent. 
In  the  case  of  the  modern  German  Fleet  the  British 
Admiralty  had  little  part  in  its  upbuilding,  but  British 
naval  power  fired  the  imagination  of  the  Emperor, 
and  it  was  a  kindly  present  made  years  before  by  King 
William  IV.  to  the  then  King  of  Prussia  which  first 
directed  his  Majesty's  thoughts  towards  the  sea. 
When  the  present  Emperor  was  a  boy,  one  of  his 
favourite  recreations  was  to  sail  a  beautiful  model  of 
about  20  tons  of  a  British  frigate  on  the  Havel  lakes  near 
Potsdam.  This  little  ship,  of  excellent  workmanship, 
was  sent  as  a  present  to  the  then  ruler  of  Prussia  early 
in  the  last  century  by  our  sailor  King,  and  was  a  never- 
failing  source  of  pleasure  to  the  present  German 
Emperor  as  a  youth.  From  his  earliest  years  at  home 
and  in  England  the  luture  ruler's  aspirations  were 
always  towards  the  sea,  and  we  can  now  see  that  his 
dreams  of  later  years,  which  have  taken  such  tangible 
shape,  were  largel}^  due  to  these  vivid  impressions 
of  sea-power  which  he  obtained  during  his  visits  to 
England,  and  which  reached  their  climax  in  1889,  when 


AS  AN  ADMIRAL  OF  THE  FLEEl''' '   ioi' 

Queen  Victoria,  on  the  occasion  of  his  visit  to  the 
Cowes  Regatta,  conferred  on  him  the,  then,  unique 
rank  of  Admiral  of  the  Fleet. 

Though  other  foreign  Princes  and  monarchs  have 
since  been  made  honorary  officers  of  the  British  Navy, 
the  German  Emperor  remained  for  some  years  the 
only  person  of  foreign  birth  holding  supreme  rank. 
The  commission  conferred  upon  the  Kaiser  v^as  of 
course  purely  honorary,  but  his  Majesty  has  never  con- 
cealed the  pride  with  which  he  dons  the  British  uniform 
with  its  deep  gold  cuffs  and  cocked  hat,  and  he  can  claim 
that  he  is  the  only  ruler  of  a  foreign  State  who  has 
ever  commanded  the  British  Navy  in  modern  times. 

Great  Britain  has  boasted  of  her  ''splendid  isolation," 
and  the  German  Emperor's  is  the  only  alien  hand 
which  has  controlled  any  of  her  fleets.  In  times  gone 
by  a  British  squadron  was  placed  under  the  orders 
of  Peter  the  Great.  This  incident  occurred  during 
the  Czar's  operations  against  Sweden,  when  he 
received  the  assistance  of  a  squadron  from  these 
islands  and  hoisted  his  flag  in  command  of  the  allied 
forces.  Between  that  date  and  the  year  when  the 
German  Emperor  became  an  Admiral  of  the  Fleet 
the  British  Navy  maintained  its  absolute  indepen- 
dence. But  soon  after  receiving  the  honorary  rank 
from  Queen  Victoria,  the  Emperor  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity to  emulate  the  example  of  Peter  the  Great, 
and  he  afterwards  confessed  in  a  speech  he  delivered 
on  board  the  British  battleship.  Royal  Sovereign^ 
that  the  incident  had  left  an  indelible  impression 
upon  his  mind.  "One  of  the  best  days  of  my  life,' 
he  remarked,  '*  which  I  shall  never  forget  as  long  as 
I  live,  was  the  day  when  I  inspected  the  Mediter- 
ranean Fleet  when  I  was  on  board  the  Dreadnought^"^ 
and  my  flag  was  hoisted  for  the  first  time." 

The  Emperor  at  this  time  was  making  a  cruise  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  visited  the  Piraeus  to  attend  the 

*  This  ship  was,  of  course,  the  predecessor  of  the  present  Dread- 
nought. 


102     BRITISH  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  NAVY 

wedding  of  his  sister  to  the  present  King  of  Greece. 
Sir  Anthony  Hoskins,  who  was  then  only  a  Vice- 
Admiral,  was  in  command  of  the  British  Fleet  which 
had  assembled  in  honour  of  the  royal  marriage.  The 
German  Emperor  decided  that  in  his  new  role  as  a 
British  officer  he  would  exercise  command,  and  con- 
sequently the  emblem  of  an  Admiral  of  the  Fleet, 
which  consists  of  the  Union  flag,  was  broken  at  the 
main  on  board  the  old  battleship  Dreadnottghty  and 
Sir  Anthony  Hoskins,  being  a  junior  officer,  was  forth- 
with relieved  of  the  control  of  the  British  men-of-war, 
and  nominally,  though  not  of  course  actually,  the 
German  Emperor,  during  the  time  that  his  flag  was 
flown,  was  in  command  of  the  greatest  of  all  the 
fighting  squadrons  of  the  British  Empire. 

On  a  subsequent  occasion,  at  Malta,  His  Majesty 
again  visited  the  British  Fleet.  Arriving  at  this  great 
naval  base  he  announced  that  on  the  following  day  he 
would  inspect  one  of  the  men-of-war.  Accordingly, 
he  proceeded  on  board,  and  his  flag  was  forthwith 
hoisted.  It  \vas  thought  that  His  Majesty  would 
formally  walk  round  the  decks  and  then  take  some 
light  refreshments  and  return  to  his  yacht.  This  was 
not  the  case,  however.  No  sooner  did  the  Emperor 
reach  the  quarter-deck,  where  he  was  received  with 
naval  honours  by  all  the  officers,  than  he  took  off  his 
coat  and  intimated  that  he  was  ready  to  go  over  the 
ship.  His  Majesty  went  everywhere,  from  the  turrets 
to  the  engine  and  boiler-rooms,  and  kept  the  Captain 
fully  occupied  in  answering  a  multitude  of  questions 
as  to  the  design  and  equipment  of  the  vessel.  With 
all  the  impetuosity  of  his  nature  he  dived  into  every 
hole  and  corner  and  saw  ever^^thing,  and  the  Captain 
was  kept  so  busy  that  he  forgot  his  duty  as  host  and 
the  wines  he  had  laid  in  for  the  occasion.  At  last  the 
inspection  ended,  the  questions  ceased,  and  His  Majesty 
prepared,  after  complimenting  the  Captain  on  the  smart- 
ness of  his  ship,  to  go  down  the  companion  ladder  to 
his  launch.     As  he  did  so,  he  turned  to  this  command- 


IMPERIAL  VISITS  TO  BRITISH  SHIPS     103 

ing  officer  and  said :  *'  Yours  must  be  the  longest  ship  in 
the  British  Navy."  ''I  think  not,  your  Majesty,"  re- 
plied the  Captain,  "it's  only  420  feet  long."  ''  Oh,  you 
surely  are  mistaken,"  added  the  Emperor,  and  then 
the  Captain  remembered  the  naval  slang  as  to  "  long- 
ships  in  the  navy  " — namely,  those  with  long  intervals 
between  refreshments.  He  forthwith  apologized  pro- 
fusely for  the  oversight,  and  implored  the  Emperor  to 
return  to  the  cabin.  His  Majesty  would  not,  however, 
do  so,  but  added  :  "January  27  is  my  birthday,  and  my 
orders  are  that  on  that  day  you  entertain  all  your 
brother  captains  to  dinner  and  drink  my  health."  He 
then  left,  pleased  at  the  result  of  the  incident. 

When  the  day  arrived,  the  dinner  was  duly  held, 
and  the  guests  enjoyed  themselves  immensely.  During 
the  evening  they  despatched  the  following  message 
to  the  Emperor :  "  The  orders  of  our  Admiral  of  the 
Fleet  have  been  carried  out,  and  we  have  drunk  your 
Majesty's  good  health.  But  there  is  one  point  on 
which  we  cannot  agree  with  your  Majesty,  and  that  is 

as   to   the   length   of  H.M.S.    ."      From   this   the 

Emperor,  who  is  familiar  with  the  language  of  the 
navy,  was  able  subsequently  to  infer  that  on  that 
evening  there  had  been  no  lack  of  hospitality. 

On  many  occasions  the  Emperor  has  visited  British 
men-of-war  in  virtue  of  his  commission  as  Admiral 
of  the  Fleet,  and  no  visitor  has  been  more  welcome. 
His  Majesty  has  always  been  very  popular  among 
British  officers,  and  by  many  little  incidents,  charac- 
teristic of  a  ruler  who  has  much  of  the  sailor's  roving 
nature  and  love  of  good  fellowship,  he  has  endeared 
himself  to  the  men  of  the  British  Fleet.  More  than 
once,  when  yachting  in  Norwegian  w^aters,  he  has 
fallen  in  with  a  cadets'  training  ship  and  entertained 
the  future  officers  in  the  most  delightful  manner, 
throwing  aside  all  that  majesty  which  hedges  round 
a  King,  and  had  made  his  young  guests  anticipate  the 
meeting  with  some  amount  of  dread.  During  his  suc- 
cession of  summer  visits  to  Cowes  Regatta  in  the  early 


104    BRITISH  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  NAVY 

years  of  his  reign,  he  never  lost  an  opportunity  of  further 
cementing  his  friendship  with  the  British  service. 

After  the  lapse  of  many  years  during  which  the 
progress  of  the  German  Navy  has  become  ever  more 
and  more  the  preoccupation  of  the  British  people,  it  is 
difficult  to  realize  that  when  the  movement  for  naval 
expansion  on  the  other  side  of  the  North  Sea  first 
began  to  take  shape  it  was  regarded  with  sympathy 
by  the  British  nation,  and  the  German  Emperor, 
wearing  his  uniform  as  an  honorary  British  officer, 
was,  of  all  monarchs,  the  most  popular  in  this  country. 
The  two  countries  were  on  terms  of  growing  cordiality 
when  the  Emperor  succeeded  his  father  in  1888.  The 
absence  of  any  reference  by  the  new  Emperor  in  his 
proclamation  either  to  England  or  to  France  caused 
momentary  anxiety,  but  that  feeling  quickly  passed 
away,  and  in  the  following  summer  the  new  Emperor 
was  the  central  figure  in  the  great  naval  pageant  at 
Spithead. 

For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  British  Fleet 
naval  manoeuvres  had  been  held  in  1885,  and  in  the  year 
after  Wilham  II.'s  accession  the  young  ruler  witnessed 
the  greatest  display  of  British  sea-power  which  had  ever 
been  organized.  The  assembly  of  1889  far  exceeded  in 
numbers  and  in  the  suggestion  of  power  the  Naval 
Review  which  had  marked  the  celebration  of  Queen 
Victoria's  Jubilee.  It  was  the  most  powerful  fleet  ever 
brought  together  in  time  of  peace.  The  Naval  Defence 
Act,  the  culmination  of  a  long  and  vigorous  agita- 
tion, had  been  passed  in  the  spring,  and  it  was 
thought  appropriate  to  mobilize  the  fleet  as  a  demon- 
stration in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  The  German 
Emperor  determined  to  visit  this  country  for  the 
special  purpose  of  joining  in  this  festival  of  British 
sea -power.  In  those  days  the  act  of  mobiliza- 
tion occupied  considerable  time ;  though  the  ships 
in  reserve  were  manned  in  the  middle  of  July  it 
was  not  until  August  i  that  the  fleet  assembled  at 
Spithead.     It  included  20  battleships,  6  coast  defence 


THE  REVIEW  AT  SPITHEAD  IN  1889       105 

vessels,  29  cruisers,  3  gun  vessels,  14  gunboats,  and 
38  torpedo  boats.     The  great  anchorage  presented  a 
brave  appearance  when,   on  the  following  day,   the 
Emperor    arrived,    escorted    by    a    squadron   of    his 
small  navy.     This  force  consisted  of  the  battleships 
Friedrich    der   Grosse^  Pretissen,  Deutschlandy    Kaiser^ 
Sachsen,   Baden,    and    Oldenburg,    together  with    the 
despatch  vessels  Zieten  and  Wacht;  while  the  training 
ship  for  German  naval   cadets,  the  Niobe,  was  also 
present,  together  with  the  corvette  Irene,  commanded 
by  the    Emperor's    brother.     The   German   Emperor 
and  his  ships  received  an  enthusiastic  welcome  as  he 
passed  through  the  English  Fleet  on  board  his  yacht, 
the  Hohenzollern.     The  spectacle  was  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  and  imposing  ever  witnessed  in  waters  which 
had  often  been  the  scene  of  naval  displays.     On  the 
following  Monday,  when  the  Prince  of  Wales,  repre- 
senting Queen  Victoria,  inspected  the  ships,  His  Royal 
Highness  was  accompanied  by  His  Majesty,  to  whom, 
subsequently,  all  the  principal  officers  were  presented 
on    board    the    Victoria    and   Albert     Early    on    the 
following   day   the  fleet   proceeded   to  sea,  steaming 
past  the  German  Emperor,  who  watched  the  evolution 
from  the  deck  of  the  Osborne,  moored  in  Sandown  Bay. 
Thus   did    the   new   ruler   of   Germany,   on   whom 
Queen  Victoria  had  just  conferred  the  honorary  rank 
of  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  in  the  British  service,  gain  a 
unique    knowledge    of    the    size    and    efficiency    of 
the   British   Navy   normally   maintained   on    a   peace 
footing  in  home  waters.     The  contrast  in  organization 
and  in  administration  between  the  British  Navy  and 
the  German  Armiy  can  hardly  have  failed  to  impress 
the  young  Emperor,  who  had  devoted  himself  with 
unremitting  persistency  to  the  study  of  the  military 
machine  of  his  own  country.     Looking  back  with  the 
knowledge  which  we  now  possess  of  the  rapidity  with 
which  a  navy  can  be  raised  from  a  peace  footing  to  a 
war  footing  as  exemplified   by  the  modern  German 
Navy,  we    can    imagine    the    impression  which   the 


io6    BRITISH  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  NAVY 

British  mobilization  made  upon  His  Majest}^  And 
then,  when  the  time  came  for  the  ships  to  pass  out  of 
the  anchorage  into  the  channel,  the  delays  and  confusion 
which  occurred  must  have  suggested  to  the  young 
ruler,  familiar  with  the  standard  of  efficiency  attained 
by  the  German  Army,  that  something  was  lacking. 

A  contemporary  account  of  this  evolution  records 
that — ''It  was  at  half- past  three  in  the  morning 
that  the  fleet  began  to  unmoor  preparatory  to  pro- 
ceeding to  sea,  but  it  was  not  until  nearly  eleven  that 
Sir  George  Tryon — the  Admiral  in  supreme  command 
— was  able  to  give  the  signal  for  his  squadron  to  weigh 
anchor.  Nearly  all  the  delay  was  caused  by  trouble 
and  mishaps  connected  with  the  anchoring  gear  of 
various  ships.  There  is  no  part  of  the  equipment 
of  a  man-of-war  which  requires  more  management 
and  experience  in  handling  than  the  ground  tackle. 
Every  vessel  has  peculiarities  of  her  own  in  this 
respect,  therefore  it  is  due,  probably,  to  the  crews  being 
in  most  cases  quite  strange  to  their  ships,  and  to  the 
officers  not  yet  having  got  the  hang  of  things,  that  so 
many  shortcomings  were  made  apparent.  Soon  after 
ten  o'clock  Admiral  Baird,  in  command  of  the  other 
section  of  the  fleet,  got  impatient  of  further  delay,  for 
it  was  manifest  that  if  he  did  not  start  speedily  another 
review  might  have  to  be  postponed.  So  he  signalled  the 
ships  of  his  squadron  to  proceed  to  sea  as  soon  as  ready, 
and  shortly  afterwards  they  began  filing  out  eastward 
in  a  long  single  line.  But  some  ships  could  not  obey  the 
order ;  and  amongst  these  were  the  Anso?i,  Coi/wgzvood, 
and  Inflexible  still  engaged  in  getting  up  their  anchors." 

This  same  writer  concluded  his  account  of  the 
spectacle  with  the  remark  that  "A  grander,  a  more 
magnificent  demonstration  of  England's  Fleet  it  would 
indeed  be  difficult  to  imagine."  But  behind  the 
seeming  of  things  there  stood  revealed  an  organization 
which,  though  it  had  recently  been  greatly  improved, 
still  left  much  to  be  desired  in  rapid  and  efficient 
action.     Moreover,  at  this  time  even  in  the  Channel 


"GUNNERY  LITTLE  ATTENDED  TO"      107 

fleet,  which  then  consisted  of  five  ships,  and  was  the 
only  fully  commissioned  force  in  home  waters,  the  main 
purpose  of  sea-power,  to  shoot  straight,  was  certainly 
not  kept  in  view.  In  his  interesting  book  of  remin- 
iscences, **  The  Navy  as  I  have  Known  It,"  Admiral  the 
Hon.  Sir  Edmund  Fremantle,  describing  the  conditions 
which  existed  in  the  Jubilee  year,  records:  ''We  had 
large  crews  and,  as  all  the  ships  were  masted,  there 
was  a  fair  amount  of  sail  drill,  while  I  fear  gunneiy 
was  little  attended  to." 

There  is  no  record  of  the  impressions  which  the 
German  Emperor  carried  home  with  him  from  Spit- 
head,  but  it  is  more  than  probable  that,  while  his 
Majesty  was  impressed  by  the  great  display  of  ships 
and  men,  he  was  not  less  impressed  by  the  failure  to 
utilize  these  resources  to  the  best  possible  advantage. 

The  British  Navy  was  living  on  its  past  achieve- 
ments. Though  it  possessed  a  mass  of  material  and  a 
large  personnel,  neither  was  well  organized  for  war. 
The  available  resources  exceeded  anything  belonging 
to  any  other  nation,  but  the  fleet  still  basked,  content, 
in  the  glow  of  the  triumphs  achieved  in  the  early  years 
of  Ihe  nineteenth  century.  The  navy  was  unreformed. 
Steam  had  taken  the  place  of  sails,  wood  had  been 
superseded,  first  by  iron  and  then  by  steel,  but  the 
routine  of  the  squadrons,  the  training  of  officers  and 
men  had  undergone  little  change.  The  conditions  of 
naval  warfare  had  altered,  but  the  British  Fleet 
remained  faithful  to  the  old  regime,  holding  fast  to 
the  belief  that  when  war  occurred  there  would  be  a 
sufficient  interval  to  allow  it  to  complete  its  arrange- 
ments, elaborate  its  plans  and  place  all  its  resources  on 
a  war  footing.  As  the  British  Navy  in  its  influence 
on  world  policy  inspired  German  ambitions,  so  German 
thoroughness  in  organization,  when  applied  to  the 
growing  German  Fleet,  reacted  upon  the  British  Nav}^ 
and  gave  it  a  new  and  vigorous  life.* 

*  In  the  preparation  of  this  chapter  use  has  been  made,  with  the 
permission  of  the  editor  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  of  an  article 
entitled  **  The  Kaiser's  Dreams  of  Sea-Power." 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

Among  the  political  developments  of  the  last  quarter 
of  a  century  there  is  none  more  remarkable  than  the 
evolution  of  German  naval  ambitions  as  revealed  in 
the  legislation  which  has  been  passed  since  1898. 

One  of  the  first  acts  after  the  Emperor  ascended  the 
throne  was  the  reorganization  of  the  central  Navy 
administration,  which  had  hitherto  been  presided  over 
by  a  general  officer  of  the  army.  This  fact  in  itself 
indicates  the  subordinate  position  which  the  navy  had 
hitherto  occupied  in  the  defensive  machinery  of  the 
German  Empire.  The  fleet  itself  was  of  extremely 
modest  proportions.  It  consisted  only  of  a  few  small 
battleships  of  heavy  gun-power,  but  limited  radius  of 
action,  whose  role  was  the  defence  of  the  coasts  of 
Germany,  and  more  particularly  the  Baltic  littoral, 
for  at  this  period  few  men-of-war  under  any  flag 
cruised  in  the  North  Sea.  The  spearhead  of  the 
British  Navy  was  exposed  in  the  Mediterranean, 
where  the  latest  and  most  powerful  ships  were  sta- 
tioned, and  the  small  Channel  fleet  spent  most  of  its 
time  not  in  the  Channel,  but  ringing  the  changes  on 
Vigo  and  other  Spanish  ports — Lisbon,  Lagos,  Gib- 
raltar, Madeira,  and  Port  Mahon.  This  squadron 
consisted  of  five  obsolescent  ships,  and  the  only 
British  vessels  permanently  in  home  waters  —  so 
complete  was  the  domination  of  the  situation  in 
southern  waters — were  a  number  of  port  and  coast- 
guard ships,  half  manned  and  distributed  round  the 
coast,  and  the  unmanned  vessels   in   reserve   in  the 

108 


REDUCTION  OF  GERMAN  ESTIMATES     109 

dockyards.  The  distribution  of  the  French  Fleet  was 
on  much  the  same  lines,  the  majority  of  the  modern 
ships  being  concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean,  while 
a  small  force  was  based  upon  Brest.  Russia  alone 
was  represented  in  northern  waters,  and  it  was  con- 
sequently in  the  Baltic  that  the  German  Fleet,  such 
as  it  was,  was  trained  and  drilled.  Except  for  a  few 
gunboats,  the  German  naval  ensign  was  entirely 
unrepresented  in  distant  seas,  and  public  opinion 
showed  no  desire  to  increase  the  naval  votes  in  order 
to  enable  German  influence  to  be  exercised  beyond 
home  waters. 

After    the    Emperor's    accession   to  the  throne   in 
June,  1888,  and  after  the  reorganization  of  naval  ad- 
ministration, an  effort  was  made  to  obtain  an  increased 
grant    from    the    Reichstag,    but    only    with    partial 
success.     From  1874  to  1889-90  the  naval  expenditure 
had    increased    gradually  from    ;^i, 950,000  to   about 
;^2, 750,000.     In    1890-91   the  Estimates  had  advanced 
to  nearly  ;^3,6oo,ooo,  and  in  the  following  year  they 
rose  still  further  to  ;^4,75o,ooo,  and  then  they  began 
to  fall  once  more  under  the  pressure  of  the  Reichstag, 
which  viewed  with  no  sympathy  the  new  naval  am- 
bitions which  were  finding  expression  in  the  Press. 
During  these  years  the  Reichstag  repeatedly  reduced 
the  votes  put  forward  by  Admiral  von  Hollmann,  the 
Minister  of  Marine.     Throughout  his  period  of  office, 
from  1890  to  1897,  he  failed  signally  to  inoculate  the 
Parliamentary  majority  with   the   new  ideas  and  the 
new  enthusiasm    which    dominated   the   Marineamt ; 
and  at  last  in  1897,  after  being  repulsed,  first  by  the 
Budget  Committee  and  then  by  the  Reichstag  itself, 
the  Marine   Minister,   whose   ambitions   were   really 
extremely  modest,  retired  from  the  scene  compelled  to 
admit  defeat.     He  was  a  sailor  and  neither  a  statesman 
nor  an  administrator,  and  his  blunt  methods  were  not 
to  the  hking  of  the  politicians.     No  surprise  conse- 
quently was   felt  when  three  months  after  this  final 
humiliation  the  Admiral  resigned  his  office.     One  of 


no  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

the  pioneers  of  German  sea-power,  Admiral  von  Holl- 
man  began,  under  the  inspiration  of  the  Emperor,  the 
naval  movement  which,  a  few  years  later,  under  the 
impulse  that  the  Boer  War  imparted  to  public  opinion, 
and  with  the  help  of  an  elaborate  Press  Bureau,  was 
carried  to  such  lengths  by  his  successor. 

On  the  resignation  of  Admiral  von  Hollman,  the 
Emperor  appointed  as  Naval  Secretary  a  comparatively 
unknown  naval  officer  named  Tirpitz.  Born  on  March  19, 
1849,  at  Gastrin,  and  the  son  of  a  judge,  Alfred  Tir- 
pitz became  a  naval  cadet  in  1865,  ^^^  was  afterwards 
at  the  Naval  Academy  from  1874  to  1876.  He  subse- 
quently devoted  much  attention  to  the  torpedo  branch 
of  the  service,  and  was  mainly  responsible  for  the 
torpedo  organization  and  the  tactical  use  of  torpedoes 
in  the  German  Navy — a  work  which  British  officers 
regard  with  admiration.  Subsequently  he  became 
Inspector  of  Torpedo  Service,  and  was  the  first  Flotilla 
Ghief  of  the  Torpedo  Flotillas.  Later  he  was  ap- 
pointed Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  naval  station  in  the 
Baltic  and  of  the  Supreme  Command  of  the  German 
Fleet.  During  these  earlier  years  of  his  sea  career 
Admiral  Tirpitz  made  several  long  voyages.  He  is 
regarded  as  an  eminent  tactician,  and  is  the  author  of 
the  rules  for  German  naval  tactics  as  now  in  use  in 
the  Navy.  In  1895  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
Rear-Admiral,  and  became  Vice-Admiral  in  1899. 
During  1896  and  1897  he  commanded  the  cruiser 
squadron  in  East  Asia,  and  was  appointed  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  Imperial  Navy  Office  in  January,  1897. 
In  the  following  year  he  was  made  a  Minister  of 
State,  and  in  1901  received  the  hereditary  rank  of 
nobility,  entitling  him  to  the  use  of  the  prefix  "  Von  " 
before  his  name. 

With  the  advent  of  this  officer  as  Marine  Minister, 
German  Naval  aft'airs  at  once  underwent  a  change. 
His  predecessor,  who  entertained  very  modest  theories 
as  to  the  size  of  the  fleet  which  Germany  should 
possess,  had   attempted   to   browbeat  the  politicians, 


ADVENT  OF  ADMIRAL  VON  TIRPITZ      in 

thumping  the  table  in  irritation  when  he  could  not  get 
his  way.  The  new  Minister  from  the  first  adopted 
other  methods.  He  devoted  himself  to  the  education 
of  the  people  by  means  of  an  elaborate  Press  Bureau, 
and  was  soon  the  undisputed  master  of  German  naval 
policy.  He  met  opposition  in  the  Reichstag  with 
a  smiling  reasonableness,  and  set  himself  to  win  the 
support  of  opponents  by  good-tempered  argument. 
In  fact.  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  from  the  first  revealed 
himself  as  a  politician  and  diplomatist,  and  from  the 
time  that  he  took  office,  though  now  and  again  slight 
checks  were  experienced,  naval  policy  in  Germany 
made  rapid — indeed,  astonishing — progress. 

In  the  year  after  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  went  to  the 
Marine  Office,  a  Navy  Bill,  far  more  ambitious  in  its 
terms  than  any  proposal  that  had  been  put  forward 
by  Admiral  von  Hollman,  was  accepted  by  the 
Reichstag. 

This  measure  was  believed  to  embody  at  any  rate 
the  beginnings  of  a  scheme  which  he  had  submitted  to 
the  Emperor  some  time  prior  to  his  appointment.  At 
any  rate,  it  enunciated  a  new  and  vital  principle.  As 
has  been  seen,  the  Government,  whether  Prussian  or 
German,  had  on  previous  occasions  drafted  extensive 
naval  programmes  for  the  carrying  out  of  which  a 
period  of  ten  or  twelve  years  w^as  required.  Not  once, 
however,  had  the  establishment  of  ships  and  personnel 
been  fixed  by  law ;  and  the  Parliament  in  each  case 
committed  itself  to  the  entire  scheme  only  to  the 
extent  of  passing  the  first  annual  instalment  con- 
sidered necessary  by  the  Government  as  the  initial 
step  towards  the  desired  goal.  In  this  wa}^  neither 
Diet  nor  Reichstag  bound  itself  or  its  successors  for 
the  future,  but  left  both  free  to  deal  with  the  annual 
naval  estimates  as  they  thought  lit.  And  in  practice 
it  had  been  found  that  very  liberal  use  was  made  of 
the  budgetary  prerogatives,  that  standards  once 
approved  were  not  considered  binding,  and  that  the 
fate  of  the  naval  estimates  depended  to  a  considerable 


112  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

extent  on  the  relations  which  happened  for  the  moment 
to  exist  between  the  Government  and  the  majority 
parties  on  questions  totally  unconnected  with  the 
naval  requirements  of  the  Empire. 

Another  disadvantage  of  the  practice  of  leaving  the 
Reichstag  free  to  determine  annually  the  number  ot 
vessels  which  should  be  laid  down  in  a  given  year, 
was,  that  it  gave  the  shipbuilding,  armour-plate,  and 
ordnance  industries  no  sure  basis  for  their  plans  for 
the  future.  The  rule  that  Germany  must  build, 
engine,  arm,  and  equip  her  own  war  vessels  had  been 
generally  accepted,  but  the  industries  w^hich  should 
enable  her  to  do  this  were  still  in  their  infancy,  and 
were  almost  entirely  dependent  upon  the  orders  of  the 
home  Government.  If  they  were  ever  to  be  able  to 
supply  the  demands  of  a  powerful  fleet,  it  was  neces- 
sary that  slips  should  be  multiplied,  plant  increased, 
and  workshops  extended.  But  so  long  as  the  naval 
policy  of  the  Empire  was  indefinite  and  subject  to 
violent  fluctuations,  shipbuilders  and  manufacturers 
would  not  endanger  their  businesses  by  locking  up 
large  amounts  of  capital  in  appliances  which  could  be 
used  for  the  building  and  arming  of  warships  and  for 
no  other  purposes.  If  German  industry  was  ever  to 
be  in  a  position  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  a  large  and 
efficient  fleet,  some  guarantee  of  steady  and  remunera- 
tive orders  must,  it  was  urged,  be  afforded  to  the 
trades  concerned.  And  apart  altogether  from  its  own 
needs,  the  Government  also  hoped  that,  some  day, 
Germany  w^ould  be  able  to  claim  a  share  in  those  large 
profits  which  Great  Britain  appropriated  to  herself  as 
the  world's  shipbuilder. 

It  w^as  by  such  arguments  that  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
justified  his  demand  that  the  strength  of  the  fleet,  the 
date  at  which  it  should  attain  that  strength,  and  the 
age  at  which  each  ship  should  be  automatically  re- 
placed by  a  new  one,  should  be  fixed  by  legal  enact- 
ment. No  portion  of  his  Bill  was  more  hotly  contested 
than  this.     It  was  objected  that,  by  accepting  it,  the 


MARINE  MINISTER'S  FIRST  TRIUMPH     113 

Reichstag  would  be  depriving  itself  of  a  considerable 
portion  of  that  power  of  the  purse  which  constituted 
the  only  effective  bulwark  of  its  rights.  But  in  the 
end  the  smiling  and  imperturbable  patience  of  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz  gained  the  day,  and  the  Reichstag  satisfied 
itself  with  the  formal  right  of  drawing  the  absolutely 
unavoidable  conclusions  from  its  own  enactment  and 
passing  every  year  the  naval  estimates,  which  could 
not  be  rejected  without  an  infraction  of  the  law.  The 
repeated  sections  in  the  Act  of  1898  which  appear  to 
reserve  the  Chamber's  Budget  rights,  are,  in  reality, 
meaningless  and  valueless — except  as  a  monument  to 
the  folly  of  those  who  believed  they  had  a  meaning 
and  a  value.  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  apparently  drew  from 
his  first  legislative  experience  the  perfectly  correct 
conclusion  that  the  Reichstag  can  be  made  to  do 
almost  anything  if  one  only  treats  it  in  the  right 
way.  The  principle  of  fixed  establishments  and 
regular  replacements  has  now  become  so  recognized 
a  feature  of  German  naval  legislation  that  opponents 
to  it  can  be  found  only  among  the  ranks  of  the 
Socialists. 

In  the  explanatory  Memorandum  attached  to  the 
Bill,  Admiral  Tirpitz  was  able  to  adduce  two  con- 
vincing reasons  why  the  fleet  should  at  once  be 
considerably  augmented.  One  of  these  was  the  fact 
that  Germany's  naval  strength  had  in  recent  years 
actually  diminished.  In  case  of  mobilization,  it  was 
pointed  out,  she  would  have  had  only  seven  efficient 
battleships,  whereas  she  had  once  had  fourteen.  Of 
the  armoured  cruisers  which  had  been  adopted  in 
other  navies  for  foreign  service  in  times  of  peace,  she 
did  not  possess  a  single  example,  and  their  work  had 
to  be  done  by  three  antiquated  battleships.  Moreover, 
to  the  tasks  allotted  to  the  fleet  in  the  Memorandum  of 
1873,  another  of  great  importance  had  been  added — 
namely,  the  defence  of  Germany's  newly-acquired 
colonial  empire.  Further,  it  was  contended  that  the 
growth  of  the  Empire's  population,  trade,  and  industry, 

8 


114 


THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 


the  development  of  her  sea-fisheries,  and  the  increasing 
investment  of  German  capital  abroad,  had  all  added  to 
the  possibilities  of  her  becoming  involved  in  quarrels 
with  other  nations.  The  fleet  which  Admiral  Tirpitz 
considered  necessary  to  fulfil  the  old  and  the  new  sea 
rqeuirements  of  the  Empire  was  as  under : 

The  Battle  Fleet. 

19  battleships  (2  as  material  reserve). 

8  armoured  coast-defence  vessels. 

6  large  cruisers. 
16  small  cruisers. 

Foreign  Service  Fleet. 

Large  Cruisers. 

For  East  Asia  ...  ...  ...  ...     2 

For  Central  and  South  America  ...  ...     i 

Material  reserve       ...  ...  ...  •••3 

Total      ...  ...  ...  ...    6 


Small  Cruisers. 

For  East  Asia 

For  Central  and  South  America 

For  East  Africa 

For  the  South  Seas  ... 

Material  reserve 

Total      ... 
I  station  ship. 


-■  3 

..  3 

..  2 

..  2 

..  4 

..  14 


The  period  proposed  for  the  gradual  attainment  of 
this  strength  was  seven  years,  but  the  Reichstag 
shortened  it  by  a  year,  and  thus  it  became  known 
as  the  "Sexennat."*  It  was  pronounced  inexpedient 
to   attempt    to    fix    for   some   years   in  advance   the 

*  The  Clerical  Party  had  suddenly  come  forward  with  a  proposal 
to  make  a  very  important  change  in  the  Navy  Bill,  and  their  scheme 
was  accepted  by  a  large  majority  of  the  Budget  Committee,  and  also 
by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Marine  on  behalf  of  the  Govern- 
ment. The  proposal  was  that  the  German  Navy  should  be  raised 
to  the  strength  contemplated  by  the  Government  Bill  at  the  end 
of  six  instead  of  seven  years,  as  the  Government  had  originally 
demanded. 


A  PLEDGE  AND  THE  SEQUEL  115 

Empire's  requirements  in  torpedo  craft,  school-ships, 
and  training  ships.* 

That  this  scheme  was  intended  by  its  author  to  be 
merely  a  beginning  has  been  shown  by  the  sequel,  but 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz  himself  little  dreamed  that  he 
would  so  soon  be  able  to  take  the  next  and  decisive 
step,  which  should  bring  him  to  within  measurable 
distance  of  his  goal.  Early  in  1899  he  said  in  the 
Budget  Committee :  "  I  declare  expressly  that  in  no 
quarter  has  the  intention  to  submit  a  new  navy  plan 
in  any  way  been  manifested ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  in 
all  quarters  concerned,  the  firmest  intention  exists  to 
carry  out  the  Navy  Law,  and  to  observe  the  limits 
therein  laid  down."  In  other  words,  the  law  was  to 
run  its  six  years'  course. 

Nevertheless,  before  the  year  was  at  an  end,  the  Bill 
which  was  to  become  the  Navy  Law  of  1900  had 
already  been  announced  by  the  Government. 

In  the  light  of  the  vast  development  of  Germany's 
colonial  and  commercial  interests  the  Navy  Act  of  1898 
was  of  an  unambitious  character.  The  German  Fleet 
was  at  this  time  still  the  weakest  possessed  by  any  of 
the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  except  Austria-Hungary, 
which  had  no  naval  pretensions.  If  only  as  a  matter 
of  historical  interest  it  is  interesting  to  record  that,  at 
the  moment  when  this  effort  towards  expansion  was 
made,  Germany  kept  in  commission  only  four  ships 
which  could  be  dignified  with  the  description  of  battle- 
ships, together  with  four  smaller  armoured  vessels. 
The  only  modern  ships  ot  the  line  under  the  German 
ensign  consisted  of  these  four  battleships  of  the  Worth 
class,  vessels  of  9,874  tons  displacement  in  comparison 
with  ships  of  15,000  tons,  which  had  already  been 
incorporated  in  the  British  Fleet.  The  German  ships, 
though  nominally  battleships,  were  really  only  coast- 
defence  vessels,  heavily  gunned  and  thickly  armoured, 
but  with  storage  for  only  680  tons  of  coal ;  whereas 

*  The  Bill  in  the  form  in  which  it  was  passed  into  law  will  be 
found  in  Appendix  I. 


ii6      THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

contemporary  British  ships  of  the  Majestic  class 
possessed  a  capacity  of  1,850  tons.*  The  four  vessels 
of  this  class,  in  addition  to  the  Worth,  were  the 
Weisenbiirg,  Kurfilrst  Friedrich  Wilhelm,  and  Branden- 
burg. They  marked  a  notable  advance  on  the  little 
armoured  ships  of  three  to  four  thousand  tons  of  the 
Siegfried  class,  which  had  been  built  during  the  early 
nineties,  but,  owing  to  their  limited  fuel  capacit}^, 
their  radius  of  action  was  extremely  restricted,  and 
they  were,  in  fact,  only  very  powerful  coast-defence 
ships,  with  a  speed  on  trial  of  between  sixteen  and 
seventeen  knots.  The  design  of  every  armoured  ship 
is  a  compromise  between  armament,  armour,  speed, 
and  coal  capacity,  and  in  this  German  design  a  predomi- 
ance  then  unprecedented  in  any  navy  in  the  world 
was  given  to  the  two  first-named  characteristics.  On 
paper  these  ships  were  vessels  of  great  offensive 
power,  as  is  revealed  by  the  contrast  given  on  p.  117, 
between  them  and  the  contemporary  battleships  of 
the  Majestic  class  of  the  British  Fleet,  which  displaced 
about  15,000  tons  and  attained  a  speed  of  eighteen 
knots,  with  1,850  tons  of  coal  on  board. 

These  few  details  reveal  the  fundamental  differences 
between  the  character  of  the  British  and  German 
Navies  at  this  time  and  the  policy  which  they  repre- 
sented. The  British  Government,  in  accordance  with 
precedent,  was  providing  a  fleet  of  the  high-seas  t3^pe, 
while  the  German  Government  was  content  with  a 
small  force  built  specifically  for  the  purpose  of  coast- 
defence.  These  four  large  German  coast-defence  ships 
were  at  this  time  supported  by  the  four  vessels  of  the 
Sachsen  type  of  7,283  tons,  already  obsolescent ;  by 
six  old  ships — one  dating  back  to  1868  ;  by  eight  little 
armoured  vessels  of  the  Beowulf  class,  of  about  3,500 
tons,  which  had  been  constructed  during  the  early 
nineties;  and  the  tail  of  the  list  was  brought  up  by  eleven 

*  It  is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  even  at  this  early  date  the 
German  Admiralty  made  provision  for  the  storage  of  oil  in  order  to 
supplement  the  coal  supply. 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  SHIP  DESIGN     117 

armoured  gunboats  each  of  1,000  tons  displacement. 
This  enumeration  of  the  naval  forces  of  Germany 
indicates  conclusively  the  modest  ambitions  which 
hitherto  had  animated  her  naval  administration. 

The    German    Fleet,   except    for    the   purposes   of 
coastal  defence,  and  specifically  for  the  protection  of 


Majestic  Class. 

Worth  Class. 

Length 

Beam     

Mean  draught... 
Armour 

Armament 

Over  all,  413  ft.  (390  ft. 
at  water-line). 

7Sft.     . 

27  ft.  0  m. 

Partial  9-in.  Harveyed 
belt,  16  ft.  broad,  and 
220  ft.  long  ;  bulk- 
heads, 14  in.  (max.) ; 
barbettes,  14  in. ;  bar- 
bette-shields, 10  in. ; 
casemates  (12),  6  in. ; 
protected  deck,  2*5  to 
4  in.;  forward  conning 
tower,  14  in,  ;  after 
conning  tower,  3  in. 

4    12 -in.  46-ton  (wire- 
wound)    breech-load- 
ing;   12   6 -in.  quick- 
fi  rers    in    casemates ; 
16  i2-pounder  quick- 
firers  ;  2  12 -pounder 
boat  -  gun  s ;     12 
3 -pounder  quick-fir- 
ing ;  2  Maxims  ;  5  tor- 
pedo-tubes  (i8-in.),  4 
submerged,    i    above 
water  in  stern. 

380  ft.  6  in.  (354  ft.  3  in. 
at  water-line). 

65  ft.  6  in. 

24  ft.  4  in. 

Complete  belt,  11 '8  to 
157  in.  (compound  in 
earlier,  steel  in  later, 
ships)  ;  barbettes  and 
conning  -  tower,  1 1  "8 
in.  ;  ammunition- 
hoists,  ii"8  in. ;  gun- 
hoods,  5  in. ;  cellulose 
cofferdam  belt ;  case- 
mate for  4"i-in.  guns, 
3  in.  ;  steel  deck,  3  in., 
fiat  on  top  of  belt. 

6  ii-in.  Krupp  breech- 
loading,  2  in  each  bar- 
bette; 8  4"i-in.  quick- 
firing  of  30  calibres  in 
a  casemate  forward  of 
the  centre  barbettes  ; 
8  3'4-in.  quick-firers  of 
30  calibres  ;  2  2'3-in. 
breech  -  loading  boat 
or  field  guns  ;  12 
I  -  pounder  quick- 
firers  ;  8  machine  ;  3 
torpedo  tubes,  2  sub- 
merged. 

her  Baltic  shores,  was  a  negligible  quantity,  having 
no  influence  either  upon  European  or  world  policy. 
The  truth  of  this  statement  is  conclusively  proved  by 
the  following  table  showing  the  relative  strength  of 
the  only  five  navies  in  the  world  which  were,  at  that 
time,  of  appreciable  importance,  the   fleets   of  Japan 


ii8 


THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 


and   of  the   United   States   being  then  still   in  their 
infanc}^ : 


Britain. 

France. 

Russia. 

Italy. 

Germany. 

Battleships  : 
First-class 
Second-class      ... 
Third-class 

Total  battleships 

Coast-defence  ships 

Cruisers  : 
First-class 
Second-class      ... 
Third-class 

Total  cruisers  ... 

Torpedo  gunboats 

29 
18 

1 

7 

6 

4 

5 

8 
2 

3 

4 

t 

54 

29 

15 

13 

14 

14 

16 

13 

— 

18 

23 
47 
34 

8 

13 

9 

6 

3 
I 

5 
9 

I 

3 
9 

104 

30 

10 

14 

13 

34 

19 

8 

15 

4 

It  must  be  confessed  that  at  this  time  the  German 
Fleet  bore  no  reasonable  relation  to  Germany's  grow- 
ing trade  and  oversea  interests.  But  the  people  of 
the  German  Empire  were  still  unconscious  of  any 
deficienc}^,  and,  blinded  by  the  success  of  their  armies 
during  the  war  with  France  and  the  small  influence 
which  naval  power  exerted  in  that  struggle,  they  had 
refused  for  many  years  to  take  upon  themselves  the 
burden  which  the  new  naval  ambitions  represented. 

But  with  the  passage  of  the  Navy  Act  of  1898,  and 
the  widespread  agitation  carried  on  by  the  Navy 
League,  under  the  highest  patronage,  and — even  more 
important — by  the  Press  Bureau  under  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz,  a  change  immediately  occurred;  and  the 
success  with  which  the  British  forces  were  enabled  to 
conduct  their  military  operations  in  South  Africa,  while 
Europe  was  forced  to  stand  by  inactive,  owing  to  the 
supreme  control  which  the  British  Fleet  possessed  of 
sea  communications,  produced  a  revulsion  of  feeling. 
The  current  of  European  events,   and  the  reception 


INFLUENCE  OF  SOUTH  AFRICAN  WAR     119 

with  which  the  Emperor's  speeches  met,  convinced  the 
Government,  within  a  comparatively  few  months  of 
the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1898,  that  they  might  safely 
abandon  this  modest  measure  and  replace  it  by  a  new 
Bill. 

What  had  happened  in  the  meantime?  This:  the 
the  outbreak  of  the  Boer  War  had  generated  in  Germany 
an  absolutely  unprecedented  hostility  to  Great  Britain, 
which  was  afterwards  roused  to  white  heat  by  the 
seizure  of  the  mail  steamer  Bundesrat  and  other  Ger- 
man vessels  on  the  African  coast.  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
had  a  unique  opportunity  such  as  was  never  likely 
to  present  itself  to  him  again.  He  made  prompt  and 
full  use  of  it,  and  while  Great  Britain  was  in  the  thick 
of  the  embarrassments  of  the  early  stages  of  the  South 
African  War,  the  great  Navy  Bill  of  1900  was  passed 
into  law. 

The  seizure  of  the  German  vessels  was  admitted 
by  the  British  Government  to  have  been  a  blunder. 
An  apology  was  tendered  to  Germany  on  account 
of  it,  and  promises  made  that  similar  incidents  should 
not  recur.  The  action  of  the  British  warships  did 
nothing  but  harm,  and  would  certainly  never  have 
been  taken  if  the  Foreign  Office  in  London  had  been 
properly  informed  on  the  situation  in  Germany  by  its 
representatives  in  Berlin,  and  had  itself  kept  the 
Admiralty  fully  posted  as  to  the  possible  political 
consequences  of  a  molestation  of  neutral  shipping. 

Consequently,  in  the  spring  of  1900,  the  Act  of  1898 
was  replaced  by  a  new  one,  in  face  of  all  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz's  protestations  of  two  years  before.  This 
measure  set  up  an  establishment  of  almost  twice  the 
size  of  the  former  one,  and  embraced  ships  intended  for 
battle  purposes  on  the  high  seas.  During  the  discussion 
of  the  measure  in  the  Reichstag  the  Centre  Party  com- 
pelled the  Government  to  modify  their  original  scheme, 
and  to  drop  five  large  and  five  small  cruisers  for 
service  on  foreign  stations,  while  the  reserve  of  cruisers 
was  reduced  by  one  large  and  two  small  vessels.     In 


120  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

the  course  of  the  debate  the  Naval  Secretary  announced 
that,  while  the  Government  were  compelled  to  agree 
to  the  amendment  of  their  proposals,  they  still  insisted 
upon  the  necessity  of  providing  the  original  number  of 
ships  for  duty  in  foreign  seas,  but  would  agree  to 
postpone  the  final  settlement  of  the  question  until  a 
subsequent  date. 

In  its  final  form,  as  it  received  the  approval  of 
the  Reichstag  and  of  the  Emperor,  and  as  it  was  pub- 
lished in  the  Imperial  German  Gazette  of  June  20,  1900,* 
the  Bill  set  up  the  following  establishment   for   the 

Fleet : 

The  Battle  Fleet. 

2  fleet  flagships. 

4  squadrons,  each  of  8  battleships, 
8  large  cruisers  for  scouting  purposes. 
24  small  cruisers  for  scouting  purposes. 

Foreign  Fleet. 

3  large  cruisers. 
10  small  cruisers. 

Reserve. 

4  battleships. 

3  large  cruisers. 

4  small  cruisers. 

The  new  Act  was  based  upon  the  same  calculation 
of  the  effective  life  of  ships  as  the  one  of  1898,  and 
provided  that,  except  in  the  case  of  total  loss, 
battleships  were  to  be  replaced  after  twenty-five  years 
and  cruisers  after  twenty  years.  It  was  provided  that 
the  age  of  ships  was  to  be  reckoned  from  the  grant  of 
the  first  instalment  in  payment  for  the  ship  to  be  re- 
placed to  the  passing  of  the  first  instalment  in  pa3^ment 
for  the  ship  to  be  built  as  "  substitute  "  (Ersatzschiff). 
It  was  proposed  to  keep  half  the  battle  squadrons — 
the  First  and  Second — fully  manned  on  a  war  footing, 
together  with  one-half  of  the  torpedo  craft  and  all  the 
school-ships  and  auxihary  vessels.  The  Third  and 
Fourth   battle   squadrons  were  to  form  the  Reserve 

*  See  Appendix  I. 


THE  NEW  NAVAL  POLICY  121 

Fleet,  half  the  ships  of  which  were  to  be  kept  in 
permanent  commission.  The  Act  also  made  provision 
for  nucleus  crews  for  the  second  half  of  the  torpedo- 
boats,  for  the  requirements  of  ships  serving  abroad, 
and  for  the  needs  of  the  shore  establishments. 

More  remarkable,  perhaps,  than  the  actual  terms  of 
the  Navy  Act  was  the  character  of  the  explanatory 
Memorandum  put  forward  by  the  Navy  Department.* 
In  this  notable  document  occurs  the  following 
statement  of  the  new  naval  policy  of  the  German 
Empire : 

**  To  protect  Germany's  sea  trade  and  colonies,  in 
the  existing  circumstances,  there  is  only  one  means  : 
Germany  must  have  a  battle  fleet  so  strong  that,  even 
for  the  adversary  with  the  greatest  sea-power,  a  war 
against  it  would  involve  such  dangers  as  to  imperil  his 
position  in  the  world. 

*'  For  this  purpose  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  German  battle  fleet  should  be  as  strong  as 
that  of  the  greatest  naval  Power,  because  a  great  naval 
Power  will  not,  as  a  rule,  be  in  a  position  to  concentrate 
all  its  striking  forces  against  us.  But  even  if  it  should 
succeed  in  meeting  us  with  considerable  superiority  of 
strength,  the  defeat  of  a  strong  German  fleet  would  so 
substantially  weaken  the  enemy  that,  in  spite  of  a 
victory  he  might  have  obtained,  his  own  position  in 
the  world  would  no  longer  be  secured  by  an  adequate 
fleet." 

The  whole  Memorandum  well  repays  study  in  the 
light  of  subsequent  events.  Almost  at  the  moment  ot 
its  publication  Admiral  von  der  Goltz,  a  former  Chief 
of  the  Admiralstab,  gave  a  less  reserved  exposition  of 
German  policy,  thus  reflecting  the  opinions  held  by 
the  naval  officers  responsible  for  the  character  of  the 
proposed  expansion  of  the  German  Fleet. 

"Let  us  consider,"  he  said,  **the  case  of  a  war 
against  P^ngland.  In  spite  of  what  many  people  think, 
there  is  nothing  improbable  in  such  a  war,  owing  to 

*  Cf.  Appendix  II, 


122      THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

the  animosity  which  exists  in  our  country  towards 
England,  and,  on  the  other  side,  to  the  sentiments  of 
the  British  nation  towards  all  Continental  Powers, 
and  in  particular  against  Germany.  These  are  not 
Chauvinistic  exaggerations,  but  the  opinion  of  the 
whole  of  the  people  of  Great  Britain,  who  are  jealous 
of  our  commercial  development.  If  England  should 
ever  lose  her  mercantile  supremacy  on  the  seas,  the 
decline  of  her  naval  dominion  would  only  be  a  question 
of  time,  and  she  realizes  the  fact  instinctivel}^  Of 
course  the  British  Government  will  make  every  effort 
to  prevent  the  violent  explosion  of  these  sentiments, 
preferring  peaceful  competition  to  war.  But  how  long 
can  that  last  ?  Violence  becomes  a  right  to  a  people 
which  fears  for  its  existence. 

''The  opinion  is  generally  held  in  this  country  that 
any  resistance  against  England  at  sea  would  be  im- 
possible, and  that  all  our  naval  preparations  are  but 
wasted  efforts.  It  is  time  that  this  childish  fear,  which 
would  put  a  stop  to  all  our  progress,  should  be  pulled 
up  by  the  roots  and  destroyed. 

"At  this  moment  (1900)  we  are  almost  defenceless 
against  England  at  sea,  but  already  we  possess  the 
beginnings  of  a  weapon  which  statesmanship  can  put 
to  a  good  use,  and  our  chances  of  success  in  a  war 
against  England  grow  more  favourable  day  by  day. 

"The  maritime  superiority  of  Great  Britain,  over- 
whelming now,  will  certainly  remain  considerable  in 
the  future;  but  she  is  compelled  to  scatter  her  forces 
all  over  the  world.  In  the  event  of  war  in  home 
waters,  the  greater  part  of  the  foreign  squadrons 
would  no  doubt  be  recalled ;  but  that  would  be  a 
matter  of  time,  and  then  all  the  stations  oversea 
could  not  be  abandoned.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
German  Fleet,  though  much  smaller,  can  remain  con- 
centrated in  European  waters. 

"With  the  increases  about  to  be  made  it  will  be  in 
a  position  to  measure  its  strength  with  the  ordinary 
British  naval  forces  in  home  waters  (then  consisting 
only  of  the  small  and  inefficiently  manned  Channel 
squadron) ;  but  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
question  of  numbers  is  far  less  important  at  sea  than  on 
land.  Numerical  inferiority  can  be  compensated  by 
efficiency,  by  excellence  of  material,  by  the  capacity 


BIRTH  OF  THE  HIGH-SEA  FLEET        123 

and  discipline  of  the  men.  Careful  preparation  per- 
mitting rapid  mobilization  can  ensure  a  momentary 
superiority." 

With  the  passage  of  the  Navy  Act  of  1900,  Germany 
proceeded  to  develop  a  High-Sea  Fleet — a  naval  force 
capable  of  going  anywhere  and  doing  anything. 
Hitherto  her  ships  had  represented  in  their  design 
the  domination  of  a  coast-defence  policy.  She  now 
entered  upon  the  construction  of  ships  of  the  first 
class.  Naval  construction  w^as  regularized,  and  forth- 
with proceeded  with  great  rapidity.  During  the  five 
years — 1886  to  1890  —  no  ship  even  nominally  of 
the  battleship  class  was  launched.  During  1891  to 
1895  only  four  vessels,  and  between  1890  and  1900 
only  six  vessels,  and  these  all  of  relatively  modest 
fighting  power,  were  put  in  the  water,  but  in  1901 
no  fewer  than  five  first-class  battleships  were  sent 
afloat. 

At  the  time  when  the  Navy  Act  of  1900  was  passed 
Germany  had  just  completed  the  five  ships  of  the  old 
Kaiser  class,  with  a  displacement  of  about  11,150  tons, 
and  mounting  four  9'4-inch  guns  of  40  calibre  as  battle 
weapons  inassociationwith  a  large  number  of  secondary 
guns — eighteen  pieces  of  5*9  inches.  The  technical  ad- 
visers of  the  German  Admiralty  at  this  date  pinned 
their  faith  to  a  storm  of  projectiles  from  quick-firing 
guns,  and  in  order  that  weights  might  be  kept  down 
and  the  ships  might  be  restricted  to  dimensions  to 
enable  them  to  navigate  the  Kiel  Canal,  reliance  was 
placed  upon  the  9*4-inch  gun  at  a  moment  when  in 
practically  all  the  navies  of  the  world  a  12-inch  weapon 
was  being  mounted. 

The  type  of  battleship  design  which  was  introduced 
with  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1898,  and  which  was 
yet  in  hand  w^hen  the  measure  of  1900  w^as  prepared, 
still  combined  a  weak  main  armament  of  four  9-4-inch 
guns  with  an  exceedingly  heavy  secondary  armament 
and  a  complete  armoured  belt.  Whereas  British 
ships   at    this    time,    such   as   those   of  the    Duncan 


124      THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

class,  were  being  given  only  partial  belts,  and  these 
only  7  inches  thick  amidships,  tapering  off  fore  and 
aft,  the  German  vessels  received  thicker  belts  ex- 
tending over  their  whole  length.  Of  this  new  design 
— known  as  the  Wittelsbach  class — five  units  were 
building  when  the  1900  Act  was  passed.  They  had 
a  maximum  coal  capacity  of  1,770  tons  of  coal,  with 
200  tons  of  oil,  and  were  capable  of  steaming  at  a 
speed  of  about  eighteen  knots,  thus  reflecting  the  rise 
of  German  ambition  for  something  more  than  a  coast- 
defence  fleet.  The  belts  of  these  ships  were  7*5  inches 
wide,  with  a  thickness  amidships  of  8*9  inches,  while 
the  four  9*4-inch  guns  were  protected  with  armour 
9*8  inches  thick,  and  the  secondary  turrets  and  case- 
mates carrying  the  eighteen  5 '9-inch  guns  were  pro- 
tected with  armour  5*9  inches  thick. 

After  the  passage  of  the  Navy  Act  of  1900  the 
9'4-inch  gun,  as  the  battle  weapon,  was  abandoned 
in  favour  of  an  ii-inch  of  40  calibre,  and  the  dis- 
placement of  the  new  ships  of  the  Deutschland 
class,  as  they  are  generically  termicd,  although 
there  are  minor  differences  in  the  ten  vessels,  was 
nearly  13,000  tons.  These  ships  really  represented  the 
entrance  of  Germany  upon  the  high  seas  as  a  first-class 
naval  Power,  possessing  vessels  fit  to  lie  in  the  line 
and  to  fight  the  men-of-war  under  any  foreign  flag. 
The  new  design  may  be  contrasted  with  advantage 
with  that  of  the  Worth  class  which  has  already  been 
described  : 

Deutschland  Class. 

Armour. 

Krupp,  complete  belt,  about  7  feet  wide,*  8*9  inches  amidships, 
tapering  to  3*9  inches  at  ends  ;  lower  edge  amidships,  67  inches ; 
low^er  deck  side  amidships,  5*5  inches  ;  main  turrets  and  barbettes, 
II  inches  to  9"8  inches;  secondary  turrets,  67  inches;  battery, 
5-9  inches;  conning-tower,  11 '8  inches;  s.t. — aft,  5*5  inches;  deck, 
2'9  inches  on  slopes,  i*6  inches  on  flat. 

*  The  five  later  ships  were  given  a  belt  with  a  thickness  of 
94  inches  amidships,  but  otherwise  their  protection  and  armament 
closely  resembled  those  laid  down  at  an  earlier  date. 


INCREASED  PROVISION  OF  CRUISERS     125 

Armament. 

Four  II  inches  (40  calibre)  in  pairs  in  turrets,  fore  and  aft; 
14  67  inches  (40  cahbre),  10  in  battery  on  main  deck,  4  singly  in 
turrets  on  upper  deck;  12  3*4  inches  (24  pounder);  4  machine; 
torpedo  tubes,  6  (18  inches),  4  submerged,  i  bow,  and  i  stern. 

Simultaneously  with  the  construction  of  these  ten 
battleships,  six  armoured  cruisers,  ranging  in  displace- 
ment from  8,800  to  about  11,000  tons,  were  laid  down, 
and  in  1906  a  single  clause  amending  the  Act  was 
passed  increasing  the  foreign  fleet  by  five  armoured 
cruisers  and  the  fleet  reserve  by  one  armoured  cruiser, 
thus  fulfilling  in  part  the  original  programme  of  the 
Navy  Department  with  which  the  Reichstag  had 
interfered. 

At  about  the  same  date  German  naval  opinion  made 
a  complete  volfe  face  in  regard  to  the  fighting  value 
of  the  submarine.  About  the  time  when  the  Act  of 
1900  was  passed  the  British  Admiralty,  after  a  careful 
study  of  the  progress  of  submarine  navigation  in 
France  and  America,  decided  that  it  could  no 
longer  ignore  this  type  of  man-of-war.  It  was  forth- 
with decided  to  buy  an  experimental  ship  from  the 
Holland  Company  of  the  United  States,  which  had 
already  demonstrated  the  practical  value  of  this 
particular  type  of  submersible  torpedo-boat.  The 
original  craft  which  was  purchased  under  these  circum- 
stances was  a  little  ship  with  a  submerged  displace- 
ment of  only  120  tons,  and  a  water-line  displacement 
of  104  tons.  She  was  propelled  on  the  surface  by  a 
four-cylinder  gasoline  engine  giving  a  speed  of  eight 
to  eight  and  a  half  knots,  while  below  the  surface  she 
was  driven  by  an  electric  motor,  and  was  capable  of 
only  six  or  seven  knots. 

The  entrance  of  this  little  ship  into  the  British  service 
was  hailed  in  Germany  with  something  approaching 
derision,  and  in  the  technical  papers  the  futility  of  the 
submarine  was  urged  with  a  wealth  of  argument.  The 
little  Holland  boat,  however,  w^as  merely  the  foundation 
from  which  the  British  authorities  proceeded  to  develop 


126  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

a  type  of  craft  in  keeping  with  the  offensive  role  of  the 
British  Navy,  and  in  1906  submarines  were  being 
built  for  the  British  Fleet  mounting  two  torpedo  tubes 
on  a  displacement  of  about  300  tons,  and  possessing 
a  surface  speed  of  fourteen  knots  in  combination  with 
a  submerged  speed  of  ten  knots.  When  it  is  added 
that  these  craft  possessed  a  full  speed  radius  of  about 
3,000  miles  on  the  surface  and  were  estimated  to  be 
able  to  travel  1 50  miles  under  water,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  German  naval  opinion  as  to  the  advantages  of  the 
submarine  underwent  a  sudden  and  dramatic  change, 
Henceforth  the  submarine  was  to  be  treated  by  German 
naval  officers  with  respect.  Without  the  formality  of 
any  public  announcement,  either  in  the  Reichstag  or 
in  the  Press,  an  under-water  boat  was  laid  down  at 
the  Germania  Yard  at  Kiel  in  1906,  and  thenceforward 
an  energetic  policy  of  construction  was  pursued,  al- 
though it  was  not  until  two  years  later  that  legislative 
provision  was  made  for  the  building  of  this  type  of 
warship. 

A  very  remarkable  leature  of  German  policy  has 
been  the  persistency  with  which  cruisers  have  been 
built  even  at  a  time  when  other  naval  Powers, 
including  Great  Britain,  were  inactive.  As  a  matter 
of  course,  during  the  period  when  the  German  Govern- 
ment was  content  to  provide  a  fleet  mainly  for  the 
purposes  of  coast  defence,  great  importance  was 
attached  to  the  efficiency  and  adequacy  of  the  cruiser 
squadrons.  At  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Navy 
Act  of  1900,  for  instance,  there  were  eighteen  cruisers 
completed  and  nearly  a  dozen  others  in  hand.  Under 
the  Act  of  that  year  provision  was  made  to  continue 
this  policy  while  attaining  a  higher  standard  of  battle 
strength.*  Even  when,  in  1908,  legislative  effect  was 
given  to  the  ambition  of  the  Marine  Office  further  to 
expedite  battleship  construction,  in  spite  of  the  heavy 
cost  involved  by  the  transition  from  mixed  armament 
ships  to  the  all-big-gun  ships  of  the  Dreadnought  era, 
*  See  Appendix  I. 


BATTLESHIP  POLICY  127 

the  Reichstag  was  asked  to  stereotype  the  cruiser 
programme.  The  Act  made  provision  for  two  hght 
cruisers  to  be  laid  down  annually,  and  in  the  measure 
passed  in  1912  an  addition. of  two  "  small  cruisers  "  w^as 
made  for  the  period  1912-1917.  A  notable  contrast  is 
provided  by  a  study  of  Germany's  action  and  the 
policy  of  the  British  Admiralty  charged  with  the 
protection  of  a  vast  oversea  trade  and  half  the  shipping 
of  the  world.  During  the  later  years  of  the  last 
century  and  the  first  four  years  of  the  present  century 
a  persistent  policy  of  construction  was  pursued  both 
in  armoured  and  protected  cruisers,  and  then  for 
several  years  there  was  a  complete  cessation  of  this 
form  of  shipbuilding  activity.  Other  countries,  Ger- 
many only  excepted,  either  acting  on  their  own 
initiative  or  accepting  the  lead  of  the  British  authorities, 
also  desisted  from  cruiser  construction.  The  advance 
in  the  size  and  cost  of  large  armoured  ships  threw 
heavy  burdens  upon  the  respective  Exchequers  and  no 
doubt  the  saving  effected  was  a  welcome  relief  at  a 
moment  when  under  every  flag  naval  expenditure  was 
advancing  at  an  unparalleled  rate.  The  result  of  the 
persistent  policy  adopted  by  Germany  became  apparent 
in  191 1,  when  in  modern  swift  cruisers  suitable  for 
scouting  the  two  fleets  were  practically  upon  an 
equality.  It  was  in  these  circumstances,  faced  by 
evidence  of  German  progress  in  cruiser  construction, 
that  the  British  authorities  again  decided  to  embark 
upon  the  building  of  new  squadrons  of  cruisers  of 
small  size  and  high  speed  —  in  fact,  of  consider- 
ably smaller  size  than  the  ships  then  in  hand  in 
Germany. 

But  in  battleship  construction  German  policy  has 
necessarily  been  less  continuous  and  consistent.  The 
war  between  Russia  and  Japan  in  the  Far  East,  and 
the  lessons  which  it  taught  to  the  naval  world  were 
destined  to  upset  completely  the  theories  upon  which 
battleship  and  larger  cruiser  design  in  Germany  had 
been  based  in  the  early  years  of  the  present  century. 


128      THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

The  German  naval  authorities  had  persisted  in  attaching 
primary  importance  to  the  secondary  gun,  still  be- 
lieving in  the  moral  and  material  effect  of  a  storm 
of  projectiles  from  numerous  quick-firing  guns.  They 
were  still  proceeding  with  the  construction  of  ships — 
battleships  and  large  cruisers — embodying  these  ideas 
when  a  new  Board  of  Admiralty  in  London,  with 
Admiral  Sir  John — now  Lord — Fisher  as  First  Sea 
Lord,  appointed  a  Committee  to  reconsider  the  design 
of  British  ships  in  the  light  of  the  information  which 
the  gunnery  tests  of  the  fleet  and  the  struggle  in  the 
Far  East  had  supplied. 

Thanks  to  the  British  alliance  with  the  Japanese, 
British  officers,  and  British  officers  only,  had  been 
permitted  to  be  present  with  the  Japanese  Fleet  during 
the  decisive  battles  of  the  war.  With  the  advantage 
of  the  information  thus  obtained  the  designs  of  British 
ships  were  reconsidered.  The  report  of  this  Committee 
was  treated  as  confidential.  In  presenting  the  Navy 
Estimates  for  1905  to  the  House  of  Commons,  the  Earl 
of  Selborne,  the  First  Lord,  contented  himself  with 
making  the  following  statement  as  to  the  work  of  this 
body,  and  of  the  new  programme  of  construction  : 

**  I  may  claim  that  the  work  of  the  Committee  will 
enable  the  Board  to  ensure  to  the  navy  the  immediate 
benefit  of  the  experience  which  is  to  be  derived  from 
the  naval  Vv^arfare  between  Russia  and  Japan,  and  of 
the  resultant  studies  of  the  Naval  Intelligence  Depart- 
ment. I  can,  however,  hold  out  no  hope  that  it  will  be 
consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  public  service  to 
publish  either  the  reference  to  the  Committee  or  its 
report. 

**  It  is  proposed  to  begin  during  the  financial  year 
1905-06 :  I  battleship,  4  armoured  cruisers,  5  ocean- 
going destroyers,  i  ocean-going  destroyer  of  the  ex- 
perimental type,  12  coastal  destroyers,  11  submarines.* 

"  His  Majesty  has  approved  that  the  battleship 
should  be  called  the  Dreadnought^  and  the  first  of  the 
armoured  cruisers  the  Invincible^ 

*  One  of  these  "  armoured  cruisers  "  was  not  built. 


APPEARANCE  OF  THE  **  DREADNOUGHT"  129 

It  was  not  until  many  months  later  that  it  gradually 
became  known  that  the  British  Admiralty  were  em- 
barking upon  the  construction  of  an  entirely  new  type 
of  battleship,  and  it  was  even  later  that  information 
was  available  as  to  the  character  of  the  "  armoured 
cruisers "  mentioned  in  the  First  Lord's  statement. 
In  the  following  spring  a  partial  revelation  of  the 
change  in  British  design  was  made  in  the  Naval 
Annual : 

"The  Dreadnought^  officially  laid  down  at  Ports- 
mouth orrOctober  2,  1905,  though  some  material  had 
already  been  built  into  her,  was  launched  by  His 
Majesty  on  February  10,  1906.  The  Admiralty 
announce  that  the  period  of  building  for  armoured 
vessels  is  to  be  reduced  to  two  years,  but  the  Dread- 
nought is  to  be  completed  in  February,  1907.  The 
rapidity  of  her  construction  will  therefore  out-rival 
that  of  the  Majestic  and  Magnificent^  which  were  com- 
pleted within  two  years  from  the  date  of  the  laying  of 
their  first  keel  plates. 

''The Dreadnought  represents  a  remarkable  develop- 
ment in  naval  construction,  which  has  been  for  some 
time  foreshadowed,  notably  by  Captain  Cuniberti,  the 
famous  Italian  naval  constructor.  The  Russo-Japanese 
War,  more  particularly  the  Battle  of  Tsushima,  es- 
tablished the  fact  that  naval  engagements  can,  and 
will,  be  fought  at  greater  distances  than  were  formerly 
considered  possible.  Hence  the  medium  armament  is 
held  by  many  authorities  to  lose  much  of  its  value." 

In  the  Naval  Annual  of  that  year,  it  was  reported 
that  the  Japanese  contemplated  laying  down  a  battle- 
ship with  an  armament  of  four  12-inch  and  ten  lo-inch 
guns.  It  was  then  announced  that  the  Dreadnought 
was  to  carry  a  main  armament  often  12-inch  45  calibre 
guns,  of  50  per  cent,  greater  power  than  those  carried 
by  the  Majestic^  while  the  medium  armament  was  to 
disappear  entirely. 

The  question  of  protection  entered  also  very  largely 
into  the  consideration,  and  the  Times,  in  describing 
the  new  ship,  said  that  it  was  understood  that  **  she 

9 


130  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

was  to  be  made  as  nearly  unsinkable  as  possible  from 
the  explosion  of  a  torpedo  or  mine."  It  was  even 
stated  that  there  would  be  no  openings  in  the  water- 
tight bulkheads,  and  this  proved  to  be  the  fact.  More- 
over, this  ship  was  the  first  large  vessel  in  the  world 
to  be  fitted  with  turbines. 

Particulars  of  the  Dreadnought  were  never  made 
public  officially,  but  the  following  is  condensed  from 
Engineerings  February  9,  1906: 

*'  On  the  forecastle  there  will  be  mounted  two  12-inch 
guns  in  a  barbette  on  the  centre  Hne,  being  considerably 
above  the  water-level.  On  each  side,  a  short  distance 
to  the  rear,  there  will  be  two  other  pairs  of  12-inch 
guns  on  the  upper-deck  level,  and  in  order  to  enable 
these  guns  to  be  fired  ahead  an  embrasure  is  formed 
at  each  side  of  the  forecastle,  so  that  all  six  12-inch 
guns  may  take  part  in  a  running  fight.  At  the  same 
time  four  of  them  can  be  used  on  each  broadside.  Aft 
there  are  two  pair  of  guns,  both  in  the  centre  line  of 
the  ship,  one  pair  to  the  rear  of  the  other ;  but  with 
this  difference,  as  compared  with  the  American  design, 
that  both  pairs  of  guns  are  on  the  same  level  and  a 
considerable  distance  apart.  These  four  guns,  there- 
fore, firing  on  either  beam,  cannot  be  fired  astern, 
although  they  have  a  very  considerable  arc  of  training 
abaft  and  forward  of  the  beam.  The  arrangement 
reduces  the  astern  fire  to  two  guns,  which  is  less  than 
in  any  preceding  ship  where  there  are  either  9'2-inch 
guns  or  6-inch  quick-firers  on  each  quarter.  But  the 
pair  of  12-inch  guns  should  be  adequate,  in  view  of 
the  other  qualities  of  the  Dreadnought^  in  connection 
with  probable  combatants.  Her  speed  of  twenty-one 
knots  would  probably  enable  her  to  outclass  any  more 
pov/erfully  armed  vessel,  as  in  most  foreign  Powers 
the  question  of  cost  must  militate  against  high  speed 
with  such  gun-power.  None  of  the  guns  are  at  a  less 
height  than  the  upper-deck  level,  and  the  two  forward 
barbette  guns  are  on  the  forecastle.  Another  im- 
portant point  in  reference  to  the  armament  is  the 
protection  against  attack  by  torpedo  and  submarine 
boats.  In  the  Dreadnought  the  intention  is  to  adopt 
an  entirely  new  weapon,  using  an  18-pound  shot. 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  "DREADNOUGHT"  131 

'*  The  placing  of  the  guns  on  the  upper  deck  has 
materiall}^  simplified  the  arrangement  of  the  armour, 
and  the  adoption  of  the  turbines  has  assisted  towards 
the  higher  gun-platform,  because  the  weights  with 
turbine  machinery  are  lower  in  the  ship,  and  thus  the 
centre  of  gravity  is  considerably  lower  ;  at  the  same 
time  the  top  hamper  in  the  ship  has  been  reduced. 
The  main  belt  in  the  way  of  the  machinery  has  been 
increased  in  thickness  to  10  inches,  and  the  upper 
deck  is  armoured.  The  gun  mechanism  is  protected 
by  thick  heavy  hoods,  as  in  the  case  of  the  earlier 
barbette  guns  ;  and  the  gun-mountings,  while  largely 
prelected  by  the  main  broadside  armour,  are  further 
shielded  by  armour  barbettes  or  C3'lindrical  casings. 

"The  adoption  of  the  steam  turbine  has  not  only 
increased  the  speed,  but  has  resulted  in  the  improve- 
ment of  the  manoeuvring  quality  of  the  ship.  Four 
shafts  are  adopted,  and  this  has  greatly  facilitated  the 
fitting  of  a  double  stern  with  two  rudders — a  form  of 
stern  advocated  for  some  time  for  heavy  battleships. 
The  cutting  away  of  the  deadwocd  in  combination 
with  a  balanced  rudder  has  improved  the  turning- 
moment  of  later  single-stern  battleships  by  30  per 
cent. ;  and  as  the  double  rudder  enables  a  larger  area 
to  be  utilized  effectively,  without  increasing  the  torsion 
on  the  threaded  shaft  of  the  steering  gear,  there  will 
be  still  better  facility  in  manoeuvring.  While  there  is 
no  change  so  far  as  the  upper  works  are  concerned, 
the  stern  of  the  ship  is  doubled  under  water,  wuth 
two  rudders  quite  20  feet  apart.  The  contract  for  the 
turbine  machinery  was  placed  with  Messrs.  Vickers, 
Sons  and  Maxim,  Limited,  and  it  is  anticipated  that 
with  the  four  propellers  running  at  over  300  revolu- 
tions, the  power  developed  will  be  equal  to  23,00c 
I.H.P.  There  will  be  tw^o  high-pressure  turbines  and 
two  low-pressure  turbines,  each  on  separate  shafts, 
and  each  shaft  wnll  also  carry  an  astern  turbine,  two 
of  which  will  take  high-pressure  and  two  low-pressure 
steam.  The  high-pressure  main  and  astern  turbines 
are  to  be  on  the  wing  shaft,  and  the  two  inside  shafts, 
^n  addition  to  carrying  the  low-pressure  ahead  and 
astern  machines,  will  also  have  turbines  of  small 
diameter  for  cruising  purposes.  Steam  for  the  low 
powers  will  pass  from  the  boiler  into   the   cruising 


132  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

turbines,  thence  to  the  high-pressure  wing  turbines, 
and  back  to  the  low-pressure  turbine  before  entering 
the  condenser.  This  will  enable  a  full  range  of 
expansion  to  be  economically  attained,  even  with  a 
small  volume  of  steam.  The  steam  pressure  is  to  be 
higher  than  in  any  previous  turbine  ship,  as  the  eighteen 
Babcock  and  Wilson  boilers  are  to  be  worked  at 
250-pound  pressure,  which  will  be  slightly  reduced  at 
the  high-pressure  turbines. 

"  The  boilers,  consistent  with  the  latest  practice, 
will  be  fitted  for  working  not  only  with  coal,  but  with 
oil  fuel.  In  order  to  reduce  the  power  necessary  to 
attain  a  speed  of  twenty-one  knots,  and  to  reduce  the 
draught  for  a  given  displacement — the  Dreadnought 
when  ready  for  sea  wnll  be  about  18,000  tons  on 
26  feet  draught — it  was  decided  to  increase  the  length 
of  the  ship  from  the  410  feet  of  the  Lord  Nelson  to 
close  upon  500  feet,  with  a  beam  of  82  feet.  This 
increase  in  length  has  the  further  advantage  that  it 
will  afford  greater  room  forward  and  abaft  for  maga- 
zines under  the  12-inch  guns  without  interfering  with 
the  under  water  torpedo-tube  gear  in  connection 
with  the  five  submerged  tubes." 

It  was  stated  unofficially  that  this  new  ship  of  the 
all-big-gun  type  rendered  obsolescent  practically  all 
the  battleships  of  the  world  with  mixed  armaments — 
that  is  with  guns  of  varying  size.  The  British  naval 
authorities  continued  to  maintain  a  discreet  silence  as 
to  the  character  of  the  new  vessels,  and  the  design,  as 
its  main  characteristics  became  known,  was  assailed 
with  a  good  deal  of  criticism.  The  controversy  was 
at  its  height  when  President  Roosevelt  called  upon 
Commander  Sims,  the  Inspector  of  Target  Practice  in 
the  United  States  Navy,  to  make  a  report  upon  the 
advantages  possessed  by  the  all-big-gun  ship  of  high 
speed  and  complete  armour  protection  in  view  of  the 
criticism  of  Admiral  Mahan  of  the  British  design.* 
Commander  Sims,  who  had  made  a  life-study  of 
gunnery  questions,  prepared  a  long  report  describing 

■^  It  has  since  become  known  that  the  Americans  had  designed  an 
all-big-gun  ship  before  the  British  Dreadnought  was  laid  down. 


THE  DREADNOUGHT  CONTROVERSY    133 

the  character  of  the  revolution  in  design,  and  its 
influence  upon  the  navies  of  the  world.  It  is  interest- 
ing to  recall  some  passages  from  this  report,  which  in 
its  essential  portions  appeared  in  the  proceedings  of 
the  United  States  Naval  Institute,  particularly  as  the 
British  Admiralty  have  never  considered  it  wise  to 
enter  upon  a  detailed  defence  of  their  policy.  Com- 
mander Sims  stated  : 

"  Concerning  the  advisability  of  building  all-big-gun 
ships,  that  is,  discarding  all  smaller  guns  (except 
torpedo-defence  guns)  and  designing  the  ships  to 
carry  the  maximum  number  of  heavy  turret  guns, 
these  alone  to  be  used  in  battle  against  other  ships,  I 
think  it  could  be  clearly  shown  that  Captain  Mahan  is 
in  error  in  concluding  that  it  would  add  more  to  our 
naval  strength  to  expend  the  same  amount  of  money 
that  the  big  ships  would  cost,  for  smaller  and  slower 
ships,  carrying  the  usual  intermediate  guns  (6-inch, 
etc.) ;  and  that,  as  in  the  question  of  speed,  this  error 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  much  important  information 
concerning  the  new  methods  of  gun-fire  was  not  con- 
sidered by  the  author  in  preparing  his  article. 
(Note. — Unfortunately  these  methods  of  gun-fire  can- 
not at  present  be  specifically  explained  in  a  published 
article,  as  this  would  involve  a  discussion  of  our 
methods  of  controlling  our  ships'  batteries,  and  bring- 
ing our  ships  into  action  with  an  enemy.) 

"  I  may,  however,  assure  the  reader  that,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  efficiency  of  gun-fire  alone,  it 
would  be  unwise  ever  to  build  a  man-of-war  of  any 
type  whatever,  having  more  than  one  calibre  of  gun  in 
her  main  battery.  In  other  words,  it  may  be  stated 
that  the  abandonment  of  mixed-battery  ships  in  favour 
of  the  all-big-gun,  one  calibre  ship  was  directly  caused 
by  the  recognition  of  certain  fundamental  principles 
of  naval  markmanship  developed  by  gunnery  officers. 

"  Therefore  we  have  but  to  decide  what  the  calibre 
for  each  class  of  ships  should  be,  a  decision  which 
should  present  no  special  difficulty,  provided  it  be  first 
determined  how  we  are  to  defeat  the  enemy— whether 
by  the  destruction  of  his  ships  (by  sinking  them  or 
disabling  their  guns)  or  by  the  destruction  or  demorali- 
zation of  their  personnel. 


134  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

"  In  this  connection  the  following  facts  should  first 
be  clearly  understood — namely  : 

"  I.  Turrets  are  now,  for  the  first  time,  being  designed 
that  are  practically  invulnerable  to  all  except  heavy 
projectiles.  Instead  of  having  sighting-hoods  on  the 
turret  roof,  where  sights,  pointers,  and  officers  are  ex- 

gosed  to  disablement  (as  frequently  happened  in  the 
Russian  ships)  there  will  be  prismatic  sights,  project- 
ing laterally  from  the  gun  trunnions,  through  small 
holes  in  the  side  of  the  turret,  and  the  gun-ports  will 
be  protected  by  8-inch  armour  plates,  so  arranged  that 
no  fragments  of  shells  can  enter  the  turrets. 

"  2.  On  the  proposed  all-big-gun  ships  the  heavy 
armour  belt  will  be  about  8  feet  above  the  water-line, 
and  extending  from  end  to  end.  The  conning-tower, 
barbettes,  etc.,  will  be  ot  heavy  armour  ;  and  there 
being  no  intermediate  battery  (which  could  not  be  pro- 
tected by  heavy  armour,  on  account  of  its  extent),  it 
follows  that  in  battle  all  the  gunnery  personnel,  except 
the  small,  single  fire-control  party  aloft,  will  be  behind 
heavy  armour,  and  that,  therefore,  neither  the  ship  or 
her  personnel  can  be  materially  injured  by  small 
calibre  guns. 

"  Considering,  therefore,  that  our  object  in  designing 
a  battleship  is  that  she  may  be  able  to  meet  those  of 
our  possible  enemies  upon  at  least  equal  terms,  it 
seems  evident  that  it  would  be  extremely  unwise  to 
equip  our  new  ships  with  a  large  number  of  small  guns 
that  are  incapable  of  inflicting  material  damage  upon 
the  all-big-gun  one-calibre  ships  of  our  enemies,  or 
upon  the  personnel  manning  their  guns." 

In  the  same  paper  Commander  Sims  explained  the 
principal  tactical  qualities  that  are  desirable  in  a  fleet 
— namely,  compactness  of  the  battle  formation  and  the 
flexibility  of  the  fleet  as  a  unit — that  is,  its  ability  to 
change  its  formation  in  the  least  possible  time  and 
space  with  safety  to  its  units.  Proceeding  to  elaborate 
his  views.  Commander  Sims  stated  : 

**  For  example,  suppose  two  fleets  of  eight  vessels 
each,  composed  of  ships  that  are  alike  in  all  respects, 
and  suppose  their  personnel  to  be  equally  skilful,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Commanders-in-Chief,  whose  dif- 


TACTICAL  CONSIDERATIONS  135 

fereiice  in  energy  and  ability  is  such  that  one  fleet  has 
been  so  drilled  as  to  be  able  to  manoeuvre  with  preci- 
sion and  safety  while  maintaining  one-half  the  dis- 
tance between  its  units  that  the  other  fleet  requires. 
'*  This  is  putting  an  extreme  case,  but  it  shows  : 
"  I.  That  the  short  fleet,  being  about  half  the  length 
of  the  other  one,  can  complete  certain  important 
manoeuvres  in  about  one-half  the  time  and  one-half 
the  space  required  for  similar  manoeuvres  of  the  long- 
fleet. 

"  2.  That,  when  ranged  alongside  each  other,  the 
defeat  of  the  long  fleet  is  inevitable,  since  the  rapidity 
of  hitting  of  the  individual  units  is  assumed  to  be  equal, 
and  each  of  the  four  leading  ships  of  the  long  fleet 
receives  about  twice  as  many  hits  as  she  can  return, 
though  the  eighth  ship  of  the  short  fleet  would  suffer 
a  preponderance  of  gun-fire  from  the  fifth  or  sixth 
vessel  of  the  long  fleet,  the  seventh  and  eighth  being 
too  far  astern  to  do  much  damage,  as  would  also  be 
the  case  if  the  long  fleet  had  several  vessels  astern  of 
these. 

"  It  is  because  of  the  principle  here  illustrated  that 
the  constant  effort  of  competent  flag-of!icers  is  to 
reduce  the  distance  between  the  units  of  their  fleets 
to  the  minimum  that  can  be  maintained  with  safety 
under  battle  conditions — that  is,  while  steaming  at  full 
speed,  without  the  aid  of  stadimeters,  sextants,  and 
other  appliances  that  should  be  used  only  for  preli- 
minary drills. 

"  Doubtless  some  flag-officers,  by  constant  com- 
petitive exercises  in  manoeuvring,  may  succeed  in 
attaining  an  interval  between  ships  that  is  less  by  15 
or  20  per  cent,  than  that  attained  by  others ;  but  mani- 
festly there  is  hardly  any  possibility  of  much  greater 
improvement  in  this  respect,  because  the  minimum 
practical  interval  between  ships  depends  upon  their 
lengths  and  manoeuvring  quahties.  For  example,  the 
German  interval  is  300  metres  from  centre  to  centre, 
while  larger  ships,  say  400  feet  long,  require  about 
400  yards,  and  those  between  450  and  500  feet  in  length 
require  about  450  yards. 

"  If  we  accept  Captain  Mahan's  advice  and  build 
comparatively  small,  low-speed  battleships,  while  our 
possible  enemies  build  large,  swift,  all-big-gun  ships, 


136  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

it  seems  clear  that  we  will  sacrifice  the  enormous 
advantages  of  fleet  compactness  and  flexibility,  the 
superior  effect  of  heavy-gun  fire  and  the  ability  to  con- 
centrate our  fire — the  loss  of  these  advantages  to  be 
fully  realized  twenty-five  years  hence,  when  our 
enemies  have  fleets  of  big  ships  while  we  still  have 
those  of  our  present  size." 

Finally,  this  officer  added  : 

"  If  it  be  claimed  that  it  would  be  better  to  reduce 
the  speed  of  the  large  vessel  to  sixteen  knots  and  put 
the  weight  saved  into  guns,  it  may  be  replied  that  the 
heavy  turret  guns  cannot  be  mounted  to  advantage  (so 
as  to  increase  the  hitting  capacity  of  the  vessel)  with- 
out very  considerably  increasing  the  size  of  the  ship, 
because  the  number  of  heavy  turrets  that  can  be  placed 
to  advantage  is  governed  largely  by  the  length  of  the 
ship — which  increases  slowly  with  the  displacement. 
This  point  is  fully  discussed  in  a  recent  article  in  a 
German  publication.  I  do  not  remember  the  displace- 
ment used  b}^  the  author  to  illustrate  the  principle, 
but,  supposing  the  ones  quoted  below  to  be  correct,  he 
shows  that  if  it  requires  a  displacement  of  20,000  tons 
to  obtain  a  broadside  fire  of,  say,  eight  12-inch  turret 
guns,  you  could  not  advantageously  mount  any  addi- 
tional turrets  on  21,000  or  22,000  tons,  but  would  have 
to  go  to  25,000  or  26,000  tons  to  obtain  the  necessary 
space.  And,  conversely,  if  you  design  a  2o,ooo~ton 
battleship  for  sixteen  instead  of  twenty  knots,  you 
cannot  utilize  the  weight  saved  to  increase  the  gun- 
power  by  adding  12-inch  turrets,  as  you  could  by 
adding  a  number  of  intermediate  guns. 

**  It  is  now  hardly  necessary  to  state  that  adding 
superimposed  turrets  (by  which  the  number  of  guns 
could  be  doubled,  if  the  weights  permitted)  does  not 
materially  increase  the  hitting  capacit}^  of  the  ship  as 
a  whole,  because  of  the  *  interference  '  caused  by 
having  four  guns  in  one  two-stor}^  turret,  while  it 
decreases  her  defensive  power  by  adding  to  the  vertical 
height  of  her  vital  targets. 

"Captain  Mahan  characterizes  the  sudden  inclina- 
tion in  all  navies  to  increase  the  size  of  the  new  battle- 
ships (from  about  15,000  to  about  20,000  tons)  as  a 
'wilful  premature  antiquating  of  good  vessels  '  ...  'a 


CAUSE  OF  INCREASED  DISPLACEMENT     137 

growing  and  wanton  evil.'  If  these  words  are  intended 
in  their  true  meaning,  the  statement  is  to  me  incom- 
prehensible. I  can  understand  an  individual  being 
wilful  and  wanton,  but  I  cannot  believe  that  the  naval 
officers  of  the  world  could,  without  good  cause,  be 
suddenly  and  uniformly  inspired  in  this  manner.  On 
the  contrary,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  mere  fact  of  there 
being  a  common  demand  for  such  large  vessels  is  con- 
clusive evidence  that  there  must  be  a  common  cause 
that  is  believed  to  justify  the  demand. 

"This  common  cause  is  undoubtedly  a  common 
belief  that  the  same  amount  of  money  expended  for 
large  war  vessels  will  add  more  to  a  nation's  naval 
power  than  the  same  amount  expended  for  small 
vessels,  for  it  cannot  reasonably  be  assumed  that  the 
tax-ridden  nations  of  Europe  expend  their  great  naval 
budgets  wilfully  and  wantonly.  Undoubtedly  each 
nation  earnestly  strives  so  to  expend  these  sums  as 
to  derive  the  greatest  increase  of  naval  power.  The 
same  is  true  in  reference  to  their  armies.  As  the 
mechanical  arts  improve  each  nation  endeavours  to 
improve  its  war  material.  When  a  nation  adopts  new 
rifles,  it  is  not  a  wilful  premature  antiquating  of  several 
million  excellent  ones,  it  is  a  case  oi  force  majeure — it 
must  adopt  them  or  suffer  a  relative  loss  of  military 
efficiency,  and  it  must  make  no  mistake  as  to  the  relative 
efficiency  of  its  weapons.  In  1870  the  French  suffered 
a  humiliating  defeat  as  a  direct  result  of  the  colossal 
conceit  which  rendered  them  incapable  of  accepting 
conclusive  evidence  that  the  German  field  artillery  was 
greatly  superior  to  theirs. 

"The  same  law — that  of  necessity — governs  the 
evolution  of  battleships.  As  might  have  been  expected, 
this  evolution  has,  as  a  rule,  been  gradual  as  regards 
increased  displacement.  The  exception  is  the  sudden 
recent  increase  (4,000  to  5,000  tons)  in  displacement. 
This  exception  therefore  needs  explanation.  ...  It 
was  due  to  a  complete  change  of  opinion  as  to  the 
hitting  capacity  of  guns  of  various  calibres.  This  is 
now  well  understood  by  all  officers  who  have  recently 
been  intimately  associated  with  the  new  methods  of 
gunnery  training.  These  methods  have  demonstrated 
this  point  in  such  a  manner  as  to  leave  no  doubt  in 
our  minds  as  to  the  correctness  of  our  conclusions. 


138      THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

The  rapidity  of  hitting  of  the  heaviest  guns  has  been 
increased  several  thousand  per  cent.,  and  that  of  smaller 
guns  about  in  proportion  to  their  calibre. 

"...  The  inception  of  the  epoch-making  principles 
of  the  new  methods  of  training  belongs  exclusively  to 
Captain  (now  Rear-Admiral)  Percy  Scott,  Director  of 
Naval  Practice  of  the  British  Navy,  who  has,  I  believe, 
done  more  in  this  respect  to  improve  naval  marksman- 
ship than  all  of  the  naval  officers  who  have  given  their 
attention  to  this  matter  since  the  first  introduction  of 
the  rifled  cannon  on  men-of-war;  nor  should  we  forget 
that  this  degree  of  improvement  was  rendered  possible 
by  the  introduction  of  telescope  sights,  the  successful 
application  of  which  to  naval  guns  was  made  by  Com- 
mander B.  A.  Fiske,  U.S.  Navy,  as  early  as  1892. 

'*  As  soon  as  the  above  facts  gained  general  accept- 
ance in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  the 
evolution  of  the  all-big-gun,  one-calibre  battleship 
became  a  foregone  conclusion ;  and  the  reason  for  the 
great  increase  in  displacement,  as  I  understand  it,  is 
simply  that  you  cannot  build  an  efficient  ship  of  this 
class  on  less  than  about  20,000  tons,  because  you  can- 
not mount  more  than  two  12-inch  turrets  to  advantage 
upon  a  battleship  of  much  less  displacement,  because 
the  length  and  breadth  are  not  sufficient." 

The  Dreadnought  design  and  all  that  it  meant  threw 
the  German  Admiralty  into  confusion.  At  the  moment 
they  were  still  engaged  in  the  construction  of  the 
vessels  of  the  Deutschland  class,  of  about  13,000 
tons,  in  which  primary  importance  was  given  to  the 
secondary  gun — fourteen  67-inch  weapons — to  the  sacri- 
fice of  the  big  gun — four  ii-inch  pieces — and  speed; 
whereas  the  new  British  design  ignored  the  secondary 
gun  in  order  to  mount  no  fewer  than  ten  big  guns, 
and  develop  the  speed  to  the  extent  of  three  or  four 
knots  above  battleships  then  building.  Before  the 
Dreadnought  of  the  British  programme  of  1905  had 
been  laid  down  at  Portsmouth,  two  German  battle- 
ships of  the  familiar  design  with  mixed  armament  had 
been  begun — the  Schleswig-Holstein  in  the  Germania 
Yard   and   the   Schlesien  at  Dantzic.     So   completely 


CONSTERNATION  IN  GERMANY        139 

were  the  German  authorities  unprepared  for  the  revo- 
lution initiated  by  the  British  Admiralty,  that  from 
the  summer  of  1905  until  July,  1907,  the  keel  of  not  a 
single  further  battleship  was  laid  in  Germany.  In  the 
meantime,  while  British  yards  were  busy  with  vessels 
of  the  new  type,  the  design  of  the  German  ships  was 
reconsidered.  After  an  interval  of  two  years  the  keels 
of  two  vessels  of  the  Dreadnought  type  were  laid 
down,  and  two  more  keels  were  placed  in  position 
a  month  later — that  is,* in  August,  1907.  These  four 
ships — the  Nassau  class — inaugurated  the  Dreadnought 
policy  in  Germany.  Two  were  completed  in  May, 
1910,  and  two  in  September  following. 

These  ships  embody  the  all-big-gun  principle  in 
association  with  a  powerful  secondary  armament,  con- 
sisting of  a  dozen  5*9-inch  guns  and  sixteen  24-pounders. 
Moreover,  whereas  the  British  Dreadnought  had  been 
provided  with  only  ten  big  guns,  which  was  held  by 
the  British  gunnery  experts  to  be  the  maximum 
number  which  could  be  carried  with  advantage  on 
the  displacement  then  considered  advisable,  the 
German  vessels  were  given  twelve  guns,  not  of  the 
12-inch  but  of  the  1 1 -inch  type.  Each  of  these  ships 
displaces  18,600  tons,  and  has  a  nominal  speed  of  twenty 
knots.  Their  normal  coal  capacity  is  885  tons,  with 
a  maximum  storage  of  2,655  tons.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  early  British  Dreadnought,  with  about  the  same 
displacement  and  coal -carrying  capacity,  attained  a 
speed  of  one  or  two  knots  more,  owing  to  the  use  of 
turbines  in  place  of  reciprocating  engines.  The  contrast 
between  the  armour  and  armament  of  the  British  and 
German  ships,  comparing  the  four  Nassaus  of  the 
German  Fleet*  with  the  Superb  class  of  the  British 
Navy,  is  given  in  the  table  on  p.  140. 

By    energetic    action    the    British    Admiralty    had 

*  British  naval  opinion  held  from  the  first  that  these  ships  of  the 
Nassau  type  vitiated  the  Dreadnought  principle  of  simplicity  of 
armament,  and  were  so  over- gunned  as  to  be  ineffective  units.  Sea- 
service  has  tended  to  confirm  this  view. 


140 


THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 


obtained  a  lead  in  the  new  type  of  battleship.*  More- 
over, even  after  the  character  of  the  Dreadnought 
became  known,  the  German  authorities  remained 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  "  armoured  cruisers  "  of 
the  Invincible  class  were  really  swift  battleships  carry- 
ing the  same  type  of  battle  gun  as  the  Dreadnought^ 
in  association  with  a  speed  exceeding  twenty- five 
knots,  and  an  armour  belt  not  inferior  to  that  placed 


Superb  Class. 

Nassau  Class. 

Armour     ... 
Armament... 

Krupp  :    Complete    belt, 
about  i6  ft.  wide  (nar- 
rower aft),  II  in.  amid- 
ships, tapering  to  6  in. 
forward  and  4  in.  aft ; 
turrets,  8  in. ;  barbettes, 
12    in.  ;    forward    con- 
ning-tower,  12  in. ;  after 
conning -tower,   8    in.; 
deck,  sloping,  27  in. 

10  i2-in.   (45  calibres)  in 
pairs  in  turrets,  i  for- 
ward, I  on  each  beam, 
2   aft   on    centre    line ; 
16  4 -in.   (50   cahbres), 
2  on  each  turret  (except 
No.  4),  8  in  superstruc- 
ture ;  5    machine ;  tor- 
pedo  tubes,    5    18 -in., 
submerged,    broadside, 
and  stern. 

Krupp  :  Complete  belt, 
12  in.  amidships,  taper- 
ing to  3*9  in.  forward, 
and  3 '9  in.  aft ;  lower 
deck  side,  7-9  in.  amid- 
ships, 3*9  in.  narrow 
belt  at  ends ;  turrets 
and  barbettes,  11  in.; 
battery,  6*1  in.  ;  con- 
ning -  tower,  11*8  in. ; 
deck,  sloping,  2-9  in. 

12  ii-in.  (45  calibres)  in 
pairs  in  turrets,  i  for- 
ward, I  aft,  and  2  on 
each  beam  ;  12  5*9  in. 
(45  calibres)  in  battery  ; 
16  3'4  in.  (24-pounder) ; 
torpedo  tubes,  6  i8-in., 
submerged,  bow,  stern, 
and  broadside. 

on  the  latest  pre -Dreadnought  German  battleships. 
By  this  decisive  move,  the  British  authorities  had 
depressed  the  value  of  all  mixed  armament  battleships, 
in  which  the  British  Fleet  was  becoming  weak  in  face 
of  foreign — and  particularly  German — rivalry,  and  had 
started  the  competition  in  armaments  on  an  entirely 

*  In  the  three  succeeding  years,  in  accordance  with  the  British 
Government's  policy  of  a  Hmitation  of  naval  armaments,  and  as  an 
example  to  other  Powers,  this  advantage  was  partially  lost,  and  hence 
the  large  programme  of  1909-10. 


THE  FIRST  GERMAN  DREADNOUGHTS    141 

new  basis  upon  terms  of  advantage.  No  sooner  was  the 
true  inwardness  of  the  Dreadnought  policy  reaHzed 
than  the  German  authorities  began  the  preparation  of 
a  new  German  Navy  Act.  It  was  eventually  decided 
that  the  best  means  of  accomplishing  the  end  in  view — 
namely,  the  construction  of  a  larger  number  of  ships 
of  the  armoured  classes  in  the  next  few  years  than 
was  provided  in  the  Act  of  1900,  was  to  reduce  the 
nominal  effective  age,  and  legislate  for  the  replace- 
ment of  all  battleships  and  large  cruisers  within 
twenty  years.  Accordingly,  attached  to  the  new  Act 
passed  early  in  1908,  which  was  over  two  years  after 
the  laying  down  of  the  Dreadnought,  was  a  schedule 
setting  forth  that  four  large  armoured  ships  should 
be  laid  down  annually  between  1908  and  191 1,  both 
inclusive,  and  that  in  191 1  onwards  to  1917,  two 
keels  annually  should  be  placed  in  position.  By 
means  of  this  single  clause  measure,  which  became 
law  on  April  6,  1908,  the  construction  of  ships  of  the 
Dreadnought  type  was  accelerated,  and,  whereas  the 
British  Admiralty  had  definitely  abandoned  the  con- 
struction of  large  cruisers  of  the  armoured  class — as 
the  German  authorities  knew  by  this  time — the  Marine 
Office  decided  that  each  of  the  ** large  cruisers" 
specified  in  the  Act  of  1900  should  be  swift  Dread- 
noughts. 

(This  point  is  an  important  one.  Between  1897 
and  1904,  Great  Britain  laid  down  27  battleships  and 
35  armoured  cruisers — a  total  of  62  armoured  ships  in 
eight  years,  or  an  average  of  775  ships  a  year.  In  this 
period  Germany  built  16  battleships  and  5  armoured 
cruisers,  or  21  armoured  ships — equal  to  an  average  of 
2"62  ships  a  year.  )In  1905  the  Admiralty  determined  to 
cease  building  armoured  cruisers.  In  that  year  they  laid 
down  4  **  capital  ships  " — all  of  them  Dreadnoughts ;  in 
the  next  tw^o  years  3  annually,  and  in  1908,  2  ships  only. 
While  the  British  authorities  abandoned  the  building 
of  armoured  cruisers,  Germany  decided  to  accelerate 
her  battleship  construction,  and  she  also  decided  that 


142 


THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 


all  the  "  large  cruisers  "  specified  in  her  Law  should 
be  swift  Dreadnoughts,  and  thus  from  38  battleships  and 
20  armoured  cruisers,  she  rose  to  an  establishment 
of  58  battleships. 

At  the  end  of  191 1,  when  it  was  imagined  that  the 
German  programme  would  fall  from  4  large  ships 
annually  to  2  ships,  a  new  Navy  Bill  was  produced.* 
Incidentally  this  measure  added  to  the  establishment 
3  battleships  and  2  unarmoured  cruisers,  and  made 
provision  for  the  construction  of  a  maximum  of  72  sub- 
marines. 

The  significance  of  the  successive  changes  in  ship- 
building policy  in  Germany,  reflecting  in  an  ascending 
scale  the  naval  ambitions  of  the  Marineamt,  may  be 
realized  from  the  following  summary,  showing  the 
establishment  of  large  armoured  ships  fixed  under 
successive  measures : 


Act. 

Establishment  of  Ships  Adopted. 

Battleships. 

Large 
Cruisers. 

1898           

1900           

1906           

1908           

1912           

17 

It 

8 

14 
20 

Dreadnoughts. 
61 

Under  the  operation  of  German  naval  legislation,  it 
is  now  intended  to  provide  sixty-one  large  armoured 
ships  of  maximum  power,  all  of  them  less  than  twenty 
years  old.  The  Act  does  not  specify  the  character  of 
the  vessels  of  the  various  classes  which  are  to  be  laid 
down.  It  is  elastic  in  this  respect.  It  leaves  to  the 
Marine  Office  complete  freedom  in  the  matter  of  design  ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  ties  effectually  the  hands  of 

*  Cf.  Appendix  I. 


THE  LEGISLATION  OF  1912  143 

the  Reichstag,  and  it  cannot,  except  it  repeal  the  Navy 
Law,  reduce  in  any  year  the  number  of  keels  to  be  laid 
down.  There  can  be  no  reduction  in  the  output  of 
naval  material  until  a  new  Navy  Law  has  been  passed. 
This  is  a  point  which  is  frequently  forgotten  in 
England. 

But  the  notable  feature  of  the  Navy  Act  passed  by 
the  Reichstag  in  1912  was  not  the  additions  to  the 
shipbuilding  programme,  though  these  were  notable, 
but  the  steps  taken  to  increase  the  instant  readiness  of 
the  fleet  for  war.  Prior  to  the  passage  of  this  measure 
it  had  been  the  practice  in  the  British  Navy  to  maintain 
only  about  half  the  men-of-war  of  various  classes  on  a 
war  footing,  relegating  the  remainder  to  reserves 
representing  various  stages  of  preparedness  for  action. 
The  German  Navy  Act  of  1912  set  up  an  entirely  new 
standard  with  a  view  to  obtaining  the  maximum 
advantage  from  a  conscript  service,  where  the  pay  is 
low,  in  competition  with  a  voluntary  service,  such  as 
obtains  in  the  British  Fleet,  with  very  much  higher 
rates  of  pay.  In  the  speech  which  he  delivered  in 
Committee  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  July  22,  1912, 
Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, 
gave  a  lucid  explanation  of  the  essential  features  of  this 
German  Navy  Act.     He  said  : 

**  The  main  feature  of  that  Law  is  not  the  increase  in 
the  new  construction  of  capital  ships,  though  that  is  an 
important  feature.  The  main  feature  is  the  increase  in 
the  striking  force  of  ships  of  all  classes  which  will  be 
available,  immediately  available,  at  all  seasons  of  the 
year.  A  third  squadron  of  8  battleships  will  be 
created  and  maintained  in  full  commission  as  part  of  the 
active  battle-fleet.  Whereas,  according  to  the  un- 
amended Law,  the  active  battle-fleet  consisted  of  17 
battleships,  4  battle  or  large  armoured  cruisers, 
and  12  small  cruisers;  in  the  near  future  that  active 
fleet  will  consist  of  25  battleships,  8  battle  or  large 
armoured  cruisers,  and  18  small  cruisers  ;  and,  whereas 
at  present,  owing  to  the  system  of  recruitment  which 
prevails  in  Germany,  the  German  Fleet  is  less  fully 


144      THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

mobile  during  the  winter  than  during  the  summer 
months,  it  will,  through  the  operation  of  this  Law,  not 
only  be  increased  in  strength,  but  rendered  much  m.ore 
readily  available. 

**  Ninety-nine  torpedo-boat  destroyers— or  torpedo- 
boats,  as  they  are  called  in  Germany — instead  of  66, 
will  be  maintained  in  full  commission  out  of  a  total 
of  144.  Three-quarters  of  a  million  pounds  had  already 
been  taken  in  the  general  estimate  for  the  year  for  the 
building  of  submarines.  The  new  Law  adds  a  quarter 
of  a  million  to  this,  and  that  is  a  provision  which,  so 
far  as  we  can  judge  from  a  study  of  the  finances  would 
appear  to  be  repeated  in  subsequent  years.  Seventy- 
two  new  submarines  will  be  built  within  the  currency 
of  the  Law,  and  of  those  it  is  apparently  proposed  to 
maintain  fifty-four  with  full  permanent  crews. 

**  Taking  a  general  view,  the  effect  of  this  Law  will  be 
that  nearly  four-fifths  of  the  entire  German  Navy  will 
be  maintained  in  full  permanent  commission — that  is  to 
say,  instantly  and  constantly  ready  for  war.  Such  a 
proportion  is  remarkable,  and  so  far  as  I  am  aware, 
finds  no  example  in  the  previous  practice  of  modern 
naval  Powers.  So  great  a  change  and  development  in 
the  German  Fleet  involves,  of  course,  important  ad- 
ditions to  their  personnel.  In  1898  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  German  Navy  amounted  to  25,000.  To-day 
that  figure  has  reached  66,000. 

*'  Under  the  previous  Laws  and  various  amendments 
which  have  preceded  this  one,  the  Germans  have  been 
working  up  to  a  total  in  1920,  according  to  our  calcula- 
tions, of  86,500  officers  and  men,  and  they  have  been 
approaching  that  total  by  increments  of,  approximately, 
an  addition  of  3,500  a  year.  The  new  law  adds  a 
total  of  15,000  officers  and  men,  and  makes  the  total 
in  1920  of  101,500.*  The  new  average  annual  addition 
is  calculated  to  be  1,680  of  all  ranks,  but  for  the 
next  three  years  by  special  provision  500  extra  are  to 
be  added.  From  1912  to  1914,  500  are  to  be  added,  and 
in  the  last  three  years  of  the  currency  of  the  Law  500 
less  will  be  taken.     This  makes  a  total  rate  of  increase 

*  In  his  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  March  26,  1913,  the 
First  Lord  corrected  this  figure.  He  stated  that  the  maximum  to  be 
attained  under  the  new  Fleet  Law  in  1920  was  107,000  apart  from 
reserves. 


INCREASED  EXPENDITURE  145 

of  the  German  Navy  personnel  ot  about  5,700  men  a 
year. 

**  The  new  construction  under  the  Law  prescribes  for 
the  building  of  three  additional  battleships — one  to  be 
begun  next  year  (191 3),  one  in  1916,  and  two  small 
cruisers  of  which  the  date  has  not  yet  been  fixed.  The 
date  of  the  third  battleship  has  not  been  fixed.  It 
has  been  presumed  to  be  later  than  the  six  years 
which  we  have  in  view. 

**  The  cost  of  these  increases  in  men  and  in  material 
during  the  next  six  years  is  estimated  as  ;^io, 500,000 
above  the  previous  estimates  spread  over  that  period. 
I  should  like  to  point  out  to  the  Committee  that  this  is 
a  cumulative  increase  which  follows  upon  other 
increases  of  a  very  important  character.  The  Law  of 
1898  was  practically  doubled  by  the  Law  of  1900,  and  if 
the  expenditure  contemplated  by  the  Law  of  1900  had 
been  followed  the  German  estimates  of  to-day  would 
be  about  ;^ 1 1,000,000.  But  owing  to  the  amendments 
of  1906  and  1908,  and  now  of  191 2,  that  expenditure 
is  very  nearly  ;^23, 000,000.  But  the  fact  that  the 
personnel  plays  such  a  large  part  in  this  new  amend- 
ment, and  that  personnel  is  more  cheaply  obtained  in 
Germany  than  in  this  countr}^  makes  the  money  go 
farther  there  than  it  would  do  over  here. 

"  The  ultimate  scale  of  the  new  German  Fleet,  as 
contemplated  by  the  latest  Nav}^  Law,  will  be  41  battle- 
ships, 20  battle  or  large  armoured  cruisers,  and  40  small 
cruisers,  besides  a  proper  proportion — an  ample  pro- 
portion— of  flotillas  of  torpedo-boat  destroyers  and 
submarines,  by  1920.  This  is  not  on  paper  a  great 
advance  on  the  figures  prescribed  by  the  previous  Law, 
which  gave  38  battleships,  20  battle  or  large  armoured 
cruisers,  and  38  small  cruisers.  That  is  not  a  great 
advance  on  the  total  scale.  In  fact,  however,  there 
is  a  remarkable  expansion  of  strength  and  efficiency, 
and  particularly  of  strength  and  efficiency  as  they 
contribute  to  striking  power.  The  number  of  battle- 
ships and  large  armoured  cruisers  alone  which  will 
be  kept  constantl}^  ready  and  in  full  commission  will 
be  raised  by  the  Law  from  twenty-one,  the  present 
figure,  to  thirty-three — that  is  to  say,  an  addition  of 
twelve,  or  an  increase  of  about  57  per  cent.  The  new 
fleet  will  in  the  beginning  include  about  twenty  battle- 

10 


146  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

ships  and  large  cruisers  of  the  oldertypes,  but  gradually, 
as  new  vessels  are  built,  the  fighting  power  of  the  fleet 
will  rise  until  in  the  end  it  will  consist  completely  of 
modern  vessels. 

"  This  new  scale  of  the  German  Fleet — organized  in 
five  battle  squadrons,  each  attended  by  a  battle  or 
armoured  cruiser  squadron,  complete  with  small 
cruisers  and  auxiliaries  of  all  kinds,  and  accompanied 
by  numerous  flotillas  of  destroyers  and  submarines, 
more  than  three-fourths — nearly  four-fifths,  maintained 
in  full  permanent  commission — the  aspect  and  scale  of 
this  fleet  is,  I  say,  extremely  formidable.  Such  a  fleet 
will  be  about  as  numerous  to  look  at  as  the  fleet  which 
was  gathered  at  Spithead  for  the  recent  Parliamentary 
visit,  but,  of  course,  when  completed  it  will  be  far 
superior  in  actual  strength.  This  full  development 
will  only  be  realized  step  by  step.  But  already  in 
1914  two  squadrons  will,  so  far  as  we  can  ascertain, 
be  entirely  composed  of  Dreadnoughts,  or  what  are 
called  Dreadnoughts,  and  the  third  will  be  made  up  of 
good  ships  like  the  Deutschlands  and  the  Braun- 
schweigs,*  together  with  five  Dreadnought  battle- 
cruisers.  It  remains  to  be  noted  that  this  new  Law 
is  the  fifth  in  fourteen  years  of  the  large  successive 
increases  made  in  German  naval  strength,  that  it 
encountered  no  effective  opposition  in  its  passage 
through  the  Reichstag,  and  that,  though  it  has  been 
severely  criticized  in  Germany  since  its  passage,  the 
criticisms  have  been  directed  towards  its  inadequacy." 

In  these  words  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 
described  in  full  detail  the  exact  character  of  the  latest 
German  Navy  Act,  and  then  he  proceeded  to  make 
some  general  observations,  which,  in  view  of  the 
organization  of  the  British  Navy,  prior  to  the  expan- 
sion of  the  German  Navy,  are  of  particular  interest : 

"  There  are  two  points  with  regard  to  navies  and 
naval  war  which  differentiate  them  from  armies  and 
land  war.  The  first  is  the  awful  suddenness  wnth 
which  naval  warfare  can  reach  its  decisive  phase.  We 
see  on  the  continent  of  Europe  immense  military 
establishments    possessed    by    nations    dwelling    on 

♦  These  two  groups  of  ships  are  of  practically  the  same  design. 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  CONDITIONS     14; 

opposite  sides  of  political  frontier  lines ;  yet  they 
dwell  and  have  dwelt  for  a  whole  generation  in 
peace  and  tranquillity.  But  between  those  armies 
and  any  decisive  collision  there  intervenes  an  in- 
evitable period  of  delay  that  acts  as  a  great  buffer, 
a  cushion  of  security.  I  mean  the  vast  process  of 
mobilization,  the  very  first  signs  of  which  must  be 
noticed,  and  which,  once  it  begins,  lays  idle  the 
industry  of  both  countries,  and  dominates  the  whole 
course  of  national  life.  So  it  is  that  through  all  these 
years  nations  are  able  to  dwell  side  by  side  with  their 
tremendous  military  establishments  without  being  a 
prey  to  undue  anxiety  as  to  immediate  attack.  But 
none  of  these  considerations  apply  to  fleets.  The  fleet 
which  was  assembled  for  the  manoeuvres  the  other 
day  was  fully  capable  of  going  into  action  as  soon  as 
the^ ammunition  could  be  brought  up  and  put  by  the 
side  of  the  guns.  And  that  is  true  of  all  the  great 
highly  efficient  navies  of  the  world. 

"  1  am  bound  to  say,  looking  far  ahead,  and  farther 
than  the  purposes  of  this  Vote,  at  the  aspect  which 
Europe  and  the  world  will  present  when  the  power  of 
States,  which  has  been  hitherto  estimated  in  terms  of 
armies,  will  be  estimated  very  largely  in  naval  strength, 
and  when  we  have  a  number  of  great  Powers  all 
possessed  of  very  powerful  navies,  the  state  of  Europe 
and  of  the  world  would  seem  to  contain  many  more 
germs  of  danger  than  the  period  through  which  we 
have  been  passing  in  our  lifetime. 

"  The  second  general  point  to  which  I  would 
direct  attention  is  the  extreme  slowness  with  which 
naval  preparations  can  be  made.  Small  ships  take 
eighteen  to  twenty  months  to  build  ;  large  ships  four 
years.  Docks  take  more  than  four  years  to  build. 
Seamen  take  from  two  to  three  years  to  train ;  arti- 
ficers take  much  longer ;  officers  take  betv/een  six  and 
seven  years.  The  efficiency  which  comes  from  the 
harmonious  combination  of  these  elements  is  a  plant 
of  very  slow  growth  indeed.  Cool,  steady,  methodical 
preparation,  prolonged  over  a  succession  of  years,  can 
alone  raise  the  margin  of  naval  power.  It  is  no  use 
flinging  millions  of  money  about  on  the  impulse  of  the 
moment  by  a  gesture  of  impatience,  or  in  a  mood  of 
panic." 


148      THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

Such  is  the  evolution  which  German  naval  ambitions 
have  undergone  since  the  Reichstag  in  the  early  years 
of  the  Emperor's  reign  refused  to  believe  that  four 
relatively  small  battleships  in  full  commission,  with 
the  same  number  of  ineffective  coast-defence  ships  of 
small  size,  did  not  represent  the  maximum  naval  power 
which  Germany  need  provide,  and  that  an  expenditure 
of  two  and  three-quarter  millions  sterling  was  not 
sufficient  burden  to  impose  annually  upon  the  Teutonic 
peoples  over  and  above  the  cost  in  money  and  service 
of  the  predominant  army. 

Nothing  reveals  the  statesmanship  of  Admiral 
Tirpitz  so  strikingly  as  the  character  of  the  naval 
legislation  for  which  he  has  been  responsible,  and 
the  manner  in  vv^hich  he  has  bent  every  influence  in 
Germany  and  every  occurrence  abroad  to  promote  his 
ends.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Navy  Act  of 
1898,  the  onl}^  example  of  a  continuous  naval  policy 
was  the  Naval  Defence  Act  of  1889,  under  which 
seventy  ships  of  various  types  were  added  to  the 
British  Navy  during  a  period  of  four  3^ears.  Of  these 
vessels  only  ten  were  of  the  armoured  classes.  This 
measure  was  confined  to  shipbuilding,  and  it  made  no 
provision  for  increasing  the  personnel  or  for  setting  up 
a  fixed  standard  of  commissioning.  It  merely  pro- 
vided a  certain  number  of  ships  and  left  it  to  Parlia- 
ment to  provide  or  not  to  provide  crews  with  which 
to  man  them,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact.  Parliament  did 
not  provide  the  necessary  officers  and  men  until  long 
after  the  ships  were  at  sea.  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  was 
not  satisfied  with  so  unmethodical  and  unstatesman- 
like  a  measure  of  procedure  when  he  went  to  the 
Marineamt  in  1897.  ^^  presented  to  the  Reichstag,  as 
may  be  seen  from  the  terms  of  the  Fleet  Law  of  1898, 
given  in  an  appendix,  a  complete  scheme  of  naval 
expansion,  making  provision  not  only  for  the  con- 
struction of  ships  in  specified  numbers  over  a  period 
of  six  years,  but  providing  also  for  the  due  expansion 
of  the   personnel   and   for   the   attainment  of  a  fixed 


POLICY  OF  ADMIRAL  VON  TIRPITZ      149 

establishment  of  ships  first  in  full  commission,  secondly 
with  nucleus  crews,  and  thirdly  in  reserve.  In  obtain- 
ing the  assent  of  the  Reichstag  to  this  measure,  which 
to  a  great  extent  removed  the  naval  expansion  move- 
ment from  the  annual  control  which  it  had  hitherto 
exercised  annually  on  the  presentation  of  the  Estimates, 
the  Minister  of  Marine  achieved  his  first  great  triumph. 

This  Act  was  to  have  remained  in  operation  for  a 
period  of  six  years,  and  was  represented  as  an  em- 
bodiment of  German  needs,  quite  independent  of  the 
naval  preparations  then  being  made  by  other  Powers. 
During  the  next  two  years  no  development  occurred 
in  the  naval  programmes  either  of  Great  Britain  or 
other  foreign  countries,  but  an  Anglophobe  wave 
passed  over  the  Continent  as  a  result  of  the  South 
African  War.  German  sympathies  in  particular  were 
aroused,  and  Admiral  Tirpitz  at  once  seized  the 
opportunity  to  repeal  the  fixed  and  immutable  Fleet 
Law  of  1898,  and  to  replace  it  by  a  new  enactment 
providing  a  Battle  Fleet  of  roughly  twice  the  strength 
of  that  legalized  in  the  establishment  of  the  former 
measure.  This  measure  was  to  have  remained  in  force 
until  1917.  Six  years  later,  however,  an  amendment 
representing  another  expansion  was  passed ;  two 
years  after  that  the  fourth  Fleet  Law  became  operative, 
and  in  191 2  another  measure  was  adopted  by  the 
Reichstag  under  the  influence  of  a  renewed  Anglo- 
phobe movement  in  Germany.  Experience  has  shown 
that  German  Fleet  Laws  are  regarded  as  immutable 
and  fixed  when  proposals  in  the  direction  of  a  limita- 
tion of  armaments  are  made,  but  as  flexible  as  though 
no  Fleet  Law  existed  when  political  circumstances  are 
favourable  for  making  a  further  effort  towards  a  higher 
standard  of  naval  power. 

Nor  does  this  study  exhaust  the  remarkable  features 
of  this  naval  legislation.  An  ordinary  statesman, 
ignorant  of  naval  matters,  might  have  so  framed  the 
successive  Naval  Laws  as  seriously  to  tie  the  hands  of 
the  naval  authorities  in  the  development  of  the  fleet. 


ISO  THE  GERMAN  NAVY  ACTS 

whereas  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,with  great  skill,  restricted 
the  powers  of  interference  on  the  part  of  the  Reich- 
stag, while   leaving  the    Marine   Office   with    almost 
complete  freedom  in  shaping  the  naval  machine  in  the 
process  of  expansion.     This  double  end  was  achieved 
by  the  use  of  generic  naval  terms  in  the  loose  manner 
adopted  by  those  unfamiliar  with  their  significance. 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz  made  up  his  "  paper  "  establish- 
ment in  the  Fleet  Laws  by  styling  every  ship  of  slow 
speed  but  carrying  an  armoured  belt  '*a  battleship," 
and  then,  under  the  terms  of  the  Law,  he  made  pro- 
vision  for  these   dummy  vessels   to  be   replaced  by 
veritable  battleships  of  maximum  power.     Thus  ships 
of   4,000  tons   displacement  have   been   replaced   by 
Dreadnoughts  of  25,000  tons,  carrying   the   heaviest 
guns,  and  protected  by  thick  armour.     The  establish- 
ment fixed  by  the  Reichstag  has  not  been  exceeded, 
but   by  a  simple  process  of  conjuring,  small   coast- 
defence  ships  have  been  quietly  converted  into  first- 
class  sea-going  battleships,  ranking  in  strategical  and 
tactical  qualities  with  the  most  formidable  ships  in  the 
British    Fleet.     The   naval   authorities   have   by  this 
means  been  able  to   prove  to   the  uninitiated  when 
challenged  that  they  have  kept  within  the  four  corners 
of  the  Law,  that  the  number  of  battleships  has  re- 
mained fixed  according  to  the  establishment  between 
the  periods  of  each  enactment,  and  at  the  same  time 
they  have  been  in  a  position  to  follow  an  active  ship- 
building policy,  at  the  same  time  raising  from  year  to 
year  the  necessary  personnel   for   manning   the  new 
vessels.     This  is  another  notable  feature  of  Admiral 
von   Tirpitz's   policy.      The   legislation   has   been   so 
elastic  as  to  enable  him  to  raise  the  necessary  number 
of  officers  and  men  to  suit  the  requirements  of  the 
Fleet.     When  a  Dreadnought,  requiring  1,106  officers 
and   men,   has   been   completed    for  sea  to    take   the 
place  of  a  ship  of  the  Hagen  class,  with  a  crew  of 
only  306,  the  additional  personnel  has  been  instantly 
ready. 


THE  "REPLACEMENT"  POLICY         151 

The  same  process  has  been  adopted  in  increasing 
the  cruiser  squadrons  of  the  German  Navy.  The  Law 
has  specified  that  a  certain  number  of  '*  large  cruisers" 
shall  be  built,  and  it  has  been  left  to  the  discretion  of 
the  naval  authorities  to  interpret  this  elastic  term  in 
tons,  guns,  armour,  knots  of  speed,  and  personnel.  In 
accordance  with  the  Law,  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  has 
thus  been  able  to  replace  cruisers  of  negligible  fighting- 
value  and  of  small  size  by  Dreadnought  battle  cruisers 
mounting  guns  of  immense  power  and  attaining  speeds 
hitherto  without  precedent.  Similarly,  small  torpedo- 
boats  have  given  way  in  the  establishment  of  the  Navy 
to  torpedo-boat  destroyers  of  large  size,  and  step  by 
step  the  naval  strength  of  Germany  has  been  increased 
by  a  process,  the  cleverness  and  ingenuity  of  which 
even  the  German  people  themselves  have  not  realized. 

Germany  has  immensely  increased  her  resources  of 
ships  and  men,  but  she  has  done  more  than  that :  she 
has  forced  other  Powers  to  organize  and  train  their 
squadrons  on  a  standard  of  efficiency  never  attempted 
in  the  past.  She  has  increased  the  strain  and  stress 
of  peace  until  it  resembles  closely  the  actual  conditions 
of  war,  and  having  determined  year  in  and  year  out 
to  keep  four-fifths  of  her  fleet  always  on  a  war  footing, 
always  instantly  ready  for  action,  she  has  compelled 
other  countries,  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of 
ordinary  foresight,  to  take  similar  action,  however 
onerous  the  financial  burden.  It  is  on  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  that  the  weight  of  this  burden 
bears  most  heavily,  for  in  those  States  alone  is  reliance 
placed  on  a  voluntary  system  of  manning. 


CHAPTER  VI 

GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

In  material,  in  the  art  of  constructing  and  equipping 
ships  of  war,  Germany  now  ranks  far  above  most  of 
the  Great  Powers,  and  she  is  httle,  if  anything,  behind 
even  Great  Britain  in  workmanship,  rapidity  and 
cheapness.  Her  personnel  also  stands  high,  for  she 
has  succeeded  in  translating  into  naval  terms  the 
professional  and  disciplinary  codes  which  have  raised 
the  German  Army  to  a  position  of  pre-eminence. 
Above  all  she  has  succeeded,  in  a  degree  never  before 
attempted  by  any  country,  in  keeping  ships  and  men 
in  constant  association.  The  German  naval  authorities 
have  recognized  that,  while  a  conscriptive  system  of 
manning  a  fleet  brings  into  the  organization  certain 
grave  and  ineradicable  disadvantages,  it  does  at  least 
enable  large  numbers  of  officers  and  men  to  be  borne 
for  service  at  a  relatively  small  annual  cost.  Realizing 
this  economic  benefit  of  conscription,  the  Marineamt 
has  had  no  hesitation  in  increasing  the  personnel 
rapidly  from  year  to  year.  The  expansion  of  this 
element  of  naval  power  has  kept  pace  with  the 
activity  of  the  shipyards.  This  policy  of  simultaneous 
increase  of  ships  and  of  men,  accompanied  as  it  has 
been  by  the  expansion  of  her  shipbuilding  and  allied 
industries  and  of  her  dockyards,  has  been  the  secret 
of  the  rapid  rise  of  Germany  as  a  maritime  Power 
wielding  world-wide  influence. 

Within  the  memory  of  the  present  generation  German 
ships  of  war,  if  not  built  in  England,  were  constructed 

152 


GERMANY'S  ENGLISH-BUILT  SHIPS      153 

in  Germany  with  materials  obtained  entirely  or  in  part 
from  England.  Her  earliest  armoured  ships  of  any 
account — the  Deutschland^  the  Kaiser  and  the  Konig 
Wilhelm — were  all  constructed  on  the  banks  of  the 
Thames  at  the  old  Samuda  Yard.  The  great  industry 
which  Germany  and  other  foreign  nations  helped  to 
support  is  now  dead,  and  on  the  other  side  of  the 
North  Sea  is  to  be  seen  an  activity  more  intense  and 
on  a  far  larger  scale  than  the  Thames  establish- 
ments could  boast  even  in  the  day  of  their  greatest 
prosperity. 

Though  there  are  many  shipbuilding  yards  and 
engine-making  establishments  in  Germany,  the  naval 
authorities  depend  exclusively  upon  the  vast  establish- 
ment of  Krupp  for  armour  and  guns,  and  the  repute 
of  the  firm  in  both  respects  stands  very  high.  The 
vast  establishment  which  supplies  the  German  and 
many  other  Governments  was  founded  in  18 10  by 
Friedrich  Krupp,  who  bought  a  small  forge  and 
devoted  himself,  with  little  commercial  success,  to 
the  manufacture  of  cast  steel.  In  this  he  was  ahead 
of  Germany's  requirements,  but  on  the  basis  thus  laid 
by  the  father,  the  son  built;  and  in  185 1  a  solid  steel 
ingot  which  he  exhibited  at  the  Great  Exhibition  in 
London  completely  took  the  metallurgic  world  by 
surprise,  and  his  fortune  was  made.  He  turned  his 
energy  and  knowledge  to  the  making  of  guns,  armour, 
weldless  steel  rails,  and  other  manufactures;  and  the 
modest  works  at  Essen  continued  to  expand  until 
to-day  they  and  the  associated  establishments  give 
employment  to  about  70,000  men,  not  all  of  whom,  of 
course,  are  engaged  on  the  manipulation  of  armaments. 

For  many  years  the  Krupp  process  of  armour 
manufacture  was  adopted  in  every  country  in  the 
world,  but  lately  the  British  Admiralty  have,  it  is 
common  knowledge,  adopted  a  superior  process  which 
produces  a  plate  of  greater  resisting  power,  and  the 
German  cemented  type  of  armour  no  longer  holds  the 
premier  position  which  it  occupied  when  its  advantages 


154    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

over  the  Harvey  plate  were  demonstrated.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Krupp  firm  still  claim  that  their 
ordnance  is  not  equalled  by  any  in  tne  world,  and 
on  the  strength  of  this  claim  they  have  obtained  most 
valuable  orders,  extending  over  a  long  series  of  years,, 
from  foreign  Governments.  British  guns  are  made  on 
the  wire-wound  system — that  is,  steel  ribbon  is  wound 
under  great  pressure  round  the  gun,  and  over  this  is 
placed  an  outer  hoop ;  Krupp's,  on  the  other  hand, 
still  remain  faithful  to  the  solid  steel  tube  to  resist  the 
gas  pressures  exerted,  arguing  that  their  method  of 
steel  manufacture  enables  them  to  submit  it  to  strains 
which  other  steel  might  not  stand.  There  has  been 
endless  controversy  as  to  the  merits  of  the  two  systems ; 
and  the  subject  was  again  discussed  as  recently  as  the 
end  of  1912,  when  the  Italian  Minister  of  Marine  laid  a 
report  before  the  Italian  Parliament  with  reference  to 
the  armaments  of  the  principal  fleets.  According  to 
this  statement  the  British,  Itahan,  and  Japanese  are 
the  only  Navies  to  mount  wire-wound  guns ;  the 
probable  life  of  the  Italian  and  Japanese  12-inch  guns 
was  given  at  80  rounds,  whereas  the  English  gun  was 
good  for  only  60  rounds.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Austrian  and  German  guns  were  given  from  200  to  220 
rounds,  and  the  American  14-inch  gun  was  estimated 
to  have  a  probable  life  of  150  rounds.  Particulars  with 
reference  to  British  and  German  guns  were  given  as 
follows : 


British. 

German. 

Calibre  in  inches           

12 

ir^ 

12 

14 

15 

Length  in  calibres         

50 

45 

45 

50 

50 

Weight  in  tons  ...         

69 

80 

53 

«3 

102 

Weight  of  projectile  in  pounds 

850 

1,240 

850 

1,360 

1,650 

Initial  velocity   ... 

2,950 

2,800 

3,000 

3,000 

3,000 

Energy  at  muzzle  in  metric  tons 

16,540 

22,150 

17-520 

27,650 

33,910 

Energy  per  kilogramme  in  kilo- 

metres ...         

240 

277 

330 

330 

330 

Probable  life  in  rounds 

60 

60 

200 

200 

200 

BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  GUNS  155 

The  attention  of  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 
was  directed  to  these  statements  in  the  House  ot 
Commons,  and  he  reiterated  the  assurance  of  former 
Ministers  that  the  expert  advisers  were  satisfied  as  to 
the  wisdom  of  retaining  the  wire-wound  system.  He 
gave  no  data  as  to  the  foundation  of  this  confidence, 
and  in  the  German  technical  press — no  doubt  with  an 
eye  to  foreign  orders — the  superiority  of  the  German 
gun  over  the  British  was  repeated  with  at  least  equal 
assurance. 

The  great  advantage  of  the  wire-wound  system,  it 
has  always  been  claimed,  is  that  after  much  use,  when 
the  rifling  is  worn,  the  gun  can  be  given  a  new  inner 
tube,  a  comparatively  simple  and  cheap  operation 
which  results  in  practically  a  new  gun  being  made 
available  for  sea  service  in  a  short  time.  All  that  can 
be  said  as  to  the  two  systems  from  practical  experience 
is  that  the  Japanese  found  the  British-made  weapons 
give  eminently  satisfactory  results  during  the  war  with 
Russia,  while  the  Krupp  artillery  guns  used  by  the 
Turkish  Army  in  the  Balkan  War  of  1912  did  not 
realize  expectations. 

Probably  in  naval  material — in  ships,  their  armour, 
armament,  and  engineering  equipment — there  is  little 
difference  as  between  the  leading  navies.  One  may 
be  thought  to  have  an  advantage  in  some  particular 
respect,  but  this  may  possibly  be  counterbalanced  by 
the  rival's  superiority  in  another.  No  final  judgment 
on  the  relative  merits  of  material,  certainly  as  between 
the  British  and  German  Navies,  can  be  passed  in  the 
absence  of  war  experience.  Generally  the  British 
ships  mount  fewer  guns  but  of  larger  calibre,  and  to  the 
experienced  eye  they  look  very  workmanlike ;  while  the 
German  ships  carry  smaller  guns  in  greater  number 
and  have  a  crowded  appearance  which  does  not  appeal 
to  British  naval  opinion  in  its  desire  for  simplicity  of 
design  and  plenty  of  working  room.  Which  school 
represents  the  nearest  approximation  to  ideal  war 
conditions  only  war  itself  can  show.     Virtually,  all  the 


156    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

instruments  for  exerting  naval  power  as  they  exist  to- 
day are  experimental,  based  upon  empirical  knowledge. 
When  the  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain 
occurred,  it  was  anticipated  that  it  would  throw  light 
upon  these  problems,  but  these  anticipations  were  not 
realized,  and  even  the  struggle  between  Russia  and 
Japan  failed  to  satisfy  fully  the  natural  curiosity  of  the 
naval  constructor  and  the  naval  officer  owing  to  the 
inefficiency  with  which  the  Russian  ships  were 
handled,  and  the  deplorable  slackness  of  the  adminis- 
tration. 

It  is  the  fashion  to  calculate  the  relative  strength  of 
fleets  in  tons  and  guns,*  but  the  probability  is  that  on 
the  day  of  trial  these  nice  paper  computations  will  be 
entirely  upset  by  the  course  of  events.  Morale,  as 
Napoleon  observed,  dominates  war.  This  dictum  is 
no  less  true  to-day  than  it  was  in  the  past.  Man  is  still 
greater  than  the  instruments  of  his  creation,  and  the 
experience  of  war  will  certainly  confirm  the  teaching 
of  history — that  the  important  element  in  naval  powxr 
is  men  rather  than  ships.  On  the  eve  of  the  Battle  of 
St.  Vincent,  when  Jervis,  in  command  of  fifteen  ships, 
was  pacing  the  quarter-deck  of  his  flagship  and  the 
Spanish  Fleet  was  entering  the  field  of  vision,  the 
numbers  of  the  enemy  were  reported  by  the  Captain 
of  the  Fleet  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  as  they  were 
counted.  "There  are  eight  sail  of  the  line.  Sir  John," 
**Very  well,  sir,"  answered  the  Admiral.  "There  are 
twenty  sail  of  the  line.  Sir  John."  "  Very  wxll,  sir," 
Jervis  responded.  "There  are  twenty-five  sail  of  the 
line,  Sir  John."  "Very  well,  sir,"  the  Admiral  again 
replied  imperturbably.  "  There  are  twenty-seven  sail 
of  the  line.  Sir  John,"  the  Captain  of  the  Fleet  at  length 
reported,  and  when  he  had  the  temerity  to  remark  on 
the  great  disparity  between  the  British  and  Spanish 
Fleets,  the  Admiral,  confident  in  the  efficiency  of  his 
small  fleet,  replied:  "The  die  is  cast,  and  if  there  be 

*  A  comparison  of  the  gun-power  of  the  British  and  German 
Fleets,  drawn  from  official  sources,  is  given  in  Appendix  VII. 


CALCULATIONS  OF  TONS  AND  GUNS     157 

fifty  sail,  I  will  go  through  them."  We  may  be  sure 
that  the  victor  of  the  Battle  of  St.  Vincent,  who  by 
stern  but  wisely  directed  measures  created  the  fleet 
which  Nelson  used  with  such  dramatic  effect  at 
Trafalgar,  would  have  scorned  and  ridiculed  an  entire 
reliance  on  mere  paper  calculations  of  guns  and  tons, 
realizing  that  victory  or  defeat  depends  mainly  upon 
the  personal  element  and  morale. 

It  is  in  respect  of  officers  and  men  that  there  is  the 
greatest  contrast  between  the  British  Fleet  and  the 
Navies  of  the  continent  of  Europe.  The  British 
service  is  organized  on  a  voluntary  system,  while 
the  Continental  fleets  are  manned  mainly  by  conscripts; 
the  former  serve  for  many  years,  while  the  latter  for  the 
most  part  submit  to  only  the  short  period  of  duty 
required  by  law  and  then  pass  into  the  reserve.  In 
the  matter  of  officers,  however,  the  German  Fleet  is 
certainly  not  worse  served  than  the  British  Navy ; 
though  the  cadets  begin  their  training  at  a  somewhat 
later  age,  a  thoroughly  good  sea  officer  is  produced. 
The  marked  distinction  between  the  two  services  is 
that,  whereas  under  the  White  Ensign  special  duties 
are  assigned  to  special  classes  of  officers — gunnery, 
torpedo,  navigation,  signalling  and  ph3^sical  training — 
in  the  German  Navy  no  hard-and-fast  lines  are  drawn. 
It  is  held  that  the  British  system  would  entail  a  larger 
number  of  officers  than  are  available  on  the  other  side 
of  the  North  Sea.  However  this  may  be,  the  German 
authorities  can  certainly  pride  themselves  upon  a  corps 
of  executive  officers  which  in  many  respects  is  not 
excelled  in  any  country.  As  in  the  British  service, 
special  lines  of  officers  are  trained  for  engineering, 
medical,  and  accountant  duties  and  these  have  no 
executive  standing. 

The  method  of  training  executive  officers  for  the 
German  Fleet  differs  in  some  important  respects  from 
that  which  obtains  in  England.  In  the  British  service 
the  cadets,  who  enter  when  they  are,  on  the  average, 
thirteen  and  a  half  years  of  age,  have  not  completed 


158     GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

their  general  education,  and  consequently  spend  four 
years  at  the  Naval  Colleges  at  Osborne  and  Dartmouth 
respectively  before  they  go  afloat  in  a  training  ship.  The 
German  naval  officer  receives  much  the  same  general 
education  as  any  other  boy  before  he  enters  the  navy, 
whereas  the  British  cadet,  after  entering,  is  submitted  to 
an  educational  course  specially  devised  with  a  view  to 
his  future  naval  career;  his  studies  embrace  physical 
science  and  practical  engineering,  and  emphasis  is  laid 
upon  athletics  and  as  much  sea  experience  as  can  be 
obtained  in  small  craft.  When  the  four  years  ashore 
are  completed  he  goes  afloat  at  about  the  same  age  as 
the  average  German  cadet  and  makes  a  six  months' 
cruise.  Which  is  the  better  system  ?  Who  shall  say  ? 
This  is  certain,  however,  that  British  naval  officers 
have  alwa3^s  held  that  lads  for  the  sea  service  cannot  be 
caught,  broken  in,  and  inoculated,  so  to  speak,  too 
early. 

The  training  and  the  position  subsequently  occupied 
by  the  naval  officer  in  the  German  organization  is 
peculiar  to  the  country  in  some  respects.  His  relation 
to  the  navy,  to  the  technical  side  of  naval  power,  and 
to  the  Emperor,  as  the  supreme  head  of  the  fleet,  was 
admirably  presented  by  two  foreign  officers  who,  after 
studying  the  German  naval  system,  compiled  the 
following  notes  :* 

Private  workshops  will  construct  the  ships,  will 
mount  the  guns,  will  provide  the  technical  personnel, 
will  instal  all  the  machinery  and  all  the  arms  for  im- 
mediate and  perfect  action  ;  only  skill  in  directing  and 
rapidity  of  action  will  be  required  of  the  officers.  It 
is  on  this  principle  that  the  organization  of  the  German 
Fleet  is  founded,  and  to  this  principle  is  subordinated 
every  detail  of  the  education  of  the  officers.  It  is  not 
claimed  that  the  officers  possess  a  profound  scientific 
knowledge  of  the  mechanism  nor  even  sufficient  prac- 
tical acquaintance  with  the  details  for  handling  it.  The 

*  Translated  from  the  Rivista  Generale  di  Marina  of  November,  191 1, 
and  published  in  the  Journal  of  the  Royal  Umied  Service  J  nstituiion. 


OFFICERS  AND  WARRANT  OFFICERS     159 

first  is  the  province  of  the  naval  architects ;  and  for 
the  second  there  exists  the  class  called  "deck  officers" 
(warrant  officers),  to  whose  function  the  Saxon  nature 
readily  adapts  itself;  a  class  between  petty  officers 
and  officers,  composed  of  individuals  whose  practical 
knowledge  of  one  single  subject  is  being  constantly 
improved  by  frequent  alternations  of  practical  expe- 
rience and  teaching  in  the  schools.  From  this  class 
are  drawn  and  placed  respectively  under  the  officers 
concerned,  experts  in  gunnery,  torpedo  and  engineer- 
ing, highly  trained  by  constant  and  exclusive  employ- 
ment of  the  one  machine,  and  perfected  in  the  schools 
by  theoretical  instruction  limited,  in  extent,  but  of 
great  efficiency. 

Relying  on  these  assistants,  the  German  naval  officer 
does  not  require  a  profound  knowledge  of  the  scientific 
part  of  his  machinery,  nor  familiarity  with  details, 
but  concerns  himself  solely  with  the  direction  of  the 
whole. 

There  are,  besides,  other  peculiarities  of  race  and  of 
political  organization  which  influence  details,  and  are 
at  first  sight  incomprehensible  to  us.  In  war  and 
executive  matters  the  control  of  the  Emperor  is  abso- 
lute and  personal.  He  issues  his  orders  directly  to 
the  chiefs  of  the  different  departments,  without  the 
intervention  of  the  Minister,  which  is  only  exercised 
in  the  administrative  part.  Contracts,  construction, 
etc.,  are  under  the  Minister's  control,  but  the  Com- 
manders-in-Chief of  the  fleets  and  of  the  naval  stations, 
the  heads  of  the  departments  of  artillery  and  of  tor- 
pedoes, and  those  of  the  centres  of  instruction  receive 
orders  directly  from  the  Emperor.  Their  personal 
responsibility  to  him  is  therefore  unavoidable  and 
effective. 

The  Emperor,  for  his  part,  issues  concise  orders  with- 
out entering  into  details,  and  this  compels  the  subordi- 
nate to  exercise  his  own  initiative.  The  result  of  this 
system  is,  first,  a  perfect  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 
Emperor  of  the  fitness  of  the  personnel ;  and,  secondly, 


i6o    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

that  each  individual  is  accustomed  to  act  on  his  own 
responsibihty  and  on  his  own  initiative  unhampered 
by  any  other  consideration  than  that  of  carrying  out 
the  design  of  the  Emperor. 

It  is  evident  that  this  tends  to  produce  admirable 
results  in  the  spirit  of  the  war  organization,  but  on  the 
condition  that  the  personal  fitness  of  the  Emperor  is 
fully  equal  to  the  great  requirements  of  such  an  im- 
portant role.     Everything  depends  on  this. 

There  are  other  important  factors  which  must  not 
be  overlooked,  if  we  would  understand  and  judge  the 
organization  of  this  navy.  The  democratic  spirit, 
claiming  equal  chances  for  all,  which  influences  all  the 
acts  of  Governments  of  the  Latin  nations,  has  not  yet 
impressed  itself  upon  the  Teutonic  race.  It  is  there- 
fore not  surprising  to  find  strict  rules  excluding  the 
lower  grades  of  society,  such,  for  example,  as  the  rules 
determining  the  entrance  to  the  Academy  in  the  first 
instance,  and  later  on  to  executive  rank,  or  those  which 
forbid  the  lower  grades  of  engineers  to  marry  if  they 
aspire  to  the  rank  of  officers. 

This  same  spirit  of  difi'erentiation  which  pervades 
the  whole  fabric  of  society,  and  is  accepted  by  the 
lower  classes  themselves,  facilitates  the  exercise  of 
military  authority  without  requiring  great  scientific  or 
intellectual  knowledge. 

The  combination  of  these  circumstances  creates  an 
atmosphere  absolutely  different,  not  only  from  our 
own,  but  from  that  of  all  maritime  nations.  It  is  not 
thought  necessary  to  give  officers  an  extensive  know- 
ledge which  might  be  useless,  and  would  probably 
quench  in  them  an  activit}^  which  should  be  applied 
rather  to  stimulating  qualities  of  another  order. 
Neither  is  there  any  intention  of  adopting  the  system 
of  evolution,  which  other  nations  have  initiated  in  the 
organization  of  engineers;  there  will  continue  to  be, 
above  all,  practical  men  with  a  career  limited  to  the 
post  of  Commander ;  because,  it  is  said,  they  have  not 
the  wherewithal  to  fill  the  higher  posts. 


ENTRY  OF  CADETS  i6i 

The  course  of  instruction  of  the  personnel  of  the 
different  branches  is  founded  upon  these  ideas. 

As  to  the  executive  branch  of  officers  the  maximum 
age  for  admittance  as  a  cadet  is  eighteen,  and  a  certi- 
ficate of  the  standard  of  education  of  ''bachelor"  is 
sufficient  to  qualify  him  for  entrance.  A  Commission 
of  the  Inspectorate  of  Schools  examines  the  antecedents 
of  the  candidate's  family  more  closel}'  than  his  diploma, 
and  his  admission  is  then  determined.  It  is  possible 
also  to  enter  before  the  age  of  sixteen,  without  having 
attained  the  standard  of  "  bachelor,"  but  in  this  case, 
and  with  the  consent  of  the  Board,  the  candidate  must 
pass  a  qualifying  examination  in  arithmetic,  algebra 
(including  quadratic  equations),  geometry,  plane  and 
solid  (elementary),  plane  trigonometry,  the  rudiments  of 
physics  (mechanics,  light,  heat,  and  electricity),  French, 
and  English  (to  read  and  translate). 

During  the  first  six  months  the  cadets  receive 
military  training  on  land,  and  then  at  once  embark  in 
the  cruisers  exclusively  reserved  for  this  purpose. 
These  vessels,  of  5,000  tons,  are  the  Hertha,  Freya^ 
Hansa,  and  Victoria  Luise. 

The  instruction  given  in  these  cruisers,  which  are 
at  the  same  time  schools  for  seamen  apprentices,  is  of 
a  practical  character ;  they  are  taught  the  principles 
of  seamanship,  including  practical  navigation  and 
pilotage,  and  sufficient  astronomy  for  the  determina- 
tion of  latitude  by  the  meridian.  In  gunnery  they  learn 
the  handling  of  the  guns  and  firing  at  the  target.  In 
the  engine-room  they  perform  the  mechanical  duties 
of  each  department  in  all  their  details.  Every  mid- 
shipman must  have  kept  at  least  twelve  watches  of 
two  hours  each  as  stoker  mechanic,  and  twenty-four 
as  artificer  in  the  engine-room.  The  study  of  gunnery 
and  of  engineering  is  purely  descriptive.  They  learn, 
besides,  French  and  English. 

During  the  first  year  the  progress  made  in  their 
studies  is  carefully  watched,  and  at  the  close  of  the 
course  the  students  pronounced  competent  undergo 

II 


i62    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

an  examination  on  board  the  same  ship  before  they 
can  pass  into  the  Kiel  School  as  midshipmen;  whilst 
those  classed  as  competent,  but  who  fail  in  the  examina- 
tion, may  repeat  the  course. 

The  "school  at  Kiel  occupies  at  present  a  building 
which,  although  sumptuously  furnished  and  decorated, 
does  not  fulfil  the  modern  requirements  for  space  in 
establishments  of  this  character.  The  German  Govern- 
ment, ahve  to  this  defect,  is  constructing  an  edifice 
adapted  for  the  purpose  at  Sonderburg. 

The  midshipmen  remain  a  year  in  this  school.  The 
table  on  p.  163  gives  the  list  of  lectures  delivered,  and 
the  time  devoted  to  each  subject  in  the  year's  course, 
which  is  the  only  one  of  a  theoretical  character  in  the 
career  of  the  German  officer. 

In  addition,  the  afternoons  are  emplo^^ed  as 
follows  : 

(a)  In  summer,  weekly  :  Two  double  hours  seaman- 
ship ;  one  hour  g^nnnastics ;  one  hour  fencing ;  one  hour 
signalling.  Monthly :  One  double  hour  in  engineer- 
ing, and,  during  the  term,  seven  double  hours  of 
navigation. 

(b)  In  winter  :  Six  double  hours  gunnery  ;  five  hours 
construction ;  one  hour  gymnastics ;  one  hour  fencing ; 
one  hour  signalling ;  one  hour  riding ;  one  hour 
dancing. 

The  textbooks  for  the  course  of  instruction  contained 
in  the&e  lectures  could  scarcely  be  more  elementary. 
The  one  for  mathematics  includes  arithmetic,  algebra, 
geometry,  and  trigonometry.  It  consists  of  450  pages, 
and  the  previous  knowledge  of  the  four  rules  of  arith- 
metic with  w^hole  numbers  is  all  that  is  required  for 
its  study.  The  theories  of  arithmetic  and  algebra  are 
confined  to  the  first  88  pages.  Plane  geometry,  with 
numerous  applications  to  pilotage,  occupies  the  next 
100  pages.  Trigonometry  is  studied  in  all  its  branches ; 
this  science,  with  the  principles  of  solid  geometry, 
which  are  indispensable  for  the  comprehension  of  all 
that   relates   to   the  sphere,  and  with   application   to 


MIDSHIPMEN'S  STUDIES  AT  KIEL      163 

cosmography  and  nautical   astronomy  (triangulation) 
occupies  the  rest  of  the  book. 

The  German  officer  does  not  study  calculus. 
Analytical  geometry  is  epitomized  in  80  pages,  which 
treat  principally  of  the   parabola,  and   touch  hghtly 


Table  of  Studies  in  the  School, 


Subjects. 

Hours  Weekly 
in  Classes. 

Observations. 

Navigation,    seamanship, 

6 

One  and  a  half   hours  a 

and  knowledge  of  the 

week  in  navigation  work, 

ship 

and  a  practical  course 
in  a  saiUng  vessel  during 
one  week. 

Gunnery  and  hydraulics 

2 

— 

Engineering        

3 

— 

Organization   of   the   de- 

2 

— 

partments 

Construction        

2 

— 

Mathematics        

2 

— 

Natural  sciences 

2 

— 

Electro-technics 

2 

— 

English     

2 

— 

French      ...         

2 

— 

Mines  (in  summtr) 

I 

— 

Land  tactics  (fortifications 

I 

During  the  summer  twelve 

in  winter) 

double  hours  approxi- 
matelv  for  land  tactics. 
During  the  winter  six 
double  hours  given  to 
the  same  subject  in  such 
form  as  the  Director  of 
Studies  may  decide. 

Drawing   and    languages 

— 

— 

optional 

on  the  other  curves  of  the  second  degree.  This  book 
contains  all  that  is  required  for  the  mathematical 
course. 

All  that  refers  to  natural  sciences  is  contained  in 
a  little  book  of  94  pages,  devoted  to  all  the  most 
elementary  principles  of  mechanics,  heat,  hght,  mag- 
netism, electricity,  and  chemistry. 


i64    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

The  class-books  on  the  applied  sciences  do  not  go 
much  farther.  Cosmography,  navigation,  meteorology, 
oceanography,  and  surveying  are  contained  in  a  volume 
of  280  pages. 

Engines  occupy  300  pages  in  a  book,  which,  after 
some  elementary  explanation  of  thermo- dynamics, 
gives  a  description  of  the  engines  actually  in  use  in  the 
German  Navy,  not  only  for  propulsion,  but  for  every 
kind  of  use  on  board.  It  describes,  therefore,  recip- 
rocating engines,  turbines,  internal  combustion,  all 
kinds  of  auxiliary  engines,  dynamos,  electro-motors, 
refrigerators,  ventilators,  pumps,  etc.  It  is  all  in  a 
very  condensed  form,  and  the  scientific  is  subordinated 
to  the  popular  character. 

Gunnery  is  the  subject  of  a  much  larger  work,  and 
is  divided  under  three  heads.  The  first  is  the  descrip- 
tion of  the  material  in  use  in  the  German  Navy;  the 
second  part,  of  50  pages,  is  a  fairly  complete  and 
very  practical  study  of  external  ballistics  and  fire 
control ;  and  the  third  portion  is  a  very  elementary 
treatise  on  internal  ballistics,  powder,  and  ammuni- 
tion. 

When  the  course  of  study  has  been  completed  in 
the  school,  the  students  pass  into  the  gunnery  school 
of  Sonderburg,  where,  for  three  months,  they  devote 
themselves  exclusively  to  the  theory  and  practice  of 
this  arm  ;  after  which,  having  satisfied  their  instructors 
in  this  course,  they  pass  into  the  torpedo  school  on 
board  a  special  ship,  where  they  remain  two  months. 
Another  examination  follows,  and  they  are  then 
attached  for  one  month's  purely  military  service  to 
one  of  the  colonial  battalions.  After  this  stage  of 
apprenticeship  the  midshipmen  have  the  privilege  of 
wearing  swords,  and  then  enter  for  a  year's  service 
afloat. 

The  examination  at  the  end  of  this  last  year  closes 
the  period  of  instruction,  and  the  place  which  the 
student  takes  in  the  examination,  together  with  his 
previous    record     in     the     schools,     determines     his 


PROMOTION  BY  SENIORITY  165 

seniority  in  the  list.  But  whatever  may  be  the  result 
of  this  examination,  the  student  does  not  enter  the 
Executive  Branch  of  Officers  until  all  the  officers  at 
the  station  to  which  he  belongs,  whether  Kiel  or 
Wilhelmshaven,  have  given  their  votes  in  his  favour. 
Should  even  one  officer  alone  raise  objection  to  the 
entrance  of  the  candidate  on  the  ground  of  the 
dignity  and  reputation  of  the  corps,  it  is  sufficient 
to  delay  his  admission  pending  the  decision  of  the 
Emperor. 

The  commanders  of  the  ships  have  the  power 
to  delay  the  final  examination  for  six  months,  and 
even  to  propose  retirement  on  professional  or  social 
grounds.  This  is  granted  by  the  Inspectorate 
of  Schools,  of  which  Board  a  Vice  -  Admiral  is 
head. 

Promotion  to  the  higher  grades  of  the  corps  goes 
practically  by  seniority,  because,  although  the  regula- 
tions direct  promotions  by  selection,  this  method  is 
little  employed,  at  present  at  all  events. 

The  officers  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  Officers 
performing  the  duties  of  naval  lieutenants  are  selected, 
not  on  their  initiative,  but  by  the  direction  of  their 
superiors,  to  go  through  a  course  of  gunnery  which 
comprises  two  standards :  the  lower,  which  requires 
two  months,  is  for  the  guns  of  cruisers  ;  the  higher, 
lasting  three  months,  for  the  heavy  guns  of  battle- 
ships. Should  three  years  elapse  without  these 
officers  being  employed  in  the  capacity  for  which 
they  have  specialized  they  forfeit  their  title  of 
specialist. 

In  the  same  way  the  "  Oberleutnants  "  (lieutenants 
of  less  than  eight  years'  seniority)  have  to  go  through 
a  further  torpedo  course,  which  lasts  three  months. 
As  in  the  previous  case,  the  title  of  specialist  is 
forfeited  by  three  years'  unemployment.  In  reality 
neither  the  torpedo  nor  the  gunnery  course  gives 
any  personal  advantage  or  differentiation  in  the 
service. 


i66    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

Promotion  in  the  ranks  of  Engineer  Officers  is  prac- 
ticall}^  limited  to  the  comparative  rank  of  **  Kapitan- 
leutnant "  (naval  lieutenant  of  over  eight  years'  service), 
because,  although  there  are  posts  ranking  with  major 
and  lieutenant-colonel  in  the  Army,  their  number  is  so 
small  relatively  to  that  of  the  officers  that  it  is  by  only 
an  exception  that  these  posts  can  be  obtained.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  pay  is  always  higher  than  that  of 
other  officers  of  equal  rank.  Their  position  on  board 
is  that  of  combatant  officers,  although  inferior  to 
that  of  the  officers  of  the  Executive  Branch,  who 
hold  certain  privileges,  such  as  Presidency  of  the 
Mess,  etc. 

The  candidates  for  entry  as  engineer  sub-lieutenant 
must,  as  students,  be  under  twenty-two  years  of  age ; 
they  must  have  attained  the  standard  of  education  of 
*'  bachelor,"  or  followed  part  of  the  course  for  this 
certificate  like  the  students  of  the  Executive  Branch 
of  Officers ;  they  must  pass  a  theoretical  examination 
in  elementary  mathematics,  the  rudiments  of  mechanics, 
and  mechanical  drawing,  as  well  as  a  practical  examin- 
ation in  what  concerns  their  profession ;  they  must, 
besides,  show  that  they  have  served  in  private  works 
for  at  least  twenty-four  months,  of  which  four  must 
have  been  passed  in  boiler  works,  two  in  copper,  and 
three  in  iron  foundries,  and  fifteen  in  machinery  work- 
shops. Having  satisfied  their  examiners  on  these 
points,  they  then  receive  an  exclusively  military 
training  for  three  months,  and  the  other  nine  months 
of  the  first  year  are  spent  in  naval  vessels.  At 
the  end  of  the  year  they  are  examined  on  board 
ship  by  a  commission  composed  of  one  captain, 
one  commander,  and  three  engineer-officers.  They 
pass  two  years  more  on  board  an  armoured  vessel; 
or  one  year  in  an  armoured  ship  and  one  in  a 
torpedo-boat  as  petty  officer,  keeping  their  watches, 
and  pass  on  to  Wilhelmshaven  for  a  theoretical 
course. 


TRAINING  OF  ENGINEER  OFFICERS     167 
The  programme  for  this  first  year  is  as  follows  : 

c:„k;<,„»=  Hours  per 

Subjects.  ^^^l 

Engines         5 

Electro-technics      3 

Mechanics 4 

Physics  2 

Chemistry      2 

Higher  mathematics  6 

Languages    4 

Drawing       3 

At  the  end  of  this  year,  the  fourth  of  their  career, 
they  are  promoted,  and  return  as  *'  deck  officers " 
(warrant  officers)  to  the  ship.  There  they  do  duty 
as  assistant  chiefs  of  the  watches  in  the  engine-room 
and  stoke-hold,  subordinate  to  the  engineer  officers, 
who  are  the  chiefs  of  the  watches.  After  four  years' 
duty  they  return  again  to  Wilhelmshaven,  w^here  they 
go  through  a  year's  course,  comprising  both  theo- 
retical and  practical  work.  The  following  subjects 
are  studied  : 

e  u-    »  Hours  per 

Subjects.  Week. 

Engines         6 

Electro-technics      4 

Mechanics ...  3 

Physics  ...         2 

Chemistry      2 

Mathematics  5 

Languages  (French  and  English)  4 

Torpedoes 4 

This  ninth  year  of  their  career  closes  the  period  of 
training  and  the  result  of  the  examination,  combined 
with  that  of  the  previous  examinations,  and  with  the 
reports  of  their  commanding  officers,  determines  their 
seniority  in  the  list  of  officers ;  but  in  order  to  take 
their  place  among  the  officers  a  favourable  vote  must 
be  obtained,  as  in  the  case  of  the  officers  of  the 
Executive  Branch,  only  in  this  case  the  officers  of  the 
Engineer  and  the  Executive  Branch  vote.  Those  who 
aspire  to  become  officers  cannot  marry  until  after  they 
have  attained  their  position. 


i68    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

After  the  first  six  months  of  study,  a  certain  number 
of  the  engineer  students  are  selected  from  the  others, 
and  trained  in  torpedo-boats  exclusively.  Later  they 
spend  a  year  at  Wilhelmshaven,  and  when  they  have 
been  advanced  to  torpedo  "  deck  officers  "  they  spend 
six  months  in  the  floating  torpedo  school,  on  board  the 
Wurttemberg.  After  this  course  they  pass  on  to  the 
school  for  torpedo  practice  on  board  the  armoured 
cruiser  Friedrich  Karl,  where  they  remain  three 
months.  Another  year  is  spent  in  practical  work  in 
the  torpedo  workshops.  After  four  years,  reckoned 
from  their  advancement  to  "  deck  officers,"  they  return 
to  Wilhelmshaven  and  go  through  the  second  course 
with  the  engineers,  and  are  finally  promoted  to  officers 
under  the  same  conditions  as  the  other  engineer 
of^cers.  The  most  distinguished  among  those  of  both 
branches  are  afterwards  sent  for  a  two  years'  finishing 
course  in  civilian  schools  and  institutes. 

The  electricity  department  is  confined  in  Germany 
to  engineer  officers,  excepting  the  machinery  required 
for  the  guns,  which  is  under  the  control  of  the  officers 
of  the  Executive  Branch,  assisted  by  "  gunnery 
engineers,"  so-called.  These  latter  are  recruits,  who 
can  prove  that  they  have  served  three  years  in  private 
workshops.  They  are  at  once  sent  to  the  artillery 
division,  where  they  are  put  through  a  three  months' 
practical  course  on  board ;  then  they  spend  two  months 
in  the  Kronprmz  (course  of  electricity);  five  months  in 
gun  factories,  and  in  workshops  for  the  construction 
of  dockyard  machinery;  one-and-a-half  months  in  the 
school  for  gunnery;  one-and-a-half  in  arsenal  work- 
shops. Having  completed  this  course  of  training  they 
are  appointed  to  ships,  and  having  given  evidence  of 
their  aptitude  and  skill,  they  are  then  recommended 
and  promoted  to  petty  officers. 

The  most  proficient  among  them,  after  a  fixed  time 
of  duty  in  the  workshops  and  four  years  on  board  ship, 
return  to  the  gunnery  school,  where  they  qualify  for 
advancement  to  "deck  officers." 


CONSCRIPTION  AND  THE  NAVY       169 

These  are  the  various  methods  by  which  officers  are 
trained,  and  it  only  remains  to  add  that  owing  to 
the  drastic  action  of  the  Emperor  the  average  age  of 
German  officers,  which  was  formerly  very  high,  has 
been  reduced.  As  an  illustration  of  His  Majesty's 
methods  it  may  be  recalled  that  one  year  after 
naval  manoeuvres  two  admirals,  a  captain,  and  four 
younger  officers  were  placed  on  the  retired  list; 
and  on  other  occasions  energetic  steps  have  been 
taken  in  order  to  secure  to  the  service  only  those 
officers  whose  intellectual  and  seaman-like  character- 
istics fit  them  for  the  arduous  duties  of  the  sea 
service. 

Throughout  the  years  of  naval  expansion  the  German 
authorities  have  been  struggling  to  eliminate  as  far  as 
possible  the  disadvantages  of  conscription  in  its  ap- 
plication to  naval  conditions.  The  War  Department  is 
responsible  for  putting  in  force  the  conscription  law, 
and  periodically  the  navy  sends  in  its  requisition, 
stating  the  number  of  recruits  who  will  be  needed,  and 
where  and  when  they  are  to  join.  The  men  selected 
are  passed  direct  into  the  fleet  without  preliminary 
training  each  October.  Under  the  British  system 
boys  are  entered  at  about  sixteen  years  of  age,  and 
receive  a  short  training  first  in  one  of  the  shore  or 
stationary  sea  establishments,  and  are  subsequently 
drafted  into  one  of  the  ships  of  the  Training  Squadron, 
thence  joining  the  sea-going  fleet.  A  certain  number 
of  youths  are  also  entered  at  an  average  age  of  about 
seventeen  and  a  half  years,  and  these  recruits  dispense 
with  the  preliminary  course,  but  are  also  drafted  to 
the  Training  Squadron  before  joining  the  fleet.  Nearly 
all  the  men  of  the  fleet  sign  on  for  twelve  years'  active 
service,  and  the  best  of  these  are  permitted  to  re- 
engage for  another  ten  years  in  order  to  earn  pensions. 
A  relatively  small  number  of  men,  not  boys,  join  the 
British  Navy  for  a  term  of  only  five  years,  with  the 
obligation  to  remain  in  the  Reserve  for  seven  years.  Five 
years,  consequently,  is  the  minimum  in  the  British  Navy, 


I/O    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

and  applies  to  only  a  relatively  small  number  of  men  ; 
but  three  years  is  the  maximum  period  of  German 
conscripts,  and  during  this  time  the  officers  and  warrant 
officers  have  to  do  their  best  to  transform  the  raw 
material  provided  by  the  State  into  skilled  seamen. 

It  is  easy  to  imagine  the  difficulties  which  assail  the 
administration  in  Germany  in  these  circumstances. 
Every  year  one-third  of  the  naval  conscripts  complete 
their  period  of  active  service  and  are  passed  into  the 
Reserve,  and  their  places  are  taken  by  an  equivalent 
batch  of  raw  recruits.  The  result  is  that  in  the  winter 
months  the  officers  and  petty  officers  of  the  fleet  are 
occupied  in  licking  into  shape  these  embryo  sailors, 
and  from  October  until  May  the  fighting  ships  of  the 
Empire  become  practically  training  vessels. 

If  this  were  a  complete  representation  of  the  condi- 
tions in  the  German  Fleet  its  efficiency  would  be  of  a 
low  order.  The  Navy  is,  however,  stiffened  by  a 
proportion  of  conscripts  who  re-engage  voluntarily, 
and  by  a  certain  number  of  volunteers  who  enter  as 
boys.  These  lads  engage  at  ages  ranging  from  fifteen 
to  eighteen  years.  They  agree  to  undergo  an  appren- 
ticeship of  two  years  followed  by  seven  years  of  active 
fleet  service.  Volunteers  are  not  trained  ashore  or  in 
fixed  naval  establishments  as  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
but  are  drafted  to  sea-going  training  ships,  which  cruise 
in  home  waters  during  the  summer  months  and  pass 
into  the  Mediterranean  during  the  winter.  By  these 
two  expedients  the  German  naval  authorities  have  been 
able  to  secure  about  25  per  cent,  of  the  German  per- 
sonnel on  what  passes  in  Germany  for  a  long-service 
system.  The  boy  volunteers  and  the  conscripts  who 
re-engage  constitute  the  class  from  which  petty  officers 
are  drawn,  and  these  men  are  the  backbone  of  the  naval 
organization  ashore  and  afloat,  and  it  is  to  their  efforts 
that  the  high  standard  of  efficiency  which  Germany's 
Navy  has  attained  may  in  a  large  measure  be  traced. 

Year  by  year,  in  order  to  provide  crews  for  the 
larger   number   of  ships  passed  into   the   fleet,   the 


A  DIFFICULT  PROBLEM  171 

Marine  Office  has  been  compelled  to  increase  the 
number  of  conscripts  required  for  sea  service,  and 
thus  the  task  of  training  the  Navy  has  been  increased 
in  advance  of  the  expansion  of  the  material,  because 
men  must  begin  training  before  their  ships  are  ready 
for  sea.  The  officers  and  petty  officers  have  had  not 
only  to  train  raw  recruits  embarked  to  take  the  place 
of  conscripts  at  the  end  of  their  three  years'  term,  but 
to  find  means  also  of  training  the  additional  recruits 
entered  as  net  additions  to  the  naval  strength.  When 
it  is  added  that  in  1894  the  number  of  officers  and  men 
in  the  Navy  was  less  than  21,000,  whereas  it  is  now 
66,000,  and  under  the  Navy  Act  of  1912  is  to  be  raised 
to  107,000,  some  conception  may  be  formed  of  the 
character  of  the  problem  which  presents  itself,  not 
only  to  the  central  administration  ashore,  but  to 
the  officers  afloat,  intent  upon  attaining  the  highest 
standard  of  efficiency  at  sea.  Admission  of  these 
difficulties  was  made  by  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  in  the 
explanatory  Memorandum  which  accompanied  the 
last  Navy  Bill  presented  to  the  Reichstag  and  which 
directed  attention  to  "  two  serious  defects "  in  the 
organization  of  the  fleet : 

"The  one  defect  consists  in  the  fact  that  in  the 
autumn  of  every  year  the  time-expired  men — i.e.^ 
almost  one-third  of  the  crew  in  all  ships  of  the  battle 
fleet,  are  discharged  and  replaced  mainly  by  recruits 
from  the  inland  population.  Owing  to  this,  the  readi- 
ness of  the  battle  fleet  for  war  is  considerably  impaired 
for  a  prolonged  period." 

When  it  is  recalled  that  the  maritime  population  of 
Germany  amounts  only  to  80,000,  and  that  compulsory 
service  in  the  active  fleet  lasts  for  only  three  years,  it 
will  be  realized  that  most  of  the  recruits  taken  for  the 
German  Navy  must  necessarily  be  landsmen.  The 
personnel  in  191 2  numbered  roughly  over  50,000,  after 
deducting  from  the  total  the  executive  officers,  en- 
gineers, cadets,  and  volunteers.  If  approximately  13,000 


1/2    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

of  these  are  regarded  as  long-service  men  there  remain 
roughly  37,500  conscripts,  one-third  of  whom  pass 
annually  into  the  Reserve,  and  are  replaced  by  raw 
hands.  Under  the  new  Navy  Law  it  is  intended  to 
strengthen  the  personnel  in  the  next  few  years  by  6,400 
annually,  and,  consequently,  if  allowance  is  made  for  a 
certain  number  of  the  net  additions  being  volunteers, 
it  follows  that  the  raw  recruits  to  be  embarked  will 
number  between  18,000  and  19,000  men,  or  about  one- 
third  of  the  total  personnel,  excluding  officers  and  long 
service  ratings.  It  is  proposed  to  utilize  the  third 
squadron  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet  largely  for  training 
purposes,  and  thus  to  raise  the  standard  of  efficiency 
in  the  First  and  Second  Squadrons  by  the  elimination, 
as  far  as  possible,  of  the  raw  recruit.  This  apparently 
is  the  best  expedient  which  has  occurred  to  the  naval 
authorities  in  the  difficulty  in  which  they  are  placed 
by  the  conscriptive  law  which  is  essential  to  the  Army, 
but  is  a  serious  handicap  to  the  Navy — not  only  in 
Germany,  but  in  every  country  on  the  continent  of 
Europe.  While  the  average  period  of  service  in  the 
British  Navy,  including  the  relatively  small  number 
of  five  years'  men  entered  for  short  service,  is  about 
ten  years,  the  average  in  the  German  Fleet  does  not 
amount  to  as  much  as  half  this  period. 

It  is  possible  to  attach  too  much  importance  to  the 
fact  that  the  German  Navy  is  recruited  '*  mainly  by 
recruits  from  the  inland  population."  The  inherited 
sea  habit  counts  for  less  to-day  than  at  any  time  since 
men  attempted  to  navigate  the  seas.  Ships  of  war  have 
become  vast  complicated  boxes  of  machinery,  and  naval 
life  requires  the  exercise  of  qualities  different  from  those 
it  demanded  in  the  sail  era.  Then  brute  courage,  en- 
durance, and  familiarity  with  the  moods  of  the  sea  were 
the  main  attributes  of  sailors,  but  to-day  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  crews  must  be  experts  in  the  handling  of 
complicated  mechanical  appliances.  In  these  cnanged 
conditions  the  compulsory  system  of  education  in 
Germany  has   proved   of  the  greatest   advantage   in 


WORK  AT  HIGH  PRESSURE  173 

providing  recruits  of  a  high  standard  of  intelligence, 
who  probably  acquire  in  six  months  as  complete  a 
familiarity  with  their  work  as  it  would  have  taken 
a  seaman  of  the  old  school  as  many  years  to  attain. 
At  the  same  time,  while  resisting  the  temptation  to 
place  too  great  importance  upon  the  inherited  sea 
habit,  it  would  be  no  less  a  mistake  to  ignore  entirely 
its  influence  upon  naval  efficiency.  Familiarity  breeds 
contempt  for  the  terrors  of  the  sea  and  for  the  horrors 
of  a  naval  action,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  in 
the  hour  of  trial  the  long-service  men  of  the  British 
Navy  will  exhibit  a  moral  standard  when  projec- 
tiles are  falling  fast  and  thick  far  higher  than  that  of 
the  conscript,  A  modern  Dreadnought  is  intended 
to  fire  its  guns  in  broadsides  and  not  in  succession, 
and  when  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  at  one  discharge 
these  guns  will  deliver  on  an  enemy's  ship,  if  they  are 
fired  accurately,  between  five  and  six  tons  of  metal,  it 
will  be  realized  that  at  such  a  moment  the  calibre  of 
men  will  count  more  than  the  calibre  of  guns. 

Let  there  be  no  mistake,  the  German  naval  authori- 
ties realize  the  disadvantages  under  which  they  are 
working  owing  to  the  restrictions  of  the  conscriptive 
law.  When  the  Act  of  1900  was  introduced  the 
Reichstag  was  informed  by  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  in  a 
Memorandum  that  "  as,  even  after  the  projected  in- 
crease has  been  carried  out,  the  number  of  vessels  in 
the  German  Navy  will  still  be  more  or  less  inferior  to 
that  of  other  individual  Great  Powers,  our  endeavours 
must  be  directed  towards  compensating  this  superior- 
ity by  the  individual  training  of  the  crews  and  by 
tactical  training  by  practice  in  large  bodies.  .  .  . 
Economy  as  regards  commissioning  of  vessels  in 
peace  time  means  jeopardizing  the  efficiency  of  the 
fleet  in  case  of  war."  Never  since  navies  existed  have 
a  body  of  officers  and  men  been  worked  at  higher 
pressure  than  those  of  Germany :  drill  never  ceases ; 
no  effort  is  spared  to  obtain  the  last  ounce  of  value 
out  of  every  one  on  board  the  ships.     The  promotion 


174    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

of  officers  rests  with  the  Emperor,  and  he  is  unsparing 
in  his  punishment  of  anything  hke  slackness ;  an 
officer  who  is  not  enthusiastic,  alert,  and  competent, 
stands  no  chance  of  rising  in  rank.  The  German 
Navy  has  no  use  for  anything  but  the  best  which  the 
Empire  can  provide,  and  in  order  that  the  highest 
expression  of  the  esprit  de  corps  which  has  con- 
tributed to  German  influence  on  shore  may  be  in- 
stilled into  the  Navy,  no  officer,  however  influential  or 
brilliant,  can  enter  either  the  executive  or  engineering 
branch  unless,  as  we  have  seen,  his  claims  are  endorsed 
by  all  his  contemporaries  ;  one  black  ball — if  the  term 
may  be  used — is  sufficient  to  disqualify  an  aspirant, 
though  he  may  have  passed  all  the  prescribed  examina- 
tions brilliantly. 

The  German  Navy  is  recognized  as  a  vast  compli- 
cated machine  which  has  to  be  worked  at  the  highest 
pressure,  and  therefore  no  sand  must  impede  the 
engine  nor  salt  water  get  into  the  boiler ;  everything 
must  be  made  to  go  smoothly  and  quickly ;  so  far  as 
it  can  be  eliminated,  there  must  be  no  distraction.  It 
may  be  that  the  officers  and  men  are  being  submitted  to 
a  regime  which  is  inimical  to  their  staying  power,  that 
their  endurance  is  being  unduly  tested,  and  their 
nerves  kept  too  continuously  on  the  strain.  This  may 
be  so,  but  the  German  naval  authorities  have  in  view 
a  kind  of  war  different  from  any  which  has  hitherto 
been  known.  It  is  not  to  be  a  long-drawn-out 
contest  in  which  patient  courage,  sturdy  tenacity  of 
purpose,  and  incapacity  to  recognize  defeat  can 
triumph  after  months  or  years  of  hostilities.  The 
German  Fleet  is  intended  to  be  used — if  used  at  all — 
like  a  thunderbolt.  The  whole  record  of  its  evolution 
and  training  confirms  this  conclusion,  and  we  have 
notable  confirmation  of  this  view  in  the  series  of 
'  notes "  by  two  Spanish  officers  already  quoted. 
They  have  written  as  follows  : 

"The  German  Navy  has  a  definite  and  immediate 
objective ;  everything  must  be   prepared  for  a  rapid, 


GERMANY'S  NAVAL  AIMS  175 

energetic  and  decisive  action.  Her  ships,  equipped  by 
her  national  industry,  rich  in  resource  of  every  kind, 
provided  with  war  material  of  the  highest  efficiency, 
must  be  ready  to  dart  at  a  given  moment  against  an 
enemy  whose  fleet  awaits  them  almost  at  the  mouth  of 
the  German  ports.  The  first  encounter,  fierce  and 
terrible,  will  decide  the  campaign,  and  will  influence 
the  future  of  both  nations.  The  partial  actions,  the  long 
blockades,  the  prolonged  manoeuvres  of  fleets,  which 
require  such  seamanship,  such  skill  in  the  personnel, 
will  necessarily  be  eliminated  in  the  future  war.  All 
that  is  required  is  men  of  action,  with  the  determina- 
tion to  win  in  one  day  of  supreme  and  fierce  struggle." 

The  ideal  of  the  German  naval  authorities  somewhat 
resembles  that  of  the  American  manufacturer.  The 
latter  does  not  attempt  to  produce  an  article  which 
will  last  a  lifetime,  because  he  foresees  that  in  a  few 
years  inventive  genius  will  have  produced  something 
better.  He  provides  a  motor-car,  locomotive,  or 
stationary  engine  which  will  run  well  and  do  good 
w^ork  for  a  reasonable  time,  and  he  sells  it  at  a  price 
which  justifies  the  owner  in  scrapping  it  directly  a 
better  article  is  available  representing  a  gain  in  power 
or  speed.  So  the  German  naval  authorities  are  intent 
on  creating  an  instrument  which  will  look  well  on 
paper  when  tons  and  guns  are  compared,  and  thus 
achieve  a  diplomatic  objective,  and  which  will  be 
trained  to  the  highest  pitch  of  efficiency  for  a  sudden 
coup,  representing  a  triumph  over  the  disadvantageous 
conditions  traceable  to  the  law  of  conscription ;  but  it 
will  never  be  the  kind  of  fleet  which  St.  Vincent 
fashioned  and  w^hich  maintained  the  blockade  for  month 
on  month  off'  the  French  coast  and  still  preserved  un- 
diminished its  ability  to  go  in  and  win  whenever  battle 
offered.  Also  it  will  not  be  the  kind  of  fleet  which 
British  officers,  faithful  to  their  inherited  traditions, 
still  desire  to  preserve — a  body  of  well-manned  ships 
which  can  go  anywhere  and  do  anything,  whether  the 
service  be  short  and  sharp,  or  whether  it  be  a  Jong  and 
wearisome  task. 


176    GERMAN  SHIPS,  OFFICERS,  AND  MEN 

Germany  is  creating  a  navy  as  a  powerful  political 
instrument  which  at  a  favourable  moment  and  in  an 
instant  can  exert  its  maximum  power.  The  German 
Fleet  has  its  limitations,  but  within  those  limitations  it 
probably  has  no  superior  in  the  world :  the  ships  are 
well  built,  the  officers  are  capable  sailors,  and  the  men 
are  raised  to  the  highest  pitch  of  efficiency  possible 
under  a  short-service  system. 


CHAPTER  VII 

WILLIAM  n.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

The  German  Fleet  as  it  is  to-day,  and  as  it  will  be 
when  its  statutory  establishment  has  been  reached, 
may  be  regarded  as  the  work  of  two  men — the  Em- 
peror William  II.  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz ;  and  in  the 
present  chapter  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  allot  to 
each  his  due  share  of  credit  for  their  joint  achieve- 
ment. The  task  is  by  no  means  an  easy  one,  and  in 
the  present  generation  it  cannot  be  performed  with 
more  than  an  approximation  to  accuracy.  It  must  be 
left  to  the  historian  of  a  distant  future,  with  access  to 
State  archives  and  the  epistolary  confidences  of  Ger- 
man statesmen  now  living,  to  tell  the  full  and  authentic 
story  of  this,  as  of  all  other  episodes,  of  the  reign  of 
William  II. 

Even  for  those  who  have  lived  long  in  Germany,  it 
is  difficult  to  form  a  judgment  as  to  the  aims  and 
motives  of  the  Emperor  William's  naval  policy,  and  of 
the  part  which  he  has  played  in  its  carrying  out.  With 
regard  to  their  sovereign,  Germans  are  inclined  to  fly 
to  one  of  two  extremes  ;  according  to  the  class  to  which 
they  belong,  they  represent  him  either  as  a  heaven- 
born  genius  of  universal  gifts,  or  as  a  busybody  whose 
meddlesomeness  is  rendered  specially  mischievous  by 
medieval  delusions  as  to  the  functions  of  monarchs 
and  their  relations  to  the  Deity.  Everything  that  he 
does  or  says  is  set  down  as  quite  right  by  the  one 
party  and  as  quite  wrong  by  the  other.  Moreover,  the 
opinions  of  those  brought  into   closest  contact  with 

177  12 


i;8    WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

him  are  vitiated  by  the  prevalence  of  a  type  of  syco- 
phancy which  is  fortunately  becoming  extinct  in  other 
countries.  As  all  offices,  high  and  low,  in  the  Empire 
and  in  Prussia  are  dependent,  directly  or  indirectly, 
on  the  Emperor's  will,  and  as  he  intervenes  in  all  the 
details  of  the  public  administration,  it  is  inevitable 
that  the  desire  to  deserve  his  favour  should  be  the 
predominant  motive  in  the  minds  of  the  servants  oi 
the  State.  And,  rightly  or  wrongly,  the  idea  obtains 
that  an  attitude  of  unqualified  and  unquestioning- 
adulation  is  the  surest  means  of  finding  the  way  into 
his  good  graces.  Over  the  unofficial  sections  of  his 
subjects  he  exercises  a  similar  influence  as  the  foun- 
tain of  all  honour.  The  German  is  vain,  and  delights 
even  more  than  other  men  in  decorations,  ranks,  and 
titles.  And  by  the  infinite  multiplication  of  these 
petty  prizes  of  life  which  has  taken  place  during  his 
reign,  the  Emperor  has  been  ministering  to  a  popular 
appetite.  Members  of  all  professions  and  occupations, 
artists,  authors,  and  musicians,  ministers  of  religion, 
doctors,  lawyers,  and  engineers,  captains  of  industry, 
commerce,  and  finance,  compete  with  one  another 
eagerly  for  a  share  in  the  annual  largesse  of  titles, 
decorations,  and  patents  of  nobility,  and  their  judg- 
ment with  regard  to  the  giver  of  the  feast  is  perverted 
by  either  the  anticipation  or  the  enjoyment  of  its 
pleasures.  It  is  true  that  this  evil  also  exists  in  other 
countries,  but  nowhere  else  has  it  assumed  such  dimen- 
sions as  in  Germany,  for  it  is  there  alone  that  a  single 
individual  endeavours  to  direct  every  force  of  the 
national  life  along  the  channels  of  his  own  convictions 
and  tastes.  On  the  other  hand,  disgust  at  the  fulsome 
flattery  of  the  people  who  flock  round  the  throne  and 
prostrate  themselves  before  it  has  excited  a  reaction 
in  the  minds  of  those  to  whom  even  the  Emperor  is 
but  a  man  to  be  measured  by  human  standards,  and 
has  prevented  them,  in  their  turn,  from  forming  a  just 
opinion  of  his  actions.  Little  wonder  if  it  is  well-nigh 
impossible,   in  the    confused   picture    resulting  from 


THE  GERMAN  EMPEROR'S  POLICY        179 

these   discordant   colours,  to  discern  the  true   linea- 
ments of  its  subject. 

For  the  foreigner,  the  task  is  further  complicated  by 
an  apparent  incongruity  between  the  Emperor's  own 
opinions  and  actions,  which  it  has  been  urged  can  be 
accounted  for  only  by  the  theory  of  deliberate  duplicity. 
Throughout  his  reign  he  has  repeatedly  protested  his 
friendship  for  Great  Britain,  and  his  wish  to  live  on 
terms  of  peace  and  amity  with  her,  but  at  the  same 
time  he  has,  just  as  consistently,  followed  a  line  of 
policy  which  is  admittedly  a  challenge  to  her  position 
in  the  world,  and  can  legitimately  be  construed  as  a 
direct  menace  to  her  very  existence.  The  apparent 
contradiction  can,  perhaps,  best  be  explained  by  taking 
his  words,  or  at  any  rate  some  of  them,  at  their  face 
value,  and  considering  them  in  relation  to  his  responsi- 
bilities as  the  head  of  the  German  Empire,  and  to  certain 
marked  traits  in  his  character.  It  is  his  obvious  duty 
as  German  Emperor  to  do  what  lies  in  his  power 
to  fortify  his  country  against  attack,  and  to  claim  for 
it  in  the  world  the  place  to  which  he  believes  it  to 
have  entitled  itself  by  its  great  military  record  and  by 
its  wonderful  achievements  in  science,  art,  and  industry. 
Though  he  has  been  more  communicative  than  any 
monarch  of  modern,  and  perhaps  of  any  other,  times, 
his  position  has  naturally  prevented  him  from  explain- 
ing his  point  of  view  as  to  his  country's  deserts  and 
aspirations,  but  we  shall  be  able  to  form  some  idea  of 
it  if  we  examine  the  opinions  of  those  of  his  people 
who  are  animated  by  the  sentiments  which  we  call 
"  national  pride "  in  ourselves,  but  are  apt  to  call 
"  national  vanity  "  in  others. 

The  patriotic  German,  who  is  familiar  with  his 
country's  history,  knows  that,  five  or  six  hundred 
years  ago,  his  forefathers  monopohzed  the  markets  and 
policed  the  seas  of  Northern  and  Western  Europe. 
He  realizes  keenly  that  Germany's  maritime  and  in- 
dustrial progress  was  first  checked,  and  then  retarded 
for  centuries,  by  political  division  and  internecine  and 


i8o   WILLIAM  11.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

foreign  wars.  Possibly  he  still  remembers  that  great 
crescendo  of  victory  in  which  Prussia  smothered 
Denmark,  then  overthrew  Austria  in  a  single  battle, 
and  finally,  at  the  head  of  the  kindred  Teutonic  States, 
humbled  France  in  the  dust,  and  welded  Germany 
together  in  one  indivisible  whole.  Even  if  he  does 
not  remember  it  as  part  of  his  own  personal  experience, 
all  its  vivid  and  stimulating  episodes  have  been  a 
thousand  times  impressed  upon  his  mind  by  school- 
master, politician,  historian,  and  journalist.  That  after 
this  tremendous  martial  achievement  he  should  regard 
his  country  as  the  mistress  of  the  continent  of  Europe 
is  no  matter  for  surprise.  But  he  sees,  too,  that  the 
Germany  of  Luther  and  Goethe,  of  Ranke,  Liebig, 
Helmholz,  and  Mommsen,  of  Bismarck  and  Moltke, 
has  become  also  the  Germany  of  Krupp,  Siemens, 
Rathenau,  Ballin,  and  Gvvdnner ;  that  the  products  of 
German  industry,  the  fruits  of  an  unexampled  applica- 
tion of  the  discoveries  of  science  to  the  processes 
of  manufacture,  have  been  carried  by  German  ships 
to  the  remotest  ends  of  the  earth ;  that  the  material 
prosperit}^  of  his  country  is  advancing  in  every  direc- 
tion by  leaps  and  bounds.  And  he  thus  believes 
Germany  to  be  strong,  wise,  and  wealthy,  and  in 
every  way  fitted  to  stand  at  the  head  of  mankind. 
But  in  one  respect  he  feels,  to  his  bitter  mortification, 
that  she  is  powerless.  Wherever  he  goes  on  the 
world's  oceans,  he  is  confronted  by  those  iron  walls 
of  Great  Britain,  which  mean  that  he  is  there  only  by 
the  sufferance  of  one  who  is  immeasurably  stronger 
than  himself  With  one  nation  he  recognizes  with 
chagrin  that  he  cannot  afford  to  quarrel,  for  by  doing 
so  he  would  expose  his  floating  merchandise  and  his 
colonies  to  certain  loss,  and  his  home  industry  to  the 
paralysis  that  would  inevitably  follow  upon  the  closing 
of  the  routes  along  which  it  exchanges  its  finished 
products  for  the  exotic  raw  materials  indispensable  to 
its  existence.  And  these  facts  are  all  the  more  galling 
to  him  because  he  regards  them  as  resulting  from  the 


THE  GERMAN  OUTLOOK  i8i 

accidents,  and  not  from  the  intrinsic  nature  of  things. 
For  he  is  convinced  that  his  country  has  the  men  and 
the  money,  and  could  soon  be  in  a  position  to  build 
and  arm  the  ships  as  easily,  as  quickly,  and  as  well  as 
any  other  State.  That  any  substantial  improvement 
of  Germany's  position  in  this  respect  would  endanger, 
not  merely  the  prosperity,  or  the  development,  or  the 
prestige,  but  also  the  very  existence  of  Great  Britain, 
is  a  consideration  which  we  cannot  ask  him  to  take 
into  his  calculations.  He  cannot  be  expected  to  regard 
even  the  existence  of  another  State  as  a  legitimate  bar 
to  the  gratification  of  his  ambitions,  especially  if  he  is 
convinced  that  that  other  State  occupies  the  place 
which,  by  moral  right,  belongs  to  his  own  country. 

No  doubt  he  could  not,  and  would  not,  cherish  such 
ambitions  if  it  had  been  made  clear  to  him  that  they 
could  never  be  realized,  that  no  efforts  on  the  part  of 
Germany  could  materially  alter  the  balance  of  sea- 
power  to  her  advantage  as  against  Great  Britain,  and 
that  she  would  be  compelled  to  fight  for  her  preten- 
sions long  before  she  was  in  a  position  to  give  battle 
on  anything  like  equal  terms.  Unfortunately  this  has 
not  been  made  clear  to  him.  On  the  contrary,  he 
knows  that  a  very  great  change  to  his  country's 
advantage  has  already  taken  place  in  the  relationship 
of  the  Fleet  of  Germany  to  that  of  Great  Britain,  and 
he  sees  no  reason  why  the  process  should  not  be 
indefinitely  continued.  He  is  persuaded  that  Germany 
will  soon  be  rich  enough  to  spend  as  much  on  her 
fleet  as  Great  Britain  does,  and  in  manning  it  will 
have  an  enormous  advantage  in  the  inexhaustible 
resources  of  conscription  among  a  population  of  eighty 
or  ninety  millions.  He  further  believes  that  the 
British  nation  is  unnerved  and  effete,  that  it  is  losing 
both  its  martial  and  industrial  vigour,  that  its  energies 
have  been  sapped  by  too  much  wealth  and  prosperity, 
and  that  it  is  rapidly  following  the  downward  path. 
Finally,  he  is  convinced  that  the  British  Parliament, 
under  the  influence  of  an  aggressive  democracy,  exclu- 


i82    WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

sively  concerned  with  its  own  immediate  material 
needs,  is  losing  the  capacity  to  realize  and  grapple  with 
the  larger  problems  of  international  politics,  and  that 
the  Cabinets  proceeding  from  it  will,  in  timorous 
anxiety,  procrastinate  and  vacillate  till  it  is  too  late 
to  strike.  In  this  idea  he  has  been  only  confirmed  by 
the  pacifist  movement  in  Great  Britain,  by  the  British 
agitation  for  disarmament  by  international  agreement, 
and  by  the  well-meant  but  unfortunate  attempt  of 
Sir  Henr}^  Campbell-Bannerman  to  effect  by  example 
what  much  amiable  precept  had  done  nothing  to 
accomplish.  These  phenomena  he  looks  upon  not  as 
evidence  of  good-will  and  peaceableness,  but  as  symp- 
toms of  physical,  moral,  and  financial  exhaustion. 

Such  is  the  view  of  many  in  Germany  to  whom  we 
cannot  fairly  deny  the  name  of  "  patriot "  if  we  are  to 
claim  it  for  an  analogous  disposition  among  ourselves. 
It  is  the  view  that  is  almost  universally  held  by  the 
officers  of  the  German  Army  and  Navy,  and,  with 
certain  qualifications  and  reservations,  it  may  be  said 
to  be  the  view  of  the  Emperor  William.  This  will  be 
evident  if,  with  the  help  of  his  many  spoken  and  written 
utterances,  we  attempt  to  follow  the  main  lines  which, 
with  many  sudden  and  violent  deviations,  his  thought 
has  taken  on  this  subject.  He  has,  for  example,  in 
his  speeches  repeatedly  dwelt  on  the  power  and 
renown  of  the  Hanse  League — "one  of  the  mightiest 
undertakings  that  the  world  has  ever  seen,"  which 
''was  able  to  raise  fleets  such  as  the  broad  back  of  the 
sea  had  probably  never  borne  up  to  that  time,"  which 
"  won  such  high  prestige  for  the  German  name  abroad," 
which  "created  markets  for  the  German  industrial 
regions,"  and  which  "only  failed  because  it  lacked  the 
support  of  a  strong  united  Empire  obedient  to  a  single 
will."  At  Hamburg,  in  June,  191 1,  he  used  these 
words:  "I  have  only  acted  historically,  for  I  said  to 
myself  on  my  accession,  that  the  tasks  which  the 
Hansa  attempted  to  solve  by  itself,  and  which  it  could 
not  solve  because  the  strong  Empire  was  not  at  its 


"OUR  FUTURE  LIES  ON  THE  WATER"     183 

back,  and  the  defensive  and  executive  power  of  the 
Empire  did  not  exist,  must  unquestionably  at  once  fall 
on  the  shoulders  of  the  newly-arisen  German  Empire; 
and  it  was  simply  the  obligations  of  old  traditions 
that  had  to  be  resumed."  It  was  in  one  former  Hanse 
town  that  the  Emperor  spoke  the  familiar  words,  "  Our 
future  lies  on  the  water;"  in  another  that  he  declared 
"The  trident  should  be  in  our  hand;"  in  a  third  that 
he  uttered  the  appeal,  "  We  have  bitter  need  of  a  strong 
German  Fleet." 

Again,  he  has  repeatedly  extolled  the  Great  Elector 
— "  the  one  among  my  ancestors  for  whom  I  have  the 
most  enthusiasm,  who  has  from  my  earliest  youth 
shone  before  me  as  a  bright  example,"  who,  "looking 
far  ahead,  carried  on  politics  on  a  large  scale,  as  they 
are  carried  on  to-day."  In  his  great  speech  at  Bremen 
in  T905,  the  Emperor  said:  "  When  as  a  youth  I  stood 
before  the  model  of  Brommy's  ship,  I  felt  with  burning 
indignation  the  outrage  that  was  then  done  to  our  fleet 
and  our  flag ;"  and  these  words  undoubtedly  referred 
to  the  injudiciously-phrased  note  in  which  Palmerston 
threatened  that  vessels  which  undertook  belligerent 
operations  under  the  colours  of  that  greater  German 
Empire,  which  then  was  not  and  was  never  to  be, 
would  render  themselves  liable  to  be  treated  as 
"pirates."  The  present  realities  of  sea-power  had 
been  early  revealed  to  him  when,  as  he  told  the 
officers  on  board  a  British  flag-ship  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, he  "was  running  about  Portsmouth  Dock- 
yard as  a  boy;"  and,  as  he  said  in  a  speech  made 
during  the  visit  of  King  Edward  to  Kiel  in  1904,  "the 
stupendous  activity  on  the  sea  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  greatest  navy  of  the  world  impressed  itself 
indelibly  on  his  youthful  mind,"  and  made  him,  "as 
Regent,  endeavour  to  realize  on  a  scale  corresponding 
to  the  conditions  of  his  country  what  he  had  seen  as  a 
young  man  in  England." 

From  such  reflections,  and  from  the  imposing  facts 
of  Germany's  recent  development,  arose  the  dream  of 


i84    WILLIAM  IL  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

world-empire  which  William  II.  sketched  out  in  the 
Bremen  speech  already  referred  to.  But  perhaps 
this  very  speech  furnishes  the  key  to  the  riddle  which 
his  pohcy  presents,  for  in  it  he  declared  with  emphasis 
that  his  vision  was  one  of  pacific  and  not  of  warlike 
conquests.  After  using  the  significant  words,  "  We 
are  the  salt  of  the  earth,"  he  said  : 

"As  the  result  of  my  reading  of  history,  I  have 
pledged  myself  never  to  strive  after  an  empty  world- 
rule.  For  what  has  become  of  the  so-called  world- 
empires?  Alexander  the  Great,  Napoleon,  all  the 
great  heroes  of  war  swam  in  blood,  and  left  behind 
them  subjugated  nations  which  rose  on  the  first 
opportunity  and  brought  their  empires  to  ruin.  The 
world-empire  that  I  have  dreamed  of  would  consist  in 
this,  that,  above  all,  the  newly-created  German  Empire 
should  on  every  side  enjoy  the  most  absolute  confidence 
as  a  tranquil,  honourable,  peaceable  neighbour,  and  that 
if  history  should  one  day  tell  of  a  German  world- 
empire,  or  of  a  Hohenzollern  world-rule,  it  should  not 
have  been  based  on  conquests  with  the  sword,  but  on 
the  mutual  trust  of  nations  striving  towards  the  same 
goal." 

Of  all  the  innumerable  speeches  of  the  Emperor 
William,  there  is  perhaps  none  that  throws  more  light 
than  this  upon  the  motives  of  his  policy.  If  it  is 
regarded  as  a  sincere  expression  of  the  speaker's 
feelings,  it  disposes  entirely  of  the  idea  that  his  fleet 
is  being  built  with  the  deliberate  intention  of  attacking 
Great  Britain  and  opening  the  way  to  her  shores  for 
the  hordes  of  the  German  Army.  And  those  who  have 
studied  with  care  the  Emperor's  words  and  deeds  will 
hardly  doubt  its  sincerity.  It  is  quite  true  that  among 
his  utterances  are  to  be  found  many  explosions  of  a 
bellicose  and  minatory  type,  but  if  ail  their  circum- 
stances are  examined,  it  will  be  seen  that  they  can 
easily  be  explained  by  a  histrionic  sensitiveness  to  the 
incidents  and  environment  of  the  moment  and  an 
impulsive  reaction  to  passing  impressions,  which  are 
among  the  traits  as  to  the  existence  of  which  in  the 


THE  EMPEROR  AND  ENGLAND    185 

character  of  William  II.  both  his  panegyrists  and  his 
critics  are  agreed.  To  those  who  have  looked  beneath 
the  surface  of  German  national  life,  it  is,  too,  no  secret 
that  the  Emperor's  most  inveterate  and  dangerous 
opponents  are  the  rampant  Chauvinists  who,  intoxi- 
cated by  the  exuberance  of  their  own  patriotism,  are 
for  ever  calling  on  him  to  pick  up  an  imaginary  gauntlet, 
and  who  criticize  him  with  great  asperity  on  the  ground 
that  he  carries  his  love  of  peace  to  excess  and  sacrifices 
Germany's  interests  and  honour  rather  than  draw  the 
sword  in  their  defence. 

The  theory  so  frequently  advanced  that  the  character 
of  William  II.  is  of  a  Machiavellian  quality,  that  he  is 
inspired  by  hostility  to  Great  Britain  and  a  determina- 
tion to  destroy  her,  and  that  his  assurances  to  the 
contrary  are  merely  designed  to  lull  her  into  a  false 
sense  of  security  till  he  is  ready  to  strike  a  fatal  blow 
at  her  heart,  is,  in  fact,  absolutely  untenable.  The 
Emperor  is  essentially  a  man  of  warm  impulse  and 
frank  utterance,  and  his  professions  of  liking  for 
England  and  the  English  are  undoubtedly  perfectly 
sincere.  He  is  exceedingly  impressionable,  especially 
to  appreciation  of  his  own  merits,  and  it  is  quite  certain 
that  he  has  been  deeply  touched  by  the  enthusiasm 
with  which  he  has  been  welcomed  in  the  streets  of 
London,  and  not  a  little  puzzled  how  to  reconcile  it 
with  the  supposed  political  antipathy  of  Great  Britain 
towards  Germany.  The  free  and  unconstrained  at- 
mosphere of  English  social  life  also  appeals  strongly  to 
a  side  of  his  nature  which  he  may  not  so  easily  indulge 
in  his  own  country,  where  he  can  never  quite  forget 
that  he  is  the  Sovereign,  to  whom  none  can  speak  on 
equal  terms  and  with  an  open  mind.  In  England,  on 
the  contrary,  he  can  feel  that  he  is  a  man  among  men, 
and  consequently  enjoy  in  all  its  fulness  that  spon- 
taneous and  unfettered  social  intercourse  for  which 
he  often  craves. 

In  his  admission  of  the  debt  which  the  German  Navy 
owes  to  its  elder  British  sister,  the  Emperor  has  been 


i86    WILLIAM  11.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

frank  and  generous.  "  Not  only,"  he  said  at  a  luncheon 
given  to  the  Duke  of  Edinburgh  at  Berlin,  "is  the  English 
Navy  a  model  for  the  German  from  the  technical  and 
scientific  standpoints,  but  the  heroes  of  the  British 
Fleet,  Nelson  and  the  rest  of  them,  have  always  been, 
and  w^ill  always  be,  the  guiding  stars  for  the  officers 
and  crews  of  the  German  Navy."  And  again,  on  board 
the  Royal  Sovereign,  he  said  :  "  Ever  since  our  fleet  has 
existed  we  have  always  striven  to  form  our  ideas  on 
yours,  and  to  learn  from  you  in  every  way."  This  is 
assuredly  not  the  language  of  env}^,  hatred,  and  malice, 
and  if  such  sentiments  have  played  a  part  in  German 
naval  policy — as  they  undoubtedly  have — they  are  at 
any  rate  not  to  be  sought  in  the  mind  of  the  Emperor 
William. 

No  doubt  the  words  quoted  above  seem  out  of 
harmony  with  the  Emperor's  expressed  hope  some 
day  to  control  a  fleet  "which  will  be  as  powerful  an 
instrument  for  the  German  Empire  as  my  ancestors 
on  the  Prussian  throne  possessed  in  the  Army,"  and 
thus  to  be  able  to  "  dictate  peace  on  the  seas  also." 
But  it  is  evidently  the  deep  sense  of  the  pacific  nature 
of  his  own  plans  which  prevents  him  from  realizing 
that  Germany  can  dictate  peace  upon  the  seas  only 
when  the  British  Empire  has  ceased  to  exist,  and  in 
all  probability  his  mind  is  so  completely  devoid  of  all 
aggressive  or  violent  designs  that  he  is  unable  to 
understand  the  suspicions  with  which  his  naval  policy 
is  regarded.  This  hypothesis  will  be  received  wath 
incredulity  only  by  those  who  have  not  recognized 
the  defects  as  well  as  the  qualities  of  the  Emperor's 
intellectual  apparatus.  His  mind  is  one  which  leaps 
boldly  at  its  final  goal  over  all  intervening  stages  and 
obstacles.  It  sees  ends  and  ignores  means;  it  revels 
in  grand  spectacular  effects,  and  does  not  trouble  itself 
with  the  detailed  work  by  which  alone  they  can  be 
attained;  it  loses  itself  in  dazzling  ideals,  and  is 
oblivious  of  the  difficulties  that  stand  in  the  way  of 
their   realization ;   it   chafes   under  restraint,   and    is 


IDEALS  AND  POLICY  187 

heedless  of  that  rule  of  consistency  which,  in  defiance 
of  the  law  of  human  nature,  public  opinion  attempts 
to  impose  on  statesmen  and  politicians.  Above  all, 
it  reacts  instantly  and  irresistibly  to  the  impressions 
of  the  moment.  It  is  these  qualities  which  make 
William  II.  at  once  the  most  charming  of  conversa- 
tionalists and  the  most  incalculable  of  monarchs. 

The  record  of  the  Emperor  is  full  of  sayings  of  which 
it  is  impossible  to  believe  he  realized  the  full  bearing 
when  he  spoke  them.  When  he  called  the  nations  of 
Europe  to  "defend  their  most  sacred  possessions" 
against  the  power  of  heathendom  that  was  arising  in 
the  Far  East,  and  when  he  promised  "  the  three  hundred 
million  Mohammedans  living  on  the  earth "  that  he 
would  "always  be  their  friend,"  he  cannot  have  fully 
realized  that  he  was  threatening  one  set  of  peoples 
and  encouraging  another  to  extravagant  and  unfulfill- 
able  hopes.  Similarly,  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that 
he  had  thoroughly  considered  the  significance  of  his 
words  when  he  spoke  of  dictating  peace  upon  the  seas. 
What  the  Emperor  expresses  by  such  utterances  are 
ideals,  not  fixed  aims  of  policy;  visions,  not  the  cal- 
culated expectations  of  statesmanship ;  speculations, 
not  positive  predictions.  Other  monarchs  and  states- 
men cherish  such  ideals,  see  such  visions,  and  indulge 
in  such  speculations,  but  they  diff'er  from  the  German 
Emperor  in  this — that  they  say  nothing  about  them  in 
public.  William  II.  is  exceptional  in  allowing  us  to 
see  so  much  of  the  workings  of  his  mind,  and  if  we 
employed  in  his  case  the  standard  usually  applied  to 
the  words  of  monarchs,  we  should  be  doing  him  an 
injustice.  That  he  permanently  and  steadily  desires 
Germany  to  have  a  powerful  fleet  and  to  be  immune 
to  attack  from  the  sea,  that  he  dreams  of  a  day  when 
she  shall  be  supreme  in  the  council  of  the  nations,  is 
indubitable  and  not  unnatural ;  but  just  as  certain  is  it 
that  he,  personally,  has  no  aggressive  designs  against 
any  of  his  neighbours,  that  he  regards  his  fleet  as  an 
instrument  of  peace,  and  that  the  destiny  he  wishes 


i88    WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

Germany  to  fulfil  is  that  of  leading  the  world  in  art 
and  science,  industry  and  commerce,  not  that  of  over- 
running it  with  the  violence  of  armed  hosts. 

How  far  the  Emperor  has  helped  to  realize  his  own 
naval  ambitions,  and  how  far  his  efforts  have  actually 
told  against  them,  it  is  also  very  difficult  to  determine 
with  anything  like  exactitude.  His  agitation  for  a 
bigger  fleet  has  been  open  and  unwearying,  and  out- 
side Germany  the  idea  is  very  prevalent  that  he  not 
only  contrived  the  naval  policy  of  the  Empire,  but 
also,  almost  single-handed,  generated  the  degree  of 
popular  support  without  which  it  could  not  have  been 
carried  out.  This  idea  will  be  seen  to  be  erroneous. 
The  Emperor's  influence  upon  his  own  people  is  very 
greatly  overrated  in  other  countries,  and  even  the 
crisis  of  1908,  in  which  the  storm  of  discontent  which 
had  long  been  gathering  burst  with  full  force  upon  his 
head,  does  not  seem  to  have  been  properly  understood 
outside  Germany.  On  that  occasion,  the  Imperial 
Parliament  listened  without  a  protest,  without  a 
murmur,  as  a  Liberal  deputy,  slowly,  deliberately,  and 
with  dramatic  emphasis,  spoke  the  following  words : 
**  In  the  German  Reichstag  not  a  single  member  has 
come  forward  to  defend  the  actions  of  the  German 
Emperor."  The  incident  was  without  a  parallel  in  the 
history  of  parliaments.  Even  the  Conservative  party, 
which  has  always  gloried  in  being  the  chief  prop  of 
the  throne,  passed  and  published  a  resolution  express- 
ing the  wish  that  the  Emperor  should  "  in  future 
exercise  a  greater  reserve  in  his  utterances,"  and 
declaring  that  "  arrangements  must  be  made  to  pre- 
vent with  certainty  a  recurrence  of  such  improper 
proceedings."  It  may  be  remarked,  in  passing,  that 
this  blow  fell  upon  William  II.  because  he  had  con- 
fessed to  having  had  Anglophile  sentiments,  and  to 
having  performed  friendly  services  to  Great  Britain,  at 
a  time  when  the  general  feeling  of  the  German  people 
was  one  of  hostility  to  this  country.  Nor  was  it  with- 
out significance  that  when,  after  holding  aloof  from 


EFFECTS  OF  PERSONAL  RULE  189 

public  affairs  for  several  weeks,  he  at  last  emerged 
from  the  solitude  of  his  palace  at  Potsdam,  it  was  in 
England  that  he  sought  the  recuperation  and  rest  of 
which  he  stood  in  need. 

As  the  debate  in  the  Reichstag  on  the  Daily  Telegraph 
interview  unmistakably  showed,  the  Emperor  at  that 
time  had  the  whole  of  his  subjects  against  him  in  a 
solid  body.  But  that  would  have  been  impossible  if 
the  interview  had  been  merely  a  single  isolated  in- 
cident. It  was,  in  fact,  the  culmination  of  a  long- 
period  of  accumulating  resentment  and  opposition. 
William  L,  then  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  fled  to 
England  in  1848  to  escape  the  wrath  of  the  populace  : 
but  he  lived  to  concentrate  on  his  person  a  hoard  of 
personal  popularity  such  as  had,  perhaps,  never  before 
fortified  a  monarch's  throne.  Only  a  few  months  after 
his  grandson's  accession,  this  inestimable  treasure  was 
already  being  rapidly  dissipated.  The  causes  of  the 
change  are  not  far  to  seek.  All  Germany  realized  that 
under  the  first  Emperor  it  was  Bismarck  who  really 
governed,  and  whatever  there  was  of  opposition  or 
political  discontent  in  the  country  was  directed  against 
the  Minister  alone.  From  the  outset,  William  II.  made 
it  clear  that  he  intended  to  be  his  own  Chancellor,  to 
take  the  initiative  in  all  branches  of  government,  and 
to  extend  his  influence  to  many  departments  of  the 
national  life  which  had  hitherto  been  regarded  as  lying 
outside  the  competence  of  the  monarch.  As  he  claimed 
for  himself  the  credit,  so  he  became  the  target  for 
the  criticism,  of  everything  done  in  his  name,  and  his 
intrusion  into  the  realms  of  theology,  art,  music, 
literature,  and  the  drama  conjured  up  for  him  many 
opponents  who  would  never  have  troubled  themselves 
one  way  or  the  other  about  his  specifically  political 
theories  and  actions.  If  he  had  adopted  an  impartial 
attitude  of  general  patronage  towards  all  the  various 
endeavours  of  his  people,  his  intervention  might  have 
had  a  purely  beneficial  and  stimulating  effect.  But  the 
contrary  was  the  case ;   everywhere  he  appeared  on 


190    WILLIAM  11.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

the  scene  as  a  convinced  and  almost  fanatical  partisan, 
and  nothing  could  be  more  indicative  of  the  antagonism 
he  aroused  and  of  the  limitations  of  his  personal  in- 
fluence than  the  fact  that  every  tendency  which  he  has 
denounced  and  opposed,  whether  in  politics,  religion, 
or  the  arts,  has  at  no  other  time  flourished  and 
prospered  in  Germany  as  it  has  precisely  during  his 
reign. 

That  his  unconcealed  determination  to  rule  person- 
ally and  in  all  things,  and  his  openly-avowed  belief  in 
the  divine  origin  and  inspired  character  of  his  office, 
also  aroused  antagonism,  will  have  surprised  few  who 
have  so  much  as  a  superficial  acquaintance  with  the 
German  nation.  The  average  cultured  German  is 
Liberal  in  conviction  and  sceptical  in  habit.  He  is  well 
aware  that  many  of  the  episodes  which  led  to  the 
Hohenzollern  ascendancy  in  Germany  had  little  enough 
of  the  divine  character  in  them,  and,  above  all,  that 
the  one  really  great  Prince  in  the  genealogy  of  his 
ruling  house  was  an  ardent  disciple  of  the  most  icono- 
clastic of  unbelievers.  How  indeed  should  he  reconcile 
the  idea  that  the  family  of  Hohenzollern  has  prospered 
under  the  direct  and  special  protection  of  a  conventional 
Providence,  with  the  fact  that  it  was  the  Voltairian, 
Frederick  the  Great,  who  first  gave  the  dynasty 
oecumenical  importance  ?  Impatience  of  the  Emperor's 
conception  of  his  functions  in  the  State  and  his  position 
in  the  universe  allied  itself  with  many  other  types  of 
dissent  and  discontent  to  form  the  great  German 
Socialist  party.  In  no  direction  has  the  Emperor's 
activity  been  more  strenuous  and  persistent  than  in 
his  efforts  to  eradicate  Socialism,  but  in  no  other 
country,  and  at  no  other  epoch,  has  this  form  of 
political  error  made  such  prodigious  strides  forward 
as  in  Germany  during  his  rule. 

But  the  political  opposition  w^hich  he  has  aroused 
has  not  been  confined  to  the  democratic  elements  in 
the  German  population.  Even  the  Prussian  nobles, 
the  strong  pillars  on  which  the  structure  of  the  Hohen- 


THE  EMPEROR  AND  THE  JUNKERS      191 

zollern  monarchy  rests,  have  more  than  once  faltered 
in   their  allegiance.      They   perhaps   understood    his 
cosmopolitanism  and  universality  less  than  any  other 
class  of  his  people.    Strongly  tinged  with  anti-semitism, 
as  they  are  almost  without  exception,  they  were  at  a 
loss  to  comprehend  his  intimacy  with  Herr  Ballin,  the 
managing  director  of  the  Hamburg-America  Shipping 
Company,  and  other  prominent  Jews  whose  work  is  of 
national  import,  or  whose  wealth  has  assisted  him  in 
carrying  out  his  schemes.     It  is  they,  too,  who  furnish 
the  Officers  Corps  of  the  Army,  which,  ever  jealous  of 
favours  shown  to   the  sister  service,  was  especially 
apprehensive  that  it  might  be  starved  to  provide  money 
for  the  ambitious  naval  projects  which  the  Emperor 
had  made  quite  evident  were  the  principal  preoccupa- 
tions of  his  mind.    With  their  material  interests  resting 
on  an  almost  purely  agrarian  basis,  the  Junkers  were 
also  filled  with  anxiety  when  they  saw  their  Sovereign 
associating  familiarly  with  the  directors  of  banks  and 
industrial   companies,   and   heard   him   dilate   on   the 
importance  of  oversea  trade  in  manufactured  products 
Their  misgivings  were  transformed  into  overt  opposi- 
tion when,  under  the  chancellorship  of  Caprivi,  the  corn 
duties  were  reduced,  and  commercial  treaties  concluded 
which   admitted  agricultural  products  into  Germany 
on    terms    more    favourable    than    those    that    had 
hitherto  prevailed.    It  was  then  that  some,  at  any  rate, 
of  the  Conservatives  openly  threatened  to  ''join  the 
Socialists  in   the   opposition."     Some  years   later,   a 
great  project  to  link  up  the  Rhine  and  the  Elbe  by  a 
system  of  canals  was  submitted  to  the  Prussian  Diet, 
but  the  Conservatives  feared  that  the  proposed  water- 
way would  provide  an  easy  channel  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  foreign  wheat  into  the  heart  of  the  Empire,  and, 
though  the  Emperor  let  it  be  known  that  he  had  the 
scheme  much  at  heart,  the  Bill  was  rejected.     He  is 
understood  to  have  said:  ''None  the  less  it  will  be 
built,"  but  that  was  fifteen  years  ago,  and  the  first  sod 
of  the  canal  has  yet  to  be  cut.     Because  the  Emperor 


192    WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

staked  his  personal  influence  in  favour  of  the  scheme, 
a  certain  amount  of  the  opposition  which  it  engendered 
among  the  most  loyal  section  of  his  people  was  inevit- 
ably directed  against  himself. 

The  dismissal  of  Bismarck  and  the  subsequent 
attempts  of  the  Emperor  to  depreciate  the  life-work 
of  the  man  to  whom  he  owed  the  Imperial  crown, 
were,  of  course,  the  principal  causes  of  the  spirit 
of  opposition  which  flared  up  with  such  startling 
suddenness  in  1908.  The  popularity  of  William  I. 
was  in  no  small  measure  due  to  his  absolute  trust 
and  confidence  in  his  Chancellor,  and  the  abrupt 
ejection  of  this  incomparable  statesman  from  his  office 
will  never  be  forgotten  or  forgiven  till  the  generation  of 
his  contemporaries  has  passed  away. 

These  things  go  far  to  explain  why  it  was  that,  in 
spite  of  the  vigorous  naval  agitation  of  the  Emperor, 
the  German  Fleet,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  Mem- 
orandum attached  to  the  Bill  of  1898,  became  weaker 
instead  of  stronger  during  the  first  ten  years  of  his 
reign.  From  the  day  of  his  accession  he  had  lost  no 
opportunity  of  manifesting  his  interest  in  the  fleet 
and  his  desire  that  it  should  be  largely  increased. 
Among  his  earliest  acts  as  monarch  was  his  un- 
heralded appearance  in  admiral's  uniform  at  a  parlia- 
mentary luncheon  given  by  Bismarck,  to  decorate 
one  of  the  guests  who  had  displayed  sympathies  and 
wishes  with  regard  to  the  Navy  similar  to  his  own. 
Year  after  year,  tables  of  diagrams,  showing  the 
disparity  between  the  fleet  of  Germany  and  those  of 
the  leading  naval  Powers,  and  prepared,  it  is  said,  by 
the  Emperor's  own  hand,  were  sent  out  over  his 
signature  to  the  Reichstag,  the  Government  depart- 
ments, and  all  public  institutions  where  it  was 
thought  they  might  meet  the  gaze  of  appreciative 
eyes.  At  a  soiree  given  at  the  New  Palace  at  Pots- 
dam in  1895,  he  assembled  round  him  a  group  of 
members  of  the  majority  parties  of  the  Reichstag,  and 
lectured  them  for  two-and-a-half  hours  on  Germany's 


A  FAMOUS  IMPERIAL  PICTURE  193 

need  of  sea-power.  Bismarck's  eightieth  birthday  was 
then  approaching,  and  the  Emperor  concluded  his 
remarks  by  urging  upon  his  hearers  that  they  should 
seize  the  opportunity  of  "  doing  the  founder  of  our 
colonial  policy  the  pleasure  of  passing  the  sum 
absolutely  required  for  the  Navy."  A  couple  of 
years  later,  he  delivered  a  similar  address  after  a 
dinner  given  to  members  of  the  Reichstag  by  the 
Finance  Minister,  von  Miquel,  illustrating  his  argu- 
ments with  the  diagrams  of  warships  mentioned 
above.  About  the  same  time,  an  English  illus- 
trated paper  published  a  picture  of  the  foreign  war 
vessels  on  the  East  Asian  station.  Among  them, 
as  the  sole  representative  of  Germany,  was  a 
small  gun-boat,  which,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the 
accompanying  text,  was  "under  sail  only."  Against 
these  words  the  Emperor  wrote,  "  What  mockery 
lies  therein,"  and  the  picture,  with  this  comment,  was 
laid  before  the  Budget  Commission  of  the  Reichstag, 
then  engaged  in  the  discussion  of  the  naval  estimates. 
Moreover,  the  monarch  had  himself  recourse  to  the 
paint-brush,  and  exhibited  in  the  Berlin  Academy  of 
Arts  a  picture  of  an  attack  by  a  flotilla  of  torpedo 
craft  on  a  squadron  of  ironclads.  No  doubt  he 
hoped  in  this  way  to  arouse  sympathy  for  his  ideas  in 
some  who  were  not  accessible  to  the  ordinary  methods 
of  political  persuasion.  The  "  Song  to  Aegir,"  the 
Scandinavian  Neptune,  of  which  he  composed  the 
music,  was  probably  also  intended  to  have  a  similar 
operation. 

But  all  these  pleas  and  cajoleries  had  little  or  no 
positive  result.  Indeed,  taken  in  conjunction  with 
other  phases  of  the  Imperial  activity,  they  seem  rather 
to  have  excited  opposition  in  the  breasts  of  the 
members  of  the  Reichstag,  who  possibly  considered 
themselves  just  as  well  qualified  as  the  monarch  to 
estimate  the  degree  and  appreciate  the  needs  of 
Germany's  maritime  interests,  and  at  any  rate  half- 
suspected  that  his  efforts    directly  to  influence  their 

13 


194    WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

deliberations  involved  an  encroachment  on  their  con- 
stitutional privileges.  The  first  naval  estimates 
submitted  in  the  new  reign,  which  provided  for  the 
laying  down  of  the  unusually  large  number  of  four 
battleships,  were  got  through  the  Reichstag  without 
much  difficulty,  but  when  Admiral  von  Hollmann  be- 
came Minister  of  Marine  in  the  following  year,  he  found 
that  quite  a  different  temper  had  taken  possession  of 
the  Parliament.  It  was  not  only  that  the  Emperor's 
general  governmental  acts  had  begun  to  stir  up 
opposition ;  his  oratorical  flights  in  praise  of  sea- 
power  and  world-empire  had  also  generated  strong 
suspicions  that  he  was  urging  Germany  along  a  path 
which  would  lead  her  to  ruin  at  home  and  disaster 
abroad.  Hollmann's  by  no  means  exorbitant  demands 
were  branded  both  in  the  Reichstag  and  the  press  as 
"  unconscionable,"  his  programme  as  "  boundless," 
and  on  every  side  were  heard  contemptuous  and 
impatient  references  to  "the  awful  fleet."  For  a 
decade  the  naval  estimates  were  ruthlessly  and  reck- 
lessly cut  down  to,  on  an  average,  not  far  short  of 
half  their  original  figure,  and  finally,  in  1897,  the 
ministerial  career  of  Hollmann  was  terminated  by  the 
unceremonious  rejection  of  three  out  of  the  four 
cruisers  which,  in  a  special  Memorandum,  he  had 
sought  to  prove  were  indispensable  for  the  protection 
of  the  Empire's  stake  on  the  seas.  And  all  this  time 
the  Emperor  had  never  ceased  to  agitate,  by  word  and 
deed,  for  the  ideas  which  he  had  so  much  at  heart  and 
to  which  the  Reichstag  nevertheless  showed  itself  so 
completely  indifferent,  if  not  actually  hostile. 

The  change  that  came  with  the  appointment  of 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz  to  the  Ministry  of  Marine  was  as 
complete  as  it  was  sudden,  and  it  is  to  this  very  able 
man  that  we  must  look  if  we  wish  to  find  not  only  the 
intellectual  author  of  German  naval  legislation,  but 
the  statesman  who  devised  and  directed  the  means  by 
which  it  was  popularized  and  passed  through  the 
Reichstag.     The  transformation  which  he  effected  was 


SAILOR  AND  STATESMAN  195 

one  both  of  policy  and  of  method.  The  three  rejected 
vessels  which  brought  about  Hollmann's  fall  repre- 
sented a  principle — that  of  "  cruiser  warfare."  At  that 
time  the  imperfectly-thought-out  strategy  of  the  Ger- 
man Naval  Ministry  was  based  on  the  two  ideas  of 
coastal  defence  and  commerce  destruction.  Pitched 
battles  between  ships  of  the  line  on  the  high  seas 
played  a  very  secondary  part  in  its  calculations.  In 
the  programme  which  he  submitted  to  the  Reichstag, 
Hollmann  laid  it  down  that  fifteen  battleships  w^ould 
be  sufficient  for  Germany's  purposes,  and  those  who 
are  best  qualified  to  form  a  judgment  of  the  Empire's 
naval  policy  at  that  epoch  are  of  opinion  that  this 
number  was  intended  to  be  not  merely  a  provisional, 
but  a  final  estimate  of  the  country's  requirements  in 
this  type  of  vessel. 

There  are  good  reasons  for  supposing  that  in  the 
Hollmann  era  no  clear  idea  existed  as  to  the  problems 
with  which  Germany  might  be  confronted  in  a  naval 
war,  and  that  his  programmes  were  the  product  rather 
of  vague  general  principles  than  of  calculated  odds 
and  chances.  In  fact,  one  of  his  main  difficulties  with 
the  Reichstag  was  his  inability  to  justify  his  estimates 
by  numerical  demonstrations. 

On  the  other  hand,  Admiral  von  Tirpitz's  strength 
always  lay  chiefly  in  this,  that  he  knew  exactly  what  he 
wanted  and  why  he  wanted  it.  When  he  came  into  office, 
it  was  generally  stated  that  he  had  years  previously 
already  laid  before  the  Emperor  a  Memorandum  em- 
bodying his  conception  of  Germany's  maritime  needs, 
and  how  they  could  be  satisfied,  and  it  is  certain  that 
the  main  outlines  of  his  policy  were  at  any  rate  clearly 
sketched  out  in  his  head  long  before  he  was  given  an 
opportunity  of  carrying  it  out.  He  was  recalled  from 
the  command  of  the  East  Asian  Squadron  to  take 
charge  of  the  Naval  Ministry,  and  he  seems  to  have 
employed  his  leisure  on  the  homeward  voyage  in 
drafting  a  programme,  which  he  had  worked  out  in  all 
its  details  before  he  took  over  his  portfolio.     In  its 


196   WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

very  fundamental  principles  it  was  a  reversal  of  that 
of  his  predecessor,  for  it  was  based  on  the  idea,  prob- 
ably adopted  from  Mahan,  that  battleships  alone  are 
the  decisive  factors  in  naval  warfare.  As  he  himself 
put  it  to  the  Reichstag :  "  If  we  have  a  strong  battle 
fleet,  the  enemy  will  have  to  defeat  it  before  he  can 
blockade  our  coasts.  But  in  such  circumstances 
he  will,  before  he  declares  war  on  Germany,  consider 
very  carefully  whether  the  business  will  cover  its 
expenses  and  justify  the  risk."  It  was  this  principle  of 
risk  which  he  took  as  his  standard  of  the  Empire's  naval 
requirements.  From  the  literature  which  he  has  inspired 
it  is  evident  that  he  is  one  of  those  who  believe  that 
Germany  is  destined  some  day,  in  the  not  very  distant 
future,  to  occupy  the  position  on  the  seas  which  now 
belongs  to  Great  Britain.  It  was,  however,  impossible 
for  a  Minister  of  State  to  argue  this  belief  in  public, 
for  the  open  confession  of  it  would  have  at  once  pro- 
duced incalculable  complications  in  international  affairs 
which  would  certainly  not  have  contributed  to  its 
realization.  Besides,  the  consummation  which  he 
wished  for  could  in  any  case  only  be  reached  by 
gradual  stages  over  a  long  period  of  years.  The 
defensive  formula  which  he  invented  was  quite  as 
effective  for  his  immediate  domestic  purposes,  and,  as 
the  sequel  showed,  was  not  appreciated  abroad  in  its 
true  and  full  significance.  It  was  that  *'  the  German 
Fleet  must  be  so  strong  that  not  even  the  greatest 
naval  Power  will  be  able  to  enter  upon  a  war  with  it 
without  imperilling  its  position  in  the  world." 

It  was  only  after  a  good  deal  of  hesitation,  and  some 
resistance,  in  high  quarters  that  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
was  able  to  make  his  view  prevail.  Even  courtly  pane- 
gyrists admit  that  at  the  commencement  of  his  term 
of  office  deep-seated  differences  of  opinion  existed 
between  him  and  the  Emperor  on  cardinal  points  of 
naval  policy.  The  monarch  was  then  a  firm  adherent 
of  the  cruiser-war  theory,  and  no  doubt  had  been 
responsible  for  its  adoption  by  his  Ministry  of  Marine. 


REVERSAL  OF  NAVAL  POLICY  197 

It  may  be  regarded  as  his  most  substantial  contribu- 
tion to  the  present  strength  of  the  German  Fleet  that 
he  finally  3aelded  to  Admiral  von  Tirpitz's  arguments. 

In  one  other  very  essential  respect  the  new  Minister 
revolutionized  the  policy  of  his  predecessor.  In  the 
Memorandum  already  referred  to,  Hollmann  defined 
the  needs  of  the  navy  only  for  the  three  succeeding 
years,  and  in  the  course  of  the  debate  on  the  esti- 
mates, he  used  these  w^ords  :  "Neither  the  Federated 
Governments  nor  the  Reichstag  will  ever  agree  to  be 
bound  to  a  formal  programme  for  years  in  advance. 
That  is  quite  impossible,  and  even  if  both  factors 
desired  it,  impossible,  for  the  very  simple  reason  that 
the  art  of  war  is  changeable  on  sea  just  as  it  is  on 
land,  and  that  to-day  no  Naval  Ministry  can  prophesy 
what  we  shall  need  ten  years  hence.  It  can  only  tell 
you  what  are  our  immediate  requirements,  and  if  the 
circumstances  change,  then  our  demands  will  change 
too.  As  to  that  there  is  no  doubt  whatever."  Here 
again.  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  not  merely  modified,  but  dia- 
metrically reversed  the  policy  of  his  predecessor,  and, 
it  may  be  added,  of  the  Emperor.  Starting  from  the 
conclusion  that  the  main  types  of  war  vessel  and  their 
respective  functions  remain  unaltered  in  principle 
throughout  the  ages,  he  induced  the  Reichstag  to 
commit  itself  statutorily  to  a  fixed  warship  establish- 
ment, a  building  programme  of  nearly  twenty  years* 
duration,  and  an  automatic  renewal  of  the  units  of  the 
fleet  when  they  had  reached  a  prescribed  age.  This 
is  the  one  absolutely  new  feature  of  German  naval 
legislation,  and  it  was  undoubtedly  the  idea  of  the 
new  Minister.  That  it  has  its  merits  appears  from 
the  facts  that  it  has  been  imitated  by  France  and  found 
warm  advocates  in  England. 

Admiral  von  Tirpitz  has,  in  fact,  been  the  Bismarck 
of  German  naval  policy,  and  just  as  the  Iron  Chan- 
cellor fulfilled  the  hopes  of  the  men  of  the  Frankfort 
National  Assembly,  so  the  smiling  and  urbane  Minister 
of  Marine  has  gone  far  towards  realizing  the  dreams 


198    WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

of  Friedrich  List  and  Prince  Adalbert  of  Prussia.  It 
may  be  questioned  whether  he  would  not  have  done 
this  work  quite  as  effectually  without  the  Emperor's 
loud  and  tempestuous  advocacy  of  his  schemes  on  the 
open  stage  of  the  world.  The  trumpet  tones  in  w^hich 
William  11.  proclaimed  his  dreams  of  world-wide  rule 
and  maritime  dictatorship,  not  only  exercised  a  dis- 
quieting effect  in  foreign  countries,  but  conjured  up  in 
the  minds  of  many  Germans  unpleasant  visions  of 
provocative  and  perilous  adventure.  Other  nations 
were  an3^thing  but  delighted  at  the  prospects  of  being 
swallowed  up  in  a  universal  Teutonic  Empire,  how- 
ever peaceful  its  conquests  and  however  beneficent  its 
rule,  and  they  took  steps  by  which  the  successive 
moves  of  German  naval  policy  were  successively 
counteracted.  But  for  the  blunders  of  British  and 
French  diplomac}^  over  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
the  Morocco  affair,  Germany  would  at  this  moment 
have  been  much  weakened  both  internally  and  ex- 
ternally by  precisely  the  measures  which  were  in- 
tended to  make  her  strong.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  had  been  less  hurry  and  less  noise,  and  the 
inevitable  ebullitions  of  German  Anglophobia  had  been 
quietly  and  unostentatiously  exploited  as  they  occurred, 
the  Imperial  Fleet  might  have  been  steadily  built  up 
without  causing  a  condition  of  chronic  alarm  through- 
out Europe,  and  without  giving  rise  to  such  effective 
counter-measures.  It  would  not,  perhaps,  so  soon 
have  reached  its  actual  dimensions,  but  its  compara- 
tive value  would  probably  have  been  even  greater 
than  it  is.  Germany  would,  too,  have  avoided  that 
rapid  accumulation  of  taxes  and  debts,  which,  in  spite 
of  her  prosperity,  has  made  those  of  her  people  who 
must  live  on  small  incomes  the  most  discontented 
class  in  Europe.  And  here,  possibly,  we  have  one  of 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz's  few  mistakes,  for  if  he  had  little 
to  do  with  the  noise  he  was  at  any  rate  responsible  for 
the  hurry.  Whether  it  will  prove  to  be  a  mistake  in 
the  Ions:  run,  the  future  must  be  left  to  show. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  "THE  MASTER"     199 

If  we  may  judge  from  the  discretion  which  he  has 
shown  by  keeping  as  far  as  possible  in  the  back- 
ground, Admiral  von  Tirpitz  would,  if  left  to  himself, 
have  built  up  the  German  Fleet  with  the  same  silent 
and  systematic  persistency  with  which  Bismarck, 
Roon,  and  Moltke  prepared  to  crush  France,  and  to 
some  extent  he  combines  in  his  character  the  qualities 
of  these  three.  He  is  at  any  rate  the  adroitest 
politician,  the  ablest  organizer,  and  the  most  far- 
sighted  strategist  in  the  Imperial  service.  Long 
before  he  was  thought  of  as  Naval  Minister,  he  had 
won  for  himself  among  his  colleagues,  by  the  skill  and 
thoroughness  with  which  he  grappled  with  every 
problem  allotted  to  him,  the  title  of  "  The  Master." 
It  was  he  who,  against  the  ignorant  protests  of  the 
older  school  of  naval  officers,  chiefly  concerned  for 
the  smartness  of  their  paint,  the  cleanness  of  their 
decks,  and  the  brightness  of  their  brasswork,  forced 
the  torpedo  upon  them,  and  brought  the  service  of 
this  weapon  up  to  the  high  pitch  of  efficiency  which  it 
has  to-day  attained  in  the  German  Fleet.  As  Chief  of 
the  Staff  to  the  General  Command  of  the  Navy,  he 
evolved  fresh  rules  of  strategy  and  new  tactical 
formations,  and  insisted  upon  manoeuvres  being 
carried  out  m  such  a  way  as  to  test  the  value  of  both. 
He  has  been  no  less  successful  as  statesman,  politician, 
and  diplomatist.  Here,  too,  he  deserves  the  name  of 
"  Master  "  among  his  contemporaries,  for  what  he  has 
done  has  been  the  greatest  ministerial  achievement  of 
our  day.  It  is  true  that  he  was  favoured  by  an 
extraordinary  run  of  luck  that  was  vouchsafed  to  none 
of  his  forerunners,  and  that  he  would  never  have  been 
able  to  drive  his  machine  but  for  the  energy  generated 
by  a  series  of  international  dissensions,  but  at  the 
same  time  it  must  be  conceded  that  he  took  advan- 
tage of  his  opportunities  with  rare  promptitude  and 
address. 

He  at  once  took  the  measure  of  the  Reichstag,  and 
saw  how  he  could  make  it  obedient  to  his  will.     It  is 


200    WILLIAM  IL  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

traditional  in  the  higher  ranks  of  the  German  official 
hierarchy  to  despise  popular  assemblies,  and  to  treat 
them  with  an  air  of  pedagogic  superciliousness. 
Hollmann  had  become  so  impatient  at  the  continual 
mutilation  of  his  estimates  that  at  last  he  thumped  his 
fist  menacingly  on  the  table.  That  precipitate  action 
sealed  his  fate.  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  recognized  that  it 
would  be  better  for  him  if  he  disguised  his  contempt, 
and  smothered  his  anger  in  his  beard.  In  one  of 
Rostand's  plays,  a  lady  is  asked  how  she  passed  the 
sentries  who  were  posted  round  a  jealously  guarded 
camp,  and  she  replies:  *T  smiled  at  them."  If  the  Naval 
Minister  were  to  be  asked  how  he  induced  the  parties 
who  had  been  so  obdurate  to  his  predecessor's  de- 
mands to  pass  his  own  so  much  more  expensive 
projects,  he,  too,  might  have  replied  :  "  I  smiled  at 
them."  Completely  breaking  with  the  tradition  of 
schoolmasterly  superiority,  he  was  all  complacency^ 
and  urbanity  to  the  ignorant  mediocrities  who  had  it 
in  their  power  to  frustrate  his  designs.  His  beaming 
rubicund  countenance  was  ever  the  brightest  and 
most  ingratiating  feature  in  the  debates  on  his  bills 
and  estimates.  His  good  humour  was  inexhaustible, 
his  courtesy  unflagging,  his  patience  undisconcert- 
able.  He  knew  exactly  what  he  wanted,  and  thought 
only  of  that.  His  mind  was  not  clouded,  like  those 
of  so  many  of  his  ministerial  colleagues,  by  reli- 
gious or  political  prejudices.  He  was  ready  to  accept 
ships  from  the  hands  of  Catholics  or  Socialists. 
Whether  they  ranked  the  Pope  above  the  Emperor, 
or  preferred  a  republic  to  a  monarchy,  was  quite  in- 
different to  him,  if  only  they  would  grant  him  the 
ships  and  the  men  he  asked  for. 

In  one  of  his  many  veiled  conflicts  with  the  Foreign 
Office,  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  is  understood  to  have  ex- 
claimed :  "Politics  are  your  affair — I  build  ships!" 
and  it  was  precisely  because  he  attended  strictly  and 
conscientiously  to  his  own  business  that  he  was  able 
to   do   it   so  well.      It  was   incumbent  upon   him   as 


THE  ADMIRAL'S  PRESS  BUREAU       201 

administrator  of  the  Navy  to  make  it  as  strong  and 
efficient  as  possible,  and  it  lay  with  the  Chancellors  to 
decide  whether  the  line  he  w^as  following  was  con- 
sistent with  the  general  policy  of  the  Empire.  That, 
against  their  own  convictions  and  what  they  conceived 
to  be  Germany's  foreign  interests,  they  allowed  him 
to  have  his  own  way,  only  proved  their  weakness  and 
his  strength. 

While  he  was  amiable  and  polite  to  all  parties  and 
persons  w^ho  could  assist  him  in  the  carrying  out  of 
his  ideas,  flattered  their  vanity  by  pretended  con- 
fidences from  the  region  of  high  politics,  took  them 
for  cruises  in  war  vessels,  and  had  them  deferentially 
escorted  round  Imperial  shipyards,  the  Admiral  was 
quick  to  appreciate  the  importance  of  winning  the 
good  graces  of  the  Catholics,  without  whose  favour,  as 
party  relationships  stood  and  were  likely  to  stand,  he 
could  hope  to  effect  little.  Young  and  active  members 
of  the  Centre  party,  who  showed  a  particular  interest  in 
the  details  of  naval  poHcy,  were  singled  out  for  special 
attention,  and  soon  were  numbered  among  his  most 
devoted  champions.  He  likewise  realized  the  value  of 
popular  support,  and  this  was  secured  through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  Press  Bureau  of  the  Ministr}^  of 
Marine.  This  institution  was,  and  is,  administered  in 
the  same  spirit  which  gained  the  Admiral  his  par- 
liamentary triumphs.  The  naval  officers  by  whom  it  is 
manned  receive  all  journalists,  domestic  and  foreign,  with 
open  arms,  and,  according  to  the  objects  and  nationality 
of  their  visitors,  furnish  them  with  ideas,  information, 
and  directions.  No  German  writer  on  naval  affairs  could 
afford  to  dispense  with  official  assistance  so  profusely 
and  willingly  supplied.  The  Press  Bureau  placed  at 
his  disposal  all  the  historical  and  statistical  data  which 
could  be  used  to  demonstrate  Germany's  need  of  a  big 
fleet,  all  the  articles  from  the  foreign  press  which  were 
likely  to  have  a  stimulating  effect  upon  his  readers,  all 
the  details  of  ship  and  gun  types  which  could  safely 
be  made  public,  all  the   rules  of  naval  strategy  and 


202    WILLIAM  11.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

tactics  which  might  be  of  service  to  him  in  the 
formulation  of  his  themes.  If  diffidence  or  a  spirit 
of  independence  prevented  him  from  coming  to  the 
Press  Bureau,  the  Press  Bureau  went  to  him,  as  will 
be  seen  from  the  following  document  which  found  its 
way  into  print : 

"Imperial  Ministry  of  Marine, 
"News  Office. 

"  Berlin, 

" ,1907- 

"It  has  become  known  here  that,  some  time  ago, 

you  published  in  articles  of  a  maritime  nature. 

For  this  reason  the  News  Office  gladly  takes  the  oppor- 
tunit}^  of  enquiring  whether  you  would  care  to  receive 
occasional  batches  of  service  material  and  press  com- 
ments for  possible  use  in  further  articles.  In  view  of 
the  impending  Navy  Bill,  your  support  in  the  Press 
might  be  particularly  valuable  in  the  immediate  future. 
"  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"  Boy-Ed." 

By  such  means  the  Admiral  succeeded  in  obtain- 
ing a  control,  gentle,  persuasive,  and  veiled,  but  none 
the  less  effective,  over  practically  the  entire  body  of 
writers  on  naval  topics  in  the  German  Press.  He 
would  have  been  a  less  able  and  a  less  successful 
statesman  if  he  had  openly  egged  on  his  army  of 
scribes  to  a  violent  campaign  against  Great  Britain. 
He  was  much  too  shrewd  to  do  that.  While  he  flooded 
Germany  with  information  of  a  provocative  character, 
the  Press  Bureau  was  careful  to  impress  upon  its 
callers  that  nothing  was  farther  from  his  thoughts  than 
the  wish  to  inspire  articles  calculated  to  inflame  inter- 
national animosities. 

The  unanimity  of  view  on  naval  subjects  which 
the  Bureau  imported  into  the  German  Press  was 
naturally  most  effective.  When  the  simple  citizen 
found  that  all  the  papers  to  which  he  had  access 
spoke  with    one   voice,   simultaneously  adopting    an 


OFFICIAL  NAVAL  PUBLICATIONS        203 

identical  attitude  to  a  fresh  situation  or  propound- 
ing a  novel  theory,  he  could  only  assume  that  they 
must  be  in  the  right.  The  proposal  that  Great 
Britain  should  abandon  her  Two-Power  standard  and 
accept  in  its  stead  a  ratio  of  three  to  two,  which 
appeared  almost  at  the  same  moment  in  a  score  of 
different  papers  while  the  191 2  Navy  Bill  was  under 
process  of  dilution,  is  an  instance  in  point.  Up  till 
then  all  naval  writers  in  Germany  had  been  unanimous 
in  protesting  that  agreements  to  fix  a  naval  ratio 
between  two  countries  were  in  their  very  nature  im- 
possible, and  the  suddenness  and  simultaneity  of  their 
conversion  must  have  been  due  to  the  intervention 
either  of  Providence  or  the  Marine  Minister.  Indeed, 
the  Minister's  statement  a  year  later  in  the  Reichstag 
Budget  Commission  definitively  set  at  rest  any  doubt 
that  might  have  existed  as  to  the  original  source  of 
the  proposal.  Since  Bismarck,  no  one  has  shown  such 
adroitness  as  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  in  the  management 
of  the  Press. 

In  addition  to  controlling  the  naval  views  of 
independent  pubHcations,  the  Press  Bureau  also 
makes  important  direct  contributions  of  its  own  to 
periodical  literature  with  the  annual  Nauticus  and  the 
monthly  magazine  Die  Marine  Rundschau.  Both  these 
publications  are  further  testimonies  to  the  ability 
with  which  the  Admiral  performs  the  duties  of  his 
office. 

But  with  all  his  cleverness,  perseverance,  and 
patience.  Admiral  Tirpitz  would  never  have  reached 
his  goal  had  not  Germany  been  swept  by  successive 
waves  of  Anglophobia.  Both  speeches  in  the  Reichstag 
and  articles  in  the  Press  make  it  quite  evident  that  the 
motive  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  most  deputies  when 
they  voted  for  the  Navy  Bills  was  the  desire  to  im- 
press, annoy,  or  terrify  Great  Britain.  The  truth  is 
that,  but  for  the  Boer  War,  the  Bill  of  1900  could 
never  have  been  so  much  as  introduced  ;  but  for  the 
perpetual  international  friction  over  Morocco  and  the 


204    WILLIAM  11.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

fantastic  legend  of  King  Edward's  designs  against 
Germany,  the  Bills  of  1906  and  1908  would  have  had 
but  small  chance  of  acceptance  ;  and  but  for  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  speech  and  Captain  Faber's  indiscretions — 
and,  it  should  be  added,  the  misrepresentations  of  both 
of  them  by  Admiral  von  Tirpitz's  Press — the  Ministry  of 
Marine  would  never  have  been  able  to  win  its  last 
victory  against  the  opposition  of  the  Treasury  and 
the  misgivings  of  the  Chancellor.  The  lesson  of  1848 
cannot  be  too  thoroughly  learnt.  The  naval  move- 
ment of  that  year  was  almost  entirely  popular  in  its 
character.  It  arose  out  of  a  sense  of  wounded  dignity, 
and  fits  of  national  temper,  blind  to  all  the  prudential 
considerations  of  domestic  and  international  politics, 
have  given  Germany  to-day  the  second  largest  fleet 
and  the  largest  Socialist  party  in  the  world.  It  may 
seem  almost  like  a  contradiction  in  terms  to  suggest 
that  a  national  sentiment  has  contributed  to  swell 
German  Socialism  to  its  present  dimensions.  But,  as 
will  be  be  seen  later,  this  is— for  Germany,  at  any 
j-ate — no  paradox,  for  in  no  other  country  does  so  small 
a  proportion  of  the  population  constitute  what  is  in 
practice  and  in  effect  the  "  will  of  the  people." 

It  should  have  become  clear  that  the  part  which  the 
Emperor  William  has  played  in  the  formulation  and 
carrying  out  of  Germany's  naval  policy  has  been  quite 
insignificant  in  comparison  with  that  played  by  his 
Minister.  The  really  effective  work  which  the  monarch 
has  done  for  his  fleet  has  been  that  of  which  the  widei 
public  has  heard  least.  The  Emperor's  brain  is  not 
an  originating  or  creative  one,  but  it  is  keenly  appre- 
hensive, appreciative,  and  assimilative,  and  its  owner 
was  quick  to  perceive  the  value  of  many  of  the  forces 
and  institutions  which  have  made  the  British  Fleet 
supreme,  not  only  in  numerical  strength  but  also  in 
esprit  de  corps  and  organization.  From  his  visits  to 
England  he  took  back  much  useful  information  as  to 
the  construction  and  handling  of  ships,  and  in  many 
other    respects    he    found    British   models   which   he 


WORLD-POLICY  AND  THE  SCHOOLS    205 

considered  worthy  of  imitation  in  his  own"  country. 
Thus  the  Institute  of  Naval  Architects  was  provided 
with  a  German  counterpart  in  the  Schiffbau-technische 
Gesellschaft,  the  ideals  of  self-discipline  of  sport  were 
fostered  in  the  Imperial  Navy,  and  when  the  tem- 
perance movement  in  the  British  Fleet  had  developed 
sufficient  strength  to  attract  attention,  the  Emperor 
inaugurated  a  similar  propaganda  among  his  crews. 
As  has  already  been  seen,  William  11.  has  generously 
admitted  the  debt  of  the  German  Fleet  to  its  British 
sister,  and  beyond  all  doubt  he  has  done  more  than 
anyone  else  to  incur  it. 

The  Emperor  has  also  been  able  to  do  a  good  deal 
towards  the  propagation  of  his  naval  ideas  through 
his  autocratic  control  over  the   official  machinery  of 
Prussia,  which  constitutes  more  than  three-fifths  of 
the  area,  and  nearly  that  proportion  of  the  population 
of  Germany.     In  a  country  where  the  tentacles  of  the 
central  authority  reach  to  the  remotest  village   this 
control  means  a  great  deal.     In  particular,  through 
the  Ministry  of  Education,  the   rising  generation  is 
being  initiated  into  the  mysteries  of  "world-policy" 
and  sea-power.     The  teaching  of  history  and  geogra- 
phy is  utilized  to  impress  upon  susceptible  minds  the 
importance  of  colonies  and  fleets,  and  to  suggest  with 
more  or  less  precision  and  emphasis  that  Great  Britain 
is  the  jealous  rival  who  chiefly  obstructs  Germany's 
path  to  that  **  place  in  the  sun  "  which  is  her  due.    The 
process  which  is  commenced  in  the  schools  is  con- 
tinued at  the  universities.     Indeed,  here  as  elsewhere, 
Germany's  professors  have  been  the  pioneers  of  her 
progress,  and  were  putting  forward  her  claim  to  sea- 
power  long  before  the  Emperor  was  born.     Friedrich 
List,  the  father  of  German  economics,  urged,  in  1840, 
that  Denmark  and  Holland  should  be  taken  into  the 
Germanic  Confederation,  which  "would  then  obtain 
what  it  at  present  lacks— namely,  fisheries  and  sea- 
power,  ocean-borne  trade,  and  colonies."     In  another 
passage  he  said : 


2o6    WILLIAM  11.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

"What  intelligent  citizens  of  those  sea-ports  (Ham- 
burg and  Bremen)  can  rejoice  over  the  continual  in- 
crease of  their  tonnage,  when  he  reflects  that  a  couple 
of  frigates,  putting  out  from  Heligoland,  could  destroy 
inside  twenty-four  hours  the  work  of  a  quarter  of  a 
century." 

List  also  maintained  that  Germany  was  "  called  by 
nature  to  place  herself  at  the  head  of  the  colonizing 
and  civilizing  nations,"  and  '*  that  the  time  had  come  for 
the  formation  of  a  Continental  alliance  against  the 
naval  supremacy  of  England."  Treitschke,  writing  ot 
the  European  situation  in  the  later  thirties,  said : 

"  Against  so  absolutely  ruthless  a  commercial  polic}^ 
inciting  and  making  mischief  all  over  the  world, 
all  other  civilized  nations  seemed  natural  allies.  Eng- 
land was  the  stronghold  of  barbarism  in  international 
law.  To  England  alone  was  it  due  that,  to  the  shame 
of  humanit}^,  naval  warfare  still  remained  organized 
piracy.  It  was  the  common  duty  of  all  nations  to 
restore  on  the  seas  that  balance  of  power,  long  existing 
on  the  Continent,  that  healthy  equipoise  which  per- 
mitted no  State  to  do  exactly  as  it  liked,  and  conse- 
quently assured  to  all  a  humane  international  law. 
The  civilization  of  the  human  race  demanded  that  the 
manifold  magnificence  of  the  world's  history,  which 
had  once  commenced  Vv^ith  the  rule  of  monosyllabic 
Chinese,  should  not  end  in  a  vicious  circle  with  the 
empire  of  the  monosyllabic  Britons.  As  soon  as  the 
Eastern  Question  was  reopened  a  far-sighted  states- 
manship was  bound  to  attempt  at  least  to  restrict  the 
oppressive  foreign  rule  which  the  English  Fleet  main- 
tained from  Gibraltar,  Malta,  and  Corfu,  and  to  restore 
the  Mediterranean  to  the  Mediterranean  peoples." 

At  the  same  time  the  Professor  was  teaching  his 
students  at  the  Berlin  University  that  "  the  settlement 
with  England  will  be  the  most  difficult  of  all,"  and 
that  ''the  result  of  our  next  war  must  be,  if  possible, 
the  acquisition  of  some  colony." 

The  modern  schoolmasters  and  professors  of  Ger- 
many are  working  to  produce  a  race  inspired  with  the 


A  ''  PATRIOTIC  BASIS  "  FOR  EDUCATION     207 

ambitions  of  List  and  the  rancours  of  Treitschke,  and 
imbued  with  the  idea  that  an  unexampled  destiny- 
awaits  their  nation.  That  the  Emperor  William  early 
recognized  what  schools  and  universities  might  be 
made  to  do  in  this  direction  is  clear  from  the  speech 
with  which  he  opened  the  Educational  Conference 
convened  by  him  in  1890,  and  in  which  he  complained 
that  the  traditional  curriculum  "  lacked  a  patriotic 
basis."  "We  should,"  he  exclaimed,  '*  rear  patriotic 
Germans  and  not  young  Greeks  and  Romans."  It  was 
also  with  a  political  purpose  that  he  recommended  a 
reversal  of  the  usual  order  in  which  history  was  taught 
— that  is  to  say,  that  the  most  recent  periods  should 
be  taken  first,  and  the  student  led  back  step  by  step 
to  the  events  of  antiquity. 

While  the  Emperor  is  not  omnipotent  in  legislation, 
he  is,  in  Prussia,  at  any  rate,  practically  unfettered  in 
administration — that  more  extensive  and  equally  im- 
portant branch  of  Government — and  so  the  impulsions 
of  his  w411  can  be  forced  down  through  the  reticula- 
tions of  the  bureaucratic  system  till  they  are  felt  by 
the  humblest  official.  He  thus  has  at  his  disposal  a 
large  body  of  zealous  co-operators  anxious  to  comply 
with  his  desires  even  if  they  should  have  no  direct 
relation  to  their  official  duties. 

To  appreciate  the  operation  of  this  force,  it  is  only 
necessary  to  turn  over  the  pages  of  the  German  Navy 
League  Handbook  and  notice  how  prominent  a  part  the 
provincial  agents  of  the  central  authority  and  sub- 
ordinate members  of  the  official  body  play  in  the 
propaganda  of  that  organization.  It  is  impossible  to 
avoid  the  conclusion  that,  wherever  difficulty  has 
been  experienced  in  forming  a  local  branch  of  the 
League,  gentle  pressure  has  been  brought  to  bear  on 
the  stationmaster,  postmaster,  or  gymnasium-director 
of  the  town,  and  has  compelled  him  to  take  the 
initiative.  In  numerous  cases  such  persons  have, 
of  course,  come  forward  and  founded  branches  of  the 
League  without   any  prompting,  knowing  well  that 


208    WILLIAM  II.  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

their  zeal  would  be  in  accordance  with  the  "  wishes  of 
the  Emperor,"  and  would  be  rewarded  by  preferment 
when  a  suitable  opportunity  arose. 

The  Navy  League  is  the  only  instrument  the  Em- 
peror possesses  for  systematically  and  persistently 
propagating  his  ideas  on  world-policy  and  sea-power 
among  the  German  people  as  a  whole.  It  was  founded 
in  1898,  at  his  personal  instance,  but  in  all  probability 
at  Admiral  von  Tirpitz's  suggestion,  with  the  assistance 
of  funds  principally  furnished  by  the  Krupp  family, 
which,  as  the  chief  material  beneficiary  from  any 
increase  in  the  German  Fleet,  could  well  afford  to 
invest  a  little  money  in  this  way.  Even  in  Bismarck's 
time  the  head  of  the  Krupp  firm  had  been  induced  to 
start  a  number  of  newspapers  to  advocate  the  aug- 
mentation of  those  armaments  from  which  he  had 
derived  a  considerable  proportion  of  his  vast  wealth, 
and  it  is  one  of  the  least  edifying  features  of  modern 
Germany  that  those  of  its  citizens  who  show  the  most 
bellicose  spirit  have  a  direct  personal  interest  in  the 
waging  of  war.  The  financial  founders  of  the  Navy 
League  included  other  prosperous  manufacturers  who 
were  anxious  to  deserve  decorations  or  titles,  and 
who,  in  some  instances,  went  so  far  as  to  compel  their 
employees  to  join  the  organization  and  so  help  to  swell 
its  membership. 

Three  weeks  before  the  League  was  constituted, 
the  first  Navy  Bill  had  already  received  the  Emperor's 
signature,  and  the  order  of  these  events  is  a  plain 
demonstration  that  even  then  the  measure  was  intended 
to  be  merely  the  thin  end  of  the  wedge.  It  is  an 
interesting  and  significant  fact  that  almost  all  the 
ruling  houses  of  Germany  have  been  induced  to 
identify  themselves  with  the  League,  though  it  is 
nominally  an  absolutely  independent  and  unofficial 
organization.  The  Emperor's  brother.  Prince  Henry 
of  Prussia,  has  assumed  the  general  protectorate,  and 
among  the  protectors  of  the  affiliated  State  federations 
are  Prince  George  of  Bavaria,  the  Kings  of  Saxony 


THE  GERMAN  NAVY  LEAGUE     209 

and  Wiirttemberg,  the  Grand  Dukes  of  Baden,  Hesse, 
the  two  Mecklenburgs,  Oldenburg,  and  S  axe- Wei  mar, 
the  Dukes  of  Anhalt,  Saxe-Altenburg,and  Saxe-Coburg- 
Gotha,  the  Princes  of  the  two  Lippes,  Waldeck- 
Pyrmont,  and  the  two  Reusses,  the  Statthalter  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  the  Regent  of  Brunswick,  and  the 
Burgomasters  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen.  Thus  the 
State  governments  have  a  direct  interest  in  the  League, 
are  under  a  moral  obligation  to  promote  its  work,  and, 
it  may  be  added,  bear  a  certain  amount  of  responsibility 
for  the  manner  in  which  its  agitation  is  carried  on. 
The  purposes  of  the  organization  are  defined  in  the 
statutes  as  follows : 

"The  German  Navy  League  regards  a  strong  German 
Fleet  as  necessary — principally  in  order  to  ensure  the 
sea  frontiers  of  Germany  against  the  danger  of  war, 
to  maintain  the  position  of  Germany  among  the  Great 
Powers  of  the  world,  and  to  support  the  general 
interests  and  commercial  communications  of  Germany 
as  well  as  the  safety  of  her  citizens  at  work  in  oversea 
countries.  Accordingly,  it  is  the  aim  of  the  German 
Navy  League  to  awaken,  cultivate,  and  strengthen  the 
interest  of  the  German  people  for  the  importance  and 
functions  of  the  fleet." 

The  members  of  the  League  are  divided  into  two 
classes — ''individual"  and  "corporative."  The  latter 
are  members  of  branches  of  other  societies  which 
enrol  themselves  in  the  League  en  masse.  The  most 
fruitful  sources  of  support  of  this  kind  are  those  kindred 
bodies,  the  Pangerman  Federation  and  the  Colonial 
Association.  On  December  31,  191 1,  the  corporative 
members  numbered  756,000,  the  individual  members 
298,000.  The  qualifications  for  individual  membership 
are  the  attainment  of  the  sixteenth  year  and  a  money 
contribution,  which,  if  not  fixed  by  the  branch,  is  left 
for  the  member  to  determine  for  him-  or  herself  The 
pecuniary  contribution  of  a  corporation  joining  the 
League  is  fixed  b}^  special  arrangement  in  each  case. 
From  the  accounts  published  it  would  appear  that  the 

14 


210   WILLIAM  IL  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

average  annual  member's  subscription  falls  a  good 
deal  short  of  sixpence.  A  considerable  number  of 
the  members  are  young  persons  of  both  sexes  who 
send  in  their  names  because  it  is  a  cheap  and  easy 
method  of  gratifying  the  association  instinct,  so  strong 
in  Germans,  or  for  the  sake  of  the  dances  and  other 
purely  social  entertainments  which  are  arranged  by  the 
branches. 

A  monthly  paper,  Die  Flotte,  which  is  published  in 
an  edition  of  350,000  copies,  is  the  League's  chief  organ 
in  the  Press,  but  the  Central  Office  also  issues  immense 
quantities  of  pamphlets  and  leaflets.  These  are  largely 
distributed  with  newspapers  owned  or  controlled  by 
the  iron  and  steel  and  shipbuilding  industries — what 
the  Socialists  call  the  "armour-plate  Press"  —  but 
naturally  find  their  way  to  all  quarters  to  which 
Government  influence  can  give  them  access.  Under 
the  name  of  "  Communications,"  items  of  naval  news 
and  controversial  paragraphs  are  sent  out  about  once 
a  week  to  all  the  papers,  and  though  little  notice  is 
taken  of  them  in  the  metropolitan  Press,  struggling 
provincial  journals  are  very  glad  to  have  their  columns 
filled  up  with  topical  matter  by  expert  and  authorita- 
tive pens.  The  League  also  pubHshes  a  profusely 
illustrated  Naval  Album,  of  which  the  Emperor  every 
year  buys  600  copies  for  distribution  as  prizes  in  the 
schools  of  Prussia — a  typical  example  of  the  inter- 
action of  the  wheels  of  the  naval  agitation  and  the 
Government  machine.  Lecturing,  too,  occupies  a 
prominent  place  in  the  League's  activity,  and  the 
Central  Office  keeps  a  stock  of  magic-lanterns  and 
slides,  which  it  lends  out  free  of  charge  to  the  local 
branches.  It  also  supplies  uniforms,  badges,  and 
bunting  for  local  festivities. 

By  far  the  most  effective  department  of  the  League's 
activity  is,  however,  the  excursions  to  the  German 
naval  ports,  which  it  arranges  for  the  benefit  of  school- 
masters and  their  classes.  The  participants  in  these 
outings  are,  as  far  as  possible,  selected  from  the  inland 


INFLUENCE  OF  NAVAL  EXCURSIONS    211 

states  and^  districts,  in  which  it  is  most  difficult  to 
arouse  enthusiasm  for  the  sea  and  the  fleet.  They  are 
taken  to  Kiel  or  Wilhelmshaven,  received  with  effusive 
courtesy  by  the  naval  officers  delegated  to  look  after 
them,  and  escorted  through  the  streets  by  a  ship's 
band  to  the  dockyards  or  war  vessels,  over  which 
hey  are  conducted  by  amiable  guides,  who  supply 
them  with  all  the  information  likely  to  stimulate  their 
interest  in  w^hat  they  have  seen.  If  the  distance  they 
have  travelled  makes  it  impossible  for  them  to  return 
home  the  same  day,  naval  barracks  or  storehouses 
which  happen  for  the  moment  to  be  vacant  are  placed 
at  their  disposal  as  night  quarters.  So  much  official 
complaisance  and  amenity,  especially  in  a  country 
where  neither  of  these  qualities  is  particularly  common 
in  the  public  services,  arouses  in  those  on  whom  it  is 
expended  a  flattering  sense  of  their  own  and  their 
national  importance,  and  schoolmasters  thus  captivated 
will  naturally,  in  due  time,  convey  their  impressions 
to  their  pupils.  Though  the  numbers  of  persons  thus 
dealt  with  are  inevitably  somewhat  limited,  the  League 
unquestionably  gains  more  ground  in  this  way  than  it 
can  hope  to  win  by  pamphlets  which  are  read  and 
lectures  which  are  listened  to  mainly  by  the  alread}^ 
convinced. 

In  spite,  however,  of  official  patronage  and  assiduous 
labour,  the  League  has  probably  failed  to  fulfil  the 
anticipations  of  its  founders.  Three  years  after  its 
incorporation  it  had  already  attained  an  "individual" 
membership  of  240,000,  and  in  the  decade  which  has 
since  elapsed  it  has  added  only  59,000  to  that  number. 
The  fact  seems  to  be  that  its  influence  has  not  ex- 
tended far  beyond  that  section  of  the  population  which 
is,  directly  or  indirectly,  amenable  to  official  pressure, 
and  the  adherence  of  which  could  be  counted  upon 
from  the  outset.  In  the  fluctuations  of  its  member- 
ship we  have  a  barometer  of  the  League's  own  internal 
crises  and  of  the  tense  phases  of  the  international 
situation.     Very  soon   after   it   had   been   founded,  a 


212    WILLIAM  IL  AND  HIS  NAVAL  MINISTER 

handful  of  purists  among  its  members  felt  compunc- 
tion as  to  the  manner  in  which  it  was  being  financed 
and  administered.  The  substantial  subscriptions  which 
flowed  into  its  coffers  from  the  pockets  of  the  Krupps 
and  other  industrial  magnates  with  a  business  interest 
in  the  building  of  warships  seem  to  have  been  the 
chief  ground  for  their  complaints  ;  but  it  is  evident 
that  the  entire  management  of  the  organization  had 
got  into  a  scandalously  lax  state  in  consequence  of  the 
inexperience  of  those  to  whom  it  had  been  entrusted. 
In  fact,  the  League  seems  to  have  existed  at  that  time 
principally  for  the  benefit  of  two  classes  of  people — 
the  wealthy  snobs  who  purchased  honours  by  supply- 
ing its  funds,  and  the  overpaid  lecturers  from  the 
ranks  of  the  retired  naval  officers  on  whom  those 
funds  were  spent.  Though  the  actual  facts  were 
hushed  up,  a  sufficient  inkling  of  them  got  about  to 
excite  the  misgivings  of  the  public,  and  in  the  next  two 
years  the  membership  (individual)  dropped  by  70,000. 
It  began  to  revive  as  soon  as  the  scandal  w^as  for- 
gotten, and,  under  the  stimulus  of  the  first  stages  of 
the  Morocco  imbroglio,  reached  in  1907  its  record 
figure  of  324,000.  At  this  juncture,  however,  it  became 
known  that  during  the  elections  of  that  year,  the 
League's  manager.  General  Keim,  had  been  so  indis- 
creet as  to  issue  pamphlets  against  the  Centre  (Catholic) 
party.  The  result  was  a  great  exodus  from  the  League 
in  Bavaria  and  other  Catholic  districts,  and  its  member- 
ship gradually  declined,  till  at  the  end  of  1910  it  stood 
at  291,000.  The  crisis  of  the  summer  of  191 1  and  dis- 
closures made  in  England  gave  it  another  push  forward, 
and,  with  a  jump  of  6,500,  the  membership  reached 
the  figure  given  above.  Exactly  how  far  the  League's 
membership  and  the  apparent  success  of  its  agitation 
have  been  the  causes,  and  how  far  the  eftects,  of  the 
naval  movements  of  recent  3^ears,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  decide.  Its  most  effective  work  has,  however,  un- 
questionably been  done  through  the  schools,  and  this 
has  as  yet  hardly  had  time  to  bear  tangible  fruit,  since 


THE  EMPEROR  AND  THE  LEAGUE      213 

the  German  citizen  is  enfranchised  only  at  the  age  of 
twenty-five  years. 

To  Germany's  neighbours,  the  League's  agitation 
is  always  valuable,  because  it  affords  some  indication 
as  to  what  the  next  development  of  the  Imperial  naval 
policy  is  likely  to  be.  When  the  too  impetuous 
General  Keim  committed  the  dangerous  blunder  of 
giving  offence  to  the  Catholics,  he  was  deposed  by 
official  intervention,  and  Admiral  Koester,  a  trusted 
confidant  of  the  Emperor,  placed  in  charge  of  the 
organization.  The  admiral  is  every  year  the  monarch's 
guest  at  the  Kiel  yachting  week  and  other  maritime 
occasions,  and  it  is  obviously  no  mere  coincidence 
that  his  most  emphatic  pleas  for  more  armoured 
cruisers,  or  whatever  it  may  be,  have  generally  been 
uttered  shortly  after  one  of  their  meetings.  There 
cannot,  in  fact,  be  the  slightest  doubt  that  the  Emperor 
is  the  real  director  of  the  Navy  League,  and  that  it 
puts  forward  no  demand  that  has  not  already  received 
his  approval,  in  principle  if  not  in  detail.  The  League 
is,  in  short,  little  more  that  a  Government  department, 
the  function  of  which  is  to  carry  on  an  agitation  for 
more  warships.  It  must,  however,  always  be  remem- 
bered that  the  League's  demands  represent  not  what 
the  Government  desires  or  expects  to  get,  but  what  it 
wants  to  be  asked  for.  In  order  that  it  may  keep  up 
the  pretence  that  it  is  an  unofficial  and  independent 
organization,  the  League  must  naturally  avoid  too 
close  a  correspondence  between  its  own  programme 
and  that  of  the  Ministry  of  Marine,  and  it  is  also 
guided  by  the  principle  that  it  is  necessary  to  ask 
much  in  order  to  get  little.  Occasionally  it  makes  a 
show  of  hurrying  and  worrying  the  Naval  Minister, 
and  of  being  positively  objectionable  to  the  Govern- 
ment, but  no  one  suffers  less  than  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
from  these  "  attacks  "  upon  him,  and  there  is  nothing 
he  would  like  better  to  see  than  the  satisfaction  of  the 
demands  by  which  they  are  accompanied. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS  OF  GERMAN  NAVAL  POLICY 

In  order  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  the  probable 
development  of  the  Anglo-German  problem,  it  is  of 
cardinal  importance  to  know  whether  Germany  has 
the  ability  and  the  will  to  continue  her  recent  policy 
of  naval  expansion.  Assuming  that  her  present 
economic  tendencies  remain  unchecked,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  as  to  her  abihty  to  do  this.  Should  her 
population,  her  industry,  and  her  commerce  expand  in 
the  future  at  anything  like  the  same  rate  as  in  the  past, 
she  will,  before  very  long,  be  in  a  position  to  build 
and  arm  warships  with  almost  as  great  facility  as  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  to  pay  for  and  man  them  with 
even  greater  ease  than  this  country. 

A  nation's  economic  strength  depends  upon  the 
numbers  and  character  of  its  population  and  the 
position  and  natural  resources  of  the  country  it  in- 
habits. In  the  size  of  her  population  alone  Germany's 
advantage  over  the  British  Isles  is  already  enormous, 
and  it  is  still  growing  steadily.  In  1871,  the  year  of 
the  foundation  of  the  German  Empire,  the  populations 
of  the  two  countries  were  : 

Germany 41,000,000 

United  Kingdom  31,800,000 

Germany's  advantage         9,200,000 

In  191 1,  the  two  populations  were  : 

Germany «        65,400,000 

United  Kingdom  45,400,000 

Germany's  advantage         20,000,000 

214 


A  CONTRAST  OF  POPULATIONS         215 

Thus  the  advantage  of  Germany  in  mere  numbers  had 
increased  since  1871  by  nearly  11,000,000,  or  by  one 
and  a  half  the  total  population  of  Canada.  How  rapidly 
this  advantage  is  progressing  may  be  gathered  from 
the  subjoined  comparison  of  the  natural  increase  of 
the  populations  of  the  two  countries  in  1910,  the 
latest  year  for  which  figures  are  available  in  both 
cases : 


Births. 

Deaths. 

Natural 
Increase. 

Germany 

United  Kingdom 

Germany's  advantage 

1,983,000 
1,123,000 

1,104,000 
630,000 

879,000 
493,000 

386,000 

An  annual  gain  upon  the  United  Kingdom  of  nearly 
400,000  souls  by  excess  of  births  over  deaths  is  not, 
however,  the  only  factor  by  which  Germany  is  in- 
creasing her  numerical  superiority.  Especially  in 
recent  years,  she  has  benefited  further  in  this  respect 
by  the  decline  of  her  emigration.  During  the  four 
decades  which  have  elapsed  since  the  foundation  of 
the  Empire,  the  excess  of  natives  embarking  over 
those  disembarking  in  the  two  countries  has  been  as 
under: 


Years. 

Germany. 

United  Kingdom. 

1871-1880          

1881-1890          

1891-1900 

1901-1910          

625,968 

1,342,423 
529^875 
279.645 

1,678,919 

2,558,535 
1,742,790 
2,841,464 

1 

In  the  individual  years  of  the  decade  which  closed 
with  191 1,  the  emigration  from  the  two  countries  was 
as  below : 


2l6 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


Year. 

Germany. 

United  Kingdom. 

1902   

32,098 

ioT,547 

1903   

. 

36,310 

147,036 

1904   

,    , 

27,984 

126,854 

1905   

. 

28,075 

139,365 

1906   

. 

31,074 

194,671 

1907   ... 

. 

31,696 

235)092 

1908   

. 

19,883 

91.156 

1909   

. 

24,921 

139,693 

1910   

.    . 

25,531 

233,709 

1911   

• 

. 

22,690 

261,858 

Totals 

; 

• 

280,262 

1,670,981 

It  would  be  some  compensation  to  the  British  Isles 
for  the  loss  of  these  1,670,000  emigrants  if  they  had  all 
gone  to  British  dependencies,  that  might  some  day  be 
united  to  the  Mother  Country  by  the  bonds  of  im- 
mutable federation,  but  large  numbers  of  them  went 
to  foreign  countries,  and  so  were  lost  to  the  British 
Empire.  In  the  United  Kingdom  during  the  nine 
years  1902  to  1910,  the  emigration  to  exceeded  the 
immigration  from  non-European  foreign  countries  by 
606,000  souls.  During  191 1,  121,829  British  passengers 
shipped  in  the  British  Isles  for  the  United  States,  and 
though  a  considerable  proportion  of  them  doubtless 
represented  return  business  and  tourist  traffic,  a  large 
residue  of  genuine  emigrants  must  still  have  remained 
over.  Fortunately  Canada,  Australasia,  and  South 
Africa  now  attract  an  ever-increasing  proportion  of 
the  emigrants  from  the  United  Kingdom,  but  it  is  still 
an  open  question  whether  those  dependencies  can  be 
regarded  as  a  British  asset  for  all  future  time.  During 
the  last  few  decades  the  centrifugal  forces  within  them 
have  unquestionably  developed  more  rapidly  than  the 
centripetal  forces,  and  while  there  has  been  a  good 
deal  of  sentiment  in  favour  of  closer  union  the  actual 
facts  have  been  in  the  direction  of  disruption.  It  is  on 
the  arrest  of  that  tendency,  and  the  substitution  for  it 
of  a  federative  consolidation,  that  the  whole  future  of 


DECREASED  GERMAN  EMIGRATION     217 

the  British  Empire  depends.  For  the  present,  it  is 
inexpedient  to  regard  the  exodus  from  the  British 
Isles  as  anything  else  than  a  sapping  of  the  national 
strength,  and  it  appears  all  the  more  strongly  in  that 
light  when  it  is  contrasted  with  the  drying  up  of  the 
stream  of  emigration  from  Germany. 

It  is  also  very  significant  that  the  decline  in  the 
drain  on  Germany's  population,  apparent  from  the 
figures  set  forth  above,  is  due  not  merely  to  the  reduc- 
tion of  her  emigration,  but  also,  to  a  considerable 
extent,  to  the  return  to  her  shores  of  many  who  had 
left  them  in  earlier  years.  Some  of  these  never  in- 
tended to  settle  abroad  definitively,  but  went  to  the 
United  States  to  complete  their  industrial  or  com- 
mercial training.  It  is  characteristic  of  modern 
Germany  that  many  of  her  commercial  leaders  have 
spent  several  years  in  the  States,  studying  the  latest 
methods  of  making  money  quickly,  and  that  their 
success  in  their  native  country  has  been  largely  owning 
to  what  they  learnt  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic. 
American  influences  have,  in  fact,  played  a  very  large 
part  in  Germany's  most  recent  development.  But 
apart  from  these  business  students,  Germany's  rapid 
progress  in  material  prosperity  has  drawn  back  to 
her  many  of  her  sons  who  had  bidden  her  what  they 
regarded  as  a  final  farewell,  but  who,  having  failed  to 
find  in  the  New  World  the  Eldorado  of  their  dreams, 
have  been  able  to  realize  in  their  old  home  the  hopes 
with  which  they  once  quitted  it. 

Moreover,  besides  ceasing  to  export  her  own 
people,  Germany  has  commenced  on  a  consider- 
able scale  to  import  those  of  other  nations.  In  the 
last  fifteen  years  her  slight  losses  through  emigration 
have  been  more  than  made  good  by  the  influx  of 
foreign  labourers  required  by  her  agriculture  and 
industry.  At  the  time  of  the  professional  census 
taken  in  June,  1907,  no  fewer  than  766,000  foreigners 
were  in  employment  in  Germany.  If  the  count  had 
been  made  a  httle  later  in  the  year  the  number  would 


2i8  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

have  been  much  larger,  for  the  demand  of  German 
agriculture  for  hands  does  not  attain  its  maximum  till 
the  season  of  the  grain  and  root  harvests.  In  the  year 
191 1,  between  350,000  and  400,000  aliens  were  taken 
into  Germany  under  contract  to  work  on  the  fields. 
Much  of  this  seasonal  labour  would  undoubtedly  settle 
permanently  in  the  country  if  it  were  permitted  to  do 
so,  but  in  order  to  prevent  an  aggravation  of  the 
Polish  problem  in  Prussia — a  majority  of  the  seasonal 
workers  being  Russian  or  Austrian  Poles — the  foreign 
agricultural  hands  are  compelled  to  recross  the  frontier 
as  soon  as  their  contracts  have  expired.  Even  on 
works  of  a  military  character,  the  details  of  which  it 
is  desired  to  keep  secret,  it  is  found  necessary  to 
employ  foreigners,  and  from  figures  which  have  been 
given  in  the  daily  press,  it  would  appear  that,  in 
spite  of  all  the  efforts  of  the  authorities  to  eliminate  it, 
the  alien  element  in  the  labour  engaged  in  the  widen- 
ing of  the  Kiel  Canal  has  varied  from  about  20  to 
35  per  cent.  At  the  ordinary  censuses  which  have 
been  taken  since  the  foundation  of  the  Empire,  the 
numbers  of  foreigners  resident  in  Germany  were  as 
under : 


1871 ... 

1875 ... 
1885 ... 
1890 ... 

1895 ... 
1900 ... 
1905 ... 
1910 ... 


206,755 
290,799 
372,792 

433>254 

486,190 

778,698 

1,028.560 

1,259,873 


Among  the  million  and  a  quarter  foreigners  counted 
in  1910  were  635,000  Austrians,  144,000  Dutch,  138,000 
Russians,  104,000  Italians,  68,000  Swiss,  32,000  Hun- 
garians and  Croats,  26,000  Danes,  19,000  French, 
18,000  British,  18,000  North  Americans,  14,000  Luxem- 
burgers,  13,000  Belgians,  and  10,000  Swedes.  < 

At  the  present  moment,  there  seems  little  prospect 
of  a  substantial  modification  of  the  numerical  relation- 
ship of  the  population  of  the  British  Isles  and  Germany, 


DECLINE  OF  THE  BIRTH-RATE 


219 


in  consequence  of  changes  in  their  birth-rates.  In 
both  countries  human  fertility  has  fallen  off  rapidly, 
but  it  remains  much  greater  in  Germany  than  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  During  the  fifteen  years  ended  with 
1910  the  birth-rate  per  thousand  of  population  was  in 
the  two  countries  : 


Year. 

United 
Kingdom. 

Germany. 

Germany's 
Advantage. 

1896            

29*0 

37'5 

8-5 

1897            

28-9 

37'2 

8-3 

1898            

287 

37-3 

8-6 

1899            

28-5 

37'o 

8-5 

1900            

28-2 

36-8 

8-8 

1901            

28-0 

36-9 

8-9 

1902            

28-0 

36-2 

8-2 

1903            

28-0 

34"9 

6-9 

1904            

277 

35-2 

7*5 

1905            

27-1 

34-0 

6-9 

1906            

27-0 

34-1 

7-1 

1907            

26-3 

33-2 

6-9 

1908            

26-6 

33-0 

6-4 

1909            

257 

31-9 

6-2 

1910            

25-0 

307 

57 

It  is  true  that  Germany's  advantage,  which  was 
8*5  per  thousand  of  population  in  1896,  had,  by  1910, 
sunk  to  57,  but  simultaneously  her  death-rate  declined 
from  22*1  to  17*1  per  thousand,  while  that  of  the 
United  Kingdom  dropped  only  from  16*9  to  14  during 
the  fifteen-year  period.  In  a  recent  newspaper  article, 
Professor  Julius  Wolf,  of  Breslau,  an  eminent 
economist,  pointed  out  that  the  birth-rate  of  Germany 
exceeded  that  of  England  alone  by  only  '6  in  the  five 
years  1851-55,  whereas  by  1881-85  its  excess  had  risen  to 
3*5  and  by  1908  to  5*5.  While  he  apparently  wished  to 
suggest  that  the  fecundity  of  England  was  falling  even 
more  rapidly  than  that  of  his  own  country,  he  at  the 
same  time  adrnitted  the  contradictory  conviction  that 
the  annual  natural  increase  of  the  population  of 
Germany,  which  is  at  present  between  800,000  and 


220  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

900,000  souls,  would,  within  measurable  time,  drop  to 
600,000,  400,000,  or  even  lower. 

It  is  only  quite  recently  that  the  German  authorities 
have  shown  signs  of  waking  up  to  the  decline  in  their 
country's  human  fertility,  though  it  has  been  going  on 
steadily  since  1876,  when  the  Empire's  births  numbered 
42'6  per  thousand  of  population.  Early  in  1912,  the 
Prussian  Government  instituted  an  enquiry  as  to  the 
causes  of  the  phenomenon  and  the  possibility  of 
counteracting  them,  but  it  is  very  doubtful  whether 
the  investigation  will  lead  to  the  discovery  of  an 
effective  antidote.  The  tendency  has  been  an  invari- 
able concomitant  of  the  concentration  of  population  in 
large  towns,  and  is  no  doubt  mainly  of  artificial  rather 
than  physiological  origin  both  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Germany.  In  the  latter  country  it  has  had  a 
special  cause  in  the  extraordinarily  rapid  inflation  ot 
the  cost  of  urban  dwelling  accommodation,  which 
renders  small  families  or  overcrowding  the  only  alter- 
natives for  the  artisan  classes.  On  the  other  hand, 
Germany  possesses  in  her  proprietary  peasants  and 
her  Catholics  a  trustworthy  bulwark  against  the  danger 
of  depopulation.  Neither  the  incentives  nor  the  op- 
portunities for  an  interference  with  the  natural  law  of 
multiplication  exist  in  the  rural  districts  in  anything 
like  the  same  degree  as  they  do  in  the  towns,  and  in 
no  country  in  the  world  can  the  Church  of  Rome  exact 
a  more  unquestioning  obedience  to  its  social  decrees 
than  it  does  in  the  Catholic  areas  of  Germany. 

Thus  we  find  that,  in  1909,  whereas  the  birth-rate  in 
Berlin  was  only  22  and  in  Hamburg  25*8  per  1,000,  in 
the  agricultural  province  of  East  Prussia  it  was  32*8, 
in  Catholic  Westphalia  38-8,  and  in  Posen,  where,  it  is 
true,  it  was  assisted  by  the  superior  fertility  of  the  Slav, 
as  high  as  39*5.  It  is,  of  course,  unlikely  that  these 
safeguards  will  always  retain  their  present  effective- 
ness, but  their  operation  will  certainly  be  felt  for  a 
long  time  to  come.  Should  the  prediction  of  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  and  Professor  Schmoller  be  verified,  and  the 


TWO  HUNDRED  MILLION  GERMANS     221 

end  of  the  century  see  the  German  nation  swollen  to 
200,000,000  souls,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that,  other 
things  remaining  as  they  are,  the  disproportion  be- 
tween its  numbers  and  those  of  the  population  of 
the  British  Isles  will  be  much  more  pronounced  than 
it  is  to-day. 

Numbers  alone  do  not,  of  course,  count  for  every- 
thing, even   as   between  nations  living  under  similar 
economic  conditions.     Superiority  of  quality  can  make 
good  almost  any  quantitative  inferiority.    The  question 
must  therefore  be  asked,  w^hether  the  character,  gifts 
and  attainments  of  the  Briton  are,  on  the  average,  so 
much  superior  to  those  of  the  German  as  to  compen- 
sate for  the  latter's  enormous  numerical  superiority. 
And,  undoubtedly,  it   can   only  be    answered   in   the 
negative.       While    the    German    is    slow,   and   lacks 
intuition,    independence   and   initiative,  he   is,  on  the 
other   hand,    patient,  industrious,   thrifty,   and   sober 
Though  he  has   but   little   originality,  he   is   a   close 
observer,  a  diligent  imitator,  a  laborious  thinker-out 
of  other  men's  thoughts.     Indeed  it  is  not  infrequently 
he  who  thinks  them  out   to   their   logical   and   their 
practical   conclusions.      If  he   fails    where   rapid   im- 
provisation is  needed,  and  has  difficulty  in  adapting 
himself  to  a  sudden  and  unforeseen  situation,  he  suc- 
ceeds wherever  faithful  adherence  to  law,  rule,  regu- 
lation, prescription,  discipline,  organization,  method, 
schedule,    or    pattern   is    the   essential    condition    of 
success.     Whatever  is  known  by  others  he  too  will 
know  ere  long,  and  he  may  be  the  first  to  apply  the 
knowledge  to  practical  use.     An  invention  or  a  fresh 
idea  may  give  another  nationality  a   momentary  ad- 
vantage, but  the  German  will  adopt  it  promptly,  and 
will  never  remain  far  behind  in  the  race.     The  whole 
history  of  German  development  during  the  last  couple 
of  centuries  has  been  one  long  record  of  the  adoption 
and  adaptation  of  the  ideas  of  other  nations.     Without 
Hume,  as  Professor  Schulze-Gaevernitz  has  admitted, 
there  would  have  been  no  Kant ;  without  Louis  XIV., 


222  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

Frederick  the  Great  is  unthinkable;  without  Napoleon, 
Moltke  would  never  have  planned  his  campaign  of 
1870.  German  industry  has  been  copied  stage  by 
stage  and  process  by  process  from  that  of  Great 
Britain.  In  particular,  both  the  ships  and  methods 
of  Germany's  Navy  as  well  as  of  her  mercantile 
marine  have  been  based  upon  British  models.  The 
copying  and  the  imitation  have,  however,  been  no 
mere  apish  mimicry,  but  the  intelligent  comprehension 
of  principle  and  the  sedulous  application  of  scientific 
law;  and  in  this  way  the  German  has  frequently 
surpassed  his  master. 

It  would  also  be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  import- 
ance to  Germany  of  her  large  infusion  of  Jewish  blood. 
There  are,  indeed,  those  who  regard  the  latest  phases 
of  the  Empire's  development  as  a  specifically  Semitic, 
and  not  at  all  as  a  Teutonic  phenomenon.  Germany's 
banks  and  financial  houses  are  almost  exclusively  in 
the  hands  of  Jews,  and  that  race  is  the  leaven  of  her 
commerce.  Herr  Ballin,  the  architect  of  the  Hamburg- 
America  Line,  the  biggest  shipping  concern  in  the 
world  ;  Herr  Rathenau,  the  organizer  of  the  Allgemeine 
Electrizitats-Gesellschaft,  the  leading  electrical  under- 
taking of  Europe  ;  and  the  Loew^es,  who  have  won 
international  repute  for  German  small  arms  and 
machine  tools,  are  all  Jew^s,  and  the  list  might  be 
extended  almost  indefinitely.  Jews  throng  the  front 
ranks  in  Germany's  law,  medicine,  art,  music,  literature, 
dramia,  and  journalism.  They  are  to  be  found  every- 
where exercising  their  unrivalled  flair  for  the  public's 
wants  and  their  marvellous  capacity  for  organization. 
Of  the  entire  population  of  the  Empire  11 1  out  of 
every  10,000  are  professing  Israelites,  whereas  in  the 
United  Kingdom  the  ratio  is  only  20  to  every  10,000. 
In  some  of  the  principal  German  towns  the  propor- 
tion of  the  Jews  is,  of  course,  much  higher  than  it  is  on 
the  average  for  the  whole  country ;  and  practically  the 
entire  city  of  Berlin  is  their  property.  To  some 
extent,  at   any  rate,  the   partial   removal   of  the  dis- 


EFFECTS  OF  PROSPERITY  223 

abilities  which  formerly  weighed  on  this  highly-gifted 
commercial  race  has  contributed  to  Germany's  rapid 
economic  advance;  and  the  merit  is  in  no  small  measure 
theirs  if  it  can  be  said  that  the  qualities  of  the  German 
mind  are  to-day  as  conducive  to  the  creation  and 
accumulation  of  material  wealth  as  the  characteristics 
of  any  other  nationality. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  danger  undoubtedly  lies  in  the 
defects  of  the  German's  qualities.  He  inclines  to 
formalism  and  rigidity,  and  his  love  of  law  and  rule 
is  already  exposing  him  to  the  risk  of  being  strangled 
by  legislation.  Moreover,  there  are  unmistakable 
signs  that  his  prosperity  has  been  too  sudden,  and 
that  his  wealth  is  accumulating  too  rapidly.  In  the 
larger  towns,  and  especially  in  the  capital,  the 
traditional  thrift,  frugality  and  idealism  of  the  German 
have  been  replaced  by  a  luxury,  a  self-indulgence,  a 
crude  materialism,  and  a  delight  in  vulgar  ostentation, 
which  bode  ill  for  the  future  of  the  race.  The  Lutheran 
religion  is  powerless,  if  not  actually  dead,  and  in  its 
stead  a  scientific  hedonism,  which  applies  to  pleasure 
and  sensuality  all  the  method  and  system  which  in 
other  directions  have  done  so  much  for  Germany,  is 
asserting  its  maleficent  sway  over  the  urban  mind. 
Berlin  is  now  the  metropolis  of  European  vice,  and, 
strange  though  it  may  seem,  there  are  many  of  its 
citizens  who  seem  quite  proud  of  this  evil  pre- 
eminence, regarding  it  apparently  as  a  legitimate  title 
to  international  fame. 

It  is  not  without  significance  that  the  article  most 
widely  advertised  in  Germany  at  the  present  day  is 
champagne — either  the  French  product  or  the  inferior 
and  deleterious  native  imitation  known  as  **  Sekt." 
This  may  indicate  wealth,  but  it  also  points  to  a 
perilous  habit  of  expenditure.  It  cannot  be  denied 
that  the  disposition  to  live  for  money  and  the  luxuries 
it  can  buy  has  developed  disquieting  strength  in  the 
British  Isles  of  recent  years,  but  the  Briton  has  an 
effective  antidote  in  the  bracing  self-discipline  of  sport. 


224  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

In  Germany  sport  is  still  only  the  cult  of  coteries,  and 
its  stimulating  principles  cannot  be  said  to  play  an 
appreciable  roll  in  the  national  life.  Whether  they 
will,  at  some  future  date,  impose  an  effectual  restraint 
on  the  present  inclination  towards  enervating  amuse- 
ments, is  a  question  to  which  it  is,  at  the  moment, 
impossible  to  return  an  answer. 

Strenuous  efforts  are  being  made  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  some  of  the  German  States  to  awaken  an 
interest  in  sports,  and  especially  by  that  of  Prussia, 
where    the    Emperor    and    the    Crown    Prince   have 
placed  themselves  at  the  head  of  the  movement.     The 
monarch's  encouragement  of  sailing  and  rowing,  his 
regular  attendances  at   the   regattas  at    Kiel,  on  the 
Elbe  estuary,  and    on  the  lakes  round   Berlin,  have, 
of  course,  a  more  definite  political  purpose  than  the 
mere  maintenance  or  improvement  of  the  physique  of 
the  nation.     It  is  here  his  outspoken  purpose  to  direct 
the  attention  of  his  subjects  to  the  water,  on  which  he 
has  told  them  that  their  future  lies.     The  Emperor 
has,  however,  exerted  himself  to  promote  other  types 
of  sport — for  instance,  by  the  introduction  of  football 
into  the  Prussian  Army ;  while  the  Crown  Prince  not 
only  is  himself  a  first-class  all-round  sportsman,  but 
loses  no  opportunity  of  inciting  others  to  follow  in  his 
footsteps.     That   both  father  and  son  have  acquired 
their  love   of   sport  from    English    associations   and 
English  example  is  indisputable.     Indeed,  the  former 
has  repeatedly  admitted   as  much.      Addressing  the 
troops  about  to  embark  on  the  expedition  to  China  in 
1900,  he  said:  "The  first  care  must  be  for  the  health 
of  the  men,  and  the  principal  thing  is  to  keep  them 
occupied  with  exercise,  games,  and  races  right  round 
the  deck.      It  is  the  experience  of  the  English,  too, 
that  physical  exercise  is  the  main  thing."     Speaking 
to   another   batch   of  men   setting   out   on   the  same 
errand,   he    said :    "  We    can    learn    here    from    the 
Enghsh,   who    are   very   practical    in    these   matters. 
Give  your  men  plenty  of  running  games."    Similarly, 


THE  GERMAN  PEOPLE  AND  SPORT    225 

the  "path-finder"  movement,  which  is  making  great 
progress  in  Germany  under  the  active  patronage  of 
Field-Marshal  Baron  von  der  Goltz,  was  considered 
worthy  of  steady  official  cultivation  only  after  the  boy 
scout  had  become  a  popular  figure  in  English  life. 
The  encouragement  of  sport  in  Germany  is,  in  fact, 
but  one  more  instance  of  Teutonic  imitativeness.  It 
has  its  origin  in  the  conviction,  that  not  only  the 
Battle  of  Waterloo,  but  also  Great  Britain's  com- 
mercial, industrial,  and  political  position  in  the  world 
was  won  on  the  playing-fields  of  Eton,  and  that  to 
attain  a  like  pre-eminence  Germany  must  adopt  similar 
methods.  This  cult  has,  however,  still  many  obstacles 
to  overcome,  not  only  in  the  national  habits  of  the 
German  race,  but  also  in  the  prejudices  and  traditions 
of  its  dominant  classes.  The  feeling  that  Germany 
should  follow  the  laws  of  her  own  national  develop- 
ment, and  close  her  doors  to  foreign  influences,  which 
seems  to  be  growing  in  strength  among  one  section 
of  the  population,  finds  expression  in  the  complaints, 
uttered  by  members  of  the  old  Prussian  nobility,  that 
the  Crown  Prince  would  be  better  occupied  in  attending 
more  closely  to  his  military  duties,  and  in  mastering  the 
intricacies  of  the  bureaucratic  machine,  than  in  shooting 
elephants  in  India,  playing  tennis  at  Heiligendam,  or 
toboganning  in  Switzerland.  What  will  be  the  ultimate 
issue  of  this  struggle  of  forces  it  is  impossible  to  foresee. 
Trustworthy  data  as  to  changes  in  the  physical 
condition  of  the  German  people  are  not  obtainable. 
German  laudatores  temporis  acli  lay  much  stress  on  the 
decline  in  the  percentage  of  the  young  men  due  to 
enter  the  Army  and  pronounced  by  the  doctors  to 
be  fit  for  military  service,  but  the  returns  on  this 
point  are  a  very  uncertain  guide.  Medical  standards 
have  changed  and  are  still  changing.  Certain  forms 
of  nervous  constitution  which  were  formerly  regarded 
as  voluntary  personal  peculiarities  are  now  classified 
as  specific  disease.  Hereditary  predispositions  can 
now  be  detected   at  a  much   earlier   stage  than  was 

15 


226  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

possible  twenty  years  ago.  Moreover,  it  is  certain 
that  the  Army  doctors  sound  for  pohtical  as  well  as 
physical  disease,  and  that  the  medical  examination  is 
used  to  give  preference  to  the  rural  recruits  who  are 
less  likely  than  the  young  artisans  of  the  towns  to 
have  been  inoculated  with  the  Socialistic  virus.  For 
it  is  felt  that  to  give  a  military  training  to  a  Socialist 
may  mean  nothing  more  than  to  furnish  an  efficient 
fighter  to  the  revolution  which  looms  up  menacingly 
in  some  Germans'  dream  of  their  Empire's  future. 
Even  if  the  diminution  of  military  fitness  were  real 
it  would  not  necessarily  signify  a  depression  of  the 
national  stamina,  but  might  easily  be  accounted  for 
by  the  advance  of  medical  skill,  which  saves  the  lives 
of  many  persons  of  inferior  vitality  who  at  an  earlier 
period  would  inevitably  have  perished  in  infancy. 

The  German  people  is  undoubtedly  passing  through 
one  of  those  phases  of  rapid  development  to  which 
the  word  "  transition "  is  generally  applied,  but  it 
would  be  rash  to  assume  that  the  outcome  of  it  will 
be  national  degeneration  or  reduced  efficiency  in  the 
contest  for  the  commercial,  industrial,  and  political 
supremacy  of  the  world.  Those  whose  position  is 
threatened  by  Germany's  challenge  will  do  well  to 
concentrate  their  attention  on  those  factors  which  tend 
to  make  her  strong  rather  than  on  those  which  appear 
to  have  the  opposite  tendency. 

Having  glanced  at  the  human  element  in  the  problem, 
let  us  now,  for  a  moment,  consider  the  material  ele- 
ment. The  prime  natural  resources  of  a  country  are 
its  area  and  the  fertility  of  its  soil,  and  in  respect  of 
these  Germany  again  has  a  great  advantage  over  the 
British  Isles,  in  spite  of  the  barrenness  of  those  vast 
tracts  in  the  north  of  the  Empire  which  at  present  are 
covered  only  w4th  heather  and  gorse,  or  with  stunted 
fir-trees  of  little  utility  except  as  firewood.  The  total 
extents  of  the  two  countries  and  the  areas  under  the 
principal  types  of  cultivation  in  1910  are  shown  in  the 
subjoined  table  : 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  RESOURCES      227 


United  Kingdom. 


Germany. 


Total  area        

Woods  and  forests     ... 
Total  cultivated  area... 

Wheat 

Barley 

Oats       

Rye       

Potatoes  


Acres. 

77,716,992 

3,069,070 

46,931,637 

1,857,671 

1,899,130 

4,116,137 

57,004 

1,144,465 


Acres. 

133,585,000 

34,272,000 

78,632,139 

4,842,196 

3,879,090 

10,594,341 
15,280,235 

8,141,323 


The  harvests  yielded  by  these  crops  in  1910  were  as 
below : 


Wheat  ... 
Barley  ... 
Oats  ... 
Rye 

Potatoes 


United  Kingdom. 


Tons. 
1,540,700 
1,430,200 
3,110,500 
6,700 
6,450,800 


Germany. 


Tons. 

3,861,500 

2, 90  J»,  900 

7,900,400 

10,511,200 

43,468,400 


The  numbers  of  the  principal  animals  bred  for 
human  food  in  the  two  countries  were  in  1907,  the 
date  of  the  last  German  agricultural  census,  as  under: 


United  Kingdom. 

Germany. 

Cattle 

Sheep    

Pigs       

11,630,142 

30,011,833 

4,055,793 

20,630,544 

7,703,710 

22,146,532 

In  the  consideration  of  the  foregoing  figures,  allow- 
ances must  be  made  for  differences  of  national  habit, 
the  prominent  place  taken  by  rye,  bread,  and  potatoes 
in  the  German's  diet,  and  his  preference  for  pork  over 
mutton.  It  should  further  be  mentioned  that  in  1909 
Germany  produced  12,684,874  tons  of  sugar-beet  and 
44,453,640  gallons  of  grape  juice  for  the  manufacture 
of  wine.     Moreover,  while  the  tendency  in  the  United 


228  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

Kingdom  is  for  land  to  go  out  of  cultivation,  in  Germany 
it  is  the  reverse.  Till  that  problematical  date  when 
Germany  possesses  colonies  in  the  temperate  zone 
suitable  for  settlement  by  white  men,  her  Government 
will  do  all  in  its  power  to  restrain  its  subjects  from 
emigration.  For  military  and  political  reasons  it  is 
anxious  to  retain  control  over  as  large  a  number  of 
people  as  possible,  and  it  also  desires  to  keep  the 
Empire  in  a  position  to  feed  itself  in  case  of  need 
Much  attention  has  consequently  been  given  of  late 
years  to  the  problem  of  repopulating  the  rural  areas, 
which  are  being  drained  of  their  best  blood  by  the  call 
of  the  towns,  and  with  this  object  in  view  great  efforts 
are  being  made  to  reclaim  the  three-and-a-half  million 
acres  of  waste,  moor  and  marsh  land  which  at  present 
is  put  to  no  use  whatever.  Scientific  opinion  seems  to 
encourage  the  idea  that  a  considerable  proportion  of 
this  might  be  brought  under  profitable  cultivation  if  the 
proper  methods  were  employed,  and  the  probability  is 
that  before  many  years  have  gone  by  Germany  will  have 
largely  increased  her  yield  of  agricultural  products. 

But  if  the  agricultural  resources  of  Germany  are 
more  productive  than  those  of  the  British  Isles,  she 
has  an  even  greater  superiority  over  this  country  in 
her  mineral  treasures.  In  a  recent  lecture.  Professor 
Engler,  of  Carlsruhe,  estimated  the  total  coal  deposits  of 
Europe  at  700,000,000,000  tons,  of  which  416,000,000,000 
tons  or  nearly  three-fifths  are  situated  in  Germany,  and 
only  193,000,000,000  tons  in  the  British  Isles.  On  the 
basis  of  the  present  rate  of  consumption,  he  calculated 
that  the  British  stores  of  coal  would  last  for  700,  those 
of  Germany  for  3,000  years.  A  more  cautious 
estimate  of  Professor  Milch  puts  the  life-time  of  the 
British  coalfields  at  300  years,  and  that  of  the  Lower 
Rhenish  and  Upper  Silesian  beds,  from  which  Germany 
draws  the  bulk  of  her  supplies,  at  over  a  thousand 
3^ears.  In  addition  to  these  stores  of  solid  fuel,  Germany 
possesses  beneath  her  own  soil  large  reservoirs  of 
petroleum,  which  already  satisfy  quite  a  considerable 


PETROLEUM  AND  IRON  ORE 


229 


proportion  of  her  requirements,  and  which  every  year 
yield  more  abundantly.  In  191 1  Germany's  con- 
sumption of  imported  petroleum  amounted  to  925,000 
metric  tons,  and  her  own  production  was  143,000  tons. 
As  recently  as  the  last  lustrum  of  the  nineteenth 
century  she  obtained  from  her  wells  no  more,  on  the 
average,  than  29,000  tons  of  oil  annually,  so  that  in  ten 
years  the  output  has  increased  fivefold.  Germany 
also  possesses  in  her  voluminous  and  rapid  rivers 
inexhaustible  reserves  of  water-power,  and  the  Bavar- 
ian Government  is  understood  to  be  at  present  pre- 
paring a  scheme  for  the  exploitation  on  a  large  scale 
of  the  streams  which  rush  down  the  northern  slopes 
of  the  Alps  for  the  generation  of  electrical  energy. 
This  project  will  possibly  create  in  South  Germany 
an  industrial  centre  as  busy  and  productive  as  those 
of  the  North  and  West  of  the  Empire. 

"  The  God  who  made  iron  grow  "  has  likewise 
bountifully  endowed  the  country,  one  of  whose  poets 
gave  Him  this  name,  with  the  cardinal  metal  of  industry. 
A  computation  made  by  a  Swedish  committee  for  the 
International  Geological  Congress  held  at  Stockholm 
in  1910  showed  the  utilizable  supplies  of  iron  ore  in 
Europe  and  their  metallic  contents  to  be  as  under: 


Country. 

Ore. 

Metallic  Contents 
of  Ore. 

Tons. 

Tons. 

Germany         

3,607,000,000 

1,270,000,000 

France 

3,300,000,000 

1,140,000,000 

United  Kingdom 

1,300,000,000 

455,000,000 

Sweden 

1,158,000,000 

740,000,000 

Russia 

864,000,000 

387,000,000 

Spain    ,., 

711,000,000 

349,000,000 

Norway 

367,000,000 

124,000,000 

Luxemburg 

270,000,000 

90,000,000 

Austria 

250,000,000 

90,000,000 

Greece 

100,000,000 

45,000,000 

Belgium 

62,000,000 

25,000,000 

Hungary 

33,000,000 

13,000,000 

Italy      

6,000,000 

3,000,000 

Switzerland     ... 

1,600,000 

800,000 

230 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


From  this  estimate  it  would  appear  that  Germany 
possesses  between  two  and  three  times  as  much  as  the 
British  Isles  of  the  principal  metallic  basis  of  all 
industries.  The  development  of  the  production  of  the 
chief  minerals  in  both  countries  during  the  last  thirty 
years  will  be  seen  from  the  following  tables : 

Coal  Production. 


Year. 

United  Kingdom. 

Germany, 

1880       

1885        

1890        

1895        

1900        

1905        

1910        

Tons. 
146,969,000 
159,351,000 
181,614,000 
189,661,000 
225,181,000 
236,129,000 
264,433,000 

Metric  Tons. 

46,974,000 

58,320,000 

70,238,000 

79,169,000 

109,290,000 

121,299,000 

152^828,000 

Metric  ton  =  2,204  pounds. 

Iron  Ore  Production. 


Year. 

United  Kingdom. 

Germany  (includ- 
ing Luxemburg). 

Tons. 

Metric  Tons. 

1880       

18,026,000 

7,239,000 

1885        

15,418,000 

9,158,000 

1890       

13,781,000 

11,406,000 

189s        

12,615,000 

12,350,000 

1896        

13,701,000 

14,162,000 

1900        

14,028,000 

18,964,000 

1905        

14,591,000 

23,444,000 

1910        

15,226,000 

28,710,000 

Thus,  whereas  in  the  United  Kingdom  the  production 
of  iron  ore  declined  substantially  in  the  period  dealt 
with,  in  Germany  it  increased  nearly  fourfold.  The 
statistics  with  regard  to  the  manufacture  of  pig-iron 
and  steel  tell  a  similar  tale,  and  a  few  figures  from 


PRODUCTION  OF  PIG-IRON  AND  STEEL    231 

them  may  be  inserted,  though  they  properly  belong- 
to  a  subsequent  section  of  this  chapter.  During  the 
past  thirty  years  the  development  of  the  production  of 
pig-iron  in  the  two  countries  has  been  as  under  : 


Year. 

United  Kingdom. 

Germany. 

1880        

1885        

1890        

1895        

1900        

1903        

1905        

1910        

Tons. 
7,749,000 
7,415,000 
7,904,000 
7,703,000 
8,959,000 

8,935,000 

9,608,000 
10,012,000 

Metric  Tons. 
2,713,000 
3,673,000 
4,651,000 

5,455,000 
8,507,000 

10,018,000 

10,875,000 
14,794,000 

It  will  be  noticed  that  thirty  years  ago  the  United 
Kingdom  manufactured  nearly  three  times  as  much 
pig-iron  as  Germany,  and  that  the  latter  country  in 
1910  had  the  advantage  by  approximately  50  per  cent. 
In  the  production  of  crude  steel  the  relationship  has 
changed  even  more  emphatically  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  British  Isles,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  subjoined 
table : 


Year. 

United  Kingdom. 

Germany. 

1890        ... 

1893        -          »          ... 

1895        

1900        - 

1905        

1910 

Tons. 
3,579,000 

2,950,000 

3,290,000 
4,901,000 
5,812,000 
6,515,000 

Metric  Tons. 
2,232,000 

3,163,000 

3,963,000 

6,362,000 

10,067,000 

12,281,000 

In  the  two  preceding  tables  special  prominence  has 
been  given  to  the  year,  inserted  out  of  the  quinquennial 


232  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

series,  in  which  German}^  overtook  the  United  Kingdom 
in  these  vital  branches  of  industry.  In  addition  to 
coal  and  iron  Germany  owns  considerable  deposits 
of  the  other  principal  metallic  ores,  from  which  she 
raised  in  1910  the  following  quantities  : 

Tons. 

Copper  ore 926,000 

Zinc  ore  718,000 

Lead  ore         148,000 

Further,  Germany  is,  in  the  words  of  one  of  her 
professors,  **  the  richest  country  in  salts  that  exists  on 
earth,"  and  among  her  saline  treasures  are  vast  deposits 
of  soluble  potash  of  a  quality  such  as  has,  up  to  the 
present,  been  found  in  no  other  part  of  the  world. 
She  has,  in  fact,  through  a  strange  geological  caprice, 
a  natural  world  monopoly  of  a  substance  which  is  now 
practically  indispensable  to  the  manufacturer  of  arti- 
ficial fertilizers,  and  this  endowment  not  only  is  of 
inestimable  value  to  her  own  agriculture,  but  has  also 
been  the  origin  of  an  important  branch  of  her  export 
trade.  In  the  course  of  191 1  she  shipped  abroad  nearly 
2,000,000  tons  of  these  potash  salts,  the  bulk  of  it  going 
to  the  United  States. 

It  may  well  be  asked  why  Germany,  with  her  large, 
plodding  and  methodical  population,  her  agricultural 
resources,  and  her  inexhaustible  mineral  deposits,  has 
been  so  tardy  in  taking  her  natural  place  in  the  ranks 
of  the  first  industrial  and  commercial  nations  of  the 
world.  The  answer  will  be  found  in  those  conditions 
of  political  division  and  confusion  which  have  been 
either  sketched  out  or  indicated  in  earlier  chapters. 
The  lack  of  unity  in  government,  administration,  legis- 
lation, weights,  measures,  and  coinage  ;  centuries  of 
misrule,  internecine  strife,  and  foreign  warfare  ;  a 
perpetual  sense  that  the  conditions  were  unstable  and 
could  not  last,  coupled  with  blank  uncertainty  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  they  might  develop — these  have 
been  the  causes  which  for  so  many  centuries  made 
Germany  the   Cinderella   among  the   big  nations   of 


RETARDED  DEVELOPMENT  233 

Europe.  Even  in  unbroken  peace  and  under  stable 
and  uniform  government  the  repair  of  the  havoc 
wrought  by  the  Thirty  Years'  War  would  have  been 
the  work  of  many  generations,  but  these  conditions 
were  denied  her  till  the  closing  quarter  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  The  armies  of  the  Great  Elector  could 
be  maintained  only  by  the  help  of  foreign  subsidies, 
and  the  wars  of  Frederick  the  Great  so  completely 
exhausted  Prussia  that  he  was  compelled,  in  his  ex- 
tremit}^,  to  melt  down  the  solid  silver  balustrade  of  the 
musicians'  gallery  in  the  Berlin  Palace,  and  replace  it 
with  the  plated  woodwork  which  is  still  pointed  out 
to  tourists  as  a  monument  of  kingly  self-abnegation. 
Before  the  fruits  of  Frederick's  conquests  and  adminis- 
trative reforms  could  be  reaped,  the  Napoleonic  tem- 
pest burst  upon  Europe,  and  the  industrial  progress  of 
Germany  was  again  violently  arrested.  The  French 
occupation  and  the  exhausting  indemnities  exacted  by 
the  conqueror  were  not  in  themselves  so  debilitating 
as  the  consequences  of  Napoleon's  attempt  to  ruin 
Great  Britain  by  closing  the  Continent  to  her  trade, 
and  of  the  retaliatory  blockade  by  which  this  measure 
was  answered. 

Under  the  conditions  thus  created,  Germany's  ship- 
ping languished  and  almost  expired,  and  her  export 
trade  received  a  blow  from  which  some  branches  of  it 
have  never  been  able  to  recover.  The  chronic  distress 
among  the  weavers  of  the  Erzgebirge,  which  has  been 
so  poignantly  depicted  by  Hauptmann  in  his  play, 
"Die  Weber,"  is  attributed  by  some  writers  to  the 
closing  of  foreign  markets  to  Silesian  linen  through 
the  Continental  blockade,  and  in  Germany  there  is  a 
curiously  illogical  tendency  to  blame  Great  Britain 
rather  than  Napoleon  for  this  calamity.  The  flag  of 
Prussia  practically  disappeared  from  the  seas ;  at  the 
commencement  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  the  ship- 
owners of  that  State  possessed  an  aggregate  fleet  of 
1,100  vessels,  but  when  the  conclusive  peace  arrived 
the  number  had  sunk  to  700,  and  these  were  for  the 


234  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

most  part  antiquated  and  of  little  value.  While  the 
blockade  was  in  force  the  prices  of  exotic  commodities, 
such  as  sugar,  coffee,  rice,  tobacco,  and  cotton,  rose  in 
Germany  to  three,  four,  and  even  five  times  their 
former  level,  and  in  its  impoverishment  the  population 
was  all  the  less  able  to  pay  the  higher  rates.  In 
Hanover,  according  to  an  official  computation,  the 
consumption  of  some  of  these  articles  was  reduced 
during  the  blockade  to  a  hundredth  part  of  what  it  had 
previously  been. 

The  War  of  Liberation,  by  which  the  Napoleonic 
yoke  was  shaken  off,  was  financed  largely  by  voluntary 
contributions.  In  the  principal  centres  the  Prussian 
Government  opened  subscription  offices,  to  which,  in 
default  of  money,  noblemen  and  their  wives  brought 
their  family  plate  and  their  personal  jewellery,  and 
members  of  the  poorer  classes  any  trinkets  or  trifles 
made  of  the  precious  metals  they  might  possess.  To 
such  straits  had  Germany  been  reduced  by  the  Napo- 
leonic era. 

The  repartition  of  Europe  carried  out  by  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  left  in  Germany  no  sense  of  finality. 
How  deeply  the  population  was  imbued  with  the  feel- 
ing that  further  changes  in  the  direction  of  national 
unity  were  inevitable,  was  shown  by  the  spontaneity 
with  which  the  Revolution  of  1848  blazed  forth  simul- 
taneously in  a  score  of  different  places.  But  so  long 
as  that  feeling  of  suspension  and  uncertainty  prevailed, 
the  fundamental  conditions  of  industrial  and  commer- 
cial progress  were  lacking.  The  country  recovered  so 
slowly  from  the  convulsions  of  the  first  fifteen  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  that  a  careful  and  conscien- 
tious investigator  like  Professor  Sombart  calculates 
that  the  economic  condition  of  its  people  in  1830  was 
lower  than  it  had  been  in  1802. 

The  Zollverein,  by  which  Germany  became  a 
Customs  unit,  only  partially  removed  the  hindrances  to 
trade  and  traffic  which  had  arisen  from  the  multiplicity 
and  multifariousness  of  her  systems  of  government. 


GROWTH  OF  THE  ZOLLVEREIN        235 

Though,  for  the  purposes  of  trade,  the  internal 
frontiers  were  abolished,  and  it  was  no  longer 
necessary,  as  it  had  been  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  to  pay  sixteen  separate  Customs  dues  on  a 
journey  from  Dresden  to  Magdeburg,  a  great  variety 
of  restraints  on  traffic  continued  to  impede  the 
exchange  of  commodities  for  many  decades  to  come. 
Moreover,  the  Zollverein  was  only  of  gradual  growth. 
As  formed  in  the  years  1834  and  1835,  it  incluc-(  d 
Prussia,  Bavaria,  Wurttemberg,  Saxony,  the  two 
Hesses,  Baden,  Nassau,  the  Thuringian  States,  and  the 
town  of  Frankfort-on-Main.  Ten  years  more  were  to 
elapse  before  it  took  in  the  large  territories  of 
Hanover  and  Brunswick;  and  the  two  chief  Hanse 
towns,  Hamburg  and  Bremen,  did  not  accept  Customs 
membership  of  the  Empire  till  1 888.  And  while  the  first 
Customs  Union  Treaty  of  1833  bound  its  signatories  to 
aim  at  uniformity  of  weights,  measures,  and  coinage, 
this  ideal  was  not  actually  realized  till  the  metric 
system  was  made  compulsory  throughout  the  Empire 
in  1872.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  great  war  of  1870  no 
fewer  than  seven  different  systems  of  currency  still 
obtained  in  Germany. 

Another  bond  which  had  to  be  burst  before  Germany 
could  freely  extend  her  limbs  was  the  serfdom  of  the 
peasantry.  Under  the  agrarian  system  generally 
prevailing  in  the  country  at  the  commencement  of  last 
century,  the  entire  peasant  population  was  tied  fast  to 
the  soil  by  innumerable  allodial  obligations  to  the 
larger  landowners.  All  the  work  on  the  estate  of  the 
junker  was  performed  by  the  peasant  proprietors  of  the 
vicinity,  who,  with  their  own  horses  or  oxen,  ploughed 
his  land,  sowed  his  seed,  and  reaped  and  threshed  his 
crops.  That  they  might  not  escape  these  labours,  they 
were  legally  bound  to  the  places  of  their  birth.  Until 
this  modified  enslavement  was  done  away  with,  and 
the  rural  population  was  permitted  to  migrate  to  the 
towns,  the  modern  industrial  development  of  Germany 
was  impossible  through  lack  of  labour,  if  for  no  other 


236  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

reason.  Attempts  at  agrarian  reform  were  made  by 
Stein  and  Hardenberg  from  1807  to  1821,  but  it  was 
not  till  the  second  half  of  the  century  that  the 
adscriptus  glebi  was  fully  and  finally  abolished. 
Meanwhile  the  United  Kingdom  had  passed  completely 
over  to  factory  and  machine  manufacture,  with  the 
assistance  of  workmen  drawn  from  the  rural  districts. 

Yet  another  impediment  which  shackled  German 
industry  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  nineteenth  century 
was  the  guild  organization  of  her  trades.  For  hundreds 
of  years  the  guilds  had  followed  the  selfish  and  short 
sighted  policy  of  restricting  output  and  smothering 
enterprise  in  the  interests  of  their  members.  The}' 
imposed  regulations  limiting  the  number  of  apprentices 
who  could  be  indentured  by  the  individual  master, 
controlling  his  output,  and  fixing  the  times,  prices,  and 
methods  both  of  the  purchase  of  his  raw  materials  and 
of  the  sale  of  his  finished  commodities.  This  entire 
system  had  to  be  swept  away  before  Germany  could 
adapt  herself  to  cosmopolitan  trade. 

It  has  been  seen  how  the  opposition  of  Hanover  to 
the  construction  of  a  railway  through  her  territory 
made  it  necessary  to  convey  building  material  for  the 
naval  base  of  Wilhelmshaven  by  the  long  and  circuitous 
sea-route ;  and  this  was  but  a  crowning  example  of 
the  purblind  and  petty  policy  by  which  German 
Princes  had  long  obstructed  the  provision  of  those 
channels  of  communication  that  are  the  arteries  and 
veins  of  a  country's  commerce.  In  consequence  of 
political  division  and  princely  jealousy,  Germany  was, 
at  the  beginning  of  last  century,  almost  entirely  devoid 
of  highways.  Especially  in  the  northern  districts, 
traffic  had  to  be  carried  on  along  rough  tracks  that 
were  hardly  passable  in  the  winter  and  after  rainy 
weather.  It  was  only  in  the  forties  of  the  nineteenth 
century  that  the  construction  of  highways  was  syste- 
matically taken  in  hand.  By  1857  Germany  had 
nearly  20,000  miles  of  good  roads ;  ten  years  later 
a  further  10,000  miles  had  been  added ;  and  by  the 


UNIFIED  POSTAL  SYSTEMS  237 

close  of  the  century  the  aggregate  length  had  increased 
to  over  80,000  miles.  The  state  of  the  roads  naturally 
reacted  on  the  speed  of  travel  and  transport.  In  the 
early  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century  twenty-five 
miles  was  considered  a  good  day's  journey,  and  it  was 
little  less  than  a  revolution  when,  in  1824,  the  Prussian 
Minister  of  Posts  introduced  the  English  mail  speed 
of  forty-five  miles,  and  so  reduced  the  distance  between 
Berlin  and  Magdeburg  from  two  days  and  a  night  to 
fifteen  hours.  Even  then,  owing  to  the  multiplicity  of 
authorities,  the  postal  service  was  ver}^  slow  in  develop- 
ing. In  1842,  two  years  after  the  adoption  of  national 
penny  postage  in  England,  the  annual  epistolary  corre- 
spondence of  Prussia  amounted  to  only  a  letter  and  a 
half  per  head  of  population,  and  ten  years  later  this 
proportion  had  not  more  than  doubled.  By  the  Prusso- 
Austrian  postal  agreement  of  1850  the  number  of 
independent  post-offices  in  Germany  was  reduced  to 
seventeen,  but  even  the  postal  tariff  of  the  North 
German  Confederation  was  a  volume  of  300  printed 
pages.  It  was  not  till  1868  that  Germany  received 
the  blessing  of  unified  postal  rates. 

Railways,  too,  came  a  little  too  soon  for  Germany. 
If  that  great  transformation  in  locomotion  had 
succeeded  instead  of  preceding  her  unification,  she 
would  have  adopted  it  with  less  doubt  and  hesitation, 
and  have  been  quicker  in  reaping  the  benefits  of  it. 
The  prophetic  eye  of  Friedrich  List  at  once  recognized 
the  enormous  importance  of  the  iron  road,  and  he 
employed  his  most  eloquent  persuasions  in  favour  of 
a  plan  for  '*  raising  Germany  by  a  great  net  of  railways 
to  the  rank  of  the  industrial  countries,  and  so  uniting 
the  severed  limbs  of  the  German  nation  to  a  sound 
and  vigorous  body."  But  this  keen-visioned  seer  was 
far  in  advance  of  the  bulk  of  his  countrymen,  and 
especially  of  those  governments  which  had  imprisoned 
and  banished  him,  as  they  had  so  many  of  the  truest  of 
German  patriots.  Stephenson's  '*  Rocket "  made  its 
fi.rst  triumphant  journey  in  1829,  and  it  was  ten  years 


238 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


later  before  Dresden  and  Leipzic  were  linked  up  by  the 
first  railway  of  any  importance  to  be  constructed  in 
Germany.  In  the  meanwhile,  two  short  local  lines 
had  been  laid  down  between  Nuremberg  and  Furth 
(1835),  and  between  Berlin  and  Potsdam  (1838).  The 
subsequent  development  of  German  railways  may  be 
seen  from  the  appended  table: 


Year. 

1845 
1850 

1855 
i860 
1865 
1870 

1875 
1880 
1885 
1890 

1895 
1900 

1905 
1910 


Length  of  Line 
in  Kilometres. 

..    2,131 

5.822 

7,781 
11,026 
13,821 
18,560 

27.795 
33.865 
37.572 
41,818 
45.203 
49,878 
54,680 
59.031 


Kilometre  =  §  mile. 


Here,  too,  it  was  the  removal  of  political  uncertainty 
by  the  foundation  of  the  Empire  which  imparted  the 
decisive  stimulus,  for  15,305  kilometres  of  line,  or 
more  than  a  quarter  of  the  whole,  were  completed  in 
the  decade  from  1870  to  1880.  The  development  of 
railways  in  the  United  Kingdom  may  be  compared 
with  that  in  Germany  by  a  glance  at  the  subjoined 
table : 


Year. 

United  Kingdom. 

Germany. 

1840        

1870        

j      1900 

j      1910        

Miles. 

843 

15.239 

21,826 

23,387 

Miles. 

293 
11,600 

36,894 

It  should,  of  course,  be  remembered  that  Germany 
does   not   build   railways  solely  for  the   purposes  of 


TRANSPORT  AND  PRODUCTION        239 

general  traffic,  but  has  constructed  many  hundreds  of 
miles  with  the  main  object  of  being  able  to  fling  her 
armies  with  the  utmost  possible  rapidity  on  to  a 
threatened  frontier. 

Of  the  many  secondary  causes  which  have  con- 
tributed to  give  Germany  to-day  what  must  be  con- 
sidered her  natural  place  in  the  front  rank  of  the 
industrial  States,  none  has  been  more  effective  in  its 
operation  than  the  adoption  of  steam  locomotion. 
England  owes  her  industrial  supremacy  very  largely 
to  her  insular  structure  and  the  situation  of  her 
mineral  resources.  Iron  ore,  coal,  and  limestone 
were  found  on  English  soil  in  close  proximity  to  one 
another,  and  in  no  case  very  far  removed  from  the 
coast  or  navigable  water.  Iron  and  steel  could  thus 
be  produced,  manufactured,  and  shipped  to  either  home 
or  foreign  ports  without  being  burdened  with  heavy 
charges  for  land  transport.  In  Germany  the  condi- 
tions were  the  very  reverse  of  these ;  though  coal 
and  iron  abounded  they  lay  at  great  distances  from 
one  another,  and  could,  as  a  rule,  be  brought  together 
only  by  overland  routes.  It  has  been  calculated  that 
even  to-day  transport  accounts  for  as  much  as  28 
to  30  per  cent,  of  the  cost  of  producing  pig-iron 
in  Germany,  whereas  in  England  the  corresponding 
proportion  is  only  9  to  10  per  cent.  It  may  easily 
be  imagined  how  serious  a  handicap  this  geographical 
separation  of  her  mineral  stores  was  to  Germany  in 
the  days  before  the  horse  had  been  ousted  by  the 
locomotive.  By  the  nationalization  of  the  railways 
the  State  was  provided  with  a  valuable  instrument  for 
stimulating  industries  which  were  considered  of  vital 
importance,  and  by  the  manipulation  of  the  transport 
tariff  economic  miracles  have  been  worked. 

Moreover,  it  was  not  till  Germany's  political  future 
was  assured  by  her  victory  over  France  that  she 
properl}^  developed  the  capacities  of  her  6,000  miles 
of  natural  and  artificial  waterways.  The  channels  of 
the  rivers   were  then   dredged  out   and   their   banks 


240  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

protected  by  buttresses  and  groins ;  new  and  im- 
proved locks  were  constructed ;  and  a  way  to  the 
interior  was  thus  opened  out  to  vessels  of  much  larger 
draught.  On  the  Rhine,  the  barges,  which  had 
averaged  about  loo  tons  displacement  in  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  gradually  increased  in 
size  to  200,  400,  and,  finally,  1,500  and  even  2,000  tons. 
During  the  last  quarter  of  the  century  the  traffic  on 
these  waterways  expanded  from  2,900,000,000  to 
11,500,000,000  kilometre  tons.  It  would  be  difficult 
to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  these  improvements 
in  methods  of  communication  to  that  process  of  '*  mov- 
ing things,"  which,  according  to  Mill,  constitutes  the 
whole  of  industry  and  commerce. 

A  salient  feature  of  modern  Germany  is  the  pro- 
minent part  played  by  the  big  banks  in  the  industrial 
life  of  the  nation.  Credit  has  thus  become  not  so 
much  a  means  as  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  industrial 
expansion.  As  Professor  Sombart  says,  "  The  banks 
have  actually  become  promoters  of  the  spirit  of 
enterprise,  the  pacemakers  of  industry  and  com- 
merce." But  here,  again,  we  have  to  do  with  a  quite 
modern  development.  Until  the  second  half  of  last 
century,  commercial  credit  in  Germany  was  in  a  most 
primitive  condition.  There  was  a  time  between  1830 
and  1840  when  the  Liibeck  Private  Bank  was  the 
only  institution  in  the  country  which  issued  notes. 
In  185 1  the  Prussian  State  Bank,  finding  its  deposits 
accumulating  and  not  knowing  what  to  do  with  them, 
gave  its  customers  notice  to  withdraw  them.  Bill 
discounting  has  become  general  in  Germany  only 
during  the  last  hundred  years.  It  is  also  certain  that 
the  great  increase  in  the  savings  bank  deposits,  so 
often  cited  as  proof  of  Germany's  prosperity,  has  been 
very  largely  due  to  the  abandonment  of  the  habit  of 
hoarding,  which  had  been  the  natural  outcome  of  a  state 
of  political  uncertainty.  Even  to-day  certain  features 
of  banking  are  but  imperfectly  developed  in  Germany. 
The    settlement    of    tradesmen's    bills   by  cheque   is 


BANKING  AND  CREDIT  241 

almost  unknown,  and  any  day  the  head  offices  of  the 
chief  banks  of  Berlin  may  be  seen  crowded  with 
customers  patiently  waiting  till  receipts  for  the  money 
they  have  paid  in  have  been  signed  by  two  members 
of  an  overworked  directorate.  It  is  no  uncommon 
experience  to  have  to  wait  a  quarter,  or  even  half  an 
hour  for  the  cashing  of  a  small  cheque  on  a  sub- 
stantial account  of  long-standing.  The  quick  passage 
of  money  across  the  counter  of  an  English  bank  would 
take  away  the  breath  of  a  German  cashier. 

Nearly  all  the  great  financial  undertakings  which 
have  capitalized  the  successive  advances  of  German 
industry  have  come  into  existence  since  the  middle  of 
last  century,  and  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  more  than 
one  of  them  were  admittedly  modelled  on  the  Credit 
Mobilier,  which  commenced  operations  in  1852.  The 
Schaafhausenscher  Bankverein  was  founded  in  1848, 
the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  in  185 1,  the  Darmstadter 
Bank  in  1853,  the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft  in 
1856,  the  Deutsche  Bank  in  1870,  and  the  Dresdener 
Bank  in  1872.  Just  as  it  is  now  impossible  to  imagine 
Germany's  business  life  without  these  financial  houses, 
so  it  is  easy  to  appreciate  how  difficult  it  must  have 
been  for  her  industry  to  get  on  to  its  feet  in  the  days 
when  nothing  corresponding  to  them  existed.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  seems  to  have  been  with  English 
capital  that  the  larger  reticulations  of  Germany's 
network  of  railways  were  constructed,  just  as  it  was 
English  capital  which  introduced  gas-works  and  water- 
mains  into  some  of  her  principal  towns,  and  inaugur- 
ated the  earliest  line  of  regular  steamers  on  the  Elbe 
between  Hamburg  and  Berlin. 

When  the  long-looked-for  moment  actually  arrived, 
and  Germany  found  herself  for  the  first  time  a  real 
national  unit,  the  pent-up  forces  burst  forth  with  such 
violence  as  to  cause  a  grave  momentary  catastrophe. 
In  his  great  German  History,  Professor  Lamprecht 
says  of  this  period  :  "  With  extraordinary  rapidity, 
new  factories,  mines,  iron  foundries,  railways  sprang 

16 


242 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


up  on  every  hand.  To  deal  first  with  the  most 
important  of  all  undertakings — railways— there  were 
in  Prussia,  in  1872,  besides  1,800  miles  (German  mile 
=  7-42  kilometres)  completed,  700  miles  under  con- 
struction and  1,200  miles  projected.  From  1871  to 
1874  as  many  blast  furnaces,  iron  foundries,  and 
machine  works  were  established  as  had  come  into 
existence  from  1800  to  1870."  The  flotations  in  the 
lustrum  following  the  declaration  of  the  Empire  at 
Versailles  far  surpassed  in  their  aggregate  capital,  if 
not  in  their  number,  those  of  any  equal  period  of  the 
century,  as  will  be  evident  from  the  subjoined  figures : 


Five  Years. 

Number  of  Com- 
panies Floated. 

Capital  in 
Million  Marks. 

1871-1875          

1876-1880          

i88i-i88c:         

1886-1890         

1891-1895         

1896-1900         

1,073 
270 
620 

1,061 
635 

1,390 

2,932 

1,100 
1.997 

In  the  single  year  1872,  no  fewer  than  479  com- 
panies, with  an  aggregate  capital  of  M.  1,477,730,000, 
were  got  together.  Economists  will  probably  always 
differ  as  to  how  far  this  reckless  speculation  and  the 
crash  which  succeeded  it  were,  respectively,  caused 
by  the  indemnity  of  ;^20o,ooo,ooo  that  Bismarck  ex- 
torted from  France.  The  bulk  of  this  money  was 
spent  almost  immediately,  ^130,000,000  of  it  being 
devoted  to  the  rearming  and  remunitioning  of  the 
German  land  forces,  while  a  further  large  sum  went 
to  build  strategic  railways  on  the  Western  Frontier. 

It  is  not  proposed  to  consider  here  the  influence 
which  a  protective  commercial  policy  has  had  upon 
Germany's  industrial  expansion,  but  it  may  be  pointed 
out  that  Bismarck's  abandonment  of  free  trade  in  1879 
coincided  with  another  event  from  which  the  Empire 
has  incidentally  reaped  inestimable  benefits — namely. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMAN  CULTURE    243 

the  invention  of  the  Thomas-Gilchrist  process  of 
making  steel.  Up  to  that  time  the  inexhaustible  sup- 
plies of  iron  found  in  Lorraine  had  been  practically 
useless  for  the  manufacture  of  steel  owing  to  the  high 
percentage  of  phosphorus  contained  in  the  ore.  The 
Thomas-Gilchrist  process,  however,  turned  this  draw- 
back into  a  positive  advantage,  for  the  conversion  of 
Lorraine  ore  into  steel  leaves  a  valuable  bye-product 
in  the  form  of  phosphoric  acid.  Profiting  by  this  Eng- 
lish invention,  Germany  now  obtains  more  than  half 
her  iron  and  three-quarters  of  her  agriculture's  re- 
quirements of  phosphoric  acid  from  the  previously 
despised  and  neglected  ore-beds  of  Lorraine.  It  was 
a  singular  dispensation  of  Providence  that  the  native 
land  of  Liebig,  the  father  of  agricultural  chemistry, 
should,  in  its  potash  salts  and  its  phosphoric  ores, 
be  so  richly  endowed  with  the  two  substances  which 
he  showed  that  it  was  necessary  for  the  farmer  to 
restore  to  the  soil  after  gathering  his  crops.  In  the 
opinion  of  Professor  Sombart,  "  the  dominant  position 
which  the  German  iron  industry  occupied  at  the  close 
of  the  nineteenth  century  is  to  a  large  extent  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  blessings  that  have  fallen  to  it  from  the 
invention  of  the  basic  process  of  casting  iron." 

In  past  ages  Germany  suffered  immeasurably  from 
the  mutual  jealousies  and  animosities  of  her  rulers, 
and  from  their  selfish  territorial  ambitions,  but  their 
emulation  in  the  fields  of  science  and  art  at  any  rate 
conferred  upon  her  one  great  blessing  from  which  she 
has  benefited  enormously  in  her  industrial  ascent. 
This  rivalry  set  up  in  the  region  now  united  as  the 
German  Empire  numerous  centres  of  culture,  and, 
in  course  of  time,  led  to  the  establishment  of  the 
twenty-one  universities,  where,  at  the  present  day, 
between  fifty  and  sixty  thousand  matriculated  students 
drink  at  the  purest  springs  of  knowledge.  To  these 
institutions  it  is  due  that  the  transition  from  empirical 
to  inductive  industry  found  the  Germans  better 
equipped,   as   a  whole,  with    scientific   and  technical 


244  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

information  and  training  than  the  people  of  any  other 
country.  It  was  a  particularly  fortunate  circumstance 
for  Germany  that  her  political  renaissance  should  have 
coincided  with  the  birth  of  an  entirely  new  industry — 
the  electrical — and  the  fundamental  regeneration  of 
another — the  chemical.  These  two  now  absolutely 
vital  industries  differ  from  all  previously  existing 
branches  of  manufacture  in  this,  that  they  are  the 
offspring  of  science  and  not  of  empirical  practice,  of 
laboratory  experiment  and  not  of  workshop  experience. 
With  the  help  of  her  large  class  of  scientifically  trained 
minds  Germany  was  able  to  grapple  with  them  from 
the  outset,  and  she  rapidly  took  the  lead  in  both.  A 
hundred  years  ago  Germany  had  no  chemical  industry 
whatsoever;  she  now  holds  the  place  of  chemist  to  the 
world.  In  191 1  her  exports  of  chemicals,  drugs,  dyes, 
colours,  and  artificial  manures,  were  worth  ;^3 5, 500,000, 
those  of  the  United  Kingdom  only  ;^2o,ooo,ooo.  In 
the  preceding  year  Germany  exported  electrical  ma- 
chinery and  apparatus  to  the  total  value  of  i;"i 0,000, 000, 
the  United  Kingdom  only  to  the  value  of  ^5,700,000. 

It  seems  hardly  necessary  to  dwell  on  the  rapid 
forward  strides  that  have  been  made  by  Germany's 
export  trade  within  recent  years,  so  frequently  and 
fulty  has  this  theme  been  dealt  wuth  in  English 
publications  ;  but  a  few  figures  may  serve  to  revive 
the  essential  facts  in  the  reader's  memory.  Since  the 
statistics  of  the  Empire  were  placed  on  something 
like  their  present  basis,  the  value  of  its  exports  has 
leapt  up  from  decade  to  decade  by  the  following 
gradations  : 

Year.  £ 

1880  144,800,000 

1890  166,400,000 

1900  230,000,000 

1910  ...    ...  367,000,000 

Of  more  importance  for  our  present  purposes  than 
the  mere  bulk  is  the  composition  of  that  trade,  and 
here  it  is  highly  significant  that,  step  by  step  with  the 


PROGRESS  OF  INDUSTRY 


245 


transformation  of  the  battleship  into  a  huge  and  com- 
plex mechanical  contrivance,  an  ever  and  rapidly 
increasing  proportion  of  the  value  of  Germany's 
exports  has  been  accounted  for  by  the  products  of  the 
engineering  industries.  Ten  years  ago  she  sent 
abroad  machines  of  all  kinds  to  the  total  value  of 
;^9,8oo,ooo,  and  that  v^as  4*1  per  cent,  of  the  value  of 
her  aggregate  export  trade.  In  191 1  the  value  of  her 
exports  of  machinery  was  ;^27, 500,000,  and  its  propor- 
tion to  that  of  her  total  export  trade  67  per  cent.  A 
clearer  idea  of  this  tendency  of  German  industry  will 
be  obtained  if  a  glance  is  cast  at  the  subjoined  figures 
from  the  three  occupation  censuses  that  have  been 
taken  in  the  Empire.  They  show  the  proportions  of 
the  persons  engaged  in  certain  occupations  to  the 
totals  of  those  earning  a  livelihood  by  industry  or 
commerce  : 


Industry, 

1882. 

1895. 

3907. 

Per  Cent. 

Per  Cent. 

Per  Cent. 

A.^riculture     

50-12 

43-13 

39-54 

Mining             

272 

3-00 

3'9i 

Metal  working 

3-26 

4'56 

482 

Machinery      

176 

2-04 

3-68 

Chemicals       

0-36 

o"54 

0-65 

Textiles           

5-25 

5-00 

4-29 

Building          

5-84 

7-i6 

7-74 

Commerce      

5-20 

6-37 

7-07 

When  the  great  fiscal  project  was  under  con- 
sideration by  the  Reichstag  in  1908,  the  Imperial 
Finance  Minister  submitted  to  that  Chamber  a  vast 
mass  of  statistical  material,  the  purpose  of  which  was 
to  show  that  Germany  was  well  able  to  bear  the 
additional  burden  that  it  was  proposed  to  place  on  her 
shoulders.  A  special  series  of  tables  was  devoted  to 
the  progress  of  German  industry  during  the  ten  years 
immediately  preceding  the  introduction  of  the  Govern- 
ment scheme.  One  of  these  tables  demonstrates  the 
changes  which  had  taken  place  during  the  decade  in 


246 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


question  in  the  number  of  persons  employed,  and  in 
the  aggregate  horse-power  of  the  engines  at  work,  in 
the  leading  manufacturing  industries.  As  compared 
with  the  figures  for  the  period  1894- 1896,  those  for  the 
years  1904-1906  showed  the  following  increases: 


Industry. 

Employees. 

Horse-power. 

Per  Cent. 

Per  Cent. 

Mining  and  iron     

71-96 
37-84 

157 

Potteries       

138 

Chemicals 

6395 

167 

Paper            

41-36 

160 

Leather        

39-66 

36 

Wood           

72-75 

115 

Food,  etc 

6-78 

70 

Clothing       

92-30 

148 

Equally  striking  is  the  progress  made  by  the  export 
trade  of  these  industries  during  the  ten  years  under  con- 
sideration. Comparing  the  two  periods  1894- 1896  and 
1904-1906,  we  get  the  following  percentual  increases: 


Industry. 

Values  of 

Quantities  of 

Exports. 

Exports. 

Per  Cent. 

Per  Cent. 

Mining  and  iron     

104*00 

70-84 

Potteries       

74-27 

23-71 

Chemicals 

50-68 

113-43 

Paper            

34-41 

42-09 

Leather        

7-54 

58-96 

Wo&d           

30-11 

11-75 

Food,  etc 

2-II 

I  96 

Clothing       

30-84 

15*51 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  industries  which  are  most 
highly  technicalized  went  ahead  much  more  rapidly 
than  the  others.  A  vivid  picture  of  the  advancing 
activity  of  Germany  in  manufacture  is  also  afforded  by 
the  appended  figures  of  the  horse-power  of  the 
stationary  steam-engines  used  at  various  periods  in 
the  industry  in  Prussia : 


SIGNS  OF  GROWING  PROSPERITY     247 


Year. 


1878  ... 

1885  ... 

1895  .- 

1907  ... 


Horse-power. 


887,780 
1,221,884 
2,358,175 
5,190417 


Percentage. 


137 
269 

585 


A  multitude  of  other  conclusive  proofs  of  the 
prosperity  of  the  nation  were  also  adduced  by  Herr 
Wermuth.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  the 
increase  in  the  savings  bank  deposits  in  Germany  has 
been  largely  due  to  a  change  of  habit ;  but  even  with 
this  qualification,  it  is  sufficiently  remarkable  that  they 
should  have  augmented,  between  1875  and  1907,  from 
M.  1,869,200,000  to  M.  13,889,100,000.  Between  1883 
and  1907,  the  deposits  in  the  ordinary  German  banks 
rose  from  M.  813,000,000  to  M.  7,050,000,000,  or,  ex- 
pressed in  percentages,  from  100  to  ^6y. 

Concurrently  with  the  accumulation  of  savings,  it 
was  shown  that  an  enormous  increase  in  the  consump- 
tion of  articles  of  food  had  taken  place.  In  the  case 
of  the  two  principal  bread  grains,  the  annual  consump- 
tion per  head  of  population  was  : 


Average  of  Years. 

Wheat. 

Rye. 

Kilos. 

Kilos. 

1878-1882      

61-4 

128-0 

1883-1887      

65-4 

1 187 

1888-1892      

67-9 

1097 

1893-1897      

87-2 

151-5 

1898-1902      

927 

149-6 

1902-1906      

96-5 

151-1 

A  particularly  noteworthy  feature  of  this  table  is  the 
evidence  it  affords  that  the  consumption  of  wheat  is 
advancing  more  rapidly  than  that  of  the  cheaper  rye. 
In  many  parts  of  Germany,  and  especially  in  the 
north,  where  wheat  cannot  be  profitably  grown,  white 
bread  is  still  regarded  as  one  of  the  luxuries  of  life. 


248 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


and  its  increased  consumption  is,  therefore,  doubly  a 
proof  of  growing  wealth.  The  increase  in  the  per  capita 
consumption  of  other  articles  of  food  bears  similar 
witness,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  appended  figures: 


Average  of  Years. 

Barley. 

Oats. 

Potatoes. 

Sugar. 

Tobacco. 

Kilos. 

Kilos. 

Kilos. 

Kilos. 

Kilos. 

1879-1883 

46-8 

82-3 

34' I 

6-3 

1-2 

1884-1888 

52-8 

857 

401-7 

77 

1-5 

1889-1893 

57-9 

84-8 

434-3 

9-8 

I  "5 

1894-1898 

69-8 

ii3'3 

^45"? 

11-4 

17 

1899-1903 

73-0 

1207 

633-6 

i3'5 

1-6 

1902-1906 

77-9 

I20-6 

6o8-o 

15-5 

1-6 

i 

Unfortunately,  no  trustworthy  statistical  data  with 
respect  to  the  consumption  of  meat  in  Germany  during 
the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  are  available. 
In  the  Treasury  publication,  from  which  the  above 
figures  have  been  taken,  the  ascertainable  facts  are 
carefully  weighed,  and  the  conclusion  is  drawn  from 
them,  that  the  German,  on  an  average,  now  eats  as 
much  meat  as  the  Englishman.  That  the  consumption 
of  meat  has  increased  enormously  in  Germany  of 
recent  years  is  incontestable. 

Still  more  notable  than  the  per  capita  consumption  of 
articles  of  food  is  that  of  the  chief  raw  materials  of 
industry.  From  1879  to  1909,  the  consumption  of  coal 
per  head  of  population  rose  from  0*86  of  a  ton  to  2*153 
tons ;  of  iron  from  48*94  kilograms  to  191  kilograms.  The 
annual  average  consumption  of  cotton  per  head  of  popu- 
lation was,  in  the  years  1871  to  1 875, only  2-84 kilograms; 
in  the  years  1906  to  1910  it  was  6-64  kilograms. 

Further  convincing  evidence  of  the  rapid  accumula- 
tion of  wealth  in  Germany  is  afforded  by  the  taxation 
assessments.  Between  1896  and  1907  the  aggregate 
income  of  individuals  assessed  for  taxation  in  Prussia 
rose  from  M.  10,148,000,000  to  M.  15,874,000,000,  or  by 
156  per  cent.  Few  things  are  more  difficult  to  calculate 
than  the  actual  total  w^ealth  of  a  nation,  and  German 


ENGLISH  AND  GERMAN  WEALTH     249 

economists  differ  widely  in  their  estimates  of  that  of 
their  own  country.  Many  of  them  are  of  opinion  that 
Germany  is  already  richer  than  France,  some  that  it 
has  even  outdistanced  England  in  point  of  wealth. 
Steinmann-Bucher,  who  takes  the  most  optimistic 
view  of  the  Empire's  riches,  calculates  that,  by  the 
year  1930,  they  will  have  attained  the  sum  of 
M.  600,000,000,000,  and  that  those  of  Great  Britain 
will  then  amount  to  no  more  than  M.  424,000,000,000, 
These  and  similar  German  computations  are,  no 
doubt,  unduly  sanguine.  They  are  based,  for  one 
thing,  on  an  arbitrary  and  misleading  definition  of 
wealth,  and  sometimes  entirely  ignore  the  important 
item  of  domestic  appurtenances  and  personal  orna- 
ments, which,  after  land  and  hard  cash,  are  the  most 
enduring  of  all  forms  of  property. 

The  casual  visitor  to  Berlin  is,  as  a  rule,  deeply 
impressed  by  the  pretentious  plaster  fagades  of  that 
mushroom  city,  which  he  usually  takes  to  be  stone, 
and  he  compares  them  with  London's  monotony  of 
grimy  brick,  very  much  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
latter.  Let  him,  however,  wander  in  the  environs  of 
the  two  capitals,  and  what  does  he  find  ?  Within  a 
radius  of  fifty  miles  around  London  the  country  is 
dotted  with  ancient  mansions,  each  filled  with  the 
masterpieces  of  the  goldsmith's,  the  jeweller's,  the 
cabinet-maker's,  and  the  potter's  craft,  many  of  which 
have  an  artistic  value  almost  beyond  price.  Five  or 
six  miles  from  Berlin  he  enters  a  region  where  he  can 
walk  for  hours  through  forests  of  stunted  fir-trees  or 
flat  expanses  of  sandy  soil,  without  encountering  a 
trace  of  the  material  refinements  of  civilization.  The 
contrast  is  just  as  sharp  if  the  surroundings  of  the 
towns  of  second-class  magnitude  in  the  two  countries 
be  compared.  Germany  is  beyond  all  doubt  heaping 
up  wealth  at  an  amazing  rate,  but  an  observant  eye 
will  divine,  much  more  truly  than  the  computations  of 
the  economists,  that  she  has  yet  much  way  to  make 
up  before  she  can  get  level  with  Great  Britain.     At 


250 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


the  same  time,  it  must  ever  be  borne  in  mind  how 
much  larger  both  her  area  and  population  are  than 
those  of  this  country,  and  though  Steinmann-Bucher's 
estimate  assuredly  exaggerates  the  prosperity  of 
Germany,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that,  if  present  ten- 
dencies remain  unchanged,  the  Empire  will,  before  the 
end  of  the  century,  have  become  by  far  the  richest 
country  in  Europe. 

Long  before  that  point  is  reached,  Germany  will  be 
able  without  an  effort  to  bear  the  weight  of  much 
heavier  armaments  than  those  she  now  carries.  It  is 
often  said  that  she  cannot  maintain  both  the  strongest 
Army  and  the  strongest  Navy  in  Europe.  The  state- 
ment sounds  plausible,  but  it  is  in  reality  an  unreasoned 
begging  of  the  question.  Whether  or  not  she  can  do 
this  thing  depends  entirely  upon  her  resources  in 
men,  money,  and  manufacturing  power,  and  in  re- 
spect of  these  three  taken  together  she  is  probably 
already  much  more  favourabl}^  situated  than  any  other 
European  State — that  is  to  say,  if  we  leave  colonies 
out  of  the  question.  And  though  she  is  rightly  re- 
garded as  essentially  the  military  State  of  the  world, 
she  as  yet  has  neither  absolutely  nor  relatively  spent  so 
much  on  national  defence  as  some  of  her  neighbours. 
Nautiats,  the  naval  annual  issued  indirectly  by  the 
German  Ministry  of  Marine,  gives  the  expenditure  of 
the  principal  Powers  of  the  world  on  national  defence 
in  the  year  1912  as  under  : 


State. 

Army. 

Navy. 

Together. 

Thousand 

Thousand 

Thousand 

Marks. 

Marks. 

Marks. 

Great  Britain 

568,340 

899,342 

1,467,682 

Russia  ...         

1,067,684 

354>956 

1,422,640 

Germany          

947.825 

461,983 

1,409,808 

United  States 

647,708 

533,943 

1,181,651 

France 

736,399 

338,623 

1,075,022 

Austria-  H  ungary 

455'8oi 

118,794 

574,595 

Italy      

338,049 

173,509 

51^,558 

Japan    

196,259 

194,643 

390,902 

EXPENDITURE  ON  ARMAMENTS       251 

Per  head  of  population  this  expenditure  works  out  as 
below : 


State. 

Army. 

Navy. 

Together. 

Marks. 

Marks. 

Marks. 

Great  Britain 

12-46 

19-72 

38-18 

France...         

i8'55 

8-53 

27-08 

Germany          

14-23 

6-94 

21-17 

Italy      

9-66 

4-96 

14-62 

United  States 

6-8o 

5-61 

12-41 

Austria- Hungary 

872 

2-27 

10-99 

Russia  ... 

6-86 

2-28 

9-14 

Japan    

376 

373 

7-49 

So  that  both  absolutely  and  relatively  Great  Britain 
spent  more  than  any  other  country  on  national 
defence,  whereas  Germany,  the  military  State  par 
excellence^  stands  only  third  on  the  list  in  respect  both 
of  aggregate  and/^r  capita  expenditure.* 

Similarl}^,  the  financial  burden  which  Germany  has 
to  bear  is  not,  at  any  rate  in  its  immediate  incidence, 
as  great  as  that  which  presses  on  some  other  countries. 
The  German  official  publication,  already  quoted,  gives 
the  following  as  the  total /^r  capita  incidence  of  taxation, 
local  and  municipal  as  well  as  national,  in  the  eight 
chief  countries  of  the  world  : 


Marks. 

United  Kingdom  (1904-05) 

95-80 

France  (1908)    

United  States  (1906-07) 

8o-8o 

Italy  (1906-07) 

48-40 

Germany  (1907) 

48-17 

Austria- Hungary  (1906) 

41-70 

\  apan  (1906)       

20-50 

Russia  (1908)     .^ 

18-40 

Even  if  the  twenty  to  twenty-five  millions  sterling  of 
additional  annual  taxation,  which  the  German  nation 
has  since  that  time  been  called  upon  to  pay  were  to  be 

*  This  survey  takes  no  account  of  the  German  Army  scheme  of 
1913,  which  at  the  moment  of  writing  had  not  yet  been  laid  before 
the  Reichstag. 


252 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 


included  in  the  above  figures,  the  Empire  would  still 
stand  in  a  very  favourable  position.  It  is,  of  course,  true 
that  the  additional  taxes  imposed  in  Germany  of  recent 
years  have  been  very  sorely  felt  and  very  bitterly 
resented.  But  that  by  no  means  implies  that  the 
country  has  reached  the  limit  of  its  taxable  capacity. 
It  is  rather  the  result  of  the  combined  action  of  a 
number  of  other  causes.  In  the  first  place,  the  pros- 
perity of  Germany  is  of  so  recent  a  date  that  it  has 
not  yet  had  time  to  penetrate  to  all  classes  of  the 
population.  While  manufacturers,  merchants,  and 
certain  categories  of  skilled  artisans  have  benefited 
largely  by  it,  the  salaried  classes  generally  and  the  vast 
body  of  unskilled  labourers  have  hardly  yet  begun  to 
feel  its  effects.  Moreover,  a  considerable  proportion  of 
the  German  revenue  is  obtained  from  protective  duties 
on  necessary  articles  of  food,  the  prices  of  v^hich  are 
raised  accordingly.  The  consumer  pays  the  amount 
of  the  duty  not  only  on  the  imported  but  also  on  the 
home-produced  portion  of  his  food,  though  the  latter 
yields  nothing  to  the  public  revenue. 

German  financial  policy  has  also  been  exceedingly 
improvident,  unsound,  and  injudicious,  for  till  the 
great  finance  reform  of  1908  the  Empire  carried  on 
its  military  and  naval  expansion  largely  on  borrowed 
money.  Up  to  that  date  the  Imperial  funded  debt 
had  grown,  in  times  of  peace  be  it  noted,  in  the  follow- 
ing manner : 


March  31. 

Million  Marks. 

Marks  per  Head. 

1878 
1881 
1886 
1891 
1896 
1901 
1906 
1907 
1908 

• 

. .          ... 

72-2 

267-8 

440-0 

1,317-8 

2,125-3 

2,3957 
3.543-5 
3.803-5 
4.003-5 

1-66 

5-90 

9-36 

26-56 

40-46 

42-29 

58-14 
61-48 
63-78 

INCREASES  OF  TAXATION  253 

At  the  close  of  the  financial  year  1907,  the  national 
debt  comprised  the  undermentioned  items  of  expen- 
diture : 

Marks. 

Army 1,670,100,000 

Navy     768,400,000 

Kiel  Canal        ... 109,000,000 

Colonial  administration          24,000,000 

South-West  Africa  Expedition        ...  379,000,000 

East  Africa  Expedition         1,800,000 

China  Expedition       287,000,000 

For  some  years  Government  and  Reichstag  cheer- 
fully committed  the  country  to  vast  expenditure  for 
the  Navy  and  other  purposes  without  troubling  them- 
selves as  to  where  the  money  was  to  come  from.  In 
the  Memorandum  to  the  Navy  Bill  of  1900  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  had  enunciated  the  principle  :  **  If  new  sources 
of  income  cannot  be  opened  up,  all  that  will  remain  will 
be  to  increase  the  amount  of  the  loan."  This  principle 
was  unquestioningly  adopted  by  the  Reichstag,  not 
with  the  cool  calculation  of  the  Naval  Minister,  but 
in  the  blindness  of  the  Anglophobia  which  the  Boer 
War  had  engendered.  Naturally  the  limits  to  such 
a  policy  are  quickly  reached.  In  1906  a  half-hearted 
attempt  was  made  to  recover  the  lost  financial  equi- 
poise, and  the  German  nation  was  saddled  with  ad- 
ditional taxation  to  the  amount  of  about  10  millions 
sterling  annually.  This,  however,  proved  totally  in- 
adequate, and,  a  couple  of  years  later,  further  imposts, 
expected  to  yield  25  millions  sterling  annually,  were 
demanded  from  the  Parliament.  Thirty-five  million 
pounds  of  fresh  taxation  within  three  years  after  nearly 
forty  years  of  still  unbroken  peace  !  It  is  not  surprising 
that  the  taxpayers  raised  a  howl  of  protest,  and  gave 
more  support  to  the  only  party  which  had  consistently 
opposed  this  expenditure — namely,  the  Socialists ;  nor 
that,  even  after  the  renewed  outburst  of  Anglophobia 
over  the  Morocco  Question  in  191 1,  it  was  the  Socialists 
who,  at  the  expense  of  all  other  parties,  enormously 
increased  their  holding  of  seats  in  the  Chamber.     The 


254  THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS 

other  parties  were  at  length  thoroughly  alarmed  by 
the  consequences  of  their  prodigahty,  and  the  military 
and  naval  measures  of  191 2  would  have  had  but  small 
chance  of  acceptance  had  it  not  been  a  perfectly  under- 
stood thing,  even  before  they  were  presented,  that  the 
increased  outlay  they  involved  would  not  be  covered 
by  additions  to  the  iiscal  burdens  of  the  masses  of  the 
population. 

A  less  reckless  and  improvident  naval  policy  might 
very  easily  have  attained  the  same  ends  at  a  some- 
what later  date  without  involving  these  inconveniences ; 
for,  as  has  been  seen  above,  the  taxation  borne  by  the 
German  people,  in  comparison  with  that  paid  by  other 
nations,  is  by  no  means  excessive,  and  all  sources 
of  public  revenue  have  the  tendency  to  yield  more 
abundantly  as  a  country  grows  richer,  which,  as  must 
also  have  become  apparent,  Germany  is  doing  very 
rapidly. 

If  it  could  be  assumed  that  Germany  had,  during 
the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years,  been  governed  only  by 
shrewd  and  far-sighted  statesmen,  thoroughly  aware 
of  all  the  bearings  of  their  actions,  it  would  be  safe 
to  conclude  that  the  Empire  was  preparing  for  a  naval 
war  which  either  they  had  determined  upon  or  con- 
sidered immediatel}^  inevitable ;  for  such  an  hypothesis 
is  the  only  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  manner  in 
which  Germany  has  pushed  her  naval  armaments  be- 
yond her  momentary  financial  strength.  Fortunately 
this  assumption  cannot  be  made.  Germany's  policy  in 
these  respects  has  been  the  result,  not  of  clear,  but 
of  clouded  thinking — that  is,  if  we  except  one  man, 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  who  conceivably  calculated  that 
the  opportunity  presented  by  the  Boer  War  might  never 
recur,  at  any  rate  during  his  tenure  of  the  Ministry 
of  Marine,  and  that  if  he  did  not  get  his  ships  then 
he  never  would  do  so. 

As  to  the  immediate  future  of  German  finance  it 
would  be  dangerous  to  prophecy.  The  increased 
quantity  of  foodstuffs  now  imported  into  the  country 


THE  FUTURE  OF  GERMAN  FINANCE    255 

has  the  effect  of  swelling  the  public  revenue,  and 
the  present  apparently  satisfactory  condition  of  the 
Empire's  finances  is,  by  an  odd  paradox,  very  largely 
due  to  the  partial  failure  of  the  harvest  in  191 1.  But 
augmented  import  of  food  means  higher  prices  in  a 
protected  country,  and  the  urban  population,  which 
is  growing  by  leaps  and  bounds  by  the  absorption 
of  ambitious  rustics,  is  already  up  in  arms  against 
the  agrarian  tariff.  It  is  quite  conceivable,  nay,  even 
probable,  that  its  discontent  may  ere  long  rise  to  such 
a  pitch  as  to  force  a  change  in  the  Empire's  commercial 
policy.  That  would  mean  a  dislocation  of  the  Imperial 
finances,  and  some  time  would  have  to  elapse  before  it 
would  be  possible  to  establish  them  on  another  footing. 


CHAPTER  IX 

PARLIAMENT  AND  GERMAN  NAVAL  POLICY 

The  question  whether  Germany  will  continue  to 
enlarge  her  Fleet  concurrently  with  her  economic 
expansion  is  not  easy  to  answer,  for  the  reply  to  it 
depends  upon  political  considerations,  both  foreign 
and  domestic,  of  a  somewhat  complex  character. 

When  we  speak  of  Germany,  or  any  other  country, 
having  certain  "  determinations"  or  "intentions,"  all  we 
can  mean  is  the  effective  will  of  the  nation  as  it  has 
been,  or  is  likely  to  be,  manifested  in  legislative  or 
administrative  acts.  This  effective  will  is  not  neces- 
sarily synonymous  with  the  popular  will — indeed  often 
is  diametrically  opposed  to  it — and  it  is  liable  to 
modification  both  by  intrinsic  change  and  by  alterations 
in  governmental  forms.  Both  nations  and  parliaments 
are,  too,  swa3^ed  by  waves  of  emotion  and  fits  of  passion, 
which  are  frequently  followed  by  reactions  just  as 
sudden  and  violent,  so  that  what  was  the  effective  will 
one  day  ceases  to  be  so  on  the  morrow.  Such  con- 
siderations have  an  important  bearing  on  the  attitude 
of  Germany  towards  the  naval  question. 

It  is  sometimes  quite  falsely  assumed  that  the 
Germans  are  to  an  exceptional  degree  a  homogeneous, 
contented,  united,  and  harmonious  people,  of  which  all 
the  members  concentrate  their  energies  primarily  on 
the  attainment  of  specifically  national  ends.  No  notion 
could  be  farther  from  the  truth.  Germany  is,  on  the  con- 
trary, with  the  possible  exception  of  Austria-Hungary, 
the  most  heterogeneous,  dissatisfied,  disunited,  and  dis- 
cordant nation  in  Europe.     In  no  other  country  do  the 

256 


DIVISIONS  OF  CLASS  AND  CREED      257 

divisions  of  class,  creed,  and  party  cut  so  deep ;  in 
none  other  are  they  so  complicated  by  cross-lines  of 
territorial  cleavage.  Professor  Hans  Delbruck  has 
justly  said  :  "  How  small  is  at  bottom  the  number  of 
those  Germans  who,  in  the  true  and  higher  sense  of 
the  term,  form  the  German  nation  and  represent  the 
German  idea — a  small,  very  small  minority."  And 
nowhere  does  the  remark  more  accurately  apply  than 
in  respect  to  naval  policy,  though  it  must  be  admitted 
that,  owing  to  a  combination  of  circumstances,  the 
number  of  Germans  w^ho  are  fascinated  by  the  idea  of 
sea-power  has  very  largely  increased  of  recent  years. 

In  past  ages  particularism  was  the  bane  of  Germany, 
and  to-day  it  is  still  her  most  serious  weakness.  But 
it  is  a  particularism  of  a  new  type.  The  old  form  of 
particularism  has  ceased  to  exist  as  a  vital  force.  TruCi 
the  other  German  rulers  regard  the  Hohenzollerm 
ascendancy  with  a  certain  amount  of  jealousy  and 
distrust,  and  resent  the  apparent  desire  of  the  Emperor 
William  to  encroach  still  further  upon  their  already 
sadly  diminished  prei;ogatives.  True,  many  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Hanover  and  Hesse-Cassel  still  describe 
themselves  as  "must-Prussians,"  to  indicate  that  their 
adherence  to  the  predominant  German  State  is  not  a 
voluntary  one.  True,  the  people  of  Munich  hate  those 
of  Berlin  as  sordid  and  unfeeling  barbarians,  and  the 
people  of  Berlin  despise  those  of  Munich  as  idle  and 
emotional  sots.  But  these  are  merely  the  little 
bickerings  and  frictions  that  exist  in  all  large  families 
without  seriously  imperilling  the  ties  of  kinship,  and 
the  Germans  as  a  whole  are  far  too  keenly  alive  to  the 
blessings  of  national  unity  ever  to  risk  them  for  the 
gratification  of  traditional  grudges.  Still  less  would 
they  allow  their  tranquillity  and  security  to  be  staked 
on  dynastic  squabbles.  The  particularisms  of  to-day 
spring,  not  from  historical  traditions  and  local  senti- 
ments, but  from  the  two  most  powerful  agencies  in 
human  society — spiritual  ideals  and  material  interests. 

The  Germany  of  the  days  of  the  H0I3'  Roman  Empire 

17 


258      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 


has  often  been  likened  to  a  mosaic  of  loosely-cemented 
pieces.  Modern  Germany  rather  resembles  a  plate  in 
which  a  series  of  cracks  cross  one  another,  thus 
increasing  the  probabilities  of  a  breakage.  The  main 
cleft  is  that  which  separates  the  Protestants  from  the 
Roman  Catholics,  and  it  is  all  the  deeper  because  it  is  to 
a  large  extent  geographical  as  well  as  denominational. 
Thus,  in  Bavaria,  Baden,  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  the 
Prussian  provinces  of  Westphalia,  the  Rhineland, 
Silesia,  Posen,  and  Hohenzollern,  Catholicism  largely 
predominates ;  while  in  Wiirttemberg  and  Oldenburg 
it  is  strongly  represented.  According  to  the  census  of 
1910,  the  two  creeds  were  territorially  distributed  as 
under : 


Roman  Catholic. 

Evangelical. 

Prussia  : 

West  Prussia            

844,566 

764,719 

Posen , 

i.347>958 

605,312 

Silesia 

2,765,394 

2,120,361 

Westphalia 

1,845,263 

1733413 

Rhineland      

4,472,058 

1,877,582 

Hohenzollern            

64,770 

3.040 

Bavaria 

4,612,920 

1,844,736 

Wiirttemberg      

696,031 

1,582,745 

Baden       

1,206,919 

769,866 

Oldenburg           

Totals         

96,067 

339>9i6 

17,951,946 

11,641,690 

Thus  out  of  the  twenty-two  million  Catholics  counted 
at  the  census,  close  upon  eighteen  millions  are  concen- 
trated on  two  continuous  belts  of  land,  one  of  which 
extends  from  Westphalia  up  the  Rhine  and  across  the 
south  of  Germany,  the  other  from  Silesia  through 
Posen  to  West  Prussia.  Moreover,  the  denominational 
concentration  is  really  much  more  intense  than  appears 
from  the  figures  given  above,  the  population  being 
Catholic  almost  to  a  man  over  large  tracts  of  territory. 

Now,  two  features  of  this  religious  segregation  are 
deserving  of  special  attention.     In  the  first  place,  it  is 


INFLUENCE  OF  CATHOLICISM  259 

noteworthy  that  the  Catholic  belts  are  composed 
either  of  those  States  of  Germany  where  the  tradi- 
tional antagonism  to  Prussia  is  strongest,  or  of 
provinces  which  have  been  conquered  by  the  sword 
of  the  Hohenzollerns.  In  the  second  place,  it  should 
be  observed  that  they  are  of  a  specifically  inland 
character,  have  no  historical  associations  with  the 
sea,  contain  no  port  of  any  significance,  and  have  little 
direct  contact  with  the  Empire's  maritime  interests. 
The  bearing  of  these  facts  will  be  apparent  when  it  is 
realized  that  Catholicism  is  in  Germany,  not  only 
a  political  force,  but  the  most  homogeneous,  constant, 
and  stable  of  all  political  forces,  though  it  has  been 
momentarily  eclipsed  in  mere  numbers  by  Socialism. 

It  was  Bismarck's  Kulturkampf — perhaps  the  greatest 
mistake  of  the  Iron  Chancellor,  who,  like  Napoleon, 
failed  to  understand  the  character  of  the  Church  of 
Rome — which  forced  German  Catholicism  into  political 
consolidation.  His  attempt  to  undermine  the  influence 
of  the  Papacy  on  its  German  adherents  failed,  and  at 
the  same  time  called  into  existence  that  solid  and 
compact  element  in  the  Reichstag,  which  is  indiffer- 
ently called  the  Centre,  or  Catholic,  or  Clerical,  or 
Ultramontane  party.  This  party  is  the  foundation  on 
which  the  German  Empire  in  its  existing  form  rests. 
At  the  present  moment,  it  completely  dominates  the 
Parliamentary  situation,  for  without  its  consent  no 
legislation  and  no  budget  can  be  passed,  and  so  far  as 
the  eye  of  the  mind  can  penetrate  into  the  future,  it  is 
likely  to  become  more  rather  than  less  indispensable 
to  the  Government  as  time  goes  on.  In  particular,  its 
acquiescence  is,  and  will  be,  necessary  for  any  further 
additions  to  the  German  Army  or  Navy,  and  for  this 
reason  it  is  desirable  that  its  character  should  be  fully 
understood. 

In  the  present  Reichstag,  the  Centre  occupies  of  its 
own  right  ninety  seats  out  of  a  total  of  397,  so  that  it 
holds  the  balance  between  the  Socialists,  who  are 
no  strong,  and  the  other  non-Socialist  groups.     Its 


26o     PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 


Parliamentary  representation  now  stands  lower  than 
it  has  ever  done  since  the  election  of  1874,  which 
followed  the  inauguration  of  the  Kulturkampf,  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  has  never  been  higher  than  106,  and 
these  facts  in  themselves  indicate  clearly  its  remark- 
able stability.  This  characteristic,  however,  appears 
in  a  much  more  striking  light  when  we  find  that  out 
of  its  ninety  seats  the  Centre  has  held  no  fewer  than 
seventy-three  uninterruptedly  since  1874,  and  fifty-one 
since  1871.  In  other  words,  it  has  for  nearly  forty 
years  successfully  defied  all  challenge  in  three- 
quarters  of  the  constituencies  which  may  be  regarded 
as  its  normal  Parliamentary  holding.  The  causes  of 
this  steadiness  are  not  far  to  seek.  The  ratios  of  the 
Catholics  to  the  entire  population  in  the  ninety  Centre 
constituencies  are  as  below  : 

Over  60  per  cent,  in  86  constituencies. 
»     70        „         in  75 
„     80        „         in  66  „ 

„    90        »  in  45  I. 

,,    95        >»  in  24 

Until  some  decided  change  takes  place  in  the 
religious  sentiments  of  either  Protestants  or  Catholics, 
at  least  these  eighty-six  constituencies  seem  certain  to 
remain  Centre  strongholds.  The  degree  of  the  Centre 
ascendancy  over  the  minds  of  the  Catholic  electorate 
may  be  illustrated  by  a  few  extreme  instances  from  the 
results  of  the  last  (1912)  elections: 


Centre  Poll,         P°VirSs°"'" 

Bergheim  (Rhine)          

Daun 

Gelsenkirchen     

Paderborn           

Kelheim 

17,138 
20,657 
22,606 
17,108 
11,161 

1 
894 
452 
915 
519 

737 

Though  the  above  are  extreme  cases,  they  may  be 
taken  as  typical  of  the  general  tendenc3\  It  is,  in  fact, 
onlv  in  the  large  towns,  where  the  Catholic  masses 


URBAN  CONDITIONS  AND  RELIGION     261 

have  been  exposed  to  the  corrosion  of  urban  scepti- 
cism and  materialism,  that  the  Church  of  Rome  has 
substantially  lost  control  over  those  who  nominally 
acknowledge  its  sway.  The  145  constituencies  in 
which  Catholics  are  in  a  majority  returned  at  the  1912 
elections  members  of  the  following  parties  : 


—    119 


Catholics  : 

Centre 

... 

...     90 

Poles      

...         ... 

...     18 

Alsace- Lorrainers 

... 

...       9 

Bavarian  Peasants' 

League  ... 

2 

Non-Catholics  : 

Socialists 



...     II 

National  Liberals 

...         ... 

...      8 

Radicals 

... 

•••      3 

Imperial  party  ... 

...         ... 

2 

Conservatives  ... 

... 

2 

—    26 

145 
These  twenty-six  Catholic  constituencies  with  non- 
Catholic  representation,  included  the  towns  of  Mul- 
heim  (population  53,000),  Metz  (68,000),  Freiburg 
(83,000),  Wurzburg  (84,000),  Muhlhausen  (95,000), 
Saarbrticken  (105,000),  Strasburg  (179,000),  Duisburg 
(229,000),  Dusseldorf  (358,000),  Cologne  (516,000),  and 
two  divisions  of  Munich  (595,000).  It  is  such  towns 
as  these  that  account  for  the  difference  between  the 
percentage  of  the  Catholic  population  of  Germany 
{■^y),  and  that  of  the  Centre  voters  to  the  total 
electorate  (21).  Essen  is  the  only  town  of  first-class 
business  importance  with  a  predominantly  Catholic 
population  which  now  remains  in  the  hands  of  the 
Centre.  It  is  an  anomalous  feature  of  the  religious 
structure  of  Germany  that  in  certain  big  towns 
situated  in  the  heart  of  pronouncedly  Catholic  dis- 
tricts, the  Evangelical  population  is  in  a  majority,  and 
of  these  Elberfeld,  Barmen,  Nuremberg,  and  Mann- 
heim may  be  cited  as  examples.  It  may  also  be 
mentioned  in  passing,  that  in  1912  not  a  single 
Conservative  was  returned  in  Westphalia,  the  Rhine 
Province,  or  Baden,  and  that  the  two  candidates  of 


262      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

this  party  who  were  successful  in  Bavaria  were  both 
chosen  by  Evangelical  divisions. 

The  geographical  concentration  of  the  Centre  may 
be  further  illustrated  by  the  fact  that,  of  the  1,990,700 
votes  which  its  candidates  secured  at  the  191 2  elections, 
no  fewer  than  1,680,600  were  cast  in  the  three  Prussian 
provinces  of  Silesia,  Westphalia,  and  Rhineland,  the 
Kingdom  of  Bavaria,  and  the  Grand  Duch}^  of  Baden  ; 
and  that  seventy-nine  out  of  its  ninety  Reichstag  seats 
were  won  in  the  same  regions.  Votes  and  seats  were 
distributed  as  below : 


Votes, 

Seats. 

Prussia  : 

Silesia 

Westphalia 

Rhineland      

Bavaria     ... 

Baden       

Totals        

154,100 
262,000 
664,000 
471,400 
129,000 

27 

1 

1,680,600 

79 

We  must  now  briefly  consider  the  political  principles 
of  the  Centre,  and  the  motives  which  usually  determine 
its  actions.  And  here  it  must  first  be  emphasized  that 
the  party  stands  on  a  purely  denominational  basis. 
All  the  temporal  interests  and  political  principles 
which  usually  go  to  the  making  of  parties  play  a 
secondary  and  quite  subordinate  role  with  its  leaders. 
It  is  there  to  safeguard  the  spiritual  interests  of  the 
Roman  Catholics  of  Germany,  and  for  the  sake  of  these 
interests  all  other  considerations  are  allowed  to  sink 
into  the  background.  Catholicism  is  in  a  minority  in 
Germany,  and  would  necessarily  be  on  the  defensive, 
even  if  it  had  not  passed  through  the  ordeal  of  the 
Kulturkampf,  and  was  not  continually  being  warned 
by  the  invectives  of  the  Evangelical  majority  of  the 
possibility  of  a  fresh  attack  upon  its  position.  While 
the  Protestant  denomination  has  lost  practically  all  its 


SOLIDARITY  OF  THE  CENTRE  PARTY    263 

spiritual  force,  it  has  retained,  as  an  inheritance  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  and  of  the  territorial  division  with 
which  that  struggle  ended,  an  intense  and  virulent 
antipathy  to  the  Church  of  Rome,  and  the  feeling  is 
especially  strong  among  the  urban,  and  consequently 
Liberal,  classes.  It  is  the  manifestations  of  this  senti- 
ment which  make  German  Catholics  fear  for  their 
faith,  and,  sinking  all  temporal  differences,  hold  together, 
as  they  consider,  in  its  defence.  The  Centre  party 
comprehends  all  ranks,  classes,  and  occupations.  On 
its  block  of  benches  in  the  Reichstag,  Princes  and 
priests  sit  side  by  side  with  university  professors, 
farmers,  manufacturers,  butchers,  publicans,  and  trade 
union  secretaries.  These  men  have  only  one  thing  in 
common— their  religion — and  when  this  is  not  at  issue 
their  line  of  action  is  determined  by  compromise  and 
opportunism. 

On  one  main  point  the  views  of  the  Centre  harmonize 
with  those  of  the  Conservatives  :  both  are  in  favour  of 
denominational  teaching  in  the  schools  and  of  State 
support  of  religion  in  general.  It  might  be  thought 
that  there  would  rather  be  risk  of  conflict  here,  but 
such  is  not  the  case.  Where  the  Conservatives  prevail. 
Protestantism  is  as  predominant  as  is  Catholicism  in 
the  Centre  districts,  and  consequently  the  danger  of 
proselytism  is  not  serious  in  either.  But  there  is  yet 
another  force  which  brings  the  two  parties  together — 
both  are  mainly  dependent  on  a  rural  electorate,  and 
for  this  reason  favour  a  protective  tariff  on  agricultural 
products.  Conservatives  and  Centre,  therefore,  form 
the  most  intimate  and  enduring  of  the  opportunist 
part}^  combinations,  without  which  Parliamentary 
action  is  impossible  in  Germany.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  south  and  west,  whence  the  Centre  draws  its 
chief  strength,  are — apart  from  questions  ot  religion — 
distinctly  Liberal  in  spirit,  and  the  Clerical  party  is 
also  compelled  to  pay  some  heed  to  the  temporal 
claims  of  the  tens  of  thousands  of  Catholic  artisans 
w^ho  are  employed  in  the  coalmines  of  Silesia  and  the 


264     PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

ironworks  of  Rhenish  Westphalia.  Consequently  the 
Centre  is  always  somewhat  democratic  in  professions, 
though  seldom  so  in  practice,  and,  for  example,  con- 
sistently advocates  the  adoption  of  universal  suffrage 
in  Prussia,  while  never  taking  any  serious  steps  to 
enforce  its  demand. 

But,  for  our  present  purposes,  most  weight  must  be 
attached  to  another  feature  of  Centre  policy.  The 
gravamen  of  the  attacks  made  upon  that  party  by  the 
Liberals  and  Radicals  lies  in  the  contention  that  its 
real  allegiance  is  to  Rome,  that  it  pursues  aims  which 
are  cosmopolitan  rather  than  German,  and  that, 
accordingly,  it  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  safeguard 
the  interests  of  the  Empire,  especially  in  matters  of 
foreign  policy,  where  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  the 
Vatican  sometimes  do  not  see  exactly  eye  to  eye. 
This  charge  of  lack  of  patriotism  tells  very  heavily 
against  the  Centre,  and  has  even  drawn  away  from  it 
some  who,  in  other  respects,  can  claim  to  be  unim- 
peachable Catholics,  and  it  makes  the  party  very 
cautious  when  it  is  called  upon  to  deal  w^ith  Army, 
Navy,  or  colonial  votes.  In  such  a  situation  its  practice 
depends  much  more  upon  adventitious  circumstances 
than  upon  the  intrinsic  merits  of  the  case.  If  nothing 
is  to  be  obtained  by  special  bargaining,  it  may  be 
relied  upon  to  play  the  popular  card,  or  what  it 
believes  to  be  the  popular  card. 

The  Navy  Bills  of  1900  and  191 2  furnish  excellent 
illustrations  of  Centre  policy  and  tactics.  The  party 
had  offered  considerable  opposition  to  the  earlier  naval 
project  of  1898,  principally  on  the  ground  that  it  con- 
stituted an  infringement  of  the  budget  rights  of  the 
Reichstag,  and  a  handful  of  Catholics  actually  voted 
with  the  Noes  in  the  decisive  divisions.  When  the 
1900  Bill  was  announced,  however,  something  very 
significant  happened  —  the  Catholic  press  raised  a 
clamour  for  the  repeal  of  the  Jesuit  Law.  This  statute, 
which  was  one  of  the  fruits  of  the  Kulturkampf,  at  that 
time  consisted  of  three  clauses.     The   first  forbade 


RELIGION  AND  POLITICS  265 

settlements  of,  and  activity  by,  the  Society  of  Jesus 
and  kindred  congregations  within  the  German  Empire. 
The  second  empowered  the  Government  to  expel 
members  of  these  Orders  from  the  country  if  foreigners, 
and  to  exclude  them  from  particular  places  or  districts 
if  natives  of  the  Empire.  By  the  third  clause  the 
Federal  Council  was  invested  with  the  power  to  issue 
regulations  for  the  execution  of  the  law\  The  general 
belief  has  always  been,  and  probably  rightly,  that  it 
was  no  mere  accidental  coincidence  when,  as  soon  as 
a  decent  interval  had  elapsed  after  the  promulgation 
of  the  1900  Navy  Bill,  the  Imperial  Government  laid 
before  the  Reichstag  a  measure  repealing  the  second 
clause  of  the  Jesuit  Law.  That  no  causal  connection 
existed  between  the  two  events  seems  all  the  more 
improbable  when  we  consider  that  a  renewed  agitation 
for  the  repeal  of  the  remnant  of  the  Jesuit  Law  set  in 
simultaneously  with  the  preparation  of  the  Defence 
Bills  of  1912.  It  is  impossible  to  demonstrate  with 
the  conclusiveness  of  legal  proof  that  these  sequences 
and  coincidences  were  really  connected  in  the  manner 
suggested.  The  German  has  a  great  faculty  for  keep- 
ing secrets,  and  the  contemporary  world  seldom  hears 
the  details  of  the  confidential  negotiations  which  are 
the  essential  process  of  so  much  of  the  legislation  that 
passes  through  the  Reichstag.  But  that  the  Catholics 
are  not  accustomed  to  give  their  support  for  nothing  if 
they  can  obtain  a  price  for  it  is  beyond  all  doubt. 

However,  another  motive  entered  into  the  Centre's 
calculations  in  the  session  of  191 2.  A  new  Reichstag 
had  been  elected,  and  it  presented  an  almost  exact 
balance  between  the  Conservatives,  Centre,  and  Poles 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  National  Liberals,  Radicals, 
and  Socialists  on  the  other.  The  country  was  ringing 
with  the  cry,  "More  soldiers  and  more  ships,"  raised, 
it  is  true,  by  a  comparatively  small  number  of  people, 
but  uttered  with  such  persistency  and  vehemence  as 
to  produce  the  impression  that  a  strong  popular  feeling 
was  inspiring  it.    It  had  been  declared  by  the  Govern- 


266      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

ment  that  the  chief  task  of  the  new  Parliament  would 
be  the  closing  up  of  the  gaps  in  the  Empire's  armour. 
If  under  such  circumstances  the  Centre  had  placed 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  Defence  Bills  it  would 
have  exposed  itself  to  the  charge  of  having  left  the 
country  imperfectly  armed  in  the  hour  of  its  need,  and 
would  have  tempted  the  Government  to  repeat  Prince 
Billow's  experiment,  so  disastrous  to  himself,  of  ruling 
with  the  Conservatives  and  Liberals.  In  spite  of  the 
recent  triumph  of  the  anti-militarist  Socialists,  the 
Centre  no  doubt  calculated  that  it  would  stand  to  lose 
if  a  General  Election  were  taken  on  the  Defence  Bills 
as  the  result  of  its  opposition  to  those  measures.  That 
is  why,  having  a  year  before  declared  itself  emphatic- 
ally against  any  further  naval  expansion,  it  accepted 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz's  latest  project  without  a  murmur. 

Moreover,  the  feeling  was  widely  diffused  among  all 
the  monarchical  parties  that  it  was  necessary  to  demon- 
strate to  the  outside  world  that  the  victories  of  the 
Socialists  at  the  elections  had  not  weakened  Germany 
where  national  questions  where  concerned,  and  could 
not  prevent  her  from  adopting  such  military  and  naval 
measures  as  were  considered  by  the  responsible  organs 
of  Government  to  be  necessary  for  her  protection. 

It  is  by  considerations  such  as  these  that  the  Centre, 
though  less  directly  affected  by  maritime  interests  than 
any  other  party,  and  though  pledged  to  strict  economy 
and  sound  finance,  has  alwa^^s  been  persuaded  to  vote 
Army  and  Navy  Bills,  and  will  probably  always  go  on 
being  persuaded  to  vote  them  in  the  future  whenever 
the  Government  can  bring  forward  a  ''  purely  defensive  " 
pretext,  and  the  temper  of  the  patriots  is  in  a  purely 
aggressive  state.  No  one,  however,  will  pretend  that 
the  peasants  of  the  Bavarian  Alps  and  the  Black  Forest 
have  much  understanding  for  the  problems  of  ''  world- 
policy,"or  that  the  Catholic  artisans  of  the  Black  Country 
of  the  Ruhr  are  more  avid  of  sea -power  than  their 
Protestant  colleagues  who  are  Sociahsts  to  a  man. 

The  second  main  line  of  cleavage  across  the  German 


GROWTH  OF  SOCIALISM 


267 


plate  is  that  which  divides  the  Socialists  from  the 
Monarchists.  The  antithesis  can  best  be  put  thus,  for 
the  effective  barrier  which  separates  the  Socialists 
from  the  remainder  of  the  population  is  not  so  much 
their  communism  as  their  rejection  of  the  monarchy. 
This  crack  has  extended  and  deepened  with  alarming 
rapidity,  and  there  is  at  any  rate  some  slight  ground 
for  the  fears  of  the  nervous  politicians  who  believe 
that  it  will  one  day  culminate  in  an  absolute  breakage. 
Since  the  formation  of  the  Empire  the  development  of 
the  German  Socialist  party  has  been  as  below: 


Election. 

Socialist  Votes 
Cast. 

Socialist  Seats  in 
Reichstag. 

1871            

124,000 

I 

1874 

_ 

352,000 

10 

1877 

493,000 

12 

1878 

437,000 

9 

1881 

312,000 

12 

1884 

550,000 

24 

1887 

763,000 

II 

1890 

1,427,000 

35 

1893 

1,787,000 

44 

1898 

2,107,000 

56 

1903 

3,011,000 

81 

1907 

3,259,000 

43 

1912 

4,250,000 

no 

This  is  the  bane.  The  antidote  we  have  already  dealt 
with — it  is  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  So  long  as  that 
institution  retains  anything  like  its  present  influence  in 
Germany  the  Socialists  can  never  hope  to  obtain  a 
clear  majority  in  the  Reichstag,  and  till  they  can  do 
that  they  are  powerless  for  legislative  purposes.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  real  danger  in  the  absolute 
control  which  they  have  secured  over  the  artisan  classes 
in  the  urban  Evangelical  districts  of  the  Empire.  They 
are  particularly  strong  in  and  around  the  capital  and  the 
other  chief  centres  of  industry  and  commerce,  as  will 
be  seen  from  the  appended  table,  showing  the  present 
representation  of  those  districts  in  the  Reichstag: 


26^      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 


District. 

1 
Total  Members.    Socialist  Members. 

1 

Berlin        

Brandenburg       

Province  of  Saxony        

Kingdom  of  Saxony       

Saxon  duchies     

Hanse  towns       

Totals       

6 

20 
20 
23 

5 

5 

7 

10 

19 

5 
5 

82 

51 

Thus  five-eighths  of  the  seats  of  these  districts  are 
in  the  possession  of  Sociahsts,  and  it  is  not  a  little 
remarkable  that  the  only  two  seaports  of  the  Empire 
which  count  for  anything — Hamburg  and  Bremen— 
and  one  of  its  two  chief  naval  bases — Kiel — should  be 
Parliamentarily  represented  by  a  party  which  has  per- 
sistently and  energetically  opposed  the  Government's 
colonial  and  maritime  policy.  A  better  idea  of  the 
territorial  concentration  of  German  Socialism  will  per- 
haps be  afforded  if  we  examine  the  1912  poll  for  the 
central  area  of  the  Empire.  If,  following  state  and 
provincial  divisions,  we  take  the  compact  block  of 
territory,  bounded  to  the  north  by  Schleswig-Holstein 
and  Mecklenburg,  to  the  south  by  Bohemia,  to  the  east 
by  the  River  Oder  from  the  point  where  its  course 
turns  due  northward,  and  to  the  west  by  the  Weser, 
we  get  the  following  figures  : 


District. 

Total  Poll. 

Socialist  Poll. 

Prussia  : 

Berlin 

Brandenburg             

Province  of  Saxony 

Hanover         

Saxony      

Saxon  duchies     

Brunswick  and  Anhalt 

Minor  principahties       

Hanse  towns       

408,600 
853,100 
622,700 

588,800 

933-500 
228,800 
167,200 
134,200 
318,400 

307,800 
418,800 
266,000 
187,200 
513,200 
111,800 
79.700 
56,600 
187,600 

Totals       

4.255,300 

2,128,700 

THE  FUTURE  OF  SOCIALISM 


269 


Within  this  area,  therefore,  more  than  half  of  the 
votes  cast  in  191 2  were  given  to  Socialist  candidates, 
and  it  is  thus  the  heart  of  Germany  that  is  coloured 
red  on  the  electoral  map.  The  Socialist  predominance 
in  this  central  mass  of  the  country  would  have  appeared 
in  an  even  more  striking  form  if  the  frontiers  of  states 
and  provinces  had  been  disregarded,  and,  attention 
being  paid  only  to  geographical  compactness,  the  region 
under  consideration  had  been  clipped  a  little  here 
and  extended  a  little  there.  In  the  principal  towns 
of  this  area  the  total  and  Socialist  polls  were  as  under; 


District. 

Total  Poll. 

Socialist  Poll. 

Berlin        

Berlin  suburban  divisions 

Stettin       

Madgeburg          

Halll        .^ 

Erfurt       

Osnabriick           

Hanover 

Dresden 

Leipzic     

Chemnitz...         

Brunswick           

Liibeck 

Bremen 

Hamburg             ...          

Totals       

408,600 

453.700 

35,000 

56,700 

51,500 

44,500 

38,200 

82,500 

105,100 

158,300 

65,500 

46,600 

25,400 

67,100 

65,900 

307,800 
277,800 
18,000 
30,900 
27,300 
2^,200 
8,000 
43,800 
54,700 
94,100 
42,000 
25,900 
13,400 
35-900 
46,900 

1,704,600 

1,049,700 

Thus  in  the  fifteen  principal  towns  of  the  central  area 
of  Germany  the  Socialists  failed  to  obtain  an  absolute 
majority  over  all  other  parties  in  the  first  ballots  oi 
1912  only  in  Osnabruck,  where  close  upon  one-half  of 
the  population  is  Roman  Catholic.  Their  aggregate 
majority  in  these  fifteen  towns  was  nearly  395,000. 

As  tendencies  are  at  present  it  would  be  rash  to 
attempt  to  lay  down  limits  for  the  future  growth  of 
Socialism  in  Germany,  and  especially  in  this  area. 
The  urban  proletariat  of  the  Protestant  regions  of  the 
Empire  is  already  completely  dominated  by  the  doc- 


270      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

trines  of  Marx,  and  it  is  likely  to  continue  under  this 
obsession  as  the  process  by  which  Germany  is  being 
transformed  from  an  agricultural  into  an  industrial 
State  progresses.  How  rapidly  this  transformation  is 
being  accomplished  will  be  evident  from  the  appended 
figures,  showing  the  proportions  of  the  total  popula- 
tion of  the  Empire  engaged,  respectively,  in  agricul- 
tural and  in  industrial  and  commercial  pursuits  at  each 
of  the  last  three  professional  censuses  : 


Census. 


1882 

1895 
1907 


Agriculture. 


Per  Cent. 
42-51 
3574 
31-31 


Industry  and 
Commerce. 


Per  Cent. 

45*57 
50-64 
56-16 


A  necessary  concomitant  of  this  process  of  trans- 
formation is  the  steady  drain  of  human  energy  from 
the  country  districts  and  its  concentration  in  the  towns. 
In  the  subjoined  table  are  shown  the  proportions  of 
the  total  population  residing,  respectively,  in  the  towns 
of  over  20,000  and  over  100,000  inhabitants  at  each  of 
the  last  five  ordinary  censuses  : 


Census. 

Towns  of  over 

Towns  of  over 

20,000  Inhabitants. 

100,000  Inhabitants. 

Per  Cent. 

Per  Cent. 

1880        

i6-i 

7-2 

1885        

18-4 
24-6         ' 

9-5 

1895        

13-9 

1900        

28-8 

162 

1910 

^4-79 

21-2 

Already  we  find  that  the  infection  of  Socialism  has 
spread  from  the  artisan  classes  to  large  numbers  of 
persons  dependent  upon  them  for  their  livelihood.  In 
the  chief  Protestant  towns  the  artisan  districts  are 
so  entirely  Socialist,  that  doctors,  law3^ers,  and  trades- 


MILLIONS  OF  SOCIALIST  "WORKERS"    271 


men  cannot  exist  in  them  without  at  any  rate  a  lip 
service  to  the  prevailing  political  creed.  Consequently 
it  would  be  unsafe  to  assume  that  Socialism  will  stop 
short  in  Protestant  Germany  at  any  particular  point, 
for  the  possibilities  of  industrial  expansion  are  not 
limited  by  those  physical  laws  v^^hich  set  a  term  to  the 
multiplication  of  peasant  ownership  of  the  soil,  the 
one  solid  bulwark  against  Utopian  experiments  that  at 
present  exists  north  of  "  the  Main  line."  On  the  con- 
trary, so  long  as  the  general  political  conditions  of  the 
country  remain  unchanged,  and  its  industrialization 
continues,  Socialism  is  likely  to  go  on  extending  its 
sway.  It  is  true  that  the  Socialist  vote  is  not  a  precise 
measure  of  the  prevalence  of  communistic  conviction, 
for  large  numbers  of  monarchists  support  "red"  can- 
didates as  the  only  means  of  entering  an  emphatic 
protest  against  the  manner  in  which  Germany  is  ruled. 
At  the  same  time,  the  strength  of  genuine  Socialism 
in  Germany  should  not  be  underestimated.  The 
numbers  of  those  actually  enrolled  in  the  Socialist 
organization  and  pledged  to  propagate  communistic 
principles  by  word,  deed,  and  pecuniary  contribution, 
have  grown  during  the  past  few  years  as  under  : 


Total 

Female 

Year. 

Membership. 

Members. 

1906            

384-327 



1907 

. 

530,466 

10.943 

1908 

... 

587.336 

29,458 

1909 

. 

633,309 

62,259 

1910 

... 

720,038 

82,642 

1911 

. 

836,562 

107,693 

1912 

. 

970,112 

130,371 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  any  other  pohtical  cause 
in  the  history  of  the  world  has  ever  had  at  its  disposal 
a  permanent  organized  army  of  nearly  a  million 
workers,  but  even  these  do  not  exhaust  the  standing 
forces   of  communism.     The   federated    "free"   trade 


272     PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

unions,  which  have  a  total  membership  of  nearly  two 
and  a  half  millions,  are  an  outcome  of  the  Socialist 
propaganda,  and  are  entirely  Socialistic  in  spirit. 
Their  chairman,  who  represents  Kiel  in  the  Reichstagv 
is  a  prominent  member  of  the  Socialist  party  there.  It 
is  an  arguable  point  whether  the  "free"  trade  unions 
are  not  a  safer  index  than  the  purely  political  organiza- 
tion of  the  true  strength  of  Socialism  in  Germany. 

This  is  not  the  place  for  a  searching  analysis  of  the 
causes  which  have  given  Socialism  its  strong  hold  upon 
the  German  people,  but  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  it 
has  more  than  doubled  its  poll  since  the  inauguration 
of  the  Tirpitz  era  in  1898;  that  it  attained  its  present 
high-water  mark,  with  four  and  a  quarter  million  votes, 
or  nearly  35  per  cent,  of  the  total  number  cast,  in  the 
midst  of  the  most  violent  Chauvinistic  agitation  which 
the  country  had  experienced  since  the  war  with  France ; 
and  that  this  agitation  was  directed  almost  exclusively 
against  Great  Britain  as  **  the  tyrant  of  the  seas."  Yet 
the  Socialists  have  not  merely  opposed  every  vote  for 
the  colonies,  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  but  have  always 
given  a  most  prominent  place  in  their  propaganda  to 
denunciations  of  militarism,  "  marinism,"  and  schemes 
of  oversea  expansion.  That  they  should,  nevertheless, 
have  flourished  so  abundantly  indicates  that  very  large 
sections  of  the  German  people  have  yet  to  be  converted 
to  the  principles  of  "world  policy"  and  sea-power,  or 
at  any  rate  do  not  desire  them  on  the  present  terms  of 
increased  taxation. 

A  third  line  of  cleavage  separates  agriculture  from 
industry,  the  rural  from  the  urban  population,  and  it  is 
all  the  wider  because  the  German  Government,  in  its 
recent  commercial  policy,  has  favoured  the  products 
of  the  soil  at  the  expense  of  those  of  the  factory. 
Agrarianism  finds  its  parliamentary  expression  in  the 
Conservative  party,  and  here  again  we  have  one  of 
those  curious  segregations  of  political  force  which  are 
so  characteristic  of  modern  German}^  At  the  1912 
elections,  the  Conservatives  obtained   1,508,700  votes 


CONSERVATIVE-CATHOLIC  DOMINATION  273 

and  58  seats,  and  of  these  1,038,200  votes  and  53  seats 
came  to  them  from  those  provinces  of  Prussia  which 
lie  almost  entirely  to  the  east  of  the  Elbe  and  from 
Mecklenburg.     They  were  distributed  as  below : 


District. 

Votes. 

Seats. 

Prussia  : 

East  Prussia 

West  Prussia             

Brandenburg             

Pomerania     

Posen 

Silesia 

Province  of  Saxony 

Mecklenburg      

Totals       

133-500 

83,800 

199,300 

148,500 

96.900 

189,800 

138,300 

48,100 

9 

10 

3 
10 

4 

2 

1,038,200 

53 

Not  a  single  Conservative  was  returned  in  the 
Prussian  provinces  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  Hanover, 
Westphalia,  Hesse- Nassau,  and  Rhineland,  or  in 
Wiirttemberg,  Hesse,  the  Saxon  duchies,  Oldenburg, 
Brunswick,  the  minor  principalities,  the  Hanse  towns, 
and  Alsace-Lorraine.  Of  the  five  seats  which  fell  to 
the  party  west  of  the  Elbe,  two  were  in  Bavaria,  two 
in  Saxony,  and  one  in  Baden. 

In  spite  of  their  trifling  parliamentary  representation 
(58  out  of  397  seats),  and  their  slight  hold  on  the 
electorate  (they  secured  only  12*4  per  cent,  of  the  total 
poll  in  191 2),  the  Conservatives  are  more  nearl}^  a 
dominant  party  in  Germany  than  any  other  of  the 
Reichstag  groups.  This  position  they  owe  in  part  to 
the  large  representation  which,  under  a  curious  system 
of  franchise,  they  possess  in  the  Prussian  Legislature, 
and  in  part  to  the  support  of  the  Centre,  which,  as  has 
been  indicated,  looks  at  religious  and  agrarian  questions 
very  much  from  their  general  point  of  view.  It  is  this 
Conservative-Catholic  domination  on  which  German 
domestic  politics  turn.  The  German  people  is,  as  a 
whole,  essentially  Liberal  in  character,  and  it  resents 


274      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

that  laws  and  regulations  should  be  dictated  to  it  by 
what  is  little  more  than  a  tenth  of  the  electorate. 
As  the  industrialization  of  Germany  continues,  the 
Conservative  rule  will  become  less  and  less  tolerable^ 
and  some  inevitable  day  the  Empire  will  be  plunged 
into  a  constitutional  crisis  of  the  severest  kind,  from 
which  it  will  eventually  emerge  with  its  political 
institutions  considerably  modified.  Nor  can  the 
change  be  long  postponed,  except  by  a  war  or  a 
period  of  acute  international  tension. 

Whether  a  constitutional  change  in  Germany  would 
be  followed  by  any  appreciable  alteration  in  her  atti- 
tude towards  the  rest  of  the  world  is  a  question  on 
which  there  is  plenty  of  room  for  differences  of  opinion. 
The  Conservatives,  as  a  whole,  have  never  been  par- 
ticularly enthusiastic  on  behalf  of  '*  world  policy." 
It  is  generally  conceded  that  Germany  already  has 
enough  tropical  territory,  and  what  the  colonial  party 
clamours  for  is  areas  on  which  she  can  settle  the 
surplus  population  that  she  will  no  doubt  one  day 
have  to  find  new  homes  for.  But  where  white  men 
can  become  acclimatized  grain  grows  and  cattle 
flourish,  and  the  Conservatives  have  unpleasant 
visions  of  colonial  agricultural  produce  pouring  into 
Germany  and  narrowing  their  margin  of  profit.  That 
is  why  they  have  never  lent  much  encouragement  to 
the  proposal  that  the  Empire  should  direct  its  attention 
to  the  acquisition  of  Asia  Minor,  and  why  they  have 
watched  the  construction  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  with 
ill-disguised  uneasiness. 

It  is  also  probably  quite  clear  to  the  Conservative 
leaders  that  immigration  colonies  would  be  a  death- 
blow to  their  domination  in  Germany.  As  soon  as 
such  colonies  became  at  all  thickly  populated  they 
would  demand  self-government  with  such  insistence 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  ignore  their  wishes. 
No  new  country  inhabited  by  people  of  European  race 
would  long  consent  to  be  ruled  by  the  rigid  formulas 
of  the  German  bureaucrac3\     But  what  was  granted  to> 


POLICY  OF  THE  "EMPIRE  PARTY"      275 

the  colonist  could  not  well  be  refused  to  the  German 
at  home,  and  the  agitation  for  a  reform  of  the  Prussian 
franchise,  already  sufficiently  vigorous,  would  acquire 
such  strength  as  to  be  irresistible.  That,  however, 
would  mean  the  destruction  of  the  Conservative 
power,  which  the  junkers  value  much  more  highly 
than  the  hypothetical  benefits  of  colonies  populated 
by  men  and  women  of  German  stock. 

Moreover,  it  is  from  Conservative  elements  that  the 
officers'  corps  of  the  German  Army  is  mainly  drawn. 
This  body  has  always  looked  upon  the  Navy  with  a 
jealous  eye,  and  has  frequently  uttered  the  complaint 
that  the  land  force  was  being  dangerously  neglected  in 
order  that  the  sister  service  might  be  disproportionately 
encouraged.  For  these  reasons  there  are  many  Con- 
servatives who  have  all  along  regarded  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz's  policy  with  distrust,  and  have  only  voted 
for  the  Navy  Bills  because  it  is  the  tradition  of  their 
party  to  grant  what  the  Government  declares  to  be 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  national  defence. 

These  remarks  do  not,  however,  apply  to  the 
**  Empire  party,"  or  Free  Conservatives.  This  small 
group  —  its  members  are  at  present  but  thirteen  — 
forms  a  narrow  and  unsteady  bridge  between  the 
Conservatives  proper  and  the  National  Liberals,  and 
comes  nearer  to  being  a  "Government  party"  than 
any  other  in  the  Reichstag.  It  is  qualified  to  hold 
this  place  in  virtue  of  its  compromise  character.  But 
just  as  the  Government,  though  nominally  "standing 
above  parties,"  is  essentially  Conservative  in  spirit,  so 
this  group  always  inclines  strongly  to  the  Right,  and 
for  all  general  purposes  may  be  treated  as  one  with 
the  main  Conservative  mass.  On  matters  of  colonial, 
military,  and  naval  expansion,  however,  the  Empire 
party  takes  the  lead,  and  it  usually  criticizes  the 
official  policy,  if  at  all,  on  the  grounds  of  alleged 
insufficiency.  Among  its  leading  members  are  to  be 
found  several  personages  who  play  prominent  parts  in 
the  coulisses  of  German  politics  :  for  example,  Prince 


2'je     PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

Hatzfeldt,  who,  in  character  and  standing,  occupies 
a  position  in  the  public  hfe  of  the  Empire  not  unlike 
that  held  for  so  many  years  in  PIngland  by  the  late 
Duke  of  Devonshire  ;  Prince  Ernest  Hohenlohe,  who 
administered  the  colonies  for  a  brief  period  before 
they  were  raised  to  the  dignity  of  an  independent 
department  under  Herr  Dernburg;  Prince  Lichnowski, 
the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  London,  who,  however, 
is,  in  many  respects,  in  but  imperfect  correspondence 
with  his  party  environment ;  and  the  ex-Governor  of 
East  Africa,  General  von  Liebert,  who  is  now  a  leading 
spirit  in  the  Pangerman  Confederation,  and  the  chair- 
man of  an  extensive  organization  that  issues  millions 
of  leaflets  and  otherwise  displays  a  laudable  activity 
without,  so  far  as  can  be  seen,  in  any  way  attaining  its 
object,  which  is  to  check  the  spread  of  Socialism.  The 
present  Chancellor,  Dr.  von  Bethmann-HoUweg,  sat 
among  the  Free  Conservatives  during  his  very  short 
occupancy  of  a  representative  seat  in  the  Reichstag. 

It  is  a  curious  trait  of  the  Empire  party  that  it 
should  be  closely  connected  with  the  newspaper  Die 
Post,  w^hich  is  conspicuous  alike  for  its  rabid  Anglo- 
phobia and  for  its  occasional  virulent  and  personal 
attacks  on  the  Government.  Always  in  a  condition  of 
frenzy,  this  journal  does  not  even  spare  the  Emperor 
himself  when  its  fits  are  in  what  may  be  called  "the 
critical  phase."  It  is  quite  in  harmony  with  the 
character  of  Die  Post  that  the  Marine  Minister  should 
have  obtained  from  among  the  ranks  of  the  Empire 
party  the  most  cordial  support  for  his  policy,  and  this 
group  is  the  only  one  in  the  Chamber  which  can  be 
regarded  as  favouring  as  a  whole  and  in  principle 
the  Admiral's  ambitious  schemes.  But  just  as  the 
Socialists  have  prospered  in  spite  of  their  consistent 
and  vehement  opposition  to  these  projects,  so  the 
Empire  party  has  drooped  and  languished  in  spite 
of  its  championship  of  them.  At  the  1912  elections 
it  lost  eleven  out  of  twenty-four  seats  and  106,000  votes, 
or  23  per  cent,  of  the  number  which  had  been  given  in 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  LIBERALISM       277 

its  favour  at  the  contest  of  1907 — again  a  strange  com- 
mentary on  the  boasted  eagerness  of  the  German  nation 
to  make  a  bid  for  sea-power. 

The  parhamentary  representation  of  the  bourgeois 
urban  interest  is  in  the  feeble  hands  of  what  calls  itself 
Liberalism,  as  exponents  of  which  two  parties  contest 
the  palm  for  incompetency  and  ineffectiveness.  Of 
these  the  National  Liberals  attempt  to  compensate  for 
their  lack  of  a  domestic  policy  by  the  loudness  of  their 
professions  of  patriotism  and  their  readiness  to  pass 
military  and  naval  votes.  They  are,  in  fact,  much 
more  concerned  to  be  "national  than  Liberal,  and 
are  the  only  other  main  party  besides  the  Free 
Conservatives  in  which  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  has  really 
convinced  and  enthusiastic  disciples.  As  a  class 
representation,  they  stand  for  industry  and  a  portion 
of  Liberal  professionalism,  and  they  are  consequently 
to  some  extent  subject  to  Semitic  influence.  Recently 
they  have  made  strenuous,  but  not  very  successful, 
efforts  to  draw  the  peasant  land-owners  out  of  the 
Conservative  camp  and  into  their  own. 

Jewish  influence  plays  a  much  more  important  role 
in  the  counsels  of  the  **  People's  Party  of  Progress,"  as 
the  German  Radicals  now  call  themselves.  This  group 
derives  its  main  strength  from  finance,  commerce, 
minor  industry,  the  residue  of  the  professional  classes, 
and  the  diminishing  section  of  small  townsmen  who 
ardently  desire  sweeping  changes  but  cannot  bring 
themselves  to  vote  for  a  Socialist  candidate.  Whereas 
the  National  Liberals  in  principle  favour  protection  for 
both  agriculture  and  industry,  the  Radicals  are  divided 
upon  this  point.  Until  recentl}^,  indeed,  they  w^ere 
split  up  into  three  separate  groups  as  the  result  of 
this  difference  of  opinion,  and  it  was  only  because  the 
question  was  not  at  the  moment  a  burning  one  that 
they  were  able  to  reunite  their  forces.  It  would  seem 
that  Free  Trade  doctrines  have  gained  ground  among 
the  Radicals  of  recent  years,  in  consequence  mainly  of 
the  rise  in  the  prices  of  the  staple  articles  of  food. 


278      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

Apart  from  the  Socialist,  this  is  the  only  party  in  which 
pacificism  and  other  derivatives  of  "  Manchesterdom" 
make  much  progress.  As  a  parliamentary  group  it  is 
contemptible  both  in  numbers  and  character,  but  it 
paradoxically  has  behind  it  the  best  and  most  largely 
circulated  papers  that  exist  in  Germany. 

Side  by  side  with  the  Liberal  and  Radical  parties, 
and  in  intimate  association  with  them,  is  the  Hanse 
League,  which  was  founded  at  the  time  of  the  last 
finance  reform  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  industry 
and  commerce  in  general,  and  to  combat  the  agita- 
tion of  the  Agricultural  League  in  particular.  Both 
organizations  have  memberships  running  into  hundreds 
of  thousands,  and  they  form,  respectively,  the  standing 
armies  of  urban  and  rural  occupation,  which  in  Germany 
are  practically  synon3^mous  with  Liberalism  and  Con- 
servatism. In  fact,  the  tendency  is  for  these  two 
political  forces  to  become  divorced  from  general  con- 
stitutional principles,  and  to  concentrate  on  the  purely 
material  interests  of  the  two  great  sections  of  the 
population  from  which  they  proceed.  And  herein  lies 
yet  another  of  the  causes  why  German  Socialism,  with 
its  noisy  advocacy  of  democratic  rights  and  franchises, 
has  gained  so  strong  a  hold  on  the  masses  of  the 
people. 

For  all  practical  purposes,  German  party  politics 
are  limited  to  the  four  forces  which  have  just  been 
enumerated  —  Catholicism,  Socialism,  Conservatism, 
and  Liberalism.  All  these  forces  pull  different  ways, 
and  the  effect  of  their  efforts  is  to  neutralize  one 
another,  and  to  render  it  easy  for  the  Government, 
when  it  wishes,  to  follow  a  line  of  its  own.  The 
maxim,  Divide  etiinpera,  has  never  been  more  effectively 
put  into  practice  than  in  the  German  Empire  of  to-day. 

Of  the  minor  groups  in  the  Reichstag,  the  Poles, 
Alsatians,  and  Lorrainers  are  au  fond  separatist. 
Prussia  has  never  succeeded  in  reconciling  foreign 
races  to  her  rule,  and  she  never  will  succeed  in  doing 
it  so  long  as  she  retains  her  present  spirit  and  methods. 


THE  ANTI-SEMITE  MOVEMENT  279 

Her  theor}^  of  government  is  that  the  peoples  subject 
to  her  are  her  children,  that  discontent  with  her  rule 
is  naughtiness,  and  that  the  onl}^  means  of  correcting 
naughtiness  is  the  rod.  Nothing  could  be  more  char- 
acteristic of  the  difference  between  the  two  countries 
than  the  contrast  between  the  Irish  policy  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  Polish  policy  of  Prussia.  Great  Britain 
has  attempted  to  solve  her  problem  b}^  placing  the 
Irish  on  the  land ;  Prussia  is  exacerbating  hers  by 
trying  to  turn  the  Poles  off  it.  Through  their  com- 
munity of  religion,  the  Poles  and  Alsace-Lorrainers 
have  a  strong  affinity  for  the  Centre  part}-^,  and  on 
matters  not  touching  their  specific  aims  frequently 
accept  its  leadership.  As,  however,  the\^  wish  Germany 
to  be  weak,  they  always  oppose  any  measures  intended 
to  increase  her  strength. 

The  various  groups  of  Anti-Semites  may  for  all 
general  purposes  be  counted  to  the  Conservatives. 
They  are  composed  of  dreamers,  unpractical  idealists 
and  cranks,  who  are  completely  out  of  touch  with  the 
realities  of  life,  and  especially  with  that  gross  mani- 
festation of  it  which  we  call  politics.  Among  them 
are  to  be  found  the  people  who  hope  to  maintain  and 
extend  German  influence  in  the  world  by  adhering  to 
the  use  of  Gothic  t3'pe  and  expunging  from  their 
language  all  words  of  foreign  origin.  Some  of  them 
will  tell  you  with  a  grave  face  that  Germany  will 
never  be  a  healthy  State  till  she  has  purged  herself 
of  her  Jews,  her  Socialists,  and  her  Catholics.  That 
is  much  the  sam.e  as  if  a  doctor  should  advise  a  patient 
to  part  with  his  brain,  heart,  and  muscular  tissue. 
Yet  the  Anti-Semites  who  would  divest  Germany  of 
her  vital  organs  are  among  the  loudest  in  clamouring 
that  she  should  be  in  a  position  to  call  all  the  world 
into  the  hsts,  and  they  demean  themselves  on  every 
opportunity  as  if  they  w^ere  in  a  special  sense  the 
guardians  of  their  country's  honour.  In  their  ranks 
stand  many  of  the  stalwarts  of  Admiral  von  Tirpitz, 
frenzied  fanatics  whom  the  coolly  adroit  Naval  Minister 


28o     PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

can  at  any  moment  plunge  into  paroxysms  of  patriotic 
fervour.  The  Anti-Semites  find  much  sympathy  among 
the  Conservatives  and  some  among  the  Catholics,  but 
their  force  in  the  Reichstag  is  recruited  principally 
from  those  portions  of  the  Empire  where  Jewish  usury 
still  presses  hard  upon  the  agricultural  population. 

It  is  from  this  strange  medley  of  discordant  ele- 
ments that  the  effective  national  will  of  Germany  must 
be  evolved,  and  the  fact  that  it  sometimes  differs 
considerably  from  any  of  their  individual  intentions 
is  the  result  of  their  number  and  their  discordancy. 
At  the  election  of  191 2,  the  397  seats  in  the  Reichstag 
were  distributed  among  these  groups  as  below  : 


Conservatives : 

Conservatives  proper 

...    45 

Empire  party     

...     13 

Anti-Semites       

...     II 

— 

69 

Catholic  group  : 

Centre      

...    90 

Poles        

...     18 

Alsace- Lorrainers,  Guelphs,  etc. 

...     15 

123 

Liberals  : 

National  Liberals           

...    43 

Radicals 

...     42 

85 

Socialists         

... 

no 

Nondescript 

... 

10 

Total        397 

As  has  been  indicated,  the  only  three  of  these  sub- 
groups which  can  really  be  said  to  favour  in  principle 
a  forward  naval  policy  are  the  Empire  party,  the 
Anti-Semites,  and  the  National  Liberals.  It  may  well 
be  asked  how,  in  such  circumstances,  a  small  body 
of  zealous  patriots  can,  time  after  time,  make  their 
own  aspirations  the  effective  will  of  the  nation.  The 
main  cause  of  this  phenomenon  has  already  been 
pointed  out  in  those  fits  of  national  passion  or  jealousy 
to  which  Germany  is  at  least  as  prone  as  other 
countries.  But  this  cause  could  not  produce  its  effects 
if  it  were  not  helped  by  the  simplicity  and  ignorance 


THE  AVERAGE  MAN  AND  THE  NAVY  281 

of  the  German  politician.  It  is  the  commonest  thing 
in  Germany  to  come  across  persons  of  high  Hterar^^ 
and  artistic  culture  to  whom  politics  are  a  sealed 
book  into  which  they  have  no  desire  to  look,  and 
a  large  section  of  the  population  is  profoundly 
indifferent  alike  to  the  questions  of  the  domestic 
legislation  and  to  those  of  the  foreign  relations  of 
their  country.  These  people  look  upon  the  acts  of  the 
Government  as  the  dispensations  of  a  minor  provi- 
dence, inscrutable  and  unchallengeable.  The  members 
of  the  Reichstag  are  not  of  course  in  this  frame  of 
mind,  but  many  of  them  are  extraordinarily  lacking  in 
political  acumen  and  aptitude.  It  is,  in  fact,  here 
more  than  anywhere  else  that  the  defect  of  the 
German's  mind  and  intellectual  training  manifests 
itself  Where  there  are  hard-and-fast  rules  and 
regulations  to  follow,  he  may  be  depended  upon  to 
follow  them.  But  that  science  of  applied  ps3xhology 
which  is  called  politics  knows  no  such  rules  and 
regulations,  and  there  he  fails,  and  fails  miserably. 
The  politician  of  no  other  country  is  so  fast  bound 
as  he  in  the  thraldom  of  his  own  phrases,  and  the 
history  of  modern  German  naval  legislation  has  been 
one  long  exploitation  of  specious  catch-words. 

The  average  German  politician  declares  that  the 
Empire  is  building  its  fleet  "  for  purely  defensive 
purposes,"  and  is  genuinely  astonished  that  this 
assurance  does  not  set  the  whole  world  at  rest.  He 
absolutely  fails  to  realize  that  the  defensive  relation- 
ship of  two  States  resembles  a  pair  of  scales :  that  if 
one  pan  is  raised  the  other  must  be  depressed;  that 
the  enhancement  of  the  safety  of  one  country  can 
only  be  secured  by  the  diminution  of  the  safety  of 
another.  And  he  persists  in  regarding  every  addition 
to  his  own  fleet  as  a  defensive,  every  addition  to  the 
British  Fleet  as  an  aggressive  measure,  oblivious  of 
the  patent  fact  that  it  is  his  own  country  and  not 
Great  Britain  that  has  altered  its  policy,  and  thereby 
modified  the  naval  relationship  of  the  two  countries 


282      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

very  considerably  to  its  own  advantage.  He  protests 
that  Germany  is  building  her  fleet  **  according  to  the 
measure  of  her  own  needs  and  without  reference 
to  the  naval  strength  of  other  States,"  though  it  is 
self-evident  that  the  measure  of  the  naval  needs  of 
one  country  can  only  be  the  naval  strengths  of 
others.  He  urges  that  Germany's  Fleet  is  intended 
merely  "  to  protect  her  coasts,  commerce,  and 
colonies,"  and  apparently  fails  to  recognize  that 
exactly  in  proportion  that  this  purpose  is  fulfilled 
Great  Britain  will  be  unable  to  protect  her  only  fron- 
tier line,  her  much  larger  and  more  vital  commerce, 
which  is  literally  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  her, 
and  her  vastly  more  extensive  and  more  valuable 
colonies.  He  argues  that  "  each  nation  has  the  in- 
alienable right  to  fix  for  itself  the  dimensions  of  its 
armaments ;"  but  if  he  were  to  reflect  for  a  moment, 
he  would  be  compelled  to  admit  that  Germany  would 
not  remain  unmoved  or  idle  if  France  and  Russia 
were  largely  to  augment  their  land  forces,  and  were 
to  mass  the  new  corps  on  his  country's  frontiers;  and, 
making  the  necessary  allowances  for  the  different 
conditions  of  naval  warfare,  that  is  precisely  what 
Germany  is  doing  by  Great  Britain.* 

Even  within  the  narrow  limits  of  their  possible 
meanings  these  phrases  are  not  true,  for  the  entire 
modern  naval  agitation  in  Germany  has  from  first  to 
last  been  carried  on  with  reference  to  Great  Britain  and 
to  that  country  onl}^  It  was  British  naval  supremacy 
which  the  German  was  called  upon  to  break;  British 
"arrogance"  and  "tyranny"  on  the  sea,  by  which  his 
pride  was  wounded  and  the  feeling  of  resentment  stimu- 
lated, without  the  existence  of  which  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
could  never  have  been  so  successful  with  his  schemes. 

But  the  crowning  example  of  German  political  in- 
consequence  is   the   argument,  frequently  employed, 

*  Something  of  the  character  actually  happened  early  in  1913,  when 
a  marked  improvement  in  the  fighting  efficiency  of  the  Russian  Army 
led  Germany  to  embark  on  a  policy  of  military  expansion.     France, 

of  course,  followed  suit. 


ENGLAND'S  BEST  CUSTOMER  283 

though  never,  of  course,  precisely  in  these  terms : 
*^  The  increase  of  the  German  Fleet  has  involved  us 
in  the  danger  of  war ;  therefore  we  will  diminish  that 
danger  by  increasing  it  further."  This  argument  can 
have  validity  only  on  the  assumption  that  Great 
Britain  is  prepared  to  abdicate  her  position  in  the 
world  and  exist  on  sufferance  like  the  smaller  States, 
for  otherwise  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  every  addition 
to  the  German  Navy  necessarily  aggravates  the  risk 
of  war,  which  w^ould  come,  if  at  all,  at  a  date  before 
Germany  was  able  to  engage  in  it  with  much  chance 
of  success. 

Nevertheless,  to  those  who  have  closely  followed 
the  debates  in  the  Reichstag  on  naval  topics,  it  must 
appear  at  least  exceedingly  probable  that  the  great 
majority  of  the  members  of  that  Parliament  are  quite 
sincere  in  their  expressed  convictions  that  Germany 
has  no  intention  of  rivalling  the  naval  power  of  Great 
Britain,  and  is  actuated  in  her  shipbuilding  policy  by  the 
desire  to  attain  a  position  which,  to  put  it  in  the  terms 
of  its  true  significance,  will  alter  her  naval  relationship 
to  other  nations  without  changing  theirs  to  her. 

Another  of  the  phrases  with  which  considerable 
sections  of  the  Reichstag  and  of  the  German  nation 
confuse  their  brains  and  disturb  their  judgments 
is  this :  "  England  fears  our  commercial  rivalr}^,  and 
has  resolved  to  destroy  us  before  it  is  too  late."  Yet 
but  a  very  slight  acquaintance  with  the  leading  facts 
of  international  trade  is  required  to  show  that  by 
*' destroying"  Germany  Great  Britain  would  deprive 
herself  of  the  best  foreign  customer  she  has,  and  it 
may  well  be  doubted  whether  any  sane  mind  has  ever 
believed  that  any  diminution  of  Germany's  competition 
in  neutral  markets  that  could  be  brought  about  by  a 
naval  war  could  compensate  for  the  corresponding 
loss  from  her  purchases  of  British  products,  which 
have  an  annual  value  of  between  thirty  and  forty 
millions  sterling. 

However,  as  already  indicated,  the  phrases  which 


284      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

have  helped  so  much  to  carry  succeeding  Navy- 
Bills  through  the  Reichstag  attain  their  maximum  and 
effective  force  only  in  moments  of  popular  excitement 
over  affronts  or  dangers,  real  or  imaginary,  to  the 
Fatherland.  External  pressure  has  made  the  German 
Empire,  and  the  same  force  holds  it  together  in  its 
present  form.  Napoleon's  service  to  Germany  was 
not  confined  to  the  destruction  of  the  mouldy  frame- 
work of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire;  he  also  made  the 
nation  realize  vividly  what  dread  possibilities  its 
political  particularism  involved.  And  to-day,  at  the 
slightest  semblance  of  a  threat  from  without,  the 
Germans  incline  even  more  strongly  than  other 
nations  to  forget  their  own  domestic  quarrels  and 
to  place  themselves  unreservedly  at  the  disposal  of 
their  Government,  the  only  power  that  can  do  any- 
thing for  them  against  a  foreign  foe.  This  charac- 
teristic, which  has  been  cleverly  exploited  by  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz,  involves  no  smiall  peril  to  the  peace  of  the 
world.  The  most  clamorous  of  the  various  sections 
of  naval  enthusiasts  in  Germany  is  that  school  of 
thinkers  who  hold  that  war  is  in  itself  a  good  thing,  and 
the  only  tonic  by  means  of  which  nations  can  shake  off 
their  social  and  political  ailments.  The}^  openly  pro- 
claim that  the  maladies  of  which  Germany  is  sickening 
— Socialism,  materialism,  and  hedonism,  for  instance — 
have  been  allowed  to  spread  too  far,  and  that  a  big 
war  should  be  prescribed  for  their  cure.*  There  is 
this  much  in  favour  of  their  theory — that  a  successful 
war  would  undoubtedly  impose  a  check,  temporarily 
at  any  rate,  on  the  dissemination  of  communistic 
doctrines,  and  therein  lies  a  temptation  and  a  risk. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  by  no  means  improbable  that 
an  unsuccessful  war,  with  the  sufferings  that  it  w^ould 
inflict  upon  the  people,  would  so  aggravate  the  pre- 
vailing dissatisfaction  with  the  Government  as  to 
precipitate   a   revolution.     This   possibility  is   recog- 

*  This  view  is  held,  and  held  very  vehemently,  by  the  Admiralstab 
— that  is,  by  the  officers  mainly  responsible  for  Germany's  naval  policy. 


GERMANY'S  NEXT  STRUGGLE     285 

nized  in  Government  circles,  and  in  this  recognition 
lies  the  safeguard.  Should  Germany,  however,  some 
day  find  herself  in  a  position  to  declare  war  with 
strong  prospects  of  success,  the  temptation  to  draw 
the  sword  would  be  very  great  indeed. 

Should  the  international  horizon  clear,  German 
pohticians  may,  in  spite  of  the  insidious  counsels  of 
AdmiralvonTirpitz,recoverfrom  their  mental  agitation, 
and  awake  to  the  facts  that  British  distrust  is  the 
effect  and  not  the  cause  of  the  increase  of  their  fleet ; 
that  their  recent  naval  policy,  however  '*  defensive  "  in 
theory  and  intention,  is  aggressive  in  effect ;  that  it 
has  not  diminished  the  risks  of  war  between  the  two 
:ountries  but  increased  them  ;  that  it  has  not,  in  the 
sum  total  of  its  consequences,  strengthened  Germany 
but  weakened  her,  internally  and  externally,  politicall}^ 
militarily,  and  financially,  by  raising  up  opposition  to 
her  abroad  and  encumbering  her  v/ith  debt,  taxes,  and 
Socialism  at  home.  They  may,  in  that  event,  once  again 
become  preoccupied  with  their  own  internal  affairs, 
and  concentrate  their  energies  on  the  great  struggle 
which  will  have  to  be  fought  out  before  German 
democracy  can  assert  its  claims  to  an  equal  share  in 
the  government  of  the  Empire.  How  long  that  struggle 
would  last,  or  what  forms  it  would  take,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  predict ;  but  there  are  no  sufficient  reasons 
for  supposing  that  its  issue  would  permanently  impair 
Germany's  position  in  the  world,  or  render  her  at  all 
less  formidable  as  a  possible  opponent.  On  similar 
provocation  a  democratic  German  Parliament  would 
probably  act  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  did  the 
National  Assembly  in  Frankfort  when  it  decided  to 
build  a  navy  in  a  hurry,  and  sweep  the  Danes  off  the 
sea.  And  a  Germany  in  w^hich  the  effective  will  of 
the  nation  represented  the  views  of  a  majority  of  the 
population  would  for  all  genuinely  national  purposes 
be  stronger  than  one  in  which  that  will  is  the  product 
of  the  adroit  exploitation  by  a  determined  few  of  panics, 
party  jealousies,  and  religious  dissensions. 


286      PARLIAMENT  AND  NAVAL  POLICY 

The  mere  removal  of  some  of  the  many  political 
grievances  which  are  rampant  in  Germany  would  of 
itself  liberate  for  larger  national  objects  a  vast  force 
of  interest  and  energy  which  is  at  present  consumed 
in  futile  protests  against  the  existing  regime.  A 
sense  of  full  partnership  in  the  business  of  the 
Empire  would  awaken  a  new  pride  in  its  institutions, 
and  diminish  the  present  large  number  of  political 
fatalists,  who,  feeling  that  they  have  no  real  influence 
on  the  destinies  of  their  country,  stand  aside  from  the 
party  struggle,  and  watch  its  progress  with  the  in- 
difference  of  strangers. 

Above  all,  a  democratization  of  Germany  would 
stay  the  advance  of  Socialism,  and  reduce  the  risk  ot 
an  eventual  plunge  into  perilous  communistic  experi- 
ments. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  school  of  blood-letters  and 
prescribers  of  prophylactic  wars  would  have  but  little 
influence  in  a  democratic  Germany,  which,  in  normal 
times,  would,  on  the  whole,  be  of  a  peaceable  dis- 
position, for  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  a  vast  majority 
of  the  nation  intensely  dislikes  the  idea  of  war,  and 
has  no  more  fervent  wish  than  to  live  in  peace  and 
concord  with  its  neighbours. 

In  any  case,  however,  the  rapidly  progressing  in- 
dustrialization of  Germany,  which  renders  a  change 
in  the  form  of  her  government  inevitable,  also  makes 
it  highly  probable  that  she  will,  before  many  genera- 
tions have  elapsed,  outstrip  all  the  other  purely 
European  nations  in  wealth  and  national  energy,  as 
she  has  already  far  surpassed  them  in  population. 
When  that  day  arrives  it  will  be  difficult  for  the 
United  Kingdom  alone  to  keep  pace  with  her  in  the 
building  of  w^arships,  as  in  other  manifestations  of 
national  activity,  and  the  future  of  the  British  race 
will  then  depend  on  the  result  of  the  efforts  now 
being  made  to  knit  together  into  one  indivisible 
political  whole  the  diverse  regions  of  the  earth  which 
it  now  inhabits. 


CHAPTER  X 

GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

Passing  mention  has  already  been  made  of  Germany's 
maritime  interests — her  colonies,  her  oversea  trade, 
and  her  shipping — which,  it  is  urged,  compel  her  from 
motives  of  self-preservation,  to  build  up  a  powerful  fleet 
for  their  defence.  It  will  be  well  to  look  a  little  closer 
into  the  nature  and  scope  of  these  interests. 

When  the  record  of  Germany's  colonies  is  examined, 
it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  she  can  either  wish  to 
add  to  their  number,  or  be  anxious  to  spend  millions 
of  pounds  on  their  defence  against  hypothetical  dangers. 
The  general  belief  among  patriotic  Germans  is  that  the 
Empire's  colonies  have  provided  agreeable  homes  and 
remunerative  employment  for  its  surplus  population, 
large  and  profitable  markets  for  its  trade,  and  abun- 
dant supplies  of  raw  materials  for  its  industry.  In 
no  singular  particular  is  this  belief  well-founded. 
Germany's  colonies  have  so  far  been  merely  a  source 
of  weakness  and  impoverishment  to  her:  they  have 
not  been  occupied  to  any  appreciable  extent  either  by 
her  own  or  by  any  other  white  people,  their  trade  is 
of  quite  insignificant  dimensions,  they  have  supplied 
her  with  no  mentionable  quantities  of  the  raw  materials 
of  her  staple  industries,  and  they  have  cost,  and  are 
costing,  her  immense  sums  of  mone}',  which  can  only 
be  recouped,  if  at  all,  at  a  very  remote  date. 

In  mere  area  the  German  colonies  are  a  very  im- 
posing mass,  for  their  superficial  extent  is  five  times 
as  large  as  that  of  the  Fatherland,  but  in  all  other 
respects  their  value  has  been  a  negative  one.     Let  us 

2S7 


2SS    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 


first  of  all  consider  to  what  extent  they  have  furnished 
fresh  fields  for  the  activities  of  German  emigrants.  In 
191 1  the  total  white  population  of  the  one  million  square 
miles  w^hich  the  Empire  then  owned  in  oversea  lands 
(certain  tracts  of  sw^ampy  jungle  on  the  Congo  have 
since  been  added  to  these  estates)  was  25,758  souls,  of 
whom  20,966  were  Germans.  But  if  w^e  wish  to  ascer- 
tain the  genuine  German  colonial  element,  we  must 
deduct  from  these  latter  8,856  official  individuals — 
officials,  protectorate  troops,  missionaries,  wives  of 
officials  and  missionaries,  nurses,  and  school  teachers, 
and  3,431  children. 

In  this  way  we  get  an  adult  German  population  of 
8,679  spread  over  a  million  square  miles  of  territory, 
practically  all  of  w^hich  has  been  in  the  possession  of 
the  Empire  for  nearl}^  thirty  3^ears.  The  detailed 
figures,  which  are  taken  from  official  returns,  are 
appended,  and  it  should  be  mentioned  that  the  Navy 
Department,  which  administers  Kiauchow,  restricts  its 
enumeration  of  official  personages  to  the  white  garrison, 
and  does  not  distinguish  children  from  adults,  so  that 
the  numbers  stated  above  really  afford  too  favourable 
a  view  of  the  situation  : 


1 

Colony. 

Total  White 
Population. 

Germans. 

Official 
Persons. 

Children. 

1 

East  Africa 

Cameroons 

'i^ogo            

South-West  Africa 
South  Sea  Colonies 
Kiauchow 

1         Totals     ... 

4.227 

1.455 

363 

13,962 

1,660 

4,091 

3.II3 
1,311 
327 
11,140 
1,056 
4,019 

1,414 

594 
202 

2,638 

617 
66 

4 

2,579 

165 

25.758 

20,966       1        8,856 

3.431 

B}"  w^a}^  of  comparison,  it  may  be  mentioned  that, 
within  the  German  Empire,  there  are  some  230  towns, 
each  of  which  contains  more  persons  of  Teutonic  race 
than  all  these  colonies  taken  together.  .  The  Gei-n.:.n 
population  of  the  Imperial  oversea  possessions  is,  in 


VOLUME  OF  COLONIAL  TRADE 


:89 


fact,  just  about  equal  to  that  of  insignificant  places  like 
Passau  and  Kempten,  which  might  disappear  from  the 
map  to-morrow  without  causing  a  perceptible  disloca- 
tion of  the  world's  affairs. 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  objected  that  Germany's 
colonies,  though  unsuitable  for  settlement  by  white 
men,  may  nevertheless  be  of  substantial  benefit  to  her 
trade.  Let  us  see.  In  1910  the  value  of  the  total 
trade  of  Germany's  colonies,  and  of  her  share  in  it, 

were  as  under  : 

Imports. 


Colony. 

Vi^hie  of  Total     ^  Value  of  Imports 
Imports.          i    from  Germany. 

East  Africa          

Cameroons          

Togo         

South-West  Africa 

New  Guinea        

East  Carolines     ... 

West  Carolines,  etc 

Marshall  Islands 

Samoa       

Kiauchow 

* 

1,932,000 

1,274,000 

573>ooo 

2,217,000 

194,000 

15,000 

36,000 

65000 

173,000 

3,501,000 

983,000 

999,000 

314,000 

1,722,000 

84,000 

3,000 

14,000 

11,000 

42,000 

109,000 

Totals       

• 

9,980,000 

4,281,000 

Exports. 

Colony. 

Value  of  Total 

Value  of  Exports 

Exports. 

to  Germany. 

East  Africa          

£ 
1.040,000 

629,000 

Cameroons 

.. 

996,000 

862,000 

Togo         

361,000 

226,000 

South-West  Africa 

1,734,000 

1,433,000 

New  Guinea 

.. 

181,000 

118,000 

East  Carolines     ... 

.. 

10,000 

9,000 

West  Carolines,  etc. 

,. 

72,000 

31,000 

Marshall  Islands 

468,000 

109,000 

Samoa       

., 

176,000 

86,000 

Kiauchow 

•• 

2,369,000 

17,000 

Totals 

•• 

•• 

7,407,000 

3,520,000 

IQ 


290    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

In  the  same  3^ear  in  which  Germany's  aggregate 
imports  from  the  whole  of  her  own  colonies  were 
worth  ;^3, 5 20,000,  she  took  from  British  West  Africa 
alone  goods  to  the  total  value  of  ;^5, 401,000.  In  the 
same  year  in  which  Germany's  aggregate  exports  to 
the  whole  of  her  own  colonies  were  worth  ;^4,28 1,000 
she  sent  to  the  British  East  Indies  goods  to  the  total 
value  of  ;^5, 165,000.  From  these  figures  it  is  clear 
that  all  Germany's  colonies  taken  together  have  not 
yet  so  great  an  importance  for  her  trade  as  single 
colonies  of  the  United  Kingdom.  The  total  external 
trade  of  the  German  colonies  is  approximately  equal 
to  that  of  the  British  West  Indies,  which  in  area  are 
not  much  more  than  a  hundredth  part  of  their  size. 
In  1910  only  two  of  Germany's  colonies  sent  her' as 
much  as  -^  per  cent,  of  her  total  import  trade :  they 
w^ere  the  Cameroons  and  East  Africa,  and  their  joint 
contribution  amounted  to  f  per  cent,  of  her  aggregate 
imports.  Three  of  her  colonies — South- West  Africa, 
East  Africa,  and  the  Cam.eroons — each  took  as  much  as 
■^  per  cent,  of  her  outward  trade,  their  aggregate  pur- 
chases amounting  to  |  per  cent,  of  her  total  exports. 

But  here  again  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
nearly  one-half  of  the  German  population  of  the 
German  colonies  consists  of  officials  and  their  depen- 
dents, so  that  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  imports 
of  these  possessions  is  composed  of  stores  for  the 
administration  and  commodities  for  the  consumption 
of  its  employees.  Thus  we  find  that  Germany's  exports 
to  her  colonies  in  1910  included  railway  material  to 
the  value  of  upwards  of  ;^25o,ooo,  silver  coin  to  the 
value  of  nearly  i;"300,ooo,  beer  to  the  value  of  ;^42,ooo^ 
and  preserved  foods  to  the  value  of  ^43,000. 

Nor  is  there  the  slightest  ground  for  the  idea  current 
in  Germany  that  her  colonies  supply  her  with  any  con- 
siderable proportion  of  the  raw  materials  which  she 
requires  for  her  manufactures,  or  of  the  articles  of 
food  which  she  cannot  produce  herself  The  Year- 
Book  issued  by  the  Imperial  Statistical  Office  gives 


THE  COLONIES  AND  INDUSTRY 


291 


special  tables,  showing  all  articles  of  which  the  export 
from  or  the  import  into  Germany  had  an  annual  value 
of  at  least  ;^i  50,000,  and  the  countries  of  destination  or 
origin  which  took  from  or  sent  to  her  such  commodities 
to  the  annual  value  of  at  least  ;^25,ooo,  together  with 
the  detail  values  in  both  cases;  and  for  1910  her 
colonies  appear  under  only  eight  separate  headings  as 
sources  of  raw  materials  or  foodstuffs.  These  eight 
commodities  and  the  value  of  her  colonies'  contribution 
to  Germany's  total  import  of  them  were  as  belov/ : 


Commodiiy. 

Total  German 
Imports. 

Share  of  Germ  in 

Colonies  in 

Imports. 

Agave  fibres 

176,000 

54,000 

Uncut  jewels 

305,000 

152,000 

Coffee       ... 

.. 

8,823,000 

26,000 

Cocoa  beans 



2,270,000 

50,000 

India-rubber 

.. 

II,II2,OCO 

1,366,000 

Copra 

.. 

4,125,000 

228,000 

Palm  kernels 

.. 

4,420,000 

119,000 

Phosphate  of  lime 

i,8o8,oco 

143,000 

From  these  figures  it  would  appear  that  the  only 
raw  materials  of  w^hich  Germany  draws  any  consider- 
able proportion  of  her  consumption  from  her  own 
colonies  are  agave  fibres  and  rough  diamonds.  She 
derives  from  none  of  her  oversea  possessions  either 
cotton,  silk,  tobacco,  wool,  hides,  tea,  or  metallic  ores, 
to  the  annual  value  of  even  so  much  as  ;^25,ooo. 

During  recent  years  great  efforts  have  been  made, 
and  much  money  has  been  spent,  by  the  German 
Government  on  the  promotion  of  cotton  culture  in 
the  East  Africa  Protectorate  and  Togo.  Mainly  as  the 
result  of  this  State  encouragemient,  the  two  colonies 
named  placed  upon  the  market  in  the  year  191 1  raw 
cotton  of  a  total  weight  of  2,750  metric  tons.  In  the 
same  year  Germany's  aggregate  import  of  cotton  was 
444,017  tons,  so  that  she  was  then  in  a  position  to 
cover  from  her  own  territor}^  only  the  one  hundred- 


292    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

and-sixtieth  part  of  her  own  requirements  of  this  raw 
material.  Cotton  growing  in  the  German  colonies  can 
so  far  be  regarded  only  as  an  interesting  experiment, 
and  is  otherwise  entirely  without  present  significance 
for  the  industries  of  the  Fatherland. 

The  plain  facts  are  that,  up  to  the  present,  Ger- 
many's colonies  have  been  practically  worthless  to 
her,  whether  for  the  settlement  of  her  own  people,  as 
markets  for  her  manufactures,  or  as  sources  of  supply 
of  raw  materials  and  tropical  food-stuffs.  On  the  other 
liand,  they  have  placed  large  tracts  of  her  territory  at 
Ihe  mercy  of  any  enemy  who  can  sweep  her  shipping 
off  the  seas,  and  have  thus  exposed  her  to  a  risk 
Vv^hich  never  threatened  her  so  long  as  she  remained 
a  purely  Continental  State.  It  may  be  argued  that 
they  have,  at  any  rate,  provided  her  with  a  convenient 
pretext  for  building  a  fleet  which  she  really  wishes  to 
have  for  other  and  more  general  purposes  of  "world- 
policy";  but  the  incontestable  bulk  and  importance 
of  her  oversea  trade,  so  little  of  which  goes  to  her 
colonies,  has  alwa3^s  been,  and  will,  so  far  as  can  be 
foreseen,  always  remain  a  much  more  effective  argu- 
ment in  favour  of  her  naval  policy. 

So  far,  however,  only  the  credit  side  of  the  balance- 
sheet  has  been  considered,  and  we  have  yet  to  see 
what  Germany's  colonies  have  cost  her.  Here  we 
find  much  more  imposing  figures.  The  bill  which  had 
been  incurred  up  to  the  year  1908  was  as  under  :• 

£ 

Cost  of  central  administration 14,500,000 

Purchase  of  Caroline  Isles         830,000 

Loans  to  colonies            ...         1,170,000 

Subsidies  to   balance   deficits  of   local 
administration  : 

East  Africa '       5,384,000 


Cameroons    ... 

Togo 

South-West  Africa  ... 

South  Sea  Islands    ... 

Kiauchow 
South-West  Africa  war  loan 
East  Africa  war  loan 

Total       


,564,000 

85,000 

7,446,000 

452,000 

6,514,000 

[8,955,000 

90,000 

-  ;^56,99o,ooo 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SHIPPING  29% 

For  all  the  German  colonies,  with  the  exception  of 
Samoa  and  Togo,  the  Imperial  subsidies  still  continue, 
and  their  aggregate  amount  for  the  year  I9i3-i4was 
estimated  in  the  budget  at  upwards  of  a  million  and  a 
half  sterling.  In  the  immediate  future  they  are  likel}'- 
to  be  substantially  increased  through  the  acquisition 
of  a  portion  of  the  French  Congo  under  the  Morocc® 
Treaty  of  191 1.  The  proportion  of  the  large  and 
ever-increasing  cost  of  the  Empire's  Fleet  which  must 
be  written  down  to  the  debit  of  this  account,  cannot, 
of  course,  be  computed;  but  if  the  part  which  the 
colonies,  present  and  future,  play  in  the  naval  agita- 
tion can  be  taken  as  a  guide,  it  must  be  a  very  large 
one. 

Altogether  it  can  be  said  that  a  very  considerable 
measure  of  ignorance  or  optimism  must  be  available 
before  it  is  possible  to  look  at  the  results  of  Germany's 
colonial  policy  with  enthusiasm  or  confidence.  There 
was  clearly  much  truth  in  the  exclamation  of  Caprivi: 
"No  greater  misfortune  could  befall  us  than  to  be 
presented  with  the  whole  of  Africa."  Yet  many 
members  of  the  Reichstag  have  been  so  completely 
hypnotized  by  the  colonial  legend  that  they  go  on 
year  after  year  talking  as  if  Germany's  colonies  were 
a  source  of  wealth  and  power,  instead  of,  as  they 
really  and  obviously  are,  a  drain  on  her  finances,  an^ 
a  weak  spot  in  her  defences.  To  the  meanest  intelli- 
gence it  should  be  quite  evident  that  up  to  now 
Germany  would  have  been  considerably  richer  and 
much  stronger  if  she  had  never  possessed  a  square 
inch  of  oversea  territory. 

The  development  of  Germany's  shipping  and  ship- 
building has  a  double  bearing.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
growth  of  her  mercantile  marine  increases  the  stake 
which  she  has  floating  on  the  water,  already  very 
large  in  the  shape  of  the  70  per  cent,  of  her  totaC 
foreign  trade  that  is  sea-borne ;  on  the  other  hand^ 
the   evolution   of  her   shipbuilding   industry   touches 


294    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

very  closely  the  question  whether  she  can  place  her- 
self in  a  position  to  defend  those  maritime  interests 
against  all  possible  foes,  and  so  become  the  dominant 
naval  Power  of  the  world. 

When  the  development  of  German  ship-owning 
during  the  last  hundred  years  is  examined,  it  will  be 
noticed  that  at  the  outset  of  that  period  it  was  suffering 
from  artificial  retardation,  that  it  made  its  decisive 
step  forward  under  the  influence  of  a  morbid  stimulus, 
and  that  in  its  most  recent  phase  it  can  hardly  be 
regarded  as  quite  normal  and  healthy. 

Like  all  other  forms  of  industrial  and  commercial 
activity  in  German}^,  shipowning  was,  until  the 
foundation  of  the  new  Empire,  most  prejudicially 
affected  by  the  territorial  divisions  and  political  con- 
vulsions which  for  centuries  had  hampered  every 
manifestation  of  the  national  life.  Passing  mention 
was  made  in  an  earlier  chapter  of  the  operation  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars  and  the  Continental  blockade  upon 
the  German  mercantile  marine.  No  port  was  hit 
harder  by  these  events  than  Hamburg,  which  is  now 
the  chief  shipping  centre  on  the  European  Continent, 
and  owns  nearly  three-fifths  of  the  sea-going  tonnage 
of  Germany.  From  1804  to  181 3  there  is  a  gap  in  the 
official  returns  of  the  sea  traffic  to  and  from  the  Hanse 
town,  and  in  the  place  of  the  usual  figures  the  following 
note  appears  :  *'  During  these  years  there  was  no  ship- 
ping traffic,  as  the  French  occupied  the  left  bank  of 
the  Elbe,  and  the  blockade  on  the  part  of  England 
came  into  force.  Only  on  June  8,  1814,  was  shipping 
reopened."  It  is  also  ver}^  significant  of  the  low  ebb 
to  which  the  mercantile  marine  of  Prussia  had  sunk, 
that,  when  Further  Pomerania  was  handed  over  to 
that  State  at  the  general  peace,  a  number  of  vessels 
belonging  to  the  ports  of  the  transferred  province 
continued  to  fly  the  Swedish  flag,  as  affording  them 
greater  security  than  that  of  their  new  country  against 
the  ravages  of  the  Barbary  pirates. 

In  fact,  German  shipping  had  lapsed  into  a  condition 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  EMIGRATION        295 


of  coma,  from  which  recovery  was  possible  only  by 
slow  degrees.  A  certain  amount  of  stimulus  was 
imparted  by  the  Treat}'  of  1824,  under  which  Prussia 
secured  exemption  from  the  provisions  of  the  British 
Navigation  Acts.  The  policy  embodied  in  these 
statutes,  which  had  been  borrowed  from  the  Venetians 
by  the  Hanseatic  League  and  copied  from  the  latter 
by  England,  had  long,  by  a  curious  iron}^,  proved  a 
great  obstacle  to  the  progress  of  German  shipping. 
Treitschke  goes  so  far  as  to  describe  the  Treaty 
of  1824  as  the  "first  real  blow  struck  at  the  bulwark 
of  British  sea  supremacy  since  the  restoration  of 
peace." 

It  is,  however,  in  the  emigration  of  her  people  to 
the  United  States  that  the  main  cause  of  the  recent  de- 
velopment of  Germany's  mercantile  marine  is  to  be 
sought.  In  the  individual  decades  from  1820  to  1870 
the  number  of  persons  who  left  what  is  now  German 
territory  for  North  America  were  : 


6,761 

152,454 
434,626 
591,667 
822,007 


In  the  early  days  of  this  migration  the  settlers 
crossed  the  Atlantic  almost  exclusively  in  British 
ships,  and  this  necessitated  a  voyage  over  the  North 
Sea  and  a  railway  journey  from  one  side  of  England 
to  the  other.  The  advantages  of  direct  shipment  from 
German  ports  were  too  obvious  to  be  overlooked,  but 
it  is  a  significant  fact  that  it  was  a  man  of  English 
birth  who  first  clearly  appreciated  in  Germany  the 
latent  possibilities  of  the  passenger  traffic  from  the 
Continent  to  the  United  States.  Robert  Miles  Sloman 
was  born  at  Yarmouth  in  1773,  and  as  a  boy  of  ten 
years  settled  at  Hamburg,  where  he  was  destined  to 
become,  and  long  remain,  the  most  enterprising  and 
far-seeing  pioneer  of  German  shipping.    It  was  he  who, 


1821- 

1830   . 

I83I- 

1840 

I84I 

1850 

I85I- 

i860 

i86i- 

1870 

296    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

in  1836,  started  the  first  regular  line  of  German  sailers 
between  the  Elbe  and  the  Hudson  ;  and  in  1850  he  made 
another  new  departure  by  placing  a  steamer  in  this 
service.  The  vessel,  however,  did  not  remain  afloat  very 
long,  and  her  loss  seems  for  a  time  to  have  discouraged 
him  from  further  experiments  with  mechanical  pro- 
pulsion. 

In  1847,  a  year  in  which,  as  has  been  seen,  the  Ger- 
man emigration  to  the  United  States  had  already 
assumed  colossal  dimensions,  a  number  of  Hamburg 
firms  decided  to  make  an  attempt  to  capture  and  ex- 
ploit this  rapidly  growing  traffic.  With  the  modest 
capital  of  ^15,000  was  formed  what  is  now  the  biggest 
individual  shipping  undertaking  in  the  world — the 
Hamburg-Amerika  Paketfahrt  Gesellschaft.  It  is  a 
curious  fact  that  the  original  partners  in  this  concern 
wxre  not  individuals  but  firms,  and  that  at  the  outset 
practically  the  entire  business  of  the  line,  both  pas- 
senger and  freight,  was  placed  in  the  hands  of 
brokers. 

The  Hamburg-America  line  did  not  venture  on  the 
purchase  of  a  couple  of  steamers  till  1856,  so  that  the 
field  was  still  fully  open  for  enterprising  competition 
when,  in  1857,  the  Norddeutscher  Lloyd  was  started 
at  Bremen  as  a  purely  steam  line,  for  the  purpose  of 
disputing  with  the  older  company  the  profits  of  the 
emigrant  traffic.  By  a  bold  and  far-sighted  policy,  the 
Bremen  concern  succeeded  in  attracting  to  its  boats 
a  very  large  proportion  of  the  German  emigration. 
Further,  by  accepting  return  cargoes  at  merely  nominal 
freights,  and  treating  cotton  and  tobacco  substantially 
as  ballast,  it  made  Bremen  the  chief  Continental  empo- 
rium for  these  articles,  and  thus  deprived  Liverpool 
and  London  of  much  of  their  transit  trade.  Half  a 
century  ago  the  spinners  of  Chemnitz  obtained  the 
entire  supply  of  their  raw  material  from  Liverpool,  but 
now  that  Bremen  ranks  second  among  the  world's 
cotton-importing  towns,  the}'  have  become  quite  in- 
dependent of  the  English  middleman.     The  develop- 


HAMBURG  AND  BREMEN 


297 


ment  of  the  importation  of  cotton  by  Liverpool  and 
Bremen  respectively  during  the  last  quarter  of  a 
century  is  shown  in  the  appended  figures  : 


1895-96 
1905-06 
1911-12 


Liverpool. 


Bremen, 


Bales. 

Bil.-s. 

2,558,798 

530451 

2,090,123 

918,955 

2,485,686 

1,612,066 

3,690,800 

2,792,000 

The  tobacco  manufacturing  trade  of  Bremen  shows 
to  this  day  traces  of  its  origin,  for  its  products  are 
packed  in  the  English  fashion,  bear  English  names 
(sometimes  of  an  unintentionall}^  grotesque  character), 
and  are  sent  out  under  labels  and  wrappers  printed 
in  the  English  language.  It  may  be  mentioned  in 
passing  that  in  American  tobaccos,  as  in  jams  and 
biscuits,  German  manufacturers  have  hitherto  failed 
completel}^  in  their  attempts  to  reproduce  British 
samples. 

Hamburg  had  been  the  pioneer  of  the  German  trans- 
atlantic passenger  traffic,  but  now  found  itself  in  danger 
of  being  outdistanced  by  Bremen.  This  menace 
spurred  the  shipowners  of  the  Elbe  to  fresh  efforts^ 
and  the  subsequent  history  of  the  German  mercantile 
marine  has  been  practically  synonymous  with  that  of 
the  two  leading  lines  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen  re- 
spectively. A  separate  book  would  be  needed  to  tell 
the  tale  of  their  rapid  growth,  their  mutual  emulation, 
and  the  ultimate  agreements  under  which,  in  amicable 
compromise,  they  divided  up  the  traffic  on  those  ocean 
routes  where  they  had  no  native  rival  to  fear.  Nor 
does  the  space  available  here  allow  the  presenta- 
tion of  details  of  the  numerous  bargains  of  the  same 
kind  w^hich  they  have  from  time  to  time  concluded 
with  the  leading  lines  of  other  countries. 


298    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

A  few  figures  will  suffice  to  give  an  adequate  idea  of 
wh  it  these  two  concerns  mean  to  the  German  mercantile 
marine,  and  of  the  dislocation  which  their  immoderate 
growth  has  brought  about.  In  1912  the  capital  of  each 
of  them  stood  at  M.  125,000,000  (in  round  figures 
;^6,ooo,ooo),  exclusive,  in  both  cases,  of  debentures  to 
the  total  amount  of  about  ;^3, 500,000.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  that  year  the  gross  register  tonnage  of  the 
vessels  belonging  to  the  two  companies  was  as 
under : 

Hamburg- America  Company      1,160,424 

Norddeutscher  Lloyd      739740 


Total         1,900,164 

This  total  is  not  far  short  of  half  the  aggregate 
tonnage  of  the  entire  mercantile  marine  of  the  German 
Empire,  which  at  the  same  date  was  4,513,191  gross 
register  tons. 

The  concentration  of  so  large  a  share  of  the  Germian 
merchant  navy  under  the  management  of  these  two 
concerns  has  aggravated  the  disproportionate  develop- 
ment of  the  two  Hanse  towns  in  w^hich  they  have 
their  respective  headquarters  at  the  expense  of  the 
other  German  ports.  Up  to  1854,  the  mercantile 
tonnage  of  the  German  ports  on  the  Baltic  was  larger 
than  that  of  those  on  the  North  Sea,  but  after  that 
date  the  positions  were  reversed,  and  the  tendency 
which  produced  the  change  has  continued  with 
gathering  force  ever  since.  It  has  manifested  itself 
not  only  in  a  greater  rapidity  of  growth  on  the  part 
of  the  merchant  fleet  of  the  North  Sea,  but  also  in 
the  actual  absolute  decline  which  that  of  the  Baltic 
experienced  for  many  years.  In  1875  the  shipowners 
of  the  German  Baltic  ports  owned  2,109  vessels,  of  an 
aggregate  of  470,914  tons  net,  but  by  1900  these 
numbers  had  sunk  to  840  vessels  and  218,750  tons. 
In  the  thirty  years  which  had  elapsed  since  the 
foundation  of  the  Empire  the  German  Baltic  littoral 


GERMANY'S  MERCHANT  FLEET 


299 


had  actually  lost  more  than  half  of  its  merchant 
shipping.  On  January  i,  1912,  German  shipping  was 
distributed  between  the  two  seas  as  under : 


Vessels. 

Net  Regiscer 
Tonnage, 

North  Sea           

Baltic        

Totals 

3730 
945 

2,594.353 
309,217 

4,675 

2,903,570 

There  is  obviously  this  much  justification  for 
Germany's  new  policy  of  naval  distribution,  that  in 
so  far  as  her  merchant  navy  and  sea-borne  commerce 
are  concerned,  she  is  ceasing  to  be  a  Baltic,  and 
becoming  a  very  important  North  Sea,  Powder.  And 
it  is  noteworthy,  that  of  the  2,903,570  net  tons  of 
mercantile  shipping  registered  in  the  Empire  at  the 
commencement  of  1912,  no  fewer  than  1,604,415  tons, 
or  considerably  more  than  half  the  total,  were  owned 
at  Hamburg,  and  859,064  tons  at  Bremen.  In  fact 
these  two  free  towns  between  them  contribute  very 
nearly  85  per  cent,  of  the  total  tonnage  of  the  German 
mercantile  fleet. 

But  the  concentration  of  German  merchant  shipping 
is  even  greater  than  appears  from  the  foregoing 
figures.  At  the  close  of  191 1,  the  composition  of  this 
shipping  w^as  as  is  shown  in  the  appended  table, 
in  which  once  more  we  return  to  gross  tons,  as  the  net 
figures  necessary  for  comparison  are  not  available  in 
all  cases : 


Steamers      

Sailing  vessels 
Sea-going  lighters  ... 

Total 


Gross  Register 
Tonnage. 

•  3-949,759 
452,996 
110,436 


4.5i3>i9i 


300    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

Included  in  this  tonnage  were  the  following  in- 
dividual merchant  fleets : 

Gross  Register 
Tonnage. 

Hamburg-America            1,160,424 

Norddeutscher  Lloj'd       739-740 

Hansa  Company 289,873 

Hamburg-South  America  Company      ...  221,859 

German- Australian  Company     199757 

Kosmos  Company I53»324 

Levant  Line            121,243 

East  Africa  Line 103,703 

Woermann  Line    ...         ...         98,134 

German-American  Petroleum  Company  84,219 

Total       3,172,276 

It  thus  appears  that  70  per  cent,  of  the  total 
merchant  tonnage  of  Germany,  and  80  per  cent,  of 
her  steam  tonnage  are  in  the  hands  of  ten  companies, 
and  considerably  more  than  half  of  the  latter  in  those 
of  the  two  leading  concerns.  In  fact,  the  recent  re- 
markable growth  of  German  mercantile  shipping  has 
been  almost  entirely  due  to  the  development  of  a 
few  big  lines  of  steamers  plying  regularly  along  fixed 
routes. 

The  concentration  of  Germany's  shipping  at  Ham- 
burg and  Bremen  is,  however,  not  only  natural,  but  in 
many  ways  exceedingly  advantageous.  A  glance  at 
the  map  will  show  that  the  Elbe,  in  conjunction  with 
the  Oder,  with  which  it  is  linked  up  into  one  system 
of  waterways  by  a  couple  of  junction  canals,  is  the 
natural  entrance  into  Germany  from  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  outside  world.  Dividing  the  Empire 
diagonally  into  two  approximately  equal  parts,  this 
mighty  stream  is  navigable  right  through  the  heart  of 
the  highly  industrialized  Kingdom  of  Saxony  and 
beyond  that  deep  into  Bohemia,  where  it  serves  as  the 
channel  of  transport  for  a  considerable  proportion  of 
the  Austro-German  trade.  By  way  of  the  Oder,  it 
permits  unbroken  water  traffic  between  the  North  Sea 
and  the  busy  mining  district  in  the  extreme  south-east 
of  Silesia.     Barge-loads  of  cheap  manufactured  articles 


A  PROPOSED  NEW  CANAL  301 

are  brought  down  from  Breslau  to  Hamburg,  there 
transhipped  on  board  sea-going  vessels,  and  landed  in 
the  London  docks  without  having  traversed  an  inch  of 
railway  line,  and  it  is  this  exclusively  water  transport 
that  chiefly  accounts  for  the  lowness  of  the  prices 
at  which  many  German  articles  can  be  sold  in 
England. 

The  busiest  point  on  this  vast  system  of  waterways 
is,  however,  Berlin,  with  its  manufacturing  suburbs, 
which  is  connected  with  the  Elbe  by  the  Spree  and  the 
Havel.  It  is  to  the  Elbe  alone  that  the  German 
capital  owes  its  present  position  as  the  chief  manu- 
facturing and  trading  centre  of  the  Empire.  The 
Rhine,  while  serving  districts  of  even  higher  in- 
dustrial development  than  those  traversed  by  the 
Elbe,  has  not  nearly  so  central  a  course  as  the  latter 
river,  and  is,  for  the  moment,  of  comparative  un- 
importance from  the  point  of  view  of  the  German 
mercantile  marine,  because  its  mouths  are  m  the 
possession  of  other  countries. 

It  may  be  mentioned  incidentally  that  a  movement 
is  now  on  foot  with  the  object  of  providing  the  Rhine 
with  a  German  mouth  by  means  of  a  canal  from 
Cologne  to  Emden.  The  proposed  waterway  would 
include  stretches  of  the  Ems  and  Ruhr,  and  would  tap 
the  coal-mining  and  iron  industry  district  which  takes 
its  name  from  the  latter  stream.  This  project  would, 
if  carried  out,  have  the  additional  significance  of  assist- 
ing the  efforts  now  being  made  to  transform  Emden 
into  that  first-class  commercial  port  on  the  North  Sea 
which  Prussia  at  present  lacks.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  the  canal  would  yield  large  surpluses,  which 
might  be  emplo3^ed  in  the  construction  of  the  much- 
talked-of  strategic  waterway  between  the  Ems  and  the 
Jade,  to  enable  German  warships  of  the  largest  size  to 
pass  at  will,  under  cover  of  the  land,  from  Wilhelms- 
haven  to  Emden,  and  so  baffle  the  vigilance  of  a 
blockading  squadron. 

The  great  importance  which  Hamburg  has  recently 


302    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

acquired  as  a  trading  port  was  rendered  possible  only 
by  the  introduction  of  steam-shipping.  Prior  to  that 
event  the  harbour  was  frequently  frozen  up  and  in- 
accessible during  a  considerable  portion  of  the  winter. 
For  instance,  in  the  five  3^ears,  1826  to  1830,  the 
Hamburg  w^ater-traffic  was,  on  an  average,  suspended 
for  seventy-two  da3'S  annually  by  accumulations  of 
ice.  The  constant  coming  and  going  of  powerful  tugs 
and  ice-breakers  now  prevents  the  water  in  the  basins 
from  congealing,  and  keeps  the  traffic  of  the  actual 
port  open  right  through  the  winter.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  German  canals  are  generally  closed  by  ice 
for  a  few  months  every  year,  and  though  the  period  of 
unnavigability  naturally  varies  with  the  severity  of 
the  weather,  traffic  upon  them  is  usually  suspended 
during  the  whole  of  the  period  which  experience  has 
shown  brings  with  it  a  risk  of  being  frozen  in.  The 
goods  which  arrive  at  Hamburg  during  this  period 
en  route  to  an  inland  destination  find  it  cheaper,  except 
in  cases  of  urgenc}^  to  remain  warehoused  at  the  Elbe 
port  till  the  spring  than  to  finish  their  journey  by  rail 
It  is  the  geographical  idiosyncrasies  of  Hamburg, 
which,  to  some  extent,  are  shared  by  Bremen,  that 
form  the  main  justification  for  the  massing  of  the  bulk 
of  Germany's  shipping  at  these  two  ports,  but  there 
are  also  other  respects  in  which  this  concentration 
possesses  undeniable  advantages.  For  example,  it 
has  provided  the  two  Hanse  towns  with  the  financial 
basis  for  a  bold  and  comprehensive  harbour  policy, 
and  they  have  developed  their  channels,  docks,  wharves, 
w^arehouses,  cranes,  and  all  the  appurtenances  necessary 
for  the  rapid  loading  and  unloading  of  ships  to  the 
highest  point  of  efiicienc}'.  Concentration  also  means 
considerable  economy  in  administration,  and  though  the 
aggregate  sums  spent  at  Hamburg  and  Bremen  on 
harbour  improvement  and  management  have  been 
large,  they  will,  in  the  long  run,  prove  to  have 
lightened  the  proportional  burden  of  dues  and  costs 
falling  on  each  ton  of  merchandise  handled. 


LINERS  AND  TRAMPS  303 

What  Bremen  lacks  in  natural  facilities,  it  has 
partially  made  good  by  a  superior  spirit  of  enterprise 
and  emulation,  and  it  thus  affords  a  valuable  illustra- 
tion of  what  can  be  effected  by  these  two  ideal  motives. 
In  many  respects  it  has  led  the  way,  and  Hamburg, 
though  much  more  prodigally  endowed  by  Nature,  has 
merely  followed  in  its  footsteps.  It  is  a  common  and 
pardonable  boast  of  Bremen  business  men  that,  if  they 
had  been  at  Hamburg,  the  great  port  and  emporium  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Weser  would  never  have  been  allowed 
an  opportunity  of  developing. 

There  are,  however,  unquestionable  risks  and  draw- 
backs in  the  manner  in  which  German  shipping  has 
evolved.  For  one  thing,  it  has  prospered  through 
the  long  and  general  upward  movement  of  the  world's 
trade  consequent  on  the  opening  out  of  fresh  markets 
in  Asia,  Africa,  and  South  America,  and  though  it  will, 
no  doubt,  continue  to  flourish  whilst  that  movement 
lasts,  it  might  find  it  very  difficult  to  survive  an 
extended  period  of  universal  depression.  The  brief 
commercial  crisis  of  1908  hit  the  Norddeutscher  Lloyd 
exceedingly  hard.  For  that  year,  even  after  reducing 
the  sum  due  to  be  v/ritten  off,  the  company's  accounts 
showed  a  loss  of  ;^8oo,ooo,  which  absorbed  the  entire 
renewal  and  reserve  funds,  and  left  only  the  insurance 
fund  of  ;^8oo,ooo  untouched.  It  was  1910  before  the 
line  was  able  to  resume  the  pa3'ment  of  dividends,  and 
the  rate  was  only  3  per  cent. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  large  liners  of  such  companies 
cannot  adapt  themselves  to  the  fluctuations  of  trade  so 
easily  as  tramps  of  moderate  size,  which  can  tide  over 
bad  times  by  picking  up  an  odd  freight  here  and  there. 
It  is  another  weak  spot  in  the  constitution  of  the  big 
lines,  that  they  are,  to  a  very  large  extent,  dependent 
for  their  profits  on  agreements  of  the  nature  of  inter- 
national trusts.  No  one  is  likely  to  contend  that  such 
agreements  are  as  sound  a  basis  to  stand  upon  as  the 
unrestricted  competition  on  which  the  enormous  British 
tramp  trade  has  been  built  up. 


304    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

The  crisis  of  1908  was  so  acutely  felt  in  German 
maritime  circles  that  leading  Hamburg  owners  seri- 
ously advocated  the  joint  purchase  and  scrapping  by 
the  big  lines  of  a  million  tons  of  shipping,  or,  as  an 
alternative,  a  mutual  undertaking  to  abstain  from 
building,  except  to  replace  losses,  for  a  period  of  two 
or  three  3'ears.  Such  fits  of  compunction  are  quickly 
overcome,  however,  and  there  were  building  for  Ham- 
burg's account  alone  at  the  beginning  of — 

1910,  16  steamers  of  a  total  of    66,000  gross  register  tonnage. 

I9II»35  yy  n  198,000 

I9I2,  51  „  „  412,000 

Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the  principal  German  shipping 
companies  have  so  far  proved  a  bad  investment  for  the 
original  shareholders.  There  are  three  of  these  com- 
panies which  each  have  a  capital  of  over  a  million 
sterling,  and  during  the  past  ten  years  their  dividends 
have  been  as  under  : 


Year. 

Hamburg- 
America. 

Norddeutscher 
Lloyd. 

Hans?i. 

1903        

1904        

1905        

1906        

1907        

1908        

1909        

T91O        

1911        

1912        

Totals 
Averages 

Per  Cent. 
6 

9 
II 
10 

6 

0 

6 

8 

9 
10 

Per  Cent. 
6 
2 

7h 

4J 

0 

0 

3 

5 

7 

Per  Cent. 
6 
9 
9 
6 
8 
6 

TO 
10 

It 

75 
7-5 

43-5 
4-35 

99 
9-9 

During  these  ten  years  the  average  annual  dividends 
of  the  four  German  shipping  companies  which  rank 
next  in  point  of  capital  were  as  under : 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  SHIPPING      305 


Company. 

Annual 
Average, 

Hamburg-South  America     ...         

Kosmos             ...         

German- Australian 

German- East  African 

Per  Cent. 
87 

7'i 

3-6 

At  the  same  time,  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  the 
mercantile  marine  of  the  United  Kingdom  is  as  yet 
seriousl}^  threatened  by  that  of  Germany.  The  pro- 
gress of  the  two  merchant  fleets  during  the  past  forty 
years  has  been,  from  decade  to  decade,  as  under: 


Year. 

United  Kingdom. 

Gerni:iny. 

Net  Register 

Net  R'^gister 

Tonnage. 

Tonnage. 

1870            

5,690,789 

982,355 

1880           

6,574-51'^ 

1,181,525 

1890           

7.978,538 

1433413 

1900           

9,304,108 

1,941.645 

1910           

1 1, 555 -663 

2,903,570 

Included  in  these  figures  are  the  following  quantities 
of  steam  shipping  : 


Year. 

United  Kingdom. 

Germany. 

Net  Register 

Net  Register 

Tonnage. 

Tonnage. 

1870           

1,112,934 

81,994 

1880           

2,723,468 

215758 

1890           

5.042,517 

723,652 

1900           

7,207,610 

1,347.875        1 

1910           

10,442,719 

2,396>733       1 

These  figures  are,  no  doubt,  capable  of  being  twisted 


in  such  a  way  as  to  bear  a  very  ominous  aspect. 

20 


It  is. 


3o6    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

for  instance,  perfectly  true  that,  in  the  forty  years 
under  consideration,  the  shipping  of  the  United 
Kingdom  merely  doubled,  while  that  of  Germany 
increased  nearly  threefold.  In  some  circumstances 
this  might  mean  a  great  deal,  but  percentage  growths 
cannot  alter  the  essential  fact,  that  whereas  in  1870 
the  United  Kingdom  owned  only  1,031,000  tons  more 
steam  shipping  than  Germany,  her  superiority  had 
increased  by  1910  to  over  8,000,000  tons. 

Nor  does  it  signify  very  much  that  the  share  of  the 
United  Kingdom  in  the  world's  steam  mercantile  fleet 
sank  in  the  ten  years  1901  to  191 1  from  53*3  to  49*8  per 
cent.,  while  that  of  Germany  rose  simultaneously  from 
io'6  to  II  per  cent.  If  all  the  factors  of  the  economic 
history  of  the  past  fifty  years  are  taken  into  considera- 
tion it  must  astonish,  not  that  the  British  proportion 
has  declined,  but  that  its  downward  movement  should 
have  been  so  insignificant  in  extent.  It  is  really, 
when  we  come  to  think  of  it  with  unbiassed  minds, 
an  astounding  phenomenon,  that  a  State  with  forty- 
five  million  inhabitants  should  own  half  the  merchant 
shipping  in  a  w^orld  with  two  thousand  millions. 

The  essential  question  from  our  present  point  of 
view  is,  however,  how  far  Germany's  water-borne 
trade  and  mercantile  marine  have  reacted  on  her  ship- 
building industry;  for  if  a  nation  hopes  to  take  the  first 
place  among  the  naval  Powers  of  the  world — and  this 
is  the  destiny  which  some  Germans  prophesy  for  their 
country — it  must  be  able  not  only  to  pay  for  the  biggest 
fleet,  but  to  construct  it  in  its  own  yards.  As  to  whether 
Germany  is  likely  ever  to  be  in  a  position  to  do  this 
it  is  impossible  to  make  positive  predictions,  but  it  is 
incontestable  that  the  progress  of  her  shipbuilding 
has,  in  some  respects,  been  hardly,  if  at  all,  less 
remarkable  than  that  which  she  has  made  in  other 
branches  of  industr}^,  and  at  present  there  are  no 
obvious  reasons  for  supposing  that  it  will  be  brought 
to  a  standstill. 

What  Germany  has  accomplished  in  the  art  of  ship- 


PROGRESS  OF  MACHINERY  307 

building  appears  all  the  more  remarkable  if  we  consider 
the  disadvantageous  circumstances  in  which  she  was 
overtaken  by  those  two  great  revolutions  of  navigation 
— the  transition  from  sails  to  steam  as  a  means  of  pro- 
pulsion, and  the  substitution  of  iron  for  wood  as  con- 
struction material.  When  the  American  watchmaker, 
Fulton,  fitted  his  first  vessel  with  Watt  engines,  in 
1802,  Germany  was  on  the  eve  of  the  ordeal  of  the 
French  occupation.  In  1807,  the  year  which  saw  the 
first  line  of  paddle-boats  plying  on  the  Hudson  River 
between  New  York  and  Albany,  that  hard  probation 
had  already  commenced ;  and  Europe  was  only  just 
beginning  to  recover  from  the  effects  of  the  Continental 
blockade  as  the  Savannah  opened  a  new  area  of 
transoceanic  traffic  by  crossing  the  Atlantic  under 
mechanical  power. 

A  steam  engine  had  been  built  in  a  German  work- 
shop as  early  as  1785,  but  the  general  adoption  of 
machinery  in  the  country  was  very  slow,  and  it  was 
1822  before  it  was  put  to  any  other  use  than  that  of 
pumping,  the  Royal  Porcelain  Works  at  Berlin  leading 
the  way  in  applying  it  to  other  purposes.  In  1840  it 
was  estimated  that  there  were  only  500  stationary 
engines  in  the  territories  belonging  to  the  German 
Customs  Union.  Six  years  later,  196  engines  of  an 
aggregate  of  2,446  horse-power  were  known  to  exist  in 
Saxony,  and  1,139,  of  an  aggregate  of  21,716  horse- 
power, in  Prussia.  In  Englandj,ooo  steam  engines  had 
been  at  work  as  early  as  18 10.  Of  the  245  locomotives 
which  were  in  service  on  the  German  railways  in 
1840,  only  38  were  of  home  manufacture,  166  having 
been  made  in  England,  29  in  the  United  States,  and 
12  in  Belgium.  These  facts  will  make  apparent  how 
heavily  handicapped  Germany  was  in  the  great  inter- 
national competition  of  the  machine  age. 

Moreover,  at  the  commencement  of  that  epoch, 
German  shipbuilding  was  still  comparatively  in  a  very 
primitive  stage  of  development.  The  Hanseatic 
Federation,  always  more  concerned  about  commerce 


3o8    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

and  carrying  trade  than  about  industry,  severely  dis* 
couraged  the  building  of  ships  by  its  members  for 
other  countries.  Repeatedly  it  issued  prohibitions 
against  the  sale  of  vessels  to  foreigners,  and  it  was 
only  after  much  trouble  that  Dantzig,  which  was 
favoured  through  its  geographical  situation  with  an 
abundant  supply  of  wood  suitable  for  shipbuilding, 
secured  the  final  abolition  of  these  restrictions. 

During  the  eighteenth  century  several  states  of  the 
German  littoral,  and  especially  Prussia  and  Hamburg, 
endeavoured  to  stimulate  shipbuilding  by  the  offer  of 
premiums,  and  in  other  ways,  but  their  efforts  availed 
little  against  the  short-sighted  selfishness  of  the  trade 
guilds,  which  arbitrarily  fixed  wages  and  opposed 
the  opening  of  new  yards  as  well  as  the  extension 
of  old  ones.  Nothing  could  have  been  better  calcu- 
lated to  prevent  an  industry  from  keeping  pace 
with  the  times,  and  the  advent  of  steam  found 
German  shipbuilders  for  the  most  part  confining  their 
activities  to  the  rule-of-thumb  construction  of  small 
coasters. 

The  first  marine  engine  to  be  built  in  Germany  seems 
to  have  been  that  supplied  by  the  works  of  Egells 
of  Berlin  (which  subsequently  developed  into  the 
Germania  yard,  at  Kiel,  now  in  the  possession  of 
the  Krupp  firm),  for  a  small  paddle  passenger  boat 
for  use  on  the  Elbe;  and  it  was  not  till  1852  that 
Fiirchtenicht  and  Brock,  now  the  Vulcan  Works  of 
Hamburg  and  Stettin,  launched  what  appears  to  have 
been  the  first  sea- going  steamer  of  German  con- 
struction. 

For  the  transition  from  wood  to  iron  as  the  material 
of  ships'  hulls,  Germany  was  also  very  badly  prepared. 
Her  builders  found  it  exceedingly  difficult  to  break 
with  their  traditional  empiricism,  and  asked  sceptically 
how  iron  was  to  float.  Many  of  them  paid  dearly  for 
their  lack  of  adaptabihty,  and  were  eventually  obliged 
to  close  their  yards.  Even  if  they  had  been  willing  to 
change  with  the  times,  they  would  have  been  unable  to 


NATURAL  DISADVANTAGES  309 

procure  the  necessary  technical  instruction  in  their 
own  country.  A  school  of  shipbuilding  was  opened  at 
Grabow,  near  Stettin,  in  1831,  but  both  its  teaching  and 
its  equipment  w^ere  of  a  very  rudimentary  character, 
and  it  was  only  after  it  had  been  transferred  to  Berlin 
(1861)  and  staffed  by  the  naval  constructors  of  the 
Ministry  of  Marine,  that  it  can  be  said  to  have  done 
much  towards  the  fulfilment  of  the  purposes  with 
which  it  was  inaugurated.  Meanwhile  German 
students  who  wished  to  acquaint  themselves  with 
the  shipbuilding  art  were  accustomed  to  attend  the 
courses  at  the  School  of  Naval  Construction  at 
Copenhagen. 

Another  drawback  under  which  German  shipbuilding 
suffered  much  at  that  time,  and  to  some  extent  still 
suffers,  was  the  distance  of  her  mineral  fields  and  iron 
works  from  the  sea-coast.  The  addition  to  the  cost  of 
the  raw  materials  thus  incurred  goes  far  to  explain 
why  the  German  yards  found  it  so  difficult  to  compete 
with  their  rivals  on  the  Tyne,  Wear,  and  Tees,  who 
obtained  their  plates  at  their  very  doors.  At  a  later 
period,  when  the  Government  had  opened  its  eyes  to 
the  importance  to  the  Navy  of  a  strong  shipbuilding 
industry,  the  materials  required  by  the  yards  were 
granted  special  rates  on  the  railways;  and  in  1879, 
when  Germany  adopted  protection,  they  were  admitted 
into  the  country  free  of  Customs  duty.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  policy  of  the  trusts  in  selling  abroad  at 
lower  prices  than  at  home  has  done  something  to 
counteract  the  effects  of  these  measures,  and  Holland 
has  been  able  to  develop  her  shipbuilding  industry 
with  the  aid  of  German  materials  supplied  to  her 
at  cheaper  rates  than  those  charged  to  the  home 
consumer. 

Germany  was  also  under  a  disadvantage  through  her 
poverty  in  the  industries  auxiliary  to  shipbuilding.  A 
large  modern  steamer,  whether  battleship  or  trans- 
atlantic liner,  is  the  most  highly  developed  product  of 
industry  that  exists,  many  of  its  component  parts  being 


310     GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

the  finished  articles  of  special  trades.  Several  of  these 
special  trades  did  not  exist  in  Germany  when  she  first 
seriously  turned  her  attention  to  the  cultivation  of  her 
shipbuilding,  whereas  they  had  been  firmly  established 
in  England  for  generations.  For  many  years  after  they 
had  acquired  the  ability  to  construct  hulls  and  engines, 
the  German  shipbuilders  were  entirely  dependent  upon 
British  manufacturers  for  boilers,  anchors,  chains, 
windlasses,  and  many  other  important  features  in  the 
equipment  of  their  vessels.  It  was  in  England,  too, 
that  most  of  the  machines  now  used  in  the  building  of 
ships  were  invented  and  first  brought  into  use ;  and 
here,  again,  Germany  was,  and  still  is,  though  not  to 
anything  like  the  same  degree  as  a  couple  of  decades 
ago,  in  the  position  of  a  pupil  who  has  yet  to  obtain 
full  command  over  his  implements. 

But  the  Germans  are  clever  and  assiduous  imitators, 
and  nowhere  have  they  shown  that  more  distinctly 
than  in  their  shipbuilding.  The  engineers  who  were 
sent  over  to  British  yards  to  supervise  the  construction 
of  vessels  for  German  firms  kept  their  eyes  open  and 
took  back  with  them  to  their  native  land  much  precious 
knowledge  of  British  methods.  It  happened  time 
and  again  that  German  shipowners  ordered  a  new 
type  of  vessel,  or  engine,  or  boiler,  from  British 
builders,  and  had  another  constructed  on  this  model  in 
Germany.  Several  of  the  technical  high  schools  in 
various  parts  of  the  Empire  now  have  special  chairs 
of  naval  construction,  and  none  has  ever  equalled 
the  German  professor  in  the  patient  accumulation 
of  all  the  available  information  on  his  particular 
subject. 

If  the  advocates  of  the  combustion  motor  are  to  be 
believed,  we  are  at  present  on  the  threshold  of  another 
new  era  in  marine  engineering,  and  in  that  event  the 
United  Kingdom  may  easil}^  lose  much  of  the  advantage 
which  her  old-established  mechanical  industry  gave 
her  when  steam  displaced  sails  for  the  propulsion  of 
ships.     Germany  is  quite  awake  to  the  potentialities 


THE  COMING  OF  THE  OIL-DRIVEN  SHIP    311 

of  the  new  power-generator,  and  several  of  her  leading 
shipbuilding  firms  and  engineering  works  have  vigor- 
ously grappled  with  the  problem  of  the  marine  oil 
motor. 

At  the  beginning  of  August,  191 2,  the  Howaldt  Yard, 
at  Kiel,  completed  for  the  Hamburg-South  America 
Line  a  6,500-ton  vessel,  the  Monte  Penedo,  fitted  with 
engines  of  this  type,  and  ships  of  the  same  class  have 
also  been  built  in  Germany  for  the  Hamburg-America 
and  the  German-American  Petroleum  Companies.  It 
is  further  understood  that  the  Augsburg-Nuremberg 
Engineering  Company  has  constructed  a  set  of  oil 
motors  of  6,000  horse-power  for  the  Imperial  Ministry 
of  Marine.  Should  the  oil  motor  prove  universally 
victorious  on  the  sea,  Great  Britain  will,  of  course, 
derive  no  further  benefit  from  her  unique  deposits  of 
smokeless  steam  coal,  and  will  become  even  more 
dependent  on  foreign  countries  for  her  motive  power 
than  she  already  is  for  her  food. 

Though  of  doubtful  advantage  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  immediate  interests  of  the  German  Fleet,  General 
von  Stosch's  rule  that  all  the  Imperial  war  vessels  should 
be  constructed  in  home  3^ards  and  of  native  material 
unquestionably  did  a  great  deal  to  stimulate  ship- 
building in  Germany.  Another  measure  w^hich  con- 
tributed much  to  the  same  end  was  the  subsidization  of 
the  mail  lines  to  the  Far  Orient,  Australia,  and  East 
and  South  Africa.  It  has  always  been  maintained  by 
German  authorities  that  the  sums  paid  by  the  Govern- 
ment under  the  postal  contracts  are  not  really  subsidies, 
and  that  the}^  had  neither  the  intention  nor  the  effect 
of  promoting  shipping.  Their  sole  purpose,  it  is 
contended,  was  to  establish  a  regular  mail  service 
between  Germany  and  portions  of  the  globe  where 
she  had  important  commercial  interests.  The  Nord- 
deutscber  Lloyd,  which  has  almost  monopolized  the 
mail-carrying  under  these  contracts,  professes  to  have 
had  no  initial  benefit  from  them,  but  rather  to  have  lost 
heavily  at  the  inauguration  of  the  service;  while  the 


312     GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

Hamburg-America  Line  renounced  participation  in  the 
subsidies  after  a  very  brief  experience. 

That  the  Government  was  not  exclusively  concerned 
for  the  carrying  of  letters  when  it  proposed  these 
contracts  was  shown  by  the  clauses  providing  for 
the  transformation  of  the  mail  steamers  into  auxiliary 
cruisers  in  time  of  war.  All  the  fastest  steamers  of 
the  German  lines  are  now  constructed  with  a  view 
to  such  a  contingency ;  their  engines  are  protected 
against  lighter  shell  fire,  platforms  are  provided  for 
the  mounting  of  quick-firers,  and  the  guns  themselves 
are  kept  in  readiness,  if  not  actually  on  board,  so  that 
the  change  from  merchant-ship  to  warship  can  be 
accomplished  with  a  minimum  of  delay.  A  large 
number  of  the  officers  of  these  liners  belong  to  the 
Naval  Reserve,  and  the  Emperor,  here  again  taking 
a  leaf  out  of  the  British  book,  allows  them  to  bear 
the  iron  cross,  the  German  war  emblem,  on  their 
flag.  As  is  the  case  with  the  reserve  officers  of  the 
British  Navy,  they  also  derive  various  other  privi- 
leges from  their  connection  with  the  Imperial  sea 
service. 

For  nearly  twenty  years  after  the  general  adoption 
of  iron  construction,  practically  every  important 
addition  to  the  German  mercantile  marine  came  from 
the  United  Kingdom.  The  seventies  witnessed  the 
first  considerable  spurt  in  German  shipbuilding,  which 
in  the  succeeding  decade  finally  broke  with  its  old 
traditions  and  passed  over  to  the  use  of  iron  as  build- 
ing material.  The  Imperial  yards  at  Kiel  and  Wilhelms- 
haven  laid  down  their  first  ironclads  in  1869,  and  in 
1875  the  works  at  Dillingen,  now  a  branch  of  the  vast 
Krupp  establishment,  commenced  the  manufacture  of 
armour  plating,  for  which  they  were  subsequently  to 
become  famous.  About  the  same  period  the  Vulcan 
works  secured  orders  from  China  for  two  armoured 
vessels  and  three  protected  cruisers,  and  the  Schichau 
yard,  at  Elbing,  made  its  name  by  the  construction  of 
torpedo    craft,    which    it    subsequently    supplied    to 


THE  BLUE  RIBBAND  OF  THE  ATLANTIC    313 

practically  every  navy  in  the  world,  with  the  exception 
of  those  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  (One  of  these 
vessels  is  actually  in  the  British  service  at  the  present 
moment,  having  been  captured  from  the  Chinese  at  the 
time  of  the  Boxer  rising.) 

Simultaneously  the  German  yards  came  to  the  front 
with  the  construction  of  large  passenger  liners.  The 
first  vessels  of  this  class  to  be  built  in  Germany  were 
ordered  by  the  Hamburg-America  Company  from  the 
Vulcan  and  Reiherstieg  yards  in  1882,  and  they  were 
soon  followed  by  the  first  half-dozen  mail-boats  of  the 
Norddeutscher  Lloyd.  An  attempt  to  rival  the  swift 
British  liners  was  made  in  1888  w^ith  the  Augusta 
Viktona,  and  less  than  ten  years  later  the  same 
owners  and  builders  captured  the  blue  riband  of  the 
Atlantic  with  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grosse^  which, 
with  its  22i  knots  speed,  remained  unchallenged  till 
the  Cunard  Line,  with  the  assistance  of  substantial 
and  direct  State  subsidies,  won  it  back  with  the 
Mauritania  and  Lusitania.  It  is  claimed  that  the 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grosse  was  completed  in  the  record 
time  of  eighteen  months,  but  rumour  has  it  that  this 
was  only  rendered  possible  by  the  employment  of 
English  material  in  her  construction.  It  must  be 
admitted,  however,  that,  considering  that  German 
shipbuilding  can  be  said  to  have  been  still  in  its 
infancy  at  that  time,  the  vessel  bears  very  eloquent 
testimony  to  its  quickness  in  learning  and  its  skill  in 
applying  its  lessons. 

With  the  50,000  -  ton  and  70,000  -  horse  -  power 
Imperator^  built  for  the  Hamburg-America  Company 
by  the  Vulcan  Works,  and  the  two  sister  ships  which  are 
being  constructed  by  Messrs.  Blohm  and  Voss  for  the 
same  line,  Germany  hopes  once  more  to  take  the  lead  in 
the  transatlantic  passenger  traffic  in  size  and  comfort 
if  not  in  speed.  It  can  hardly  be  pretended  that  either 
in  design  or  workmanship  she  is  any  longer  sensibly 
behind  the  British  Isles  in  turning  out  steamers  of  this 
type,  and  her  shipyards  are  equipped  with  the  very 


314    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

latest  and  most  efficient  appliances  for  saving  labour 
and  handling  heavy  castings.  Thus  Messrs.  Blohm  and 
Voss  have  erected  a  crane  to  lift  w^eights  up  to  300  tons^ 
while  the  Germania  yard  has  two  (one  floating  and 
one  stationary),  and  the  Vulcan  Works  one,  of  only 
fifty  tons  less  raising  power. 

For  various  reasons  the  amount  of  capital  sunk  in 
the  German  shipbuilding  industry  cannot  be  precisely 
ascertained.  The  great  Schichau  works  at  Dantzig 
and  Elbing  are,  for  instance,  a  private  concern,  which 
publishes  no  accounts,  and  the  proprietors  of  v/hich  ow^e 
the  fortune  of  six  millions  sterling  they  are  reputed  to 
have  accumulated  at  least  as  much  to  their  agricultural 
machinery  and  locomotives  as  to  their  torpedo  craft 
and  dredgers.  The  Germania  yard  at  Kiel  is  part  of 
the  immense  Krupp  undertaking,  which,  though,  for 
purposes  of  convenience,  worked  as  a  public  company, 
is,  with  the  exception  of  the  qualifying  directors'  shares, 
a  family  property,  and  allows  no  insight  into  the  details 
of  the  financial  adjustments  between  its  manifold  depart- 
ments. It  is,  however,  estimated  by  Herr  Lehmann- 
Felskowski,  a  well-informed  waiter  on  the  subject,  that 
an  aggregate  sum  of  M.  200,000,000  (say  ;^  10,000, 000)  is 
at  present  invested  in  German  shipbuilding.  Some- 
thing like  one-half  of  this  is  administered  by  ordinary 
limited  liability  companies,  and  of  the  numbers,  capital, 
and  profits  of  these  during  recent  years,  the  appended 
figures  will  afford  an  adequate  idea : 


1907. 

1908. 

1909. 

1910. 

Number  of  companies 
Share  capital  in  M.  1,000  ... 
Debentures  in  M.  1,000 
Dividend  in  M.  1,000 
Dividend  per  cent 

18 
63,660 

6-09 

19 

68,739 

31,056 

2,594 

377 

19 

64,363 

31,884 

2,189 

3-4 

18 

59,726 

34,187 

1,852 

3"i 

The  companies  included  in  these  statistics  have,  how- 
ever, worked  with  very  unequal  results,  as  will  be 


REDUCED  SHIPBUILDING  PROFITS    315 

seen  from  the  subjoined  details  of  the  dividends  of  the 
chief  of  them  : 


1S03. 

1904. 

1905. 

1906. 

1907. 

1908. 

1909. 

1910. 

1911. 

1 

"1 
II 
4 
4 

Vulcan 

BlohmandVoss 
Weser 

14 

9 

14 

9 
0 

14 

9 
0 

14 

7 
0 

14 

7 
0 

12 

4 
0 

II 
6 
0 

Howaldt 

0 

4 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Reiherstieg     ... 

10 

S 

6 

7 

10 

10 

7 

S 

6 

Tecklenborg  ... 

12 

10 

10 

4 

9 

0 

0 

0 

4 

Oderwerke     ... 

3 

S 

S 

6 

6 

6 

6 

5 

6 

Neptun 
Seebeck 

10 

1\ 

5 
4 

6 

7 
0 

4 
0 

4 
4 

0 
0 

0 
0 

Bremen  Vulcan 

0 

6 

10 

10 

10 

0 

0 

1\ 

10 

Nordseewerke 

~ 

~ 

0 

0 

0 

It  is  impossible  to  survey  these  figures  and  the  facts 
explanatory  of  them  without  a  faint  suspicion  that  the 
efforts  of  the  German  Government  artificially  to  stimu- 
late shipbuilding  have  not  been  an  unmixed  blessing 
to  the  yards  v^^hose  services  to  the  Navy  v^ere  to  have 
been  rewarded  by  extended  business  and  increased 
profits.  Before  the  Howaldt  works  received  an  order 
for  a  cruiser  in  1901,  and,  by  the  promise  of  more  im- 
portant naval  commissions,  was  encouraged  to  lay 
down  expensive  special  plant  for  the  construction  of 
large  warships,  they  had  never  paid  a  smaller  dividend 
than  5  per  cent.  What  the  subsequent  results  of  their 
operations  have  been  is  indicated  in  part  by  the  fore- 
going figures,  which,  however,  give  no  sufficient  idea 
of  the  severity  of  the  crisis  of  1910,  when  the  company 
was  driven  to  desperate  financial  devices  in  order  to 
complete  the  battleship  Helgoland^  and  at  one  time 
actually  contemplated  the  sale  of  the  greater  portion 
of  its  site  at  Kiel  as  the  only  sure  method  of  staving 
off  irretrievable  disaster.  Its  difficulties  were  ulti- 
mately surmounted  by  a  combined  condensation  of 
old  and  issue  of  new  capital,  the  existing  shareholders 
supplying  the  funds  necessary  to  save  the  situation. 
It  is  not  known  to  what  extent,  if  any,  the  Imperial 


3i6    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

Ministry  of  Marine  contributed  to  the  rescue  of  the 
establishment,  the  disappearance  of  which  would  have 
seriously  interfered  with  its  plans. 

It  was,  however,  to  some  degree  through  the  inter- 
vention of  this  department  that  the  Weser  yard  was 
kept  on  its  feet.  This  concern  had,  on  the  whole,  paid 
very  well  up  to  the  inauguration  of  the  new  naval 
policy  of  the  German  Empire.  But  in  1904  it  under- 
took a  considerable  extension  of  its  premises  and 
plant,  to  enable  it  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  in- 
creased construction  for  the  German  Fleet,  and  from 
that  date  up  to  the  moment  of  writing  its  shareholders 
have  received  nothing.  Miscalculations  and  strikes 
caused  delays  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  new  works 
and  consequent  losses,  and  by  1907  the  company  was 
shaken  to  its  foundations.  Its  shares  fell  from  130  to 
45,  and  its  position  was  all  the  more  critical  because 
its  buildings  and  other  structures  were  erected  on 
rented  land.  At  this  juncture  the  Ministry  of  Marine 
took  over  the  half-finished  ships  which  the  yard  was 
building  to  its  order,  and  in  the  following  3^ear  the 
shareholders  were  persuaded  to  contribute  an  additional 
three  and  three-quarter  million  marks  to  save  their 
investments  from  annihilation. 

These  have  not  been  the  only  untoward  incidents  in 
the  recent  history  of  German  shipbuilding.  In  1903 
an  attempt  was  made  to  establish  a  big  yard  at  Emden, 
where,  with  the  assistance  of  the  municipality,  the 
Nordseewerke  w^ere  founded.  The  original  capital 
was  M.  2,100,000;  but  this  proved  altogether  in- 
sufficient, and  in  1907  a  committee  appointed  to  advise 
what  could  be  done  to  keep  the  undertaking  going 
recommended  that  an  additional  M.  2,200,000  v/as 
absolutely  necessary.  This  was  raised  by  share- 
holders' contributions  and  the  renunciation  by  the 
creditors  of  a  portion  of  their  claims;  but  these  efforts 
to  place  the  yard  on  a  sound  footing  were  unavailing, 
and  it  was  sold  by  auction  for  M.  53,000  to  the  big 
coal-dealing   firm    of  Hugo   Stinnes.     Another   ship- 


SUGGESTED  SHIPBUILDING  TRUST    317 

building  undertaking  which  has  been  unable  to  keep 
its  head  above  water  was  the  Eider  yard,  of  Tonning, 
which,  after  various  abortive  attempts  to  amalgamate 
it  with  the  Howaldt  and  other  companies,  went  into 
liquidation  in  1909. 

In  the  summer  of  1912,  when  a  distinct  revival  had 
already  set  in,  it  was  complained  in  the  German  Press 
that  shipbuilding  was  altogether  in  a  parlous  state, 
and  that  companies  like  the  Vulcan,*  of  Stettin  and 
Hamburg,  which  continued  to  pay  substantial  divi- 
dends, were  enabled  to  do  so  only  by  the  profits  of 
their  general  engineering  business.  It  was  urged  that 
the  only  means  by  which  German  shipbuilding  could 
be  saved  was  a  comprehensive  trust,  or,  at  any  rate, 
an  amalgamation  into  several  large  groups,  which 
would  have  no  difficulty  in  coming  to  agreements,  as 
necessity  arose,  to  prevent  underbidding  in  the  home 
market.  Rumours  of  secret  rebates  granted  to  the 
German  shipbuilders  by  the  manufacturers  of  their 
materials  suggest  also  that  the  yards  do  not  work 
under  the  same  economic  conditions  as  other  branches 
of  ^industry,  but  are  rather  privily  favoured  at  their 
expense. 

If  it  cannot  be  said  that  Germany  as  yet  seriously 
menaces  the  oceanic  carrying  trade  of  the  British  Isles, 
even  less  dangerous  seems  her  rivalry  in  general  ship- 
building. The  variations  from  year  to  3'ear  in  the 
output  of  this  industry  are  very  great,  a  period  of  high 
freights  invariably  leading  to  over-production,  and  this, 
in  its  turn,  being  followed  by  a  term  of  restricted 
activity,  while  the  building  of  one  or  two  vessels  more 
or  less  of  the  largest  type  will  cause  considerable  dis- 
crepancies between  the  construction  figures  of  suc- 
cessive years.  For  these  reasons  quinquennial  periods 
have  been  taken  in  the  appended  table,  showing  the 

*  While  this  book  is  in  the  press  it  is  announced  that,  in  con- 
sequence of  a  loss  of  ;^ioo,ooo  on  the  construction  of  warships  for 
the  Imperial  Navy,  the  Vulcan  Company  will  divide  profits  for  19 12 
(a  record  year  for  German  shipbuilding)  at  the  rate  of  only  6  per  cent. 


3i8    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 


progress  of  shipbuilding  in  the  two  countries  during 
the  past  thirty  3'ears  : 


Quinquennium. 

United  Kingdom. 

Germany. 

1881-1885               

1886-1890               

i89:-i895            

I896-I900            

I90I-I905           

I906-I9IO            

Tons  Built. 

3,313,431 
2,9^0,040 
3,512,841 
4,145,396 
4,624,642 
4,126,093 

Tons  Built. 
248,504 

242,793 
307,829 

439,545 
574,403 
612,112 

Here  again,  by  the  use  of  percentages  and  multiples, 
the  figures  can  be  given  an  appearance  very  threaten- 
ing to  the  United  Kingdom's  predominance  in  the 
shipbuilding  industry.  It  is  obvious  at  a  glance  that 
while  her  output  of  tonnage  in  the  quinquennial 
periods  under  review  increased  by  only  about  30  per 
cent.,  that  of  Germany  became  twice  and  a  half  as 
great  as  it  was;  further,  that  from  being  more  than 
thirteen  times  as  large  as  that  of  Germany,  the  output 
of  the  United  Kingdom  declined  in  comparison  till  it 
was  less  than  seven  times  as  large.  These  relation- 
ships are,  however,  of  little  significance  in  comparison 
with  the  facts  that  the  excess  of  British  over  German 
shipbuilding  rose  during  the  period  dealt  with  from 
3,064,927  tons  to  3,513,981  tons.  So  far,  indeed,  is 
Germany  from  seriously  imperilling  the  United  King- 
dom's position  as  shipbuilder  to  the  world  that,  in  spite 
of  all  the  pressure  and  inducements  brought  to  bear  on 
her  shipowners,  they  still  purchase  large  quantities  of 
tonnage  abroad.  In  the  quinquennial  periods  of  the 
last  thirty  3^ears  the  amounts  of  these  foreign  purchases 
were  : 


Quinquennium. 
1881-1885 
1886-189O 
1891-1895 
1896-1900 
1901-1905 
1906-1910 


Tons. 
217,004 
275,382 
273,928 

515,48^ 
450,258 

334,007 


BRITISH  PREDOMINANCE 


319 


A  great  deal  of  this  shipping  was  not,  of  course, 
built  to  order,  but  was  transferred  to  Germany  by 
British  firms,  who  had  exhausted  its  utility  so  far  as 
their  purposes  were  concerned.  During  the  three 
years  1909,  1910,  and  191 1,  the  vessels  built  in  the 
United  Kingdom  on  German  account  were  of  the 
following  aggregate  tonnage  : 


Year. 

Vessels. 

Tons  Gross. 

1909           

1910           

1911            

2 

5 
3 

8>i79 
26,507 
20,527 

As  clinching  evidence  of  the  overwhelming  pre- 
dominance which  British  shipbuilding  still  maintains, 
the  following  figures,  showing  the  number  and  tonnage 
of  vessels  of  all  kinds  launched  in  the  United  Kindom 
and  elsewhere,  respectively,  during  the  year  191 1,  may 
prove  interesting : 


Number. 

Tonnage. 

United  Kingdom           

British  Colonies  and  foreign  countries 

Totals         

822 
946 

2,034,630 
1,384.379 

1,768 

3,419,009 

By  the  exclusion  of  warships  these  figures  become 


Number. 

Tonnage. 

United  Kingdom 

British  Colonies  and  foreign  countries 

Totals         

772 
827 

1,803,844 
846,296 

i>599 

2,650,140 

It  is,  however,  our  special  present  object  to  enquire 
how  far  Germany  is  equipped  for  rivalry  with  Great 


320    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

Britain  in  the  building  of  a  war  navy,  and  here  it  must 
be  admitted  that  her  situation  is  much  more  favour- 
able than  it  is  in  respect  to  the  mercantile  marine. 
To  demonstrate  this  it  is  only  necessary  to  state 
that  the  warships  of  over  loo  tons  launched  in  the 
United  Kingdom  in  191 1  had  a  total  displacement  of 
221,430  tons,  while  those  launched  in  Germany  had  a 
total  displacement  of  as  much  as  128,340  tons.  If  the 
extreme  possibilities  of  construction  wxre  not  attained 
on  the  side  of  the  United  Kingdom,  no  more  were 
they  on  that  of  Germany.  In  the  winter  of  1905-06 — 
that  is  to  say,  just  before  the  era  of  the  Dreadnought 
battleship — Count  Ernst  Reventlow,  the  well-known 
writer  on  naval  topics,  circularized  the  German  yards 
that  up  to  that  time  had  built  capital  warships,  with 
an  enquiry  as  to  the  speed  at  which  they  could  con- 
struct such  vessels  and  the  number  they  could  complete 
annually.  The  replies  received  may  be  summarized  as 
under: 


Yard. 

Period  of  Con- 
struction in 
Months. 

Could  be 
Completed 
Annually. 

Germania             ...         

Howalcit 

Vulcan     ...         ...         

Blohm  and  Vo_:s            

Scliiciiau 

;     Weser      

Total        

24-30 

24 

24-30 
24-30 
30-36 
24-30 

2 

I 

4 
2 

2 
2 

■'    i 

Up  to  the  present  Germany  has  never  laid  down  more 
than  four  capital  warships  in  one  year,  so  that  at  the 
date  of  Count  Reventlow's  investigation,  without  the 
co-operation  of  the  Imperial  yards  at  Wilhelmshaven, 
Kiel,  and  Dantzig,  her  private  industry  would,  as  was 
stated  in  the  reply  of  the  Schichau  firm,  have  been  able 
to  turn  out  such  vessels  at  a  rate  which  would  have 
been  three  times  the  Empire's  past  maximum  produc- 


SHIPBUILDING  RESOURCES  321 

tion.  It  could,  in  fact,  according  to  these  figures, 
which  must,  however,  be  accepted  with  some  reserve, 
have  kept  up  a  speed  of  construction  twice  as  great 
as  that  which  Great  Britain  would  be  compelled  by  the 
German  Navy  Law  to  maintain  for  all  future  time  if 
the  two-keels-to-one  standard  were  to  be  observed. 
It  should,  however,  be  mentioned  that  the  undertakings 
given  to  Count  Reventlow  by  some  of  the  yards  were 
conditional  upon  the  prompt  delivery^pf  armour  plating 
and  heavy  guns  by  Krupps,  who  so  far  have  furnished 
the  German  Navy  with  its  entire  requirements  of  these 
two  essential  articles  of  warship  equipment. 

This  Krupp  monopoly  is  undoubtedly  a  weak  spot 
in  Germany's  warship-building  arrangements,  and 
especially  since  the  able  race  which  developed  the 
great  works  at  Essen  has  become  extinct  in  the  male 
line  and  the  undertaking  is  managed  solely  by  what 
are  in  fact,  if  not  in  name,  salaried  officials.  As  yet, 
however,  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  quality  of 
Krupp  workmanship  or  the  capacity  of  the  establish- 
ment, in  case  of  need,  to  supply  guns  and  armour  for 
a  much  larger  number  of  battleships  and  large 
cruisers  than  Germany  has  any  immediate  intention 
of  building ;  and  the  intimate  friendship  which  has 
long  existed  between  the  Emperor  William  and  the 
Krupp  family  is  possibly  an  even  more  important 
factor  than  it  was,  now  that  the  ordinary  share  capital 
of  the  undertaking  is  entirely  in  the  hands  of  a  woman. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Krupps  were  taken  into 
the  confidence  of  the  Government  before  the  Navy  Bill 
of  1900  was  drafted,  and  that  the  subsequent  extensions 
of  the  works  were  then  agreed  upon  in  principle. 
These  extensions  took  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of 
the  Germania  shipbuilding  yard  in  1901,  and  of  enor- 
mous additions  to  the  ordnance  and  armour  plate 
works  a  few  years  later.  To  carry  out  these  develop- 
ments debentures  were  issued  to  the  amount  of 
M.  20,000,000  in  1901,  and  to  the  amount  of  M.  25,000,000 
(out  of  a  total  of  M.  50,000,000,  for  which  rights  were 

21 


322    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

obtained)  in  1908.  On  neither  side  is  the  relationship 
of  the  German  Government  to  Krupps  an  ordinary 
business  one,  and  in  all  probability  its  basis  is  an 
undertaking  to  the  effect  that,  if  the  works  would  lay 
down  the  plant  necessary  to  supply  a  certain  quantity 
of  big  guns  and  armour  plate  annually,  the  Government 
would  do  its  best  to  see  that  the  orders  required  to 
keep  that  plant  remuneratively  employed  were  duly 
forthcoming. 

Since  the  replies  to  Count  Reventlow's  enquiries 
were  penned,  the  building  of  the  Dreadnought  has 
brought  about  a  positive  revolution  in  the  dimensions 
of  capital  warships.  A  sudden  jump  of  five  thousand 
tons  in  displacement,  and  then  a  further  advance  of 
nearly  as  much,  together  with  the  corresponding 
increases  in  length  and  beam,  must  have  been  very 
unwelcome  to  the  German  shipyards ;  but  if  the 
builders  have  not  fully  kept  pace  with  these  changes, 
at  any  rate  it  may  be  assumed  that  they  have  not  been 
left  very  far  behind,  and  that  their  powers  of  produc- 
tion have  not  been  substantially  reduced  since  they 
sent  in  the  estimates  in  question.  Besides,  the  com- 
pletion of  the  new  Vulcan  yard  at  Hamburg,  from 
which  the  company  anticipated  an  increase  in  efficienc}^ 
of  from  50  to  75  per  cent.,  took  place  subsequent  to 
the  launch  of  the  Dreadnought^  and  naturally  arrange- 
ments were  made  to  comply  with  the  fresh  standard. 

This  establishment  was  decided  upon  in  1905,  and 
was  formally  opened  in  the  presence  of  the  Emperor 
William  on  June  21,  1909.  It  contains  three  slips, 
respectively,  305,  259,  and  207  metres  in  length,  for 
the  construction  of  liners;  while  a  fourth,  which 
provides  accommodation  for  vessels  of  up  to  41 
metres  beam,  was  specially  designed  for  warships 
of  the  largest  dimensions.  The  191 2  edition  of 
NauticHS  gives-  a  useful  table  (of  which  the  essential 
features  are  reproduced  as  an  appendix  to  this  book), 
showing,  among  other  details,  the  slip  accommodation 
at  all  the  principal  German  shipyards.     From  this  it 


NUMBER  OF  BUILDING  SLIPS 


323 


would  appear  that  the  yards  which  have  already  had 
experience  in  the  building  of  battleships  and  large 
cruisers  have  at  their  disposal  the  following  slips  for 
vessels  of  the  larger  types  : 


Yard. 

150  to  200  Metrer. 

Over  200  Metn  s. 

Vulcan,  Hamburg         

Vulcan,  Stettin 

Schichau...         

Blohm  and  Voss           

Weser      

Germania            

Howaldt 

Totals 

I                              ....         ..  ....  .. 

3 
3 
5 

I 

4 
2 

2 
2 
2 

4 
3 

I 

18 

14 

In  addition  to  these  private  slips,  there  are  five  of 
unspecified  length  at  the  Imperial  yards  at  Wilhelms- 
haven,  Kiel,  and  Dantzig,  and  it  w^ould  certainly  be 
no  exaggeration  to  state,  that,  in  an  emergency,  this 
accommodation  would  suffice  for  the  construction  of 
at  least  twice  as  many  large  armoured  ships  as  are 
specified  in  the  Fleet  Law,  other  conditions — the  sup- 
ply, in  particular,  of  guns,  armour,  torpedo  equipment, 
and  engines — being  of  equivalent  capacity.  But,  as 
already  stated,  Germany  is  handicapped  by  the  inability 
of  her  shipyards  to  manufacture  their  own  heavy 
ordnance  and  armour  plates  and  their  dependence 
for  these  articles  on  the  one  firm  that  at  present 
produces  them  in  Germany.  And  so  long  as  that  firm 
is,  in  its  turn,  dependent  solely,  or  nearly  so,  on  home 
orders  for  the  utilization  of  its  plant  and  the  remunera- 
tion of  its  capital,  it  will  never  be  in  a  position  to 
respond  to  the  exigencies  of  such  an  emergency. 

German  naval  legislation  was  not,  however,  dic- 
tated exclusively  by  political  motives  ;  one  of  its 
objects  was  to  establish  an  industry  which  should 
break  the  British  shipbuilding  monopoly,  and  become 
not    merely   a   broad   and   stable  foundation   for  the 


324    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 

erection  of  the  Empire's  war  fleet,  but  also  a  valuable 
national  economic  asset.  The  Navy  Act  of  1900  gave 
the  German  shipbuilders  the  assurance  of  future  orders, 
which  was  necessar^^  to  induce  them  to  run  the  risk 
of  laying  down  the  plant  required  for  the  construction 
of  ships  of  the  largest  classes.  From  the  date  of  the 
passing  of  that  measure,  it  was  known  that  for  all 
future  time  the  Imperial  Ministry  of  Marine  would 
require  the  annual  delivery  of  at  least  three  capital 
warships,  and  the  yards  had  a  definite  justification  for 
large  capital  outlay.  What  was  hoped,  and  what  is 
hoped,  is  that,  with  the  aid  of  the  experience  thus 
gained,  they  will  be  able  to  enter  more  successfully 
into  competition  with  the  United  Kingdom  for  the 
naval  orders  of  those  States  that  cannot  build  their 
war  vessels  for  themselves.  On  the  degree  of  the 
fulfilment  of  these  hopes  will  depend  to  a  ver}^  large 
extent  the  issue  of  the  struggle  for  the  supremacy  of 
the  seas. 

The  German  Government  will  assuredly  leave  no 
stone  unturned  to  assist  its  shipbuilders  to  obtain 
foreign  contracts.  It  was  undoubtedly  with  a  view 
to  securing  orders  that  the  Vojt  der  Tann,  as  soon  as 
she  had  passed  through  her  trials  in  such  a  way  as,  on 
the  published  figures,  to  warrant  the  boast  that  she 
was  the  fastest  battle-cruiser  afloat,  was  despatched 
to  South  America  at  forced  speed  for  a  tour  of  the 
Republican  ports,  and  similar  motives  will  in  the 
future  frequently  have  to  be  looked  for  behind  German 
naval  movements.  For  the  first  time  in  modern 
history,  the  German  Navy  is  now  equipped  with  a 
large  number  of  vessels  approximately  equal  in  size, 
speed,  and  strength  to  the  best  in  the  world,  and  what 
it  has  effected  in  this  respect  during  the  twelve  years 
which  have  elapsed  since  the  change  in  the  Empire's 
naval  policy  was  clearly  formulated  has  been  little 
less  than  astounding. 

The  approach  which  in  that  short  period  has  been 
made  to  Great  Britain  has  involved  not  only  the  size 


COMPETITION  FOR  FOREIGN  ORDERS    325 

and  number  of  the  vessels,  but  also  their  quality,  and 
it  is  not  improbable  that  in  a  few  years'  time  Hamburg, 
Bremen,  Kiel,  and  Dantzig  may  be  able  to  secure 
a  considerable  proportion  of  those  foreign  orders  for 
large  armoured  ships,  which  now  go  almost  ex- 
clusively to  the  Clyde,  the  Tyne,  and  Barrow.* 
This  is  an  ambition  which  has  played  an  important 
part  in  German  naval  legislation,  and  should  it  ever 
be  realized  it  will  have  a  very  decisive  bearing  on  the 
chances  of  the  Empire  in  a  naval  war.  With  her  slips 
and  her  finishing  docks  regularly  occupied  by  vessels 
building  for  foreign  States,  Germany  would  have  an 
invaluable  reserve  of  material  on  which  to  fall  back  in 
case  of  need,  and  which  might  easily  decide  in  her 
favour  the  fortunes  of  a  campaign  against  an  enemy  of 
anything  like  equal  strength. 

Up  to  the  present  the  only  German  yard  which  has 
to  any  considerable  extent  executed  foreign  orders  has 
been  that  started  by  Ferdinand  Schichau  in  1837,  ^nd 
now  owned  by  his  son-in-law,  Herr  Karl  Ziese.  It  is 
not  without  interest  that  the  founder  of  this  under- 
taking made  prolonged  investigations  in  England 
before  embarking  on  his  venture,  though  the  mention 
of  this  must  by  no  means  be  taken  to  imply  that  he 
was  not  an  engineer  of  great  and  original  gifts.  The 
Schichau  yard  can  boast  the  distinction,  unique  for 
a  German  shipbuilding  concern,  of  having  done  pioneer 
work  in  at  least  one  branch  of  naval  construction.  In 
turn  it  has  been  able  to  claim  for  the  Russian  28*4-knot 
torpedo-boat  A dier  (iSSo)^  the  four  Chinese  destroyers 
built  in  1898  (367  knots),  of  which  one,  it  may  be 
recalled,  is  now  in  the  British  service,  the  Russian 
cruiser  Nowik  of  the  same  year  (26  knots),  and  the 
Argentine  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  Cordoba  and  La 
Plata,  finished  in  191 1,  that  they  were  the  fastest  vessels 

*  Since  these  words  were  written  a  first-class  battleship  has  been 
commenced  at  the  Vulcan  yard  at  Hamburg  for  the  Greek  Govern- 
ment at,  it  is  reported,  an  unremunerative  price  ;  and  at  the  moment 
of  going  to  press  the  same  establishment  has  strong  hopes  of  securing 
the  order  for  a  sister  vessel  to  the  one  under  construction. 


326    GERMANY'S  MARITIME  INTERESTS 


of  their  respective  classes  afloat,  though  the  details 
of  the  conditions  under  which  the  trials  that  yielded 
these  results  took  place  have  not  been  published. 
The  two  last-named  boats  belonged  to  a  series  of 
twelve,  of  which  four  each  were  placed  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  France,  and  Germany,  and  in  their  trials  they 
attained  a  speed  of  ^6'S  knots  ;  whereas,  according  to 
the  reports  in  the  German  Press,  the  stipulated  32  knots 
was  reached  neither  by  the  British  nor  the  French 
boats.  Up  to  1912  the  Schichau  yards  had  delivered 
the  following  torpedo  craft  (torpedo-boats,  destroyers, 
and  torpedo  cruisers) 


To— 
Germany 
Russia 
Italy 
China 
Japan 
Austria 
Turkey 
Brazil 
Norway 
Argentine 
Sweden 
Denmark 


Number. 
179 

39 
36 
21 

\l 

9 

5 
4 
2 
I 
I 


Total 


334 


A  few  foreign  orders  have  also  been  executed  by 
the  Vulcan  Works  and  the  Germania  yard.  Up  to 
the  end  of  191 1  the  former  had  completed  the  following 
war  vessels : 


For— 

Battle- 
ships. 

Large 
Cruisers. 

Other 
Cruisers. 

Torpedo 
Craft. 

Germany         

China 

Japan    

Russia 

Uruguay          

Greece             

10 

2 

2 

I 

14 

4 

I 
I 

3? 

16 

2 
ID 

The  Germania   3'ard,  which,  it  should  be  noted,  is 
the  only  shipbuilding  establishment  that  up  to  the 


THE  GERMANIA  YARD 


327 


present  has  applied  itself  to  the  construction  of  sub- 
marines, had,  at  the  commencement  of  191 2,  supplied 


the  following  war  vessels  : 


lo— 

Battle- 

Large 

Other 

Torpedo 

Sub- 

ships, etc. 

Cruisers. 

Cruisers. 

Craft. 

marines. 

i 

Germany 

12* 

I 

9 

32 

16 

Turkey       

li 

— 

14 

— 

Russia         

— 

I 

— 

4 

4 

Brazil          





3 

Argentine  ... 

— 

— 

— 

3 

— 

Spain 

— 



— 

I 

— 

Norway 

— 

— 

— 

— 

4 

Austria        









2 

Italy            

— 

— 

— 

— 

I 

*  Including  one  armoured  coast-defence  ship. 
f  Armoured  coast-defence  ship. 

The  yards  of  the  Weser  Company,  Messrs.  Blohm 
and  Voss,  and  the  Howaldt  Company,  the  only  three 
other  German  undertakings  which  up  to  the  present 
have  occupied  themselves  seriously  with  the  construc- 
tion of  warships,  seem  to  have  executed  no  orders  for 
foreicrn  Governments. 


APPENDIX  I 
GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION 

ACT  RELATING  TO  THE  GERMAN  FLEET  OF 
APRIL  10,  1898 

We,  Wilhelm,  by  the  grace  of  God,  German  Emperor,  King 
of  Prussia,  etc.,  order  in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  with  the 
consent  of  the  Federal  Council  and  of  the  Reichstag,  what 
follows : 

I.  Ship  Establishment. 

Clause  I. 

1.  The  ship  establishment  of  the  German  Fleet  is,  apart 
from  torpedo  craft,  school-ships,  special  service  ships,  and 
gunboats,  fixed  as  below : 

{a)  Ready  for  use — 

1  fleet  flagship, 

2  squadrons  each  of  8  battleships, 

2  divisions  each  of  4  armoured  coast-ships, 

6  large  cruisers  |  ^  ^    ^         ^      j    p^ 

16  small  cruisers j  * 

3  large  cruisers  |  ^^^  f^^^;       ^^^^-^^^^ 
10  small  cruisersj  ^ 

{h)  As  material  reserve — 

2  battleships, 

3  large  cruisers, 

4  small  cruisers. 

2.  Of  the  ships  existing  or  under  construction  on  April  i, 
1898,  there  shall  be  reckoned  on  this  establishment — 


as  battleships 
as  armoured  coast-ships 
as  large  cruisers     ... 
as  small  cruisers     ... 

...     12, 
...       8, 
...     10, 
...     23. 

328 

GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION         329 

3.  The  provision  of  the  means  for  the  new  ships  necessary 
for  the  attainment  of  the  establishment  (Clause  i)  is  subject  to 
annual  determination  by  the  Imperial  Budget,  with  the  standard, 
that  the  completion  of  the  legal  establishment,  in  so  far  as  the 
means  stated  in  Clause  7  suffice,  can  be  attained  by  the  end 
of  the  financial  year  1903. 

Clause  2. 
The  provision  of  the  means  for  the  necessary  replacement 
construction  is  subject  to  annual  determination  by  the  Imperial 
Budget,  with  the  standard  that,  as  the  rule — 

battleships  and  armoured  coast-ships  can  be  replaced  at 

the  end  of  25  years, 
large  cruisers  at  the  end  of  20  years, 
small  cruisers  at  the  end  of  15  years. 
The  periods  run  from  the  year  of  the  granting  of  the  first 
instalment  for  the  ship  to  be  replaced  to  the  granting  of  the 
first  instalment  of  the  replacing  ship. 

To  a  prolongation  of  the  replacement  period  the  consent  of 
the  Federal  Council  is  required  in  the  individual  case,  to  an 
abbreviation  that  of  the  Reichstag.  Any  grants  of  replace- 
ment ships  before  the  expiry  of  the  statutory  life-time — acts  of 
God,  such  as  the  sinking  of  a  ship,  excepted — are  to  be  com- 
pensated for,  within  a  period  to  be  agreed  upon  with  the  Reich- 
stag, by  the  postponement  of  other  replacement  construction. 

II.  Maintenance  in  Commission. 

Clause  3. 

The  provision  of  means  for  maintaining  the  Home  Battle 

Fleet  in  commission  is  subject  to  annual  determination  by  the 

Imperial  Budget,  with  the  standard  that  there  can  be  kept  in 

commission : 

(a)  For  the  constitution  of  active  formations — 

9  battleships, 
2  large  cruisers, 
6  small  cruisers. 

(b)  As  nucleus  ships  of  reserve  formations — 

4  battleships, 

4  armoured  coast-ships, 
2  large  cruisers, 

5  small  cruisers. 


330  APPENDIX  I 

{c)  For  rendering  a  reserve  formation  active  for  a  period 
ol;  two  months — 

2  battleships  or  armoured  coast-ships. 

III.  Personal  Establishment. 
Clause  4. 

Of  warrant  officers,  petty  officers,  and  men  of  the  seamen's 
divisions,  and  of  the  dockyard  and  torpedo  sections,  there 
shall  be : 

1.  i-|  crews  for  the  ships  on  foreign  service. 

2.  Full  complements  for — 

the  ships  belonging  to  active  formations  of  the  Home 

Battle  Fleet, 
half  of  the  torpedo  craft, 
the  school-ships, 
the  special  service  ships. 

3.  Nucleus  crews    (engine-room   personnel  |,  remaining 

personnel  |  of  the  full  complements)  for— 
the    ships    belonging  to    reserve   formations   of    the 

Home  Battle  Fleet, 
the  second  half  of  the  torpedo  craft. 

4.  The  necessary  shore  requirements. 

5.  An  addition  of  5  per  cent,  on  the  total  requirements. 

Clause  5. 

The  strengths  required  according  to  the  standard  of  these 
principles  for  the  seamen's  divisions  and  dockyard  and  torpedo 
sections  are  subject  to  annual  determination  by  the  Imperial 
Budget. 

IV.  Other  Expenditure. 

Clause  6. 

All  recurrent  and  non-recurrent  expenditure  in  the  Naval 
Estimates  with  regard  to  which  no  provisions  are  made  in  this 
law  are  subject  to  annual  determination  by  the  Imperial 
Budget  according  to  the  standard  of  the  requirements. 

V.    Cost, 
Clause  7. 
During   the   next   six   financial   years   (1898   to    IQ03)   the 
Reichstag  is  not  bound  to  provide  for   all  non-recurrent   ex- 


GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION         331 

penditure  of  the  Naval  Estimates  more  than  M.  408,900,000 — 
viz.,  for  building  and  arming  ships  more  than  M.  356,700,000, 
and  for  other  non-recurrent  expenditure  more  than  M.  52,200,000 
— or  for  the  recurrent  expenditure  of  the  Naval  Estimates  more 
than  an  average  increase  of  M.  4,900,000  annually. 

In  so  far  as  the  law  cannot  be  carried  out  in  accordance 
with  this  provision  before  the  end  of  the  financial  year  1903, 
its  execution  will  be  extended  beyond  the  year  1903. 

Clause  8. 

In  so  far  as  the  total  of  the  recurrent  and  non-recurrent  ex- 
penditure in  any  financial  year  exceeds  the  sum  of  M.  1 17,525,494 
marks,  and  the  proper  revenue  of  the  Empire  does  not  suffice 
to  cover  the  excess,  the  extra  amount  may  not  be  raised  by 
augmenting  or  adding  to  indirect  Imperial  taxes  on  articles 
consumed  by  the  masses. 

Legally  attested  under  our  own  signature  and  Imperial  seal. 

Given  at  Homburg  vor  der  Hohe,  April  10,  1908. 

WILHELM. 

FURST  ZU  HOHENLOHE. 


ACT  RELATING  TO  THE  GERMAN  FLEET  OF 
JUNE  14,  1900. 

We,  Wilhelm,  by  the  grace  of  God,  German  Emperor, 
King  of  Prussia,  etc.,  order  in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  with 
the  consent  of  the  Federal  Council  and  of  the  Reichstag,  what 
follows : 

I.  Ship  Establishment. 

Clause  I. 
There  shall  consist : 

1.  The  Battle  Fleet  of— 

2  fleet  flagships, 

4  squadrons  of  8  battleships  each, 
8  large  cruisers  1^  g^^^^g_ 
24  small  cruisers) 

2.  The  Foreign  Service  Fleet  of — 

3  large  cruisers, 
10  small  cruisers. 


332  APPENDIX  I 

3.  The  Material  Reserve  of — 

4  battleships, 

3  large  cruisers, 

4  small  cruisers. 

To  this  prescribed  establishment  are  to  be  reckoned  at  the 
promulgation  of  this  Law  the  ships  specified  in  Schedule  A. 

Clause  2. 

Except  in  the  case  of  losses  of  ships  there  shall  be  replaced : 

Battleships  after  25  years, 
Cruisers  after  20  years. 

The  periods  run  from  the  year  of  the  granting  of  the  first 
instalment  for  the  ship  to  be  replaced  to  the  granting  of  the 
first  instalment  of  the  replacing  ship. 

For  the  period  from  1901  to  19 17  the  replacement  building 
will  be  regulated  according  to  Schedule  B. 

II.  Maintenance  in  Commission. 

Clause  3. 

With  regard  to  the  maintenance  in  commission  of  the  Battle 
Fleet  the  following  principles  obtain  : 

1.  The  First   and  Second   Squadron   form   the   active 

Battle  Fleet,  the  Third  and  Fourth  Squadrons  the 
Reserve  Battle  Fleet. 

2.  Of  the  Active  Battle  Fleet  all,  of  the  Reserve  Battle 

Fleet  half  of  the  battleships  and  cruisers  shall  be 
kept  permanently  in  commission. 

3.  For  manoeuvres  some  ships  of   the  Reserve  Battle 

Fleet  which  are  out  of  commission  shall  be  tempor- 
arily placed  in  commission. 

III.  Personal  Establishment. 

Clause  4. 

Of  warrant  officers,  petty  officers,  and  men  of  the  seamen's 
divisions  and  of  the  dockyard  and  torpedo  sections  there  shall  be: 

I.  Full  complements  for  the  ships  belonging  to  the 
Active  Battle  Fleet,  half  of  the  torpedo-boats,  the 
school-ships,  and  the  special  service  ships. 


GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION         333 

2.  Nucleus  crews  (engine-room  personnel  |,  remaining 

personnel  ^  of  the  full  complements)  for  the  ships 
belonging  to  the  Reserve  Battle  Fleet,  as  well  as 
for  the  second  half  of  the  torpedo-boats. 

3.  I J  crews  for  the  ships  on  foreign  service. 

4.  The  necessary  shore  requirements. 

5.  An  addition  of  5  per  cent,  to  the  total  requirements. 


IV.    Cost. 

Clause  5. 

The  provision  of  means  for  the  carrying  out  of  this  Law  is 
subject  to  annual  determination  by  the  Imperial  Budget. 

Clause  6. 

In  so  far  as  from  the  financial  year  igoi  the  additional 
requirements  of  recurrent  and  non-recurrent  expenditure  in 
the  ordinary  estimates  of  the  naval  administration  exceed  the 
additional  yield  of  the  Imperial  stamp  duties  to  the  sum  of 
M.  53,708,000,  and  the  deficit  is  not  covered  from  other 
sources  of  the  Empire's  revenue,  the  deficit  shall  not  be  raised 
by  augmenting  or  adding  to  indirect  Imperial  taxes  on  articles 
consumed  by  the  masses. 

V.  Final  Provision. 

This  Law  comes  into  force  simultaneously  with  the  Laws 
with  regard  to  the  Amendment  of  the  Imperial  Stamp  Law  of 
April  27,  1894,  ^^^  with  regard  to  the  Amendment  of  the 
Customs  Tariff  Law. 

The  Law  with  regard  to  the  German  Fleet  of  April  10,  1898, 
is  repealed. 

Legally  attested  under  our  own  signature  and  Imperial  seal. 

Given  at  Castle  Saalburg,  near  Homburg  vor  der  Hohe, 
June  14,  1900, 

WILHELM. 

FtJRST  ZU  HOHENLOHE. 


334 


APPENDIX  I 


SCHEDULE   A. 

Enumeration  of  the  Ships  to  be  Reckoned  to  the  Fixed 
Establishment  on  the  Promulgation  of  this  Law. 


Battleships. 

Large  Cruisers. 

Small  Cruisers. 

I.  Bayern 

I. 

Konig  Wilhelm 

I. 

Zieten 

2.  Sachsen 

2. 

Kaiser 

2. 

Blitz 

3.  Wiirttemberg 

3- 

Deutschland 

3. 

Pfeil 

4.  Baden 

4- 

Kaiserin  Augusta 

4- 

Arkona 

5.  Oldenburg 

Hertha 

5- 

Alexandrine 

6.  Brandenburg 

6. 

Victoria  Louise 

6. 

Greif 

7.  Kurfiirst  Fried- 

7. 

Freya 

7- 

Irene 

rich  Wilhelm 

8. 

Hansa 

8. 

Prinzess  Wilhelm 

8.  Weissenburg 

9. 

Vineta 

9- 

Schwalbe 

9.  Worth 

|io. 

Fiirst  Bismarck 

10. 

Wacht 

10.  Kaiser     Fried- 

fi. 

Prinz  Heinrich 

II. 

Jagd 

rich  III. 

12. 

B 

12. 

Sperber 

II.  Kaiser      Wil- 

13- 

Bussard 

hehii  II. 

14. 

Meteor 

12.  Kaiser     Wilhelm 

15. 

Falke 

der  Gro>se 

16. 

Komet 

13.  Kaiser  Barbarossa 

17- 

Kormoran 

14.  Kaiser    Karl    der 

18. 

Kondor 

Grosse 

19. 

Seeadler 

15-  C 

20. 

Gefion 

16.  D 

21. 

Geier 

17.  E 

22. 

Hela 

18.  F 

23- 

Gazelle 

19.  G 

24. 

Niobe 

20.  Siegfried 

25. 

Nymphe 

21.  Beowulf 

26. 

C 

22.  Frithjof 

27. 

D 

23.  Hildebrand 

28. 

E 

24.  Heimdall 

29. 

F 

25.  Hagen 

26.  ^gir 

27.  Odin 

GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION 


335 


SCHEDULE   B. 

Distribution  among  the  Individual  Years  of  the  Replacement 
Ships  to  be  Built  in  the  Years  1901  to  1917  Inclusive. 


Replacement  Year. 

Battleships. 

Large  Cruisers. 

Small  Cruisers. 

1901       



I 



1902      

— 

I 

I 

1903       

— 

I 

I 

1904      

— 

— 

2 

1905       

— 

— 

2 

1906 

2 

— 

2 

1907      

2 

— 

2 

1908      

2 

— 

2 

1909      

2 

— 

2 

1910      

2 

1911 

I 

2 

1912      

2 

1913       

2 

1914      

2 

1915      

2 

1916 

2 

1917      

2 

— 

I 

Totals 

17 

10 

29 

ACT  OF  JUNE  5,  1906,  AMENDING  THE  LAW 

RELATING  TO  THE  GERMAN  FLEET 

OF  JUNE  14,  1900. 

We,  Wilhelm,  by  the  grace  of  God  German  Emperor,  King 
of  Prussia,  etc.,  order,  in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  with  the 
consent  of  the  Federal  Council  and  of  the  Reichstag,  what 
follows : 

Single  Paragraph, 

The  ship  establishment  fixed  in  Clause  i  of  the  Law  relating 
to  the  German  Fleet  of  June  14,  1900,  is  increased: 

1.  In  the  case  of  the  Foreign  Service  Fleet  by  5  large  cruisers ; 

2.  In  the  case  of  the  material  reserve  by  i  large  cruiser. 

Legally  attested  under  our  own  signature  and  Imperial  seal. 
Given  at  the  Neues  Palais,  June  5,  1906. 

WILHELM. 

FURST  VON  BiJLOW. 


336 


APPENDIX  I 


ACT  OF  APRIL  6,  1908,  AMENDING  CLAUSE  2 

OF     THE     LAW    RELATING    TO    THE    GERMAN 

FLEET  OF  JUNE  14,  1900. 

We,  Wilhelm,  by  the  grace  of  God  German  Emperor,  King  of 
Prussia,  etc.,  order  in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  with  the  consent 
of  the  Federal  Council  and  of  the  Reichstag,  what  follows  : 

Single  Clause. 
The  following  takes  the  place  of  Clause  2  of  the  Law  relating 
to  the  German  Fleet,  June  14,  1900: 

Clause  2. 
Except   in   the  case  of  the  loss  of  ships,  battleships  and 
cruisers  will  be  replaced  at  the  end  of  20  years. 

The  periods  run  from  the  year  of  the  granting  of  the  first 
instalment  of  the  ship  to  be  replaced  to  the  granting  of  the  first 
instalment  for  the  replacing  ship. 

For  the  period  from  1908  to  1917  the  replacement  building 
will  be  regulated  according  to  Schedule  B. 

Legally  attested  under  our  own  signature  and  Imperial  seal. 
Given  at  Palermo  on  board  M.Y.  Hohenzollem,  April  6,  1908, 

WILHELM. 
FURST  VON  BULOW. 

SCHEDULE   B. 

Distribution  amongthe  Individual  Years  of  the  Replacement 
Ships  to  be  Built  in  the  Years  1908  to  1917  Inclusive."^ 


Replacement  Year. 

Battleships. 

Large  Cruisers. 

Small  Cruisers. 

1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 

1913 
1914 

1915 
1916 
1917 

3 
3 
3 
2 

r 

— 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I 

rotals 

17 

6 

19 

*  The  programme   of  shipbuilding,  including  replacement  and 
additional  ships,  1897-1917,  is  shown  in  Appendix  V. 


GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION         337 

ACT  OF  JUNE  14,  1912,  AMENDING  THE 

LAWS  RELATING  TO  THE  GERMAN  FLEET  OF 

JUNE  14,  1900,  AND  JUNE  5,  1906. 

We,  Wilhelm,  by  the  grace  of  God  German  Emperor,  King 
of  Prussia,  etc.,  order  in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  with  the 
consent  of  the  Federal  Council  and  of  the  Reichstag,  what 
follows : 

Clause  I. 

The  following  Clause  i  replaces  Clause  i  of  the  Law  con- 
cerning the  German  Fleet  of  June  14,  1900,  and  the  amend- 
ment of  this  Law  of  June  5,  1906. 

There  shall  consist : 

1.  The  Battle  Fleet  of— 

1  fleet  flagship, 

5  squadrons  of  8  battleships  each, 

12  lare^e  cruisers  1  , 

^1,        .         vas  scouts. 
30  small  cruisersj 

2.  The  Foreign  Service  Fleet  of — 

8  large  cruisers, 
10  small  cruisers. 

Clause  2. 

The  following  paragraphs  replace  paragraphs  i  and  2  of 
Clause  3  of  the  Law  concerning  the  German  Fleet  of  June  14, 
1900 : 

1,  I  fleet  flagship, 

3  squadrons  of  battleships, 
8  large  cruisers,  and 

18  small  cruisers 

form  the  Active  Battle  Fleet ; 

2  squadrons  of  battleships, 

4  large  cruisers,  and 
12  small  cruisers 

form  the  Reserve  Battle  Fleet. 

2.  The  whole  of  the  battleships  and  cruisers  of  the  Active 
Battle  Fleet  and  a  quarter  of  those  of  the  Reserv^e  Battle 
Fleet  are  to  be  kept  permanently  in  commission. 


338  APPENDIX  1 

Clause  3. 

The  following  paragraphs  are  to  replace  the  opening  sen- 
tence and  paragraphs  i  and  2  of  Clause  4  of  the  Law  concerning 
the  German  Fleet  of  June  14,  1900: 

The  following  proportions  of  warrant  officers,  petty  officers, 
and  men  of  the  Seamen,  Dockyard,  and  Torpedo  Divisions,  as 
well  as  the  Submarine  Sections,  shall  be  available : 

1.  Full  crews  for  the  ships  belonging  to  the  Active  Battle 
Fleet,  for  the  whole  of  the  torpedo  boats  and  submarines  with 
exception  of  the  Material  Reserve  of  both  these  classes  of  boats, 
for  the  school  ships  and  for  the  special  ships. 

2.  Nucleus  crews  (one-half  of  the  engine-room  personnel, 
one-quarter  of  the  remaining  personnel  of  the  full  crew)  for 
the  ships  belonging  to  the  Reserve  Battle  Fleet. 

Clause  4. 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  is  empowered  to  publish  the  text 
of  the  Law  concerning  the  German  Fleet  of  June  14,  igoo, 
with  such  alterations  as  result  from  the  Laws  of  June  5, 
1906,  April,  1908,  and  the  present  Law.  Given  at  the  New 
Palace,  June  14,  191 2. 

WILHELM. 

VON  BETHMANN  HOLLWEG. 


Memorandum  appended  to  the  German  Navy  Bill,  1912. 

The  organization  of  the  Fleet  still  suffers  from  two  serious 
defects  : 

The  one  defect  consists  in  the  fact  that  in  the  autumn  of 
every  year  the  time-expired  men — i.e.,  almost  one-third  of  the 
crew  in  all  ships  of  the  Battle  Fleet — are  discharged,  and 
replaced  mainly  by  recruits  from  the  inland  population.  Owing 
to  this,  the  readmess  of  the  Battle  Fleet  for  war  is  considerably 
impaired  for  a  prolonged  period. 

The  second  defect  consists  in  the  fact  that  at  the  present 
time,  with  an  establishment  of  fifty-eight  capital  ships,  only 
twenty-one  ships  are  available  at  first,  if  the  Reserve  Fleet 
cannot  be  made  ready  in  proper  time.  Since  the  Fleet  Law 
w^as  drawn  up,  this  latter  has  become  more  and  more  unlikely, 
as  the  moment  at  which  the  Reserve  Fleet  can  be  ready  for 


GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION         339 

war  gets  more  and  more  deferred.  This  is  a  consequence  of 
the  ever-growing  complexity  of  modern  ships,  and  of  the 
steadily  growing  difficulty  in  training  large  organizations.  At 
the  present  day,  therefore,  the  Reserve  Fleet  only  comes  into 
consideration  as  a  second  fighting  line  ;  but  in  view  of  our  great 
numerical  strength  in  reserve  men,  it  still  maintains  its  great 
importance. 

Both  these  defects  are  to  be  removed,  or  at  any  rate  con- 
siderably ameliorated,  by  the  gradual  formation  of  a  third 
active  squadron. 

The  requisite  ships  for  this  third  active  squadron  are  to  be 
derived  : 

(a)  By  dispensing  with  the  Reserve  Fleet  Flagship. 
[h)  By  dispensing  with  the  present  existing  Material  Reserve 
— 4  battleships,  4  large,  and  4  small  cruisers. 

[c)  By  newly  constructing  3  battleships  and  2  small  cruisers. 

As  the  maintenance  in  commission  of  ships  in  the  Reserve 
Fleet  can  be  reduced  by  one-half  in  consequence  of  the  increase 
of  active  organizations,  the  formation  of  a  third  active  squadron 
only  renders  the  additional  maintenance  in  commission  of  three 
battleships,  three  large  and  three  small  cruisers  necessary 
beyond  those  to  be  maintained  in  commission  already  provided 
for  in  the  Fleet  Law.  This  involves  a  corresponding  increase 
in  personnel. 

A  further  increase  in  personnel  is  necessary  as  the  com- 
plements of  all  classes  of  ships,  including  torpedo  boats,  have 
had  to  be  augmented. 

Moreover,  an  increase  in  submarines  and  the  acquisition  of 
some  airships  is  contemplated.  The  submarines,  which  are 
still  at  the  present  moment  without  organization,  are  to  be 
organized — as  regards  manning — after  the  manner  of  the 
torpedo-boats. 


340  APPENDIX  I 


APPENDICES. 

1.  Comparison  of  the  Amendment  with  the  Fleet  Laws. 

2.  Programme  of  Construction. 

3.  Increased  requirements  of  Personnel. 

4.  Calculation  of  Cost. 

APPENDIX  1. 

Comparison  of  the  Amendment  with  the  Fleet  Laws, 

Provisions  of  the  Fleet  Law. 

I.  Establishment  of  Ships. 

Section  i. 

There  shall  be  (i)  the  Battle  Fleet,  consisting  of — 2  fleet 
flagships,  4  squadrons  of  8  battleships  each,  8  large  cruisers, 
and  24  small  cruisers  as  scouts.  (2)  The  Foreign  Service 
Fleet,  consisting  of — 8  large  cruisers  and  10  small  cruisers. 
(3)  The  Material  Reserve,  consisting  of — 4  battleships,  4  large 
cruisers,  and  4  small  cruisers. 

Alterations  of  the  Amendment. 

I.  Establishment  of  Ships. 

Section  i. 

There  shall  be  (i)  the  Battle  Fleet,  consisting  of — i  fleet 
flagship,  5  squadrons  of  8  battleships  each,  12  large  cruisers, 
and  30  small  cruisers  as  scouts.  (2)  The  Foreign  Service 
Fleet,  consisting  of — 8  large  cruisers  and  10  small  cruisers. 

Provisions  of  the  Fleet  Law. 

II.  Maintenance  in  Commission. 

Section  3. 

The  following  principles  obtain  regarding  the  maintenance 
in  commission  of  the  Battle  Fleet :  (i)  The  First  and  Second 
Squadrons  form  the  Active  Battle  Fleet,  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Squadrons  the  Reserve  Battle  Fleet. 

(2)  The  whole  of  the  battleships  and  cruisers  of  the  Active 
Battle  Fleet,  and  one-half  of  those  of  the  Reserve  Battle  Fleet, 
are  to  be  kept  permanently  in  commission. 


GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION         341 

Alterations  of  the  Amendment. 

II.  Maintenance  in  Commission. 

Section  3. 

The  following  principles  obtain  regarding  the  maintenance 
in  commission  of  the  Battle  Fleet :  (i)  i  fleet  flagship, 
3  squadrons  of  battleships,  8  large  cruisers,  and  18  small 
cruisers  form  the  Active  Battle  Fleet,  2  squadrons  of  battle- 
ships, 4  large  cruisers,  and  12  small  cruisers  form  the  Reserve 
Battle  Fleet. 

(2)  The  whole  of  the  battleships  and  cruisers  of  the  Active 
Battle  Fleet  and  one  quarter  of  those  of  the  Reserve  Battle 
Fleet  are  to  be  kept  permanently  in  commission. 

Provisions  of  the  Fleet  Law. 

III.  Establishment  of  Personnel. 

Section  4. 

The  following  proportions  of  warrant  officers,  petty  officers, 
and  men  of  the  Seamen,  Dockyard,  and  Torpedo  Divisions 
shall  be  available  : 

(i)  Full  crews  for  the  ships  belonging  to  the  Active  Battle 
Fleet,  for  half  of  the  torpedo-boats,  for  the  school-ships,  and 
for  the  special  ships. 

(2)  Nucleus  crews  (two-thirds  of  the  engine-room  personnel, 
one-half  of  the  remaining  personnel  of  the  full  crews)  for  the 
ships  belonging  to  the  Reserve  Battle  Fleet,  as  well  as/oy  the 
second  half  of  the  torpedo-boats. 

Alterations  of  the  Amendment. 

III.  Establishment  of  Personnel. 

Section  4. 

The  following  proportions  of  warrant  officers,  petty  officers, 
and  men  of  the  Seamen,  Dockyard,  and  Torpedo  Divisions, 
as  well  as  of  the  Submarine  Sections,  shall  be  available  : 

(i)  Full  crews  for  the  ships  belonging  to  the  Active  Battle 
Fleet,  for  the  whole  of  the  torpedo-boats  and  submarines  with 
exception  of  the  Material  Reserve  of  both  these  classes  of  boats,  for  the 
school-ships  and  for  the  special  ships. 

(2)  Nucleus  crews  (one- third  of  the  engine-room  personnel. 


342 


APPENDIX  I 


one-quarter  of  the  remaining  personnel  of  the  full  crews)  for 
the  ships  belonging  to  the  Reserve  Battle  Fleet. 

The  remaining  provisions  of  the   Fleet  Laws  remain  un- 
altered. 

Explanations. 

With  regard  to  Section  i. 
The  legal  establishment  of  ships  experiences  an  increase  oj 
three  battleships  and  two  small  cruisers  through  the  Amendment : 


Previous 
Establishment. 

Future 
Establishment. 

Increase. 

Battleships       

Large  cruisers 

Small  cruisers 

38 
20 

38 

41 
20 
40 

+  3 
+  2 

With  regard  to  Section  3. 
Of  the   legal   establishment   of   ships,  there  are   to   be   in 
commission : 


Battleships. 

Large  Cruisers. 

Small  Cruisers. 

Previ- 
ously. 

In 

Future. 

Previ- 
ously. 

In 

Future. 

Previ- 
ously. 

In 
Future. 

In  the  Active  Battle 
Fleet           

In  the  Reserve  Battle 
Fleet           

Totals    

17 
9 

25 
4 

4 
2 

8 
I 

12 
6 

18 
3 

26 

29 

6 

9 

18 

21 

Consequently,  additionally  in  commission  in  future : 
3  battleships,  3  large  cruisers,  3  small  cruisers. 

With  regard  to  Section  4. 
I.  In  accordance  with  the  Ivlemorandum  to  the  Estimates  of 
1906  there  are  to  be  : 
Altogether — 144  torpedo  boats. 

Of  which  ready  for  use — 99  with  full  active  service  crews. 
As  Material  Reserve — 45  without  crews. 
Nothing  is  altered  in  this  by  the  Amendment. 


GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION 


343 


Section  4  of  the  Fleet  Law  of  1900  provided  for  72  full  crews, 
and  72  nucleus  crews,  making  together  a  total  of  116  full  crews 
(compare  footnote  to  Memorandum  accompanying  Estimates 
of  1906). 

Only  99  are  required,  and  the  Fleet  Law,  therefore,  demands 

17  full  crews  too  many. 

Article  3  of  the  Amendment  brings  the  number  of  crews 
legally  to  be  held  in  readiness  into  line  with  actual  require- 
ments, and  therefore  reduces  the  torpedo  personnel  demanded  under 
the  Fleet  Law  by  seventeen  boafs  crews. 

2.  It  is  proposed  to  demand  6  submarines  every  year.  With 
a  twelve  years'  life  this  gives  an  establishment  of  72  boats. 
For  54  of  these  boats  active  service  crews  are  estimated  for; 

18  form  the  Material  Reserve  without  crews. 

APPENDIX  2. 

Programme  of  Construction. 


Previous   Programme 

of  Construction. 

Year. 

Battle- 

Large 

Total  Large 

Small 

ships. 

Cruisers. 

Ships. 

Cruisers. 

1912 

I 

2 

2 

I913 



I 

^ 

2 

2 

1914 

... 

I 

2 

2 

19 1 5 

... 

I 

2 

2 

1916 

... 

I 

2 

2 

1917 



I 

2 

2* 

Future  Programme  of  Construction. 


Year. 

Battle- 

Large 

Total  Large 

Small 

ships. 

Cruisers. 

Ships. 

Cruisers. 

1912 

I 

2 

2 

1913 

2t 

3 

2 

1914 

I 

2 

2 

1915 

I 

2 

2 

1916 

2t 

3 

2 

19^7 

I 

2 

2* 

*  Including  one  additional  ship  outstanding  from  the  Fleet  Law. 

t  Including  one  additional  ship  under  the  Amendment, 

The  year  of  construction  of  one  battleship  and  two  small  cruisers  is  reserved. 


344  APPENDIX  I 

APPENDIX  3. 

Additional  Personnel  Required. 

(A.)  Men  of  the  Seamen,  Dockyard,  and  Torpedo  Divisions, 
as  well  as  of  the  Submarine  Sections — 14,310;  annual  average 

(B.)  Executive  Officers — 433  ;  annual  average,  48. 

(C.)  Engineers — 116;  annual  average,  13. 

(D.)  Medical  Officers  and  Sick  Birth  Staff — 175;  annua 
average,  19. 

(E.)  Paymasters  and  Accountant  Staff — 119;  annual 
average,  13. 

Remark. 

The  requisite  increase  in  personnel  consists  of — 
(i)  The    personnel    necessary    for    additional    ships    to   be 
maintained  in  commission  under  the  Amendment. 

(2)  The  personnel  to  be  held  in  readiness  for  the  submarines. 

(3)  The  personnel  becoming  necessary  in  consequence  of 
alterations  in  complements  and  increased  activity  in  training. 

In  regard  to  (3),  the  complements  of  torpedo-boats,  and  in 
part  also  of  the  ships,  have  experienced  an  increase  which  is 
not  taken  into  account  in  the  calculations  for  the  requirements 
of  personnel  for  the  Fleet  Law,  as  this  could  not  be  foreseen. 
The  larger  complements  have  become  necessary  owing  to 
growth  in  size  and  speed  of  ships  and  torpedo-boats,  as  well  as 
on  account  of  the  greater  requirements  of  the  guns  in  guns' 
crews. 

The  additional  requirements  of  training  personnel  is  a 
consequence  of  the  increase  in  active  naval  fighting  forces. 

*  Five  hundred  men  are  to  be  demanded  in  excess  of  the  average 
annual  increase  in  each  of  the  three  years  1912-1914.  This  increase 
is  to  be  balanced  by  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  three  years 
1918-1920. 


GERMAN  NAVAL  LEGISLATION 


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APPENDIX  II 

MEMORANDUM  APPENDED  TO  THE 
GERMAN  NAVY  BILL,  1900 

I.  NECESSITY  AND  SCOPE  OF  THE  INCREASE 
OF  THE  NAVY. 

The  German  Empire  needs  Peace  at  Sea. — For  the  Ger- 
man Empire  of  to-day  the  security  of  its  economic  develop- 
ment, and  especially  of  its  world-trade,  is  a  life  question.  For 
this  purpose  the  German  Empire  needs  not  only  peace  on  land 
but  also  peace  at  sea — not,  however,  peace  at  any  price,  but 
peace  with  honour,  which  stitisfies  its  just  requirements. 

A  naval  war  for  economic  interests,  particularly  for  com- 
mercial interests,  will  probably  be  of  long  duration,  for  the  aim 
of  a  superior  opponent  will  be  all  the  more  completely  reached 
the  longer  the  war  lasts.  To  this  must  be  added  that  a  naval 
war  which,  after  the  destruction  or  shutting-up  of  the  German 
sea  fighting  force,  was  confined  to  the  blockade  of  the  coasts 
and  the  capture  of  merchant  ships,  would  cost  the  opponent 
little ;  indeed  he  would,  on  the  contrary,  amply  cover  the 
expenses  of  the  war  by  the  simultaneous  improvement  of  his 
own  trade. 

An  unsuccessful  naval  war  of  the  duration  of  even  only  a 
year  would  destroy  Germany's  sea  trade,  and  would  thereby 
bring  about  the  most  disastrous  conditions,  first  in  her  economic, 
and  then,  as  an  immediate  consequence  of  that,  in  her  social 
life. 

Quite  apart  from  the  consequences  of  the  possible  peace 
conditions,  the  destruction  of  our  sea  trade  during  the  war 
could  not,  even  at  the  close  of  it,  be  made  good  within  measur- 
able time,  and  would  thus  add  to  the  sacrifices  of  the  war  a 
serious  economic  depression, 

346 


THE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1900  347 

Navy  Law^  does  not  yet  make  Allowance  for  the  Pos- 
sibility OF  a  Naval  War  with  a  Great  Sea-Power. — The 
Navy  Law  does  not  make  allowance  for  the  possibility  of  a 
naval  war  with  a  great  naval  Power,  because,  when  it  was 
drafted  in  the  summer  of  1897,  the  first  consideration  was  to 
secure  the  carrying  out  in  modern  ship  material  of  the  1873 
plan  for  the  founding  of  the  fleet,  limiting  the  increase  to  the 
small  number  of  battleships  which  was  necessary  to  establish, 
at  least  for  a  double  squadron,  the  organization  demanded  by 
tactical  exigencies. 

The  Justificatory  Memorandum  to  the  Navy  Law  left  no 
doubt  as  to  the  military  significance  of  the  Battle  Fleet.  It  is 
therein  expressly  stated : 

"  Against  greater  sea-powers  the  Battle  Fleet  would  have 
importance  merely  as  a  sortie  fleet." 

That  is  to  say,  the  fleet  would  have  to  withdraw  into  the 
harbour  and  there  wait  for  a  favourable  opportunity  for  making 
a  sortie.  Even  if  it  should  obtain  a  success  in  such  a  sortie, 
it  would  nevertheless,  like  the  enemy,  suffer  considerable  loss 
of  ships.  The  stronger  enemy  could  make  good  his  losses,  we 
could  not.  In  war  with  a  substantially  superior  sea-power, 
the  Battle  Fleet  provided  for  by  the  Navy  Law  would  render 
a  blockade  more  difficult,  especially  in  the  first  phase  of  the 
war,  but  would  never  be  able  to  prevent  it.  To  subdue  it,  or, 
after  it  had  been  considerably  weakened,  to  confine  it  in  its 
own  harbour  would  always  be  merely  a  question  of  time.  So 
soon  as  this  had  happened,  no  great  State  could  be  more  easily 
cut  off  than  Germany  from  all  sea  intercourse  worthy  of  the 
name  —  of  her  own  ships  as  also  of  the  ships  of  neutral 
Powers.  To  effect  this  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  control 
long  stretches  of  coast,  but  merely  to  blockade  the  few  big 
seaports. 

In  the  same  way  as  the  traffic  to  the  home  ports,  the  Ger- 
man mercantile  ships  on  all  the  seas  of  the  world  would  be  left 
to  the  mercy  of  an  enemy  who  was  more  powerful  on  the  sea. 
Hostile  cruisers  on  the  main  trade-routes,  in  the  Skager  Rack, 
in  the  English  Channel,  off  the  north  of  Scotland,  in  the  Straits 
of  Gibraltar,  at  the  entrance  to  the  Suez  Canal,  and  at  the 

*  In  this  Memorandum  "  Navy  Law "  means  the  Navy  Act 
of  1898. 


348  APPENDIX  II 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  would  render  German  shipping  prac- 
tically impossible. 

Also  with  regard  to  this  the  Justificatory  Memorandum  to 
the  Naval  Law  speaks  unambiguously.     In  it  is  observed : 

*'  Protection  of  sea  trade  on  all  the  seas  would  occur  prin- 
cipally in  time  of  peace.  In  case  of  war  it  would  be  the  task 
of  the  foreign  service  cruisers  to  afford  their  own  mercantile 
ships  the  "  utmost  possible  protection." 

That  is  to  say,  the  ships  would  do  the  "utmost  possible." 
What  would  be  possible  in  this  respect  is  clear  when  it  is 
realized  that  the  Navy  Law  provides  altogether  for  forty-two 
cruisers,  whilst  the  greatest  Naval  Power,  for  example,  to-day 
already  possesses  206  cruisers  (finished  or  under  construction), 
and,  moreover,  has  as  its  disposal  bases  and  coaling  stations 
on  all  the  chief  trade-routes. 

For  the  Protection  of  Sea  Trade  and  Colonies  there 
IS  only  One  Means — a  Strong  Battle  Fleet. — To  protect 
Germany's  sea  trade  and  colonies  in  the  existing  circumstances 
there  is  only  one  means — Germany  must  have  a  battle  fleet 
so  strong  that  even  for  the  adversary  with  the  greatest  sea- 
power  a  war  against  it  would  involve  such  dangers  as  to 
imperil  his  position  in  the  world. 

For  this  purpose  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  that  the  Ger- 
man Battle  Fleet  should  be  as  strong  as  that  of  the  greatest 
naval  Power,  for  a  great  naval  Power  will  not,  as  a  rule,  be  in 
a  position  to  concentrate  all  its  striking  forces  against  us.  But 
even  if  it  should  succeed  in  meeting  us  with  considerable 
superiority  of  strength,  the  defeat  of  a  strong  German  Fleet 
would  so  substantially  weaken  the  enemy  that,  in  spite  of  the 
victory  he  might  have  obtained,  his  own  position  in  the  world 
would  no  longer  be  secured  by  an  adequate  fleet. 

In  order  to  attain  the  goal  which  has  been  set,  the  protection 
of  our  sea  trade  and  of  our  colonies  by  ensuring  a  peace  with 
honour,  Germany  requires,  according  to  the  standard  of  the 
strength-relationships  of  the  great  Sea- Powers,  and  having  re- 
gard to  our  tactical  formations,  two  double  squadrons  of  efiicient 
battleships,  with  the  necessary  cruisers,  torpedo-boats,  and  so 
on,  pertaining  thereto.  As  the  Navy  Law  provides  for  only 
two  squadrons,  the  building  of  a  third  and  fourth  squadron  is 
contemplated.  Of  these  four  squadrons  two  will  form  a  fleet. 
The  second  fleet  is  to  be  organized  in  its  tactical  composition 


THE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1900  349 

in  the  same  way  as  the  first  fleet  provided  for  in  the  Navy 
Law. 

For  the  scope  of  the  maintenance  in  commission  in  time  of 
peace  the  following  consideration  has  been  decisive  :  As  the 
ship-establishment  of  the  German  Navy,  even  after  the  carry- 
ing out  of  the  projected  increase,  will  still  be  more  or  less 
inferior  to  the  ship-establishments  of  some  other  great  Powers, 
compensation  must  be  sought  in  the  training  of  the  personnel 
and  in  tactical  training  in  the  larger  combinations. 

A  trustworthy  training  of  the  separate  ships'  crews,  as  well 
as  an  adequate  training  in  the  larger  tactical  combinations, 
can  be  ensured  only  by  permanent  maintenance  in  commission 
in  time  of  peace.  To  economize  in  commissioning  in  time  of 
peace  would  mean  to  jeopardize  the  efficiency  of  the  fleet  for 
the  event  of  war. 

The  minimum  of  commissioning  is  the  permanent  formation 
of  that  fleet  which  comprises  the  newest  and  best  ships  as  an 
active  combination — that  is  to  say,  a  combination  in  which  all 
battleships  and  cruisers  are  in  commission.  This  fleet  would 
form  the  school  for  tactical  training  in  double  squadron,  and  in 
case  of  war  would  bear  the  first  shock.  For  the  second  fleet, 
which  will  comprise  the  older  battleships,  it  must  suffice  if  only 
half  of  the  ships  are  permanently  in  commission.  For  train- 
ing in  the  larger  combination  some  further  ships  must  then, 
it  is  true,  be  placed  temporarily  in  commission  during  the 
manoeuvres.  In  case  of  war  this  second  fleet — the  Reserve  Battle 
Fleet — will  have  to  make  up  its  arrears  in  the  training  of  the 
separate  ships'  crews  and  the  deficiency  of  training  in  the 
larger  combination  behind  the  protection  afforded  by  the  Active 
Battle  Fleet. 

With  Four  Line  Squadrons,  Coast  Squadron  is  less 
Important. — If  Germany  possesses  four  squadrons  of  efficient 
battleships,  a  coast  squadron  composed  of  small  armoured  ships 
is  less  important. 

Increase  of  the  Foreign  Service  Ships. — Besides  the 
increase  of  the  home  battle  fleet,  an  increase  of  the  foreign 
service  ships  is  also  necessary.  In  consequence  of  the  occupa- 
tion of  Kiauchow  and  the  great  enhancement  of  our  oversea 
interests  in  the  last  two  years,  it  has  already  become  neces- 
sary, at  the  cost  of  the  scouting  ships  of  the  Battle  Fleet,  to 
send  abroad  two  large  ships  more  than  were  provided  for  by 


350  APPENDIX  II 

the  plan  of  the  Navy  Law.  Indeed,  for  an  effective  represen- 
tation of  our  interests  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  send 
out  even  more  ships,  if  such  had  only  been  available.  In 
order  to  form  a  judgment  of  the  importance  of  an  increase  of 
the  foreign  service  ships,  it  must  be  realized  that  they  are  the 
representatives  abroad  of  the  German  defence  forces,  and  that 
the  task  often  falls  to  them  of  gathering  in  the  fruits  which  the 
maritime  potency  created  for  the  Empire  by  the  home  Battle 
Fleet  has  permitted  to  ripen. 

Moreover,  an  adequate  representation  on  the  spot,  supported 
on  a  strong  home  Battle  Fleet,  in  many  cases  averts  differ- 
ences, and  so  contributes  to  maintain  peace  while  fully  up- 
holding German  honour  and  German  interests. 

A  numerical  demonstration  of  the  additional  requirements 
cannot  be  given  for  a  considerable  time  in  advance  in  the 
same  manner  as  for  the  Battle  Fleet,  which  rests  upon  an 
organic  foundation. 

If  the  demand  is  made  that  the  foreign  service  fleet  shall  be 
in  a  position  (i)  energetically  to  uphold  German  interests 
everywhere  in  time  of  peace,  (2)  to  be  adequate  for  warlike 
conflicts  with  oversea  States  without  navies  deserving  of  the 
name,  an  increase  of  at  least  five  large  and  five  small  cruisers, 
as  well  as  of  one  large  and  two  small  cruisers  as  material 
reserve,  seems  called  for.  The  Navy  Law  foresees  as  ready  for 
use  three  large  and  ten  small  cruisers,  and  as  material  reserve 
three  large  and  four  small  cruisers. 

A  distribution  of  the  foreign  service  fleet  among  the  foreign 
stations  cannot  be  given,  as  this  distribution  depends  upon 
the  political  circumstances,  and  these  can  only  be  estimated 
from  case  to  case. 

II.  CARRYING   OUT  OF  THE   INCREASE— COST- 
RAISING  OF  THE  MEANS. 

Necessary  Sea- Power  should  be  Created  as  soon  as 
Possible. — If  the  necessity  for  Germany  of  so  strong  a  fleet 
is  admitted,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  contest,  that  the  honour 
and  welfare  of  the  Fatherland  peremptorily  demand,  that  the 
home  sea-power  should  be  brought  up  to  the  requisite  strength 
as  soon  as  possible. 

Therefore  the  Increase  cannot  be  Deferred  till  the 
Expiry  of  the  Sexennate. — With  the  Budget  for  1900  the 


THE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1900  351 

increase  of  the  Navy  provided  for  in  the  Navy  Law  is 
accompHshed  with  the  exception  of  one  small  cruiser.  The 
additional  ships  will,  after  the  passing  of  the  Budget,  stand  on 
the  sHps  in  the  summer  of  this  year.  For  the  further  years 
it  is  only  a  question  of  building  replacements.  For  the  next 
three  years  the  laying  down  of  five  large  and  seven  small 
replacing  ships  is  provided  for  in  the  building  plan  of  the  Navy 
Law.  The  small  ships  to  be  replaced  are  completely  obsolete 
and  absolutely  useless  for  warfare.  If  the  replacement  of 
these  is  taken  in  hand  first  as  especially  urgent,  there  remain 
hardly  any  means  over  for  the  laying  down  of  larger  ships, 
since  the  sum  provided  in  the  building  programme  — 
M.  35,000,000 — is  almost  absorbed  by  the  rise  in  the  price 
of  the  other  ships  and  an  increase  in  the  supplies  of  ammuni- 
tion which  had  become  necessary.  If  it  were  desired  to  keep 
within  the  sum  allowed  by  the  Navy  Law,  no  large  ships  could 
be  laid  down  from  igoi  to  1903. 

In  consequence  of  the  urgency  of  a  strengthening  of  the 
Navy  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  restriction  in  the  building 
of  big  ships  through  the  limitations  of  the  Navy  Law  on  the 
other,  it  was  imperative  that  the  demand  for  an  increase  of  the 
ship  establishment  should  not  be  postponed  till  the  expiry  of 
the  sexennate  but  should  be  made  now. 

Exposition  of  the  Building  Programme. — The  additional 
ships  to  be  built  have  to  fit  as  is  expedient  into  the  gaps  left  by 
the  replacement  buildings  which  fall  due  during  the  next  few 
years,  and  the  replacements  of  large  ships,  owing  to  their 
considerable  cost,  are  the  ones  to  be  taken  chiefly  into 
account. 

If  the  limitation  of  pecuniary  means  foreseen  in  the  Navy 
Law  is  left  out  of  consideration  and  regard  paid  only  to  the 
age  of  the  ships,  there  will  be  due  for  replacement — 

1.  In  the  year  igoi  :  Seven  large  ships  (four  of  the  Sachsen 
class,  Konig  Wilhelm,  Kaiser,  Deutschland). 

2.  In  the  twelv^e  years  1902  to  1913  :  Three  large  ships 
(Oldenburg,  Kaiserin  Augusta,  Siegfried). 

3.  In  the  four  years  1914  to  1917:  Seventeen  large  ships 
(seven  of  the  Siegfried  class,  four  of  the  Brandenburg  class, 
five  of  the  Hertha  class,  Fiirst  Bismarck). 

In  consideration  of  the  replacement  construction,  therefore 
the  necessary  increase  of  the  Navy  should  be  carried  out  in  the 


352  APPENDIX  II 

years  1902  to  191 3;  but  even  then  the  yearly  shipbuilding 
activity  would  remain  so  irregular  that  it  seems  best  to  dis- 
tribute the  entire  requirement  of  46  large  ships  evenly  over 
sixteen  years,  and,  as  a  rule,  to  lay  down  annually  3  large 
ships.  That  such  a  rate  of  construction  can  be  maintained 
is,  after  the  experience  of  recent  years,  in  which  also  3  large 
ships  were  laid  down  annually,  not  to  be  doubted. 

With  regard  to  the  small  cruisers,  it  would  be  expedient  to 
choose  a  similar  rate  of  construction.  Within  the  next  sixteen 
years  29  ships  have  to  be  replaced :  the  increase  amounts  to 
16  ships.  Under  a  building  programme  extending  over  sixteen 
years  3  keel-layings  would,  as  the  rule,  fall  to  each  year. 

The  construction  of  torpedo-boat  divisions,  gunboats,  and 
special  service  ships  will  run  concurrently. 

With  regard  to  the  age  limit  of  the  new  large  torpedo-boats, 
experience  is  still  lacking  at  the  present  time.  If  it  is  taken  at 
sixteen  years,  in  every  year  there  would  become  due  the  laying 
down  of  I  torpedo-boat  division  (4  additional  divisions  for  the 
new  squadron,  12  replacement  divisions  for  the  2  existing 
squadrons  and  the  coast  squadron  of  armoured  ships). 

The  additional  and  replacement  construction  of  gunboats 
and  special  service  ships  that  will  be  necessary  in  the  next 
sixteen  years  cannot  be  foreseen. 

Order  of  Construction. — There  remains  for  decision  the 
order  in  which  the  ships  are  to  be  built.  In  order  to  attain 
with  the  utmost  possible  speed  a  greater  military  efficiency, 
it  is,  in  the  first  place,  necessary  to  have  ready  a  third  squadron 
of  modern  battleships  with  accessories.  On  its  completion  an 
Active  Battle  Fleet  of  17  ships  of  the  line  of  the  most  modern 
construction  and  a  Reserve  Battle  Fleet  of  17 — with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Brandenburg  class — inferior  armoured  ships  (4  of  the 
Brandenburg  class,  4  of  the  Sachsen  class,  8  of  the  Siegfried 
class,  and  the  Oldenburg)  can  be  formed.  This  will,  it  is  true, 
involve  the  putting  back  of  the  replacements  of  the  Sachsen 
class  behind  the  additional  construction  to  supplement  the 
Active  Battle  Fleet.  This  is  a  considerable  drawback,  but 
seems  permissible,  since  the  Sachsen  class  underwent  sub- 
stantial reconstruction  only  in  the  last  few  years.  True,  that 
has  not  transformed  twenty-five-year-old  coastal  armoured 
ships  into  fully  efficient  modern  ships  of  the  line ;  nevertheless 
the  ships  are  still  seaworthy,  and  are  in  utility  but  little  inferior 


THE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1900 


353 


to  those  of  the  Siegfried  class,  which  also  belong  to  the  Reserve 
Battle  Fleet. 

Cost  of  Ship  Construction  and  Armament. — Under  this 
building  programme  there  would  be  required  for  ship  construc- 
tion, inclusive  of  the  torpedo-boat  divisions  (additional  and 
replacement  construction),  according  to  the  price  units  of  the 
Budget  of  1900,  altogether  M.  1,306,000,000,  or  on  an  average 
M.  81,600,000  annually. 

It  will,  however,  be  necessary  to  strengthen  the  heavy 
artillery  on  the  battleships  and  large  cruisers,  and  the  equip- 
ment of  ammunition  on  all  classes  of  vessels.  Accordingly, 
somewhat  higher  price  units  have  been  taken  as  the  basis  of 
the  financial  calculations,  whereby  an  average  annual  require- 
ment of  M.  87,600,000  results.     Still  further  expense  arises : 

1.  From  the  building  of  gunboats  and  special  service  ships. 

2.  From  the  reconstruction  of  older  ships,  which  is  becoming 
necessary,  in  so  far  as  the  cost  thereof  cannot  be  met  out  of  the 
means  provided  by  the  Budget  for  recurrent  expenditure. 

3.  From  the  rise  of  prices  in  consequence  of  technical  im- 
provements. 

4.  From  the  rise  in  prices  of  materials  and  in  wages. 

The  probable  financial  requirements  for  these  purposes  cannot 
be  given.  In  the  financial  calculations  M.  12,400,000  have  been 
added  to  the  average  annual  instalment  of  M.  87,600,000  men- 
tioned  above.  That  gives  as  the  probable  average  requirement 
for  shipbuilding  and  arming  the  sum  of  M.  100,000,000  annually. 

Increase  of  Military  Personnel. — The  increase  in  the 
establishment  of  ships  renders  necessary,  up  to  the  year 
1920  (date  of  the  readiness  for  war  of  the  ships  given  out  in 
the  year  19 16),  an  increase  of  the  military  personnel  by  35,551, 
and  in  the  following:  manner : 


Altogether. 

Annual  Average. 

Naval  officers     ...         

Marine  engineers           

Surgeons 

Paymasters         

Crews      

Totals       

1,212 

283 

188 

122 

33746 

60 
14 

I 

1,687 

35.551 

1,776 

23 


354  APPENDIX  II 

It  is  in  contemplation  to  demand,  during  the  first  ten  years 
(period  of  the  preparation  of  the  Third  Squadron  and  increase 
of  the  foreign  service  ships),  an  augmentation  of  the  personnel 
higher  than  the  average,  and  in  the  last  ten  years  (period  of 
the  replacement  of  inferior  armoured  ships  of  the  Fourth 
Squadron  by  fully  efficient  battleships)  a  correspondingly  lower 
augmentation. 

The  obtaining  of  the  professional  personnel  necessary  for  such 
an  increase  involves  the  annual  enlistment  of  about  200  naval 
cadets  and  1,000  ships'  boys. 

That  enlistments  of  this  magnitude  will  be  practicable  if  the 
extension  of  the  Navy  is  statutorily  assured  does  not  seem 
doubtful  after  the  experiences  of  recent  years. 

Other  Non-recurring  Expenditure. — The  other  non- 
recurring expenditure  which  will  be  rendered  necessary  by 
the  increase  of  the  fleet  cannot  be  estimated.  In  order  to 
cover  the  existing  necessities  out  of  the  many  possibilities,  and 
to  be  able  to  choose  what  is  right  in  the  individual  case,  the 
working  out  of  rival  projects,  and,  consequently,  long  and 
expensive  preliminary  labours,  are  required.  Accordingly, 
only  general  indications  can  be  given. 

Extension  of  the  Shipyard  and  Dock  Works. — Of  chief 
importance  for  the  question  of  cost  is  the  extension  of  the  ship- 
yard basins  and  harbour  works  in  order  to  provide  mooring  and 
equipment  berths  for  the  increased  establishment  of  ships. 
This  necessity  principally  affects  Wilhelmshaven  and  Dantzig; 
Kiel  less,  since  the  spacious  and  protected  harbour  of  Kiel  can 
be  utilized  for  berthing  ships  which  are  not  under  repair  or  in 
process  of  equipment.  An  extension  of  the  shipyard  works  at 
Wilhelmshaven  and  Dantzig  will  probably  present  no  special 
difficulties. 

At  Kiel  and  Wilhelmshaven  the  need  for  docks  is  temporarily 
covered  by  the  docks  which  are  either  under  construction  or 
demanded  for  igco,  so  that  docking  facilities  a.re  only  to  be 
increased  at  Dantzig. 

An  extension  of  the  workshops  is  called  for  only  by  the 
increased  requirements  for  the  maintenance  of  the  ships,  as 
an  enhancement  of  the  building  activity  of  the  yards  is  not 
necessary. 

Further,  so  far  as  the  yards  are  concerned,  consideration 
must   be  given  to   {a)    increase  of  the  working  stock — tugs. 


THE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1900  355 

praams,  cranes,  and  so  on ;  (b)  increase  of  the  materials  for 
equipping  ships — coal,  lubricating  material,  and  so  on ;  {c)  in- 
crease of  the  magazines. 

Coast  Fortifications. — Larger  outlay  for  coast  fortifica- 
tions is  all  the  less  necessary  the  more  the  Battle  Fleet  is 
strengthened.  At  the  same  time  the  existing  coast  fortifications 
must  be  maintained  in  a  state  of  efficiency. 

Moreover,  in  consequence  of  the  extension  of  the  harbour 
works,  possible  changes  of  channel,  and  so  on,  the  construction 
of  fresh  detached  batteries  over  a  longish  space  of  time  will 
not  be  avoidable. 

Garrison  Accommodation,  Artillery,  Torpedo,  and 
Mine  Works. — The  outlay  for  the  extension  of  garrison 
accommodation  (barracks,  hospitals,  and  so  on),  as  well  as 
of  the  depots  for  artillery,  torpedo,  and  mine  material,  will  not, 
in  view  of  the  long  period  over  which  it  will  be  distributed, 
and  in  comparison  with  the  expenses  for  shipbuilding,  require 
considerable  sums. 

Estimate  of  the  other  Non-recurring  Expenditure. — 
In  order  to  obtain  a  serviceable  standard  for  estimating  the 
remaining  non-recurring  expenditure,  it  seems  expedient  to 
revert  to  the  experiences  of  the  past. 

In  the  period  of  the  greater  development  of  the  Navy,  from 
1873  to  1882,  M.  9,000,000  was,  on  an  average,  absorbed  by 
these  expenses.  This  same  average  sum  was  contemplated 
for  the  first  six  years  of  the  Navy  Law. 

In  the  coming  period  the  expenses  will  not  distribute  them- 
selves evenly  over  the  individual  years,  but  at  the  outset  will 
exceed  the  average  amount,  because  the  great  expenses  for  the 
extension  of  the  yards  will  occur  then. 

If  an  average  sum  of  M.  15,000,000  —  that  is  to  say, 
M.  6,000,000  more  than  the  maximum  of  former  longer  periods 
of  time — is  taken  as  a  basis,  and  M.  18,000,000  are  put  down 
for  the  first  ten  years,  and  for  the  next  ten  a  gradual  decline  to 
M.  9,000,000 — the  hitherto  highest  amount — it  will  probably 
be  found  that  an  adequate  allowance  has  been  made. 

Increase  of  the  Recurring  Expenditure. — For  calcu- 
lating the  increase  of  the  recurring  expenditure,  the  best 
standard,  as  experience  has  shown,  is  afforded  by  the  dimen- 
sions which  the  outlay  for  military  personnel  and  commission- 
ing will  probably  attain. 


356  APPENDIX  II 

A  calculation  on  this  basis  is  given  in  the  Annex  IV.*  It 
results  in  an  average  annual  increase  of  M.  5,400,000.  Never- 
theless, the  circumstance  that  the  increase  of  personnel  and 
the  maintenance  in  commission  must,  as  far  as  possible,  keep 
pace  with  the  increase  of  the  ship  establishment,  makes  it 
seem  right  to  allow  M.  6,000,000  in  the  first  half,  and 
M.  4,800,000  in  the  second  half  of  the  twenty-year  period  for 
the  rise  of  recurring  expenditure. 

Increase  of  the  Total  Outlay  for  Naval  Purposes. — 
The  following  assumptions  form  the  basis  for  the  estimates  of 
the  financial  requirements : 

1.  Annual  quota  for  shipbuilding  and  armaments, 
M.  100,000,000  ;  total  requirements  for  sixteen  years, 
M.  1,600,000,000,  of  which  M.  603,000,000  are  to  be  covered 
by  annual  loans,  M.  997,000,000  from  ordinary  revenue. 

Recourse  to  borrowed  money  to  obtain  additional  ships  is  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  which  have  obtained  hitherto. 
The  loan  amounts  of  the  separate  years  have  been  adjusted  in 
such  a  way  that  they  gradually  and  evenly  decline,  and  in  the  year 
1920,  after  the  last  ship  has  been  completed,  reach  nil,  so  that 
the  normal  renewal  quota  then  falls  upon  the  ordinary  revenue. 

2.  Average  quota  for  other  non  -  recurring  expenditure, 
M.  15,000,000  ;  that  is  to  say,  in  the  first  ten  years 
M.  18,000,000,  in  the  next  ten  years  a  gradual  fall  to 
M.  9,000,000  ;  altogether  for  sixteen  years  M.  261,000,000. 
Of  this  sum  M.  166,000,000  are,  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  past,  to  be  covered  by  loans,  M.  95,000,000  from 
ordinary  revenue.  Here,  too,  the  distribution  of  the  loans 
over  the  separate  years  has  been  adjusted  in  such  a  way  that 
the  amounts  of  the  loans  gradually  decHne;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  sums  to  be  contributed  by  ordinary  revenue 
correspondingly  increase.  In  the  year  1920  the  loan  amount 
is  nil;  the  amount  estimated  to  be  covered  out  of  ordinary 
revenue  M.  9,000,000,  which  is  the  quota  that  is  regarded  as 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  what  would  then  be  existing. 

3.  Average  annual  rise  of  recurring  expenditure,  M.  5,400,000, 
namely :  In  the  first  ten  years,  M.  6,000,000 ;  in  the  last  ten 
years,  M.  4,800,000. 

4.  Increase  of  the  pension  fund  to  threefold  its  present 
dimensions. 

♦  Not  reprinted  here. 


THE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1900  357 

5.  The  interest  on  past  loans  and  those  to  be  issued  up 
to  1920  have  been  taken  into  consideration. 

As  is  apparent  from  the  calculation  of  the  financial  require- 
ments, the  total  cost  for  the  sixteen  years  will  be : 

1.  Loans  to  the  amount  of  M.  769,000,000. 

2.  An  average  annual  rise  of  M.  11,000,000  in  the  naval 
expenditure  covered  out  of  ordinary  revenue  (inclusive  of 
pensions  and  interest  on  debt). 

The  total  annual  outlay  for  the  Navy  (inclusive  of  pensions 
and  interest  on  debt)  would  increase  from  M.  169,000,000  in 
the  year  1900  to  M.  323,000,000  in  the  year  191 6,  or,  on  an 
average,  by  M.  9,600,000  annually.* 

This  estimate  of  the  financial  requirements  is  intended  to, 
and  can,  give  only  a  survey  of  the  total  cost.  The  expenditure 
to  be  included  in  the  annual  Budgets,  as  well  as  its  distribution 
between  Joans  and  ordinary  revenue,  are  to  remain  subject  to 
the  annual  determination  of  the  legislative  factors.  If  the 
method  of  the  estimate  of  the  financial  requirements  is  taken 
as  a  basis,  the  amount  computed  in  the  table  would  in  the 
individual  years  be  allotted  to  the  ordinary  revenue,  the 
balance  in  each  case  to  loans. 

Raising  of  the  Means. — The  past  development  of  the 
Imperial  finances  justifies  the  expectation  that  an  annual 
increase  of  the  claims  on  the  ordinary  revenue  for  naval  pur- 
poses to  the  amount  calculated  above  can  be  covered  without 
fresh  taxation. 

Should  this  temporarily  prove  impossible  to  the  necessary 
extent,  it  would  only  remain,  if  new  sources  of  income  cannot 
be  opened  out,  to  raise  the  amount  of  the  loan  in  such  years. 

III.  STATUTORY  DETERMINATION  OF  THE 
INCREASE. 

Necessity  of  the  Statutory  Determination  of  the 
Strength  and  Organization  of  the  Navy  is  already 
ADMITTED. — By  the  passing  of  the  Navy  Law,  the  necessity 
of  placing  the  strength  of  the  Navy  and  its  organization  on  a 

*  That  the  average  increase  of  the  total  expenditure — M.  9,600,000 
— is  smaller  than  the  average  increase  of  that  portion  of  the  naval 
outlay  which  falls  on  the  ordinary  revenue  of  the  P^mpire — 
M.  11,100,000 — is  due  to  the  annual  diminution  of  the  amount, 
contained  in  the  former  sum,  which  falls  on  the  loans. 


358  APPENDIX  II 

statutory  basis  was  admitted.  From  this  follows,  of  itself, 
that  an  increase  of  the  Navy  likewise  requires  statutory  regu- 
lation. Though  in  this  situation  a  further  justification  of  the 
necessity  of  statutory  determination  is  not  necessary,  the 
grounds  on  which  the  Federated  Governments  consider  the 
statutory  form  indispensable  shall  nevertheless  be  once  more 
explained  in  what  follows. 

Only  if  the  Entire  Increase  is  Carried  Out  will  its 
Purpose  be  attained. — The  Federated  Governments  are 
of  the  opinion,  that  an  increase  of  the  Navy  can  only  fulfil 
the  intended  purpose,  the  securing  of  peace  even  against  the 
most  powerful  naval  opponent,  if  it  is  carried  through  in  the 
proportions  contemplated  for  it.  Fractions  of  a  squadron  do 
not  constitute  a  formation,  and  have,  in  a  military  sense,  only 
the  significance  of  a  strengthened  material  reserve.  Just  as 
little  would  a  limitation  to  three  squadrons  suffice,  because 
thereby  the  aim  of  the  increase  would  not  be  attained. 

Therefore  before  a  Commencement  is  made  with  its 
Execution  the  Entire  Plan  must  be  adopted.  —  It  is, 
therefore,  necessary,  that  before  the  execution  of  the  plan  is 
entered  upon,  the  legislative  factors  should  agree  as  to  whether 
the  entire  plan  is  right  and  should  be  carried  out.  A  decision 
on  this  question  must  be  brought  about,  and  it  must  be  one  of 
permanent  validity.     This  can  be  only  done  by  a  law. 

Further  Reasons  for  the  Statutory  Determination. 
— Apart  from  this  consideration  the  statutory  determination 
of  the  increase  is  also  necessary  on  the  following  grounds : 

I.  Uncertainty  as  to  whether  the  Entire  Plan  is  to  be  Carried 

Through  impedes  its  Execution. 

I.  Only  the  statutory  determination  of  the  increase  testifies 
the  firm  will  to  create  the  fieet.  Unless  this  firm  will  is 
brought  to  indubitable  expression,  considerable  difficulties, 
both  of  a  personal  and  material  nature,  will  oppose  themselves 
to  the  execution  of  the  great  plan. 

Only  if  a  sure  guarantee  is  given  for  the  execution  of  the 
plan  can  the  permanent  participation  of  a  large  number  of 
efficient  undertakings  in  the  building  of  the  fleet  be  counted 
upon,  as  only  then  will  the  necessary  capital  be  laid  out  on 
expensive  works  for  the  construction  of  warships.  But  healthy 
competition  will  only  be  rendered  possible  if  the  Navy  is  not 


THE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1900  359 

restricted  to  a  very  few  big  undertakings.  Only  if  a  further 
development  of  the  Navy  is  legally  placed  beyond  question 
will  there  be  adequate  entries  of  naval  cadets,  ships'  boys,  and 
volunteers,  that  is  to  say  of  such  persons  as  chose  the  naval 
service  as  their  life  profession. 

Only  under  a  statutory  determination  of  the  aim  can  the 
internal  development  of  the  Navy,  and  particularly  the  exten- 
sion of  the  shipyard  and  harbour  works,  be  properly  adjusted 
from  the  outset  to  later  requirements. 

2.  Importance  of  the  Statutory  Determination  for  the  Prestige  of  the 
German  Name  Abroad. 

2.  The  united  decision  of  Federal  Council  and  Reichstag  to 
double  the  war  fleet,  as  marked  by  a  statutory  determination 
of  the  increase,  will  be  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the 
prestige  of  the  German  name  abroad,  and  so  for  the  entire 
political  and  economic  development  of  the  German  Empire. 

Objections  to  a  Statutory  Determination. — Against 
a  statutory  determination  of  the  increase  it  has  been  objected, 
that  the  time  necessary  for  the  execution  of  so  great  a  plan  is 
so  long,  that  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  whether,  within  this  time, 
the  technical,  political,  and  financial  conditions  for  such  a 
statutory  determination  might  not  undergo  a  fundamental 
change. 

The  Federated  Governments  do  not  regard  such  radical 
alterations  as  probable.  Should  they,  contrary  to  expectations, 
occur,  the  two  legislative  factors  are  at  any  time  in  a  posi- 
tion to  alter  the  Navy  Law  and  the  contemplated  Amending 
Act. 

That  the  Federated  Governments  will  ever  oppose  a  change 
of  the  Navy  Law  which  becomes  necessary  in  consequence  of 
changes  in  the  technical  and  military  conditions  of  warfare  no 
one  can  believe. 

It  is  further  objected  that  precisely  the  Navy  Law  has 
furnished  proof  that  the  strength  which  a  fleet  shall  attain, 
that  is  to  say,  the  goal  of  its  development,  is  not  adapted 
to  statutory  determination,  and  that,  accordingly,  the  same 
mistake  should  not  be  committed  again. 

This  objection  can  only  be  explained  by  an  inaccurate  view 
of  the  Navy  Law.  This  consists  of  two  parts — of  one  part  of 
permanent  validity,  which  in  earlier  Reichstag  proceedings  was 


36o  APPENDIX  II 

described  as  "  Aeternat,"  and  of  another  part  of  only  temporary 
significance,  which  received  the  name  "  Sexennat." 

The  first  part  is  the  essential  one.  It  regulates  the  strength 
and  organization  of  the  fleet,  the  replacement  construction,  the 
maintenance  in  commission,  and  the  personal  establishment. 
In  this  essential  part,  the  "  Aeternat,"  the  strength,  and,  as  a 
necessary  consequence,  the  provisions  with  regard  to  mainten- 
ance in  commission,  are  to  be  extended.  The  remaining 
provisions  of  the  Navy  Law  are  not  touched. 

The  second  part  of  the  Navy  Law,  the  so-called  "  Sexen- 
nat," had  merely  the  object  of  legislatively  laying  down  a  term 
for  the  attainment  of  the  statutory  ship  establishment,  and  not 
for  the  carrying  out  of  the  replacement  construction,  for  the 
building  of  replacement  ships  continues  further  in  unbroken 
series  beyond  the  Sexennat. 

In  the  Reichstag  proceedings  with  regard  to  the  Navy  Law, 
the  statutory  determination  of  a  period  within  which  the  ship 
establishment  was  to  be  attained  encountered  by  far  the  most 
difficulties,  in  consequence  of  misgivings  in  respect  of  Budget 
rights.  The  consequence  of  this  was,  that  the  essential  feature 
of  the  Navy  Law  stepped  into  the  background,  and  the  statutory 
determination  of  a  period  for  the  attainment  of  the  fixed 
establishment — that  is  to  say,  that  part  which  after  the  passing 
of  the  Budget  of  1900  was  assured  and  therefore  objectless, 
gave  the  Law  among  the  public  its  character  and  the  name  of 
Sexennat. 

Demand  of  the  Federated  Government  for  the  Bill. — 
In  consequence  of  the  difficulties  then  encountered,  and  in 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  it  is  somewhat  questionable  to  lay 
down  by  statute  a  term  for  the  completion  of  a  plan  for  the 
carrying  out  of  which  so  long  a  period  is  necessary,  the  Feder- 
rated  Governments  have  considered  that  they  should  refrain 
therefrom,  and  have  restricted  themselves  merely  to  the  statu- 
tory determination  of  the  goal.  They  are  here  guided  by  the 
confident  expectation  that  the  Reichstag,  when  it  has  accepted 
the  goal  of  the  development,  will  do  its  utmost,  in  the  measure 
of  the  financial  resources  of  the  Empire,  to  bring  this  object  to 
completion. 


APPENDIX  III 

GERMANY'S  SHIPBUILDING  RESOURCES 

The  growth  of  the  war-shipbuilding  industry  in  Germany  has 
kept  pace  with  every  movement  towards  a  higher  standard 
of  naval  power.  The  remarkable  character  of  this  expansion 
of  the  country's  resources  was  revealed  by  Count  von  Reventlow 
in  an  article  which  he  contributed  to  the  Marine  Number  of 
Cassier's  Magazine  published  in  December,  191 1 ;  and  from  the 
data  which  he  then  presented  some  conception  can  be  formed 
of  the  phenomenal  progress  which  has  been  made  since.  In 
1890  German  public  opinion  congratulated  itself  on  the 
determination  of  their  Government  to  rely  no  longer  even  on 
ships'  plates  manufactured  in  England,  but  to  insist  on  German 
ships  being  built  in  the  Fatherland  of  German  materials. 

The  resources  of  the  three  Imperial  yards,  which  have  been 
greatly  extended  from  time  to  time,  are  in  keeping  with  the 
development  which  the  navy  has  undergone  in  recent  years. 

The  Imperial  yard  at  Kiel  has  two  large  slips  and  a  small 
one  for  torpedo-boats,  six  floating  docks,  and  six  dry  docks. 
The  yard  at  Wilhelmshaven  has  two  large  slipways,  five 
floating  docks,  with  four  small  ones  for  torpedo-boats,  and 
seven  dry  docks.  At  Dantzig  there  is  a  comparatively  small 
slipway,  three  horizontal  slips,  a  docking-basin,  and  two  floating 
docks.  This  yard  is  gradually  being  devoted  to  submarines. 
The  Imperial  yards  are  generally  confined  to  repairs,  yet  they 
are  designed  on  the  principle  that  they  shall  possess  a  sufficient 
power  of  output  so  as  to  prevent  private  yards  from  being  in  a 
position  to  fix  the  prices  at  which  war  vessels  should  be  built, 
and  they  have  shown  themselves  equal  to  the  occasion,  and  are 
by  no  means  behind  private  establishments. 

Count  von  Reventlow's  descriptions  of  private  establishments 
is  the  fullest  and  most  authoritative  which  is  available,  and 

361 


362  APPENDIX  III 

bears  testimony  to  Germany's  present  capacity  to  build  and 
equip  the  largest  and  most  powerful  men-of-war. 


The  Vulcan  Company  of  Stettin. 

The  Vulcan  was  developed  out  of  the  shipyard  w^hich  was 
founded  in  1851  by  Fruchtenich  and  Brock,  in  Bredow.  This 
development  took  place  in  1857.  In  the  mercantile  marine  the 
Vulcan  became  the  typical  shipbuilding  establishment  for  fast 
ships  after  the  North  German  Lloyd,  following  the  example  of 
the  Hamburg-America  Line,  had  its  ships  built  in  German  yards. 
The  fact,  also,  that  the  North  German  Lloyd  was  bound  ta 
have  its  postal  ships  built  in  German  yards  was  of  great  benefit 
to  the  Vulcan.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Vulcan  was  the  first 
private  shipbuilding  yard  to  be  in  a  position  to  build  armoured 
vessels  and  to  show  that  far-sighted  policy — we  had  almost  said 
boldness — of  adapting  itself  to  great  undertakings.  In  1868  the 
German  naval  authorities  made  the  experiment  of  building  an 
armoured  corvette,  the  Hansa,  in  the  State  yard  at  Dantzig. 
The  Vulcan  Company  received  an  order  to  build  a  sister-ship ; 
the  order  hung  back,  how^ever,  for  some  considerable  time,  and 
it  was  only  in  1873  that  the  Preussen  w^as  laid  down  at  the 
Vulcan  yard.  The  efficiency  in  the  case  of  the  Vulcan 
Company  is  all  the  more  commendable,  inasmuch  as  the 
Admiralty  had  warned  the  directors  not  to  lay  down  an 
expensive  plant  for  building  armoured  ships,  as  it  was  not 
certain  that  orders  would  be  given.  With  the  year  1873  came 
the  oft-mentioned  order  of  General  Stosch  that  all  warships 
belonging  to  Germany,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  all  materials, 
should  be  constructed  in  Germany.  This  undoubtedly  acted  as 
a  great  stimulus  to  the  Vulcan.  The  production  of  its  yards 
may  be  seen  from  the  following  statistics:  Since  1871  they 
have  built  no  warships,  among  which  a  large  number  for  the 
Chinese,  Japanese,  Russian  and  Greek  Navies,  respectively. 
Apart  from  torpedo-boats,  the  Vulcan  has  received  more  orders 
for  vessels  of  war  than  any  other  yard,  and  has,  dating  from 
igoo,  built  a  large  number  of  torpedo-boats  for  the  German 
Navy.  The  Vulcan  has  built  over  159  screw-steamers,  among 
them  over  a  dozen  mail  steamers  and  about  forty  Atlantic 
freight  and  passenger  ships.  To  these  may  be  added  fifty 
paddle-steamers  and  seven  ice-breakers. 


GERMANY'S  SHIPBUILDING  RESOURCES   363 

The  area  of  the  Vulcan  yard  is  283,400  square  metres,  of 
which  91,915  are  covered  with  workshops.  There  are  seven 
slips,  of  which  two  are  over  200  metres,  three  between  150  and 
200  metres,  and  two  of  100  to  150  metres.  There  are  two 
floating  docks,  one  of  100  to  150  metres,  and  another  under 
100  metres.  The  Vulcan  is  in  a  position  to  build  large 
warships  and  vessels  for  the  mercantile  marine,  yet  for  years 
there  has  been  an  ever-increasing  necessity  to  establish  yards 
on  the  North  Sea.  On  the  one  hand,  now,  was  the  question  of 
locality,  and  on  the  other  the  draught  of  water  in  the  Oder. 
The  establishment  at  Bredow  is  of  the  most  practical  and 
modern.  Round  the  slips  lie  the  workshops  and  magazines; 
light  railways  facilitate  transport  between  one  part  and  another 
of  the  works.  They  have  their  own  forges  and  armour-plate 
plant — in  fact,  everything  associated  with  an  up-to-date  ship- 
yard. There  are  also  engine  and  boiler  works,  and  it  may  be 
mentioned  that  there  are,  in  addition,  locomotive  and  turbine 
building  works. 

The  establishment  on  the  Elbe  dates  from  1906.  In  that 
year  a  beginning  was  made  with  the  construction  of  a  yard  on 
the  island  of  Ross,  within  the  boundary  of  the  Hamburg  Free 
Harbour.  The  yard  has  an  area  of  226,850  square  metres,  with 
a  water  front  of  1,100  metres.  The  yard  abuts  on  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  Harbour,  and  is  connected  with  the  State  Railway. 
Up  to  the  present  there  are  two  slips  over  200  metres  long  and 
two  large  floating  docks,  while  a  third,  of  over  150  metres  long 
with  a  lifting  capacity  of  25,000  tons,  is  in  process  of  con- 
struction. By  dredging  in  front  of  the  slips,  the  depth  of  water 
has  been  so  much  increased  that  the  largest  ships  may  be 
launched  and  armed.  Every  mechanical  device  is  at  hand.  The 
Vulcan  will  now  be  able  to  compete  under  far  more  favourable 
conditions  with  other  shipbuilders,  and  it  may  be  anticipated 
that  the  yards  will  pay,  notwithstanding  the  enormous  initial 
outlay.  The  capital  of  the  Vulcan  amounts  to  M.  15,000,000, 
and  the  last  dividend  was  11  per  cent.  The  members  of  the 
staff  and  workmen  were  12,000  in  all.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Navy,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  possess  so 
efficient  a  shipyard  on  the  Elbe.  In  any  war  in  the  North  Sea 
the  Vulcan  yards,  and  those  of  Blohm  and  Voss,  would  be 
immensely  valuable  for  docking  and  repairing  disabled  vessels. 
That  the  company  themselves  consider  this  North  Sea  branch 


364  APPENDIX  III 

the  most  important,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  they  have 
transferred  their  central  bureau  to  Hamburg  since  October  i 
of  this  year.  Nevertheless,  the  yards  at  Bredow  will  retain 
much  of  their  present  importance,  for  the  demands  of  ship- 
building are  great  and  will  continue  to  increase.  The  Vulcan 
is  regarded  in  Germany,  and  with  justice,  as  having  grown  up 
with  the  development  of  German  shipping  and  the  German 
naval  power,  as  sharing  in  all  their  experiences,  and  as  having 
always  risen  to  the  height  of  its  demands. 

The  Shipyard  F.  Schichau,  of  Elbing  and  Dantzig. 

This  is  the  unique  and  largest  shipbuilding  yard  in  Germany 
which  is  not  a  limited  company,  but  remains  in  private  hands. 
The  Schichau  works  were  founded  in  1837  by  Ferdinand 
Schichau  at  Elbing,  and  are  now  owned  by  his  son-in-law, 
Geheimrath  Zeiss.  Ferdinand  Schichau  was  a  man  whose 
abilities  may  not  unjustly  be  compared  with  those  of  Alfred 
Krupp,  founder  of  the  works  of  that  name.  He  started  the 
works  at  Elbing  for  engine  building  in  1837,  and  ten  years 
later  obtained  the  first  order  for  a  marine  engine.  Hence- 
forward the  works  developed  more  and  more  in  the  direction 
of  shipbuilding,  and  began  with  building  dredges,  which  are 
to-day  one  of  the  specialities  of  the  firm.  In  the  early  fifties 
the  Prussian  Government  approached  the  Schichau  works  as 
to  building  the  engines  and  boilers  for  the  corvette  Dantzig. 
I  mention  this  otherwise  unimportant  fact  to  show  the  intimate 
connection  which  has  existed  between  the  firm  of  Schichau 
and  the  Prussian,  later  the  German,  Government — relations 
which  have  proved  of  the  greatest  importance,  both  in  matters 
of  shipbuilding  and  torpedo-boat  construction.  Later,  the  firm 
confined  itself  to  its  original  engine  building,  until,  in  1855,  ^^^ 
iron  ship  Borussia  was  built  in  their  newly-established  shipyard. 
Shipbuilding  now  developed  apace,  and  in  the  early  seventies 
a  second  ship  was  constructed  in  partnership  with  the  engineer 
Zeiss,  the  present  owner.  The  Schichau  engines  proved  them- 
selves as  superior  as  the  materials  used  in  the  construction  of 
the  torpedo-boats.  In  the  seventies  the  Prussian  Government 
gave  an  order  for  a  spar-torpedo.  The  brilliant  result  of  this 
boat  and  its  successes  laid  the  foundation  of  the  firm's  fame  in 
this  branch  of  their  productions.      In  the  eighties  the  German 


GERMANY'S  SHIPBUILDING  RESOURCES    365 

Government  turned  to  the  torpedo,  and  Captain  Tirpitz — as 
he  was  then — developed  the  type  of  boat  and  the  general 
organization.  The  superiority  of  the  Schichau-built  boats  lay 
chiefly  in  their  light  displacement,  speed,  large  radius  of  opera- 
tions, and  seaworthiness,  even  in  rough  weather,  large  coal 
capacity  and  comfort.  In  open  competition,  in  1884,  Schichau 
obtained  the  preference,  and  ever  since,  up  to  the  beginning  of 
the  present  century,  has  built  almost  all  the  German  torpedo- 
boats.  The  reputation  of  these  torpedo-boats  brought  them 
numerous  orders  from  abroad.  Great  attention  was  drawn  to 
them  when  a  torpedo-boat  of  140  tons,  ordered  by  China, 
reached  Foochow  in  sixty  days,  going  under  its  own  steam, 
without  parent  ship.  As  is  well  known,  other  builders  besides 
"Vulcan"  and  "Weser"  have  entered  into  competition  with 
Schichau  in  the  domain  of  torpedo-boats,  but  the  distinction 
of  being  the  inventor  of  the  German  torpedo-boat  belongs  to 
Schichau.  That  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  our  torpedo-boats 
of  the  present  day  preserve  the  type  of  the  original  Schichau 
boat. 

At  the  end  of  the  eighties  the  firm  of  Schichau  acquired 
a  yard  at  Dantzig,  as  they  intended  to  devote  themselves  also 
to  the  construction  of  large  vessels,  and  from  1890  onwards 
cruisers  and  battleships  have  been  built  for  the  German  Navy, 
as  also  for  other  foreign  navies.  In  addition,  it  must  be  noted 
that  several  large  liners  have  been  built  for  the  North  German 
Lloyd. 

The  works  have  grown  with  every  demand  made  upon  them, 
and  would  be  more  than  equal  to  any  extraordinary  efforts 
which  might  be  required  of  them  in  the  matter  of  rapid  ship- 
building by  the  German  naval  authorities.  The  ground  covered 
by  their  yards  at  Elbing,  Dantzig,  and  Pillau  amounts  to 
more  than  87  hectares.  The  staff  and  workmen  generally 
number  8,000. 

The  yard  at  Elbing  has  nineteen  slips  for  torpedo-boats  and 
two  docks;  that  at  Dantzig  seven  slips,  of  which  four  are 
adapted  for  ships  of  the  largest  tonnage.  The  slips  are  sup- 
plied with  the  most  up-to-date  appliances,  such  as  electric 
cranes,  etc.  The  present  owner,  like  his  predecessor,  the 
founder,  belongs  to  that  band  of  great  organizers  of  labour  and 
distinguished  experts. 


366  APPENDIX  III 

Blohm  and  Voss  Shipyard. 

In  1877  the  shipbuilding  yard  and  engine  works  of  Blohm 
and  Voss  were  founded  on  the  Island  of  Steinwerder  in  the 
Elbe,  and  were  at  first  small  and  of  little  importance.  The 
position  of  the  enterprise  to-day  is  most  important.  In  191 1 
the  yards  employed  7,500  men.  The  works  cover  460,000 
square  metres,  of  which  300,000  have  been  built  upon,  and  the 
water-front  is  2,570  metres  long.  There  are  ten  slips,  of  which 
four  are  over  200  metres  long,  five  between  150  and  200  metres, 
and  a  small  one  of  less  than  150  metres.  There  are  floating 
docks,  the  largest  of  which  has  a  lifting  capacity  of  35,000  tons, 
and  there  are  others  of  capacities  of  17,500,  17,000,  4,700,  and 
3,000  tons.  Two  of  these — the  largest  and  the  third — can  be 
transported,  and  in  case  of  war  would  be  of  great  service  to 
the  fleet  in  the  Elbe.  In  1881  Blohm  and  Voss  were  turned 
into  a  limited  liability  company,  with  a  capital  of  M.  6,000,000, 
and  loan  on  mortgages  of  M.  8,000,000.  A  dividend  of  6  per 
cent,  was  paid  in  igio. 

The  yards  are  used  for  the  construction  of  all  kinds  of  ships, 
but  a  speciality  is  made  of  floating  docks.  In  addition  to  ship- 
building, there  are  large  works  for  the  construction  of  steam- 
engines  and  turbines.  There  are  two  boiler-making  estabHsh- 
ments  for  cylindrical  and  water-tube  boilers.  Lately  a  foundry 
for  bronze  and  steel  has  been  added.  In  short,  there  is  every 
modern  requirement,  both  as  regards  machinery  and  equip- 
ment generally. 

Shipbuilding  of  any  importance  for  the  German  Navy  dates 
back  only  a  comparatively  short  time.  This  began  in  the 
eighties  with  the  small  cruiser  Kondor,  followed  in  the  nineties 
by  the  battleship  Kaiser  Karl  der  Grosse,  of  about  11,000  tons, 
and  from  that  date  an  uninterrupted  series  of  armoured  cruisers. 
Beginning  with  the  cruiser  Frcidrich  Karl,  launched  in  1902, 
there  followed  the  York,  Scharnhorst,  Von  der  Tami,  Moltkey 
Goben,  and  the  cruiser  "/"of  the  1910  programme,  not  yet 
launched.  The  building  of  armoured  cruisers  has  been 
specialized  by  Blohm  and  Voss,  and  the  cruisers  Von  der 
Tann  and  Moltke  have  given  them  a  reputation  throughout  the 
world.  This  was  also  the  first  German  shipyard  to  make 
arrangements  on  a  large  scale  for  the  construction  of  turbines, 
the  cruiser  Von  der  Tann  having  been  the  first  large  cruiser 


GERMANY'S  SHIPBUILDING  RESOURCES    367 

iitted  with  the  turbine.  Several  years  earlier  the  firm  had 
received  the  second  prize  for  the  best  plan  of  an  armoured 
cruiser,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  prize  offered  by  the  Russian 
Government  for  a  new  type  of  battleship.  The  works  have 
in  the  last  decade  advanced  enormously  in  the  matter  of 
battleship  building,  and  can  compete  in  this  branch  with  any 
firm  in  the  world.  In  war  the  position  of  the  yard  on  the 
Elbe  would  be  of  great  advantage  as  a  repairing  and  refitting 
basis  to  Germany. 

Messrs.  Blohm  and  Voss  have  built  a  large  number  of 
steamers  of  all  kinds  for  the  mercantile  marine,  notably  for 
the  Hamburg  -  America  and  North  German  Lloyd  Lines. 
Besides  this  they  have  built  vessels  for  the  Hamburg  South 
American  Line,  for  the  Woermann,  the  German  East  African, 
and  the  Kosmos  Lines.  A  considerable  amount  of  the  firm's 
activity  is  devoted  to  repairing  vessels,  as  their  position  in 
Hamburg  Harbour  and  their  possessing  manifold  modern 
appliances  stand  them  in  great  service.  The  number  of  work- 
men varies  between  5,500  and  8,000.  The  yards  of  Blohm 
and  Voss  grow  yearly  in  importance. 


The  Howaldt  Works. 

These  works  were  started  and  opened  as  a  shipyard  in  1876 
by  their  founder,  Howaldt,  and  have  only  recently  been  turned 
into  a  limited  liability  company,  up  to  which  time  they  were 
the  private  property  of  the  Howaldt  family.  The  yards  are  in 
Kiel  Harbour.  In  1876  there  were  only  450  square  metres 
covered  with  buildings,  and  a  total  ground  area  of  20,000  square 
metres.  To-day  there  are  35,515  square  metres  covered  with 
workshops^  and  the  total  area  amounts  to  735,695  square 
metres.  The  yards  can,  therefore,  be  very  much  enlarged. 
In  these  yards  there  is  evidence — more,  perhaps,  than  in  any 
other — of  the  extraordinary  gro\vth  of  German  shipbuilding. 
The  old  yard  remains,  but  new  and  enlarged  shipyards  have 
been  constructed.  The  original  shipyard  is  principally  utilized 
for  the  lighter  and  least  important  work,  but  the  work  is  cen- 
tralized. The  Howaldt  works  have  a  water-front  of  fully  two 
kilometres,  one  of  which  is  arranged  as  a  quay.  This  company 
has  a  capital  of  M.  7,750,000.  They  have  had  difficulties  of 
recent  years,  and  no  dividend  has  been  paid,  but  there  is  every 


368  APPENDIX  III 

ground  for  believing  that  this  period  of  adversity  is  over.  The 
shipyard  has  six  slips,  one  of  over  200  metres  in  length,  two- 
over  150,  two  over  100,  and  four  less  than  100  metres  long^ 
There  is  also  a  floating  dock.  The  number  of  employees 
amounts  to  3,500.  A  turbine  manufactory  is  in  process  of 
construction. 

Since  1876  Howaldts  have  built  numerous  ships  of  all  sorts 
and  sizes,  more  especially  for  abroad,  among  others,  the  Russian 
school  ship  Okean.  Floating  docks,  floating  cranes,  and  dredgers, 
form  also  part  of  their  output.  Modern  naval  construction  by 
this  firm  is  comparatively  recent.  Their  first  modern  cruiser, 
the  Undine )  was  begun  there  in  1901.  There  soon  followed  a 
battleship  of  20,000  tons — namely,  the  Helgoland.  It  may  be 
expected  that  the  Howaldt  yards  will  soon  be  in  a  position 
equal  to  that  of  any  other  German  yards  for  building  large 
men-of-war. 

The  Weser  Limited  Liability  Company  was  founded  in 
1872,  having  been  originally  C.  Waltjen  and  Co.,  established 
in  1843.  The  business  was,  from  the  beginning,  remunerative, 
and  the  firm  got  many  orders  for  mercantile  ships,  and  also 
ships  of  war,  though  these  were  of  comparatively  small  size. 
As  ships  grew  larger  with  time  the  yards  proved  too  small, 
and  an  extension  on  its  original  situation  was  impossible.  In 
consequence,  the  whole  establishment  was  transferred  to 
Gropelingen,  a  suburb  of  Bremen,  and  the  new  works  were 
gradually  completed  between  1901  and  1905.  The  shipyard 
as  it  now  it,  is  entirely  new  and  entirely  up-to-date,  having  no 
old  equipments.  This  is,  naturally,  a  very  favourable  position 
to  be  in,  but  to  accomplish  this  entailed  a  very  heavy  outlay. 
On  the  completion  of  these  works  the  company  became  one  of 
the  important  shipbuilding  companies  of  Germany.  They  employ 
about  5,000  officials  and  workmen.  There  are  five  slipways, 
one  over  200  metres  long,  another  over  150  metres,  one  over 
100  metres,  and  another  less  than  100  metres  long.  There  is  a 
floating  dock  of  100  to  150  metres  long.  The  construction  of 
two  further  slips  has  been  begun.  The  dockyard  harbour  is 
1,200  metres  long,  and  the  largest  ships  can  easily  be  launched. 
The  works  cover  an  area  of  600,000  square  metres,  and  there 
is  a  waterfront  of  1,200  metres  long.  Capital,  M.  7,500,000. 
No  dividend  last  year. 

Mercantile  ships  were  chiefly  built  for  the  North  German 


GERMANY'S  SHIPBUILDING  RESOURCES    369 

Lloyd.  The  latest  were  the  Goven  and  the  Liitzow,  and  the 
transatlantic  steamer  Berlin,  of  28,000  tons,  the  largest  vessel 
built,  up  to  that  time,  on  the  banks  of  the  Weser.  The 
company  also  built  the  first  longitudinal-ribbed  vessel  in 
Germany.  It  will  also  be  of  particular  interest  to  learn  that 
the  Hamburg- America  Line  has  ordered  this  year  a  6,500-ton 
cargo  steamer,  to  be  driven  by  oil-motors.  The  vessel  will  be 
350  feet  long,  50  feet  beam,  with  a  depth  of  22  feet  6  inches. 
There  will  be  two  motors  on  the  "  Junkers "  system,  each 
capable  of  developing  800  effective  horse-power.  The  speed  is 
10  knots.  The  auxiliary  engines  will  be  driven  at  sea  by  com- 
pressed air  and  electricity,  and  in  harbour  by  steam. 

The  yard  supplied  the  Navy  with  a  considerable  number  of 
vessels,  such  as  gunboats  and  small  cruisers  ;  but  when  the 
new  yards  were  established  at  Gropelingen  it  was  possible  to 
take  orders  for  battleships  and  armoured  cruisers.  In  1907  the 
order  for  the  battleship  VVestphalen,  of  the  Nassau  class,  of 
about  18,000  tons,  was  placed  here,  although  no  battleships 
had  previously  been  built,  but  only  cruisers  and  gunboats. 
The  vessel  was  delivered  in  prompt  time,  and  successfully 
underwent  all  the  trials.  This  yard  has,  in  a  very  short  time, 
showed  itself  capable  and  efficient  for  building  the  largest  class 
of  vessel.  They  have  introduced,  also,  a  turbine  on  a  system 
of  their  own,  and  known  as  the  "  Weser-Bergmann." 

The  Krupp  Germania  Yard  at  Kiel. 

The  Germania  yard  has  a  curious  history,  inasmuch  as  it 
had  its  beginning,  not  on  the  sea-coast,  but  inland.  It  derives 
its  origin  from  a  small  foundry  and  workshop,  which  was 
founded  by  F.  A.  Egells,  in  1822,  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Berlin,  and  employed  only  ten  men.  The  works  were  gradually 
enlarged,  and  frequently  received  orders  for  marine  engines 
and  boilers.  In  1871  works  were  started  at  Tegel,  near  Berlin, 
and  became  theMarkisch-Schleische  Machinenbau-  und  Hutten. 
Aktiengesellschaft.  The  great  industrial  progress  in  Germany 
brought  many  orders  for  ships'  engines  and  boilers.  These 
became  the  specialities  of  the  firm,  and  it  was  a  natural  conse- 
quence that  they  should  turn  to  shipbuilding.  In  1879  the 
company  bought  the  Norddeutscher  yard  at  Kiel,  and  in  1881 
the  two  branches  were  united  under  the  name  of  the  Schiff-  und 

24 


370  APPENDIX  III 

Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft  Germania.  Under  this  desig- 
nation the  yard  has  produced  much  good  work,  and  built  a 
number  of  mercantile  and  naval  vessels  for  home  and  abroad. 
As  of  interest  in  naval  history,  it  ought  to  be  mentioned  that 
the  cruiser  Kaiserin  Augusta  was  built  in  the  Germania  yard, 
the  first  German  warship  to  be  fitted  with  triple  screws  and  to 
reach  the  then  exceptional  speed  of  twenty-two  knots.  The 
Fiirst  Bismarck,  the  first  German  armoured  cruiser,  launched 
in  1897,  was  built  by  the  Germania.  In  1896  Friedrich  Krupp, 
of  Essen,  took  over  the  yard  on  a  twenty-five  years'  lease.  By 
the  terms  of  the  contract  the  firm  of  Krupp  stipulated  that  they 
might  make  any  alterations  in  the  situation  they  might  deem 
necessary.  They  also  reserved  the  right  to  acquire  the  yard 
for  themselves.  The  moment  for  this  occurred  in  1902.  On 
April  I  of  that  year  this  yard  became  the  possession  of  Krupp, 
under  the  name  of  Friedrich  Krupp  Aktiengesellschaft 
Germania-werft.  It  then  entered  upon  a  new  period  of 
development.  Many  millions  were  invested  in  the  new  plant, 
and  nothing  was  spared  in  making  the  establishment  one  of 
the  biggest  and  best-equipped  in  Germany.  This  has  happened, 
and  the  Germania  is  now  equal  to  the  greatest  possible  de- 
mands which  may  be  made,  either  for  the  construction  of 
naval  or  mercantile  ships.  The  area  covered  by  the  works  is 
235,000  square  metres.  There  are  four  slips  of  between  150 
and  200  metres,  three  of  between  100  and  150  metres,  and  six 
under  100  metres.  The  Germania  does  not  possess  a  dock. 
There  are  4,000  workmen  employed.  The  capital  belongs  to 
the  Krupp,  Essen  Company.  The  Germania  stands  alone  in 
Germany  in  so  far  that  it  produces  its  own  guns  and  armour. 
The  purchase  of  the  Germania  yards  would  appear  to  have 
been  a  favourite  idea  of  the  late  Herr  Krupp,  and  it  is  well  to 
draw  attention  to  this,  as  its  development  is  being  pushed 
forward  by  every  possible  means.  The  first  German  ship- 
building works  to  be  covered  in  were  constructed,  and  a 
passing  visit  will  show  that  no  expense  has  been  spared. 
Battleships,  cruisers,  torpedo-boats,  and,  as  a  speciality,  sub- 
marines, are  built.  For  many  years  Germania  has  built 
torpedoes  for  foreign  Governments,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
the  present  century  begun  to  build  regularly  for  the  German 
torpedo  flotilla,  with  excellent  results.  Experiments  were  also 
made  with  submarines,  and  in  1902  the  first  submarine,  the 


GERMANY'S  SHIPBUILDING  RESOURCES    371 

Forel,  was  delivered  to  Russia,  to  be  succeeded  by  others.  A 
few  years  later  the  first  submarine  for  the  German  Navy  was 
built,  and  proved  in  every  respect  a  satisfactory  type. 

Mercantile  vessels  are  also  built,  and  a  large  number  have 
been  supplied  to  the  orders  of  the  North  German  Lloyd  and 
Hamburg- American  Lines,  as  well  as  large  numbers  of  tug- 
boats, railway  steamers,  dredgers,  and  freight  steamers. 

The  Germania  has  also  taken  up  the  turbine,  and  alone  pro- 
duces the  water-tube  boilers  on  the  system  Schultz.  Further- 
more, she  builds  oil-motors  and  all  engines  and  boilers  installed 
in  ships  of  her  building. 

The  Krupp  Germania  has  this  difference  as  compared  with 
all  the  other  German  yards,  that  she  has  not  gradually  de- 
veloped, but  has  been  made  at  one  stroke,  by  means  of  the 
Krupp  millions,  a  great  and  modern  yard.  Her  power  of 
production,  as  that  of  most  of  the  German  yards,  is  far  superior 
to  the  present  demands  likely  to  be  made  upon  it. 


APPENDIX  IV.- 


■AREA,  SLIPS,  REPAIRING-SLIPS, 
CHIEF  GERMAN  SHIP 


Slips. 

Area  in 

Yards. 

Square 

From 

From 

Metres. 

Up  to 

100  Metres 

Long. 

100  to 

150  Metres 

Long. 

150  to 

200  Metres 

Long. 

Over 

200  Metres 
Long. 

Vulcan  Works,  Hamburg i  ... 

227,180 

2 

Vulcan  Works,  Stettin 

269,560 



2 

3 

2 

F.  Schichau,  Elbing,  Dantzig 

874,000 

21 

I 

3 

2 

Blohm  and  Voss,  Hamburg... 

460,000 

— 

I 

5 

4 

I  Weser  Company,  Bremen 2  ... 

604,400 

I 

I 

I 

3 

Germania  Yard,  Kiel-Gaarden 

225,000 

6 

3 

4 

[  Howaldt  Works,  Kiel 

165,400 

4 

2 

2 

I 

1  Bremer  Vulcan  Works,  Vege- 

[      sack .. 

332,000 



3 

2 

I 

[Joh.  C.  Tecklenborg,  Geeste- 

l      miinde          

210,000 

I 

2 

I 

2 

jFlensburger  Shipbuilding 

f       Company,  Flensburg 

178,000 

3 

2 

2 



I  Reiherstieg   Shipyard,    Ham- 

burg   

68,300 

— 

2 





'Neptun  Company,  Rostock  ... 

107,000 

I 

2 

2 



G.  Seebeck,  Geestemiinde    ... 

174)750 

5 



23 



Stettin-Oder  Works,  Stettin... 

118,000 

8 





J.    Frerichs    and    Co.,    Eins- 

i      warden 

161,390 

l4 

3 

5 

H.    C.    Stiilcken    and    Son, 

Hamburg     

18,020 

7 







Henry  Koch,  Liibeck 

72.500 

I 

4 





:  J.  W.  Klawitter,  Dantzig      ... 

52,000 

4 





•  Heinr.    Brandenburg,    Hara- 

rJ>'A 

\      burg 

13,600 

6 







Rickmers    Reismuhlen    Ship- 

building Company,  Bremer- 

haven           

94,000 

27 

2 





Jos.  L.  Meyer,  Papenburg  ... 

31,900 

3 







Ruscke  and  Co.,  Stettin 

24,000 

5 







Stocks   and   Kolbe,  Welling- 

dorf-Kiel      

16,000 



__ 





Stocks    and    Kolbe,    Sonder- 

burg  Branch 

60,000 

6 







J.H.N.  Wichhorst,  Hamburg 

16,500 

2 







Shipyard      and       Machinery 

Works  Company,  Hamburg 

8,900 

4 







i  C.  Cassens,  Emden 

10,000 

4 







f  Johannsen  and  Co., Dantzig... 

13,500 

2 







C.  Liihring,   Hammelwarden 

6,200 

5 





Gustav    Fechter,    Konigsberg 

12,000 

3 







G.  H.  Thyen,  Brake 

15,000 

2 







1  Eider  Shipbuilding  Company, 

[       Tonning^ 

60,000 

— 

4 





I  North  Sea  Works,  Emden    ... 

280,000 





l4 

1  Bremen  State  Docks 







;  North  German  Lloyd 

Totals 

The  three  Imperial  yards     ... 

1                 Grand  totals 

f 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

7,850,000 

107 

34 

27 

18 

iJ 

16 
5 

191 

372 


DOCKS,  AND  NUMBER  OF  EMPLOYEES  OF  THE 
YARDS  IN  1912. 


Dry  Docks. 

Floating  Docks. 

^ 

Number  ofl                                                    j 
Officials                                                        J 

Up  to 

100  Metres 

Long. 

Over 

100  Metres 

Long. 

Up  to 

100  Metres 

Long. 

From 

100  to 

150  Metres 

Long. 

Over 

150  Metres 
Long. 

and 
Workmen 
Employed. 

Remarks. 

I 

^} 

— — — _5 





I 

I 

13,000 

^  In    addition    to   one  I 



— 

4 

8,000 

iloating  dock  over; 

— 

— 

I 

I 

3 

9,000 

150  metres  long  and  ] 

— 

— 

2 

I 

5,000 

of25,oootons  lifting  j 

— 

— 

— 





5,600 
3,500 

capacity,   and   one 

— 

— 

I 

— 

— 

floating     dock     of 

17,500  tons   lifting 



— 

— 



__ 

3,500 

capacity  under  con- 

struction for  Ham- 

I 

I 

— 

— 

— 

2,600 

burg. 

— 

— 

I 

— 

— 

2,800 

2  The  German i a  yard 
belongs      to      the 

— 

— 

— 

2 

-— 

2,000 

Krupp  firm. 

— 

— 

I 

— 

— 

1,700 

3 

4 

— 

— 

— 

1,100 

3  Building  dock. 

2 

— 

~~ 

1,000 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

750 

*  Transverse  slip. 

— 

— 

3« 

l6 

— 

700 

5  One  slip  projected. 

— 

— 

2 

— 

— 

750 

— 

— 

I 

— 

— 

600 

^  Dock  A,  two  sections,  • 
altogether  86  metres 

— 

~ 

""" 

I 

— 

500 

long;  Dock  B,  one 
section,  53-5  metres 

long;  DockC,  two 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

500 

sections,  altogether 

— 

~— 

— 

— 

— 

450 

93  metres  long ;  B 

~~ 

"~" 

2 

— 

— 

400 

and  C  docks,  com- 
bined in  three  sec- 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

300 

tions,  have  a  length 

50 
300 

of  146-5  metres. 

— 

I 

— 

— 

— 

7  Including  one  trans- 

verse slip. 

— 

^~ 

— 

— 

— 

340 

150 

8  This     yard     is     not 

I 

— 

— 

— 

— 

130 
120 

working. 

I 

— 

— 

— 

— 

120 
1 10;^ 

9  In  Bremerhaven.  An 
additional  dry  dock 



— 







of  260  metres,  be- 

— 

— 

I 



— 

400 

longing  to  the  Bre- 

— 

l8 







men  State,  is  also 

— 

20 

— 

— 

— 

— 

under  construction 
at  Bremerhaven. 

10  Four  dock  pontoons 
for   torpedo    craft. 

6 

9 

22 

8 

^4 

65,470 

15 

^'^lO 

12 

13  10 

24,000 

One  floating  dock 
contemplated. 

27 

47 

89,470 

I 

373 


/. 


APPENDIX  V 


fl(^  BRITISH   AND   GERMAN   SHIPBUILDING 

;f*  PROGRAMMES 

The  following  tables  show  the  British  and  German  ships  laid 
down  between  1897  and  19 13,  and  the  programmes  of  sub- 
sequent years — the  British  figures  being  based  on  the  Admiralty 
forecast,  and  the  German  on  the  latest  German  Fleet  Law : 


Great  Britain.               , 

Germany. 

n   . 

"d    . 

TJ     . 

t3     • 

(U  w 

QJ     t/2 

0    . 

oj  w 

(U    t/3 

t/3 

<a  0? 

Si    l-i 

zi  >- 

TJ    t/3 

i  ^ 

V-     fc- 

ii    I- 

iJ 

5.^ 

11 

^1 

|l 

1  a 

3    !U 

hi 

ri897-i898 

4 

4 

3 

6 



I     — 





0 

1898-1899 

7 

8 

I 

12 



2 

I 

2 

6 

£ 

1899-1900 

2 

2 

I 

— 

2 

3 



2 

6 

i'S 

1900-1901 

2 

6 

I 

5 

2 

2 



2 

6 

rt'Si 

1901-1902 

3 

6 

2 

10 

5 

2 

I 

3 

6 

1902-1903 

2 

2 

61 

9 

4 

2 

I 

3 

6 

0 
X 

1903-1904 

5 

4 

4^ 

15 

— 

2 

I 

2 

6 

S 

1904- 1905 

2 

3 

— 

2 

I 

3 

6 

I1905-1906 

— 

— 

— 

— 

2  1     I 

3 

6 

Totals 

27    1  35 

18 

57 

13 

18  i     6 

20 

48 

'  1905- 1906 

4 

— 



6 

12^ 

. —  j  



1906-1907 

3 

— 

— 

2 

123 

2 

I 

2 

12 

T3 

.2 

1907-1908 

i, 
0 

— 

I 

5 

123 

3 



2 

12 

0 

1908- 1909 

2 

— 

6 

16 

— 

4 



2 

12 

c- 

1909-1910 

8 

— 

6 

20 

— 

4 



2 

12 

1. 

1910-1911 

5 

— 

5 

20 

— 

4 



2 

12 

^- 

1911-1912 

5 

— 

4 

20 

— 

4 



2 

12 

0 

1912-1913 

4 

— 

82 

20 

— 

2 



2 

12 

1 

1913-1914 
1914-1915 

5 

— 

8 

16 

— 

^  1  

2 

12 

4 

— 

5 

0 

6 

2 



2 

12 

Q 

1915-1916 

4 

— 

6 

_5 

5 

2 



2 

12 

1916-1917 

4 

— 

_6 

5 

5 

3 



2 

12 

.1917-1918 

4 

— 

5 

5 

6 

2 



2 

12 

Totals   authorized 

(1905-1913)  (Dread- 

nought period) 
Grand   totals,   includ- 

39 

— 

38 

125  1  36 

26 

I 

16 

96 

ing  additional  ships 

of  German  Fleet  Law  |  82* 

35 

56 

182 

49 

53'      7 

44 

192 

^  Included  in  these  two  figures  are  eight  scouts — small  cruisers — which  were 
laid  down  in  1902  and  1903. 

2  The  cruisers  of  1912-13  were  designated  "  hght  armoured  cruisers." 

3  These  thirty-six  craft  are  small  destroyers,  and  were  built  as  such; 

4  These  totals  include  battle  cruisers. 

5  No  programme  of  British  cruisers  or  torpedo  craft  announced. 

The  thirty-nine  British  battleships  exclude  the  two  Colonial  vessels — Australia 
and  New  Zealand— axid  the  battleship  given  by  the  Federated  Malay  States,  and 
ordered  early  in  1913. 

374 


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375 


APPENDIX  VII 


NAVAL  EXPENDITURE,  ETC.,  OF  GREAT 

BRITAIN  AND  GERMANY  IN  EACH  OF 

THE  YEARS  1901-02  TO  1913-14 

GREAT    BRITAIN 
(Financial  Year  :   April  1  to  Marqh  31) 


Year. 


Total  Naval 
Expen- 
diture.* 


Amount  Voted 

for  New 

Construction, 

including 

Armament 

(Expenditure 

shown  in 

Italics). 


Amount  of 
New  Con- 
structioa  f 


Numbers  of 
Personnel. 


1901-02  ... 
1902-03 

1903-04  ... 

1904-05  ... 

1905-06  ... 

1906-07  ... 

1907-08  ... 

1908-09  ... 

1909-10  ... 

I910-II  ... 

I9II-12  ... 
1912-13  (estimated):}: 
I9i3-i4(estimated) 


34,872,299 
35,227,837 
40,001,865 
41,062,075 
37,159,235 
34,599,541 
32,735,767 
33>5ii,7i9 
36,059,652 
41,118,668 
43,061,589 
45,616,540 
47,021,636 


10,420,256 

[10,341,780) 

10,436.520 

(9,/6'2,2l7) 

11,473,030 

{12,398,133) 

13,508,176 

{13,184,419) 

11,291,002 

{11,368,744) 

10,8:^9,500 

{10,486^397) 

9,227,000 

{8,849,589) 

8,660,202 

{8,521,930) 

11,227,194 

{11,076,551) 

M>957,430 
{14,755,289) 

{15,148,171) 

17,271,317 

{16,323,926) 

16,101,884 


Tons. 

139.940 
89,465 

155,225 
85,880 

116,570 

83,260 

119,937 

77,202 

92,957 
176,582 

183,045 
113,089 

236,406 


117,116 
121,870 

125,948 
130,490 

127,667 

127,431 

127,228 
127,909 
127,968 

130,817 
132,792 
137,500 

1 46,000  § 


*  The  gross  total  of  naval  expenditure  excludes  the  annuity  in  repayment  of 
loans  under  the  Naval  Works  Acts,  and  includes  {a)  the  expenditure  out  of  loans 
under  those  Acts,  and  (i>)  appropriations  in  aid. 

t  Tonnage,  when  completed,  of  vessels  launched. 

X  Including  Supplementary  Estimate.  §  Maximum  numbers. 

376 


NAVAL  EXPENDITURE 


377 


GERMANY 

(Financial  Year  :  April  to  March) 


Total  Naval 

Amount  to 

Amount  Votec. 
for  New 

Amount 

of  New 

Construc- 

tion.t 

Numbers 

Year. 

Expen- 

be met  from 

Constructiorj, 

of  Per- 

diture. 

Loans.* 

including 
Armament. 

sonnel. 

£ 

£ 

,  £ 

Tons. 

1901-02     ... 

9,530,000 

2,701,712 

4,^^3.423 

62,640 

31,157 

1902-03      ... 

10,045,000 

2,463,111 

4,662,760 

30,119 

33,542 

1903-04     ... 

10,400,000 

2,307.975 

4.388,748 

64,340 

35,834 

1904-05      ... 

10,105,000 

2,256,115 

4.275.489 

44,072 

38,128 

1905-06     ... 

11,300,000 

2,295,939 

4,720,206 

45.729 

40,843 

1906-07     ... 

12,005,000 

2,486,056 

5.167,319 

53.180 

43,654 

1907-08     ... 

14,225,000 

2,806,764 

5,910.959 

33.985 

46,936 

1908-09     ... 

16,490,000 

4,214,048 

7.795.499 

i04,97it 

50,531 

1909-10     ... 

20,090,000 

5,371,161 

10,177,062 

83,184! 

53.946 

1910-II      ... 

20,845,000 

5.515,287 

11,392,856 

101,830! 

57.373 

1911-12J   ... 

22,031,788 

5,328,274 

11,710,859 

122,630! 

60,805 

1912-13+   ... 

22,609,540 

4,039,628 

ii,49i,i87§ 

— " 

66,783 

1913-14I:   ... 

22,876,675 

2,502,446 

10,864,112^ 

— 

73,176 

*  Interest   on  loans   and  annuities  in  repayment  of  loans   do  not  appear  in 
Navy  Estimates. 

f  Submarines  not  included. 

I  Estimates  as  voted. 

§  Includes  ;i^97, 847  for  airships  and  experiments  with  airships. 

II  Estimates  as  proposed.    Supplementary  Estimate  of  £146,771  for  Aeronautics 
not  included. 

If  Including  ;iri44,325  for  airships  and  aviation,  but  not  the  Supplementary 
Estimate  for  Aeronautics. 


I 


APPENDIX  VIII 

EXTENT  OF  BRITISH   AND   GERMAN 
EMPIRES 

BRITISH   EMPIRE 


Area. 

Population. 

United  Kingdom           

India        

Europe 

Asia  (except  India)        

Australia  and  Pacific  Islands  ... 

Africa       

America 

Totals       

121,391 

1,773,088 
119 
165,879 
3,190,168 
2,187,275 
4,010,034 

45,365,599 

314,955,240 

248,038 

8,324,050 

6,147,974 
34,999,986 

9,360,484 

11,447,954 

419,401,371 

GERMAN    EMPIRE 


Area. 

Population. 

Europe     

Africa       ...         

Asia          

Pacific      

Totals       

208,780 

931,460 

200 

96,160 

65,400,000 

13,419,500 

168,900 

357,800 

1,236,600 

79,346,200 

378 


J^ndal 


u — ^W^ 


58 


a 


^'^' 


'^ 


"^ 


Jen 


c;>^.inefii^*l^' 


-.( 


.^.StcttA'E^ 


^*"*''^     OBt^^^ 


:^ 


yViZKa/  ^a^e5 underlined  thus..  Chatham 

Cflal  and  Oil  Depots C 

Cables    British —^ 

"       German ■ ■ 

Wireless  Stations ^j 

Flying  Stations F 

Docks  to  accommodate  "Dreadnoughts"^ D 

..,, , , Torpedo  Destroyers d 


DISTANCES   IN    NAUTICAL   MILES. 


Rosyth         to  Wllhelmshaven    - 

445  m 

Sheerness    „           „                -        - 

270  „ 

Dover          „           „                -        - 

330  „ 

„   Rosyth       -        -        - 

473   „ 

Sheerness    „        „           ... 

468   „ 

Portsmouth  „        „           ... 

570  „ 

Kiel  to  Wllhelmshaven  by  Kiel  Canal 

80   „ 

by  Great  Belt 

530  „ 

xr^^"^       i 


Talcahuanj 


INDEX 


Adalbert,  Prince  of  Prussia:  father 
of  the  German  Fleet,  74,  79 ;  his 
building  programme,  82  et  seq. 

Adscriptus  glehi  abolished,  236 

African  Colonies.     See  East  Africa 

African  Companj^,  the,  58  ;  head- 
quarters at  Emden,  59 

Agriculture,  census  of  persons  occu- 
pied in,  245 

Amazon,  navigation  school  ship,  81 

America,  United  States  of,  and  the 
German  Navy.  74 ;  British  in- 
fluence on  Navy  of,  100 ;  and 
the  Dreadnought  controversy, 
132  et  seq. ;  expenditure  on  army 
and  Navy,  250,  251 

Anti-Semite  Movement,  279 

Arguin,  Island  of,  transferred  to 
the  Dutch,  64,  65 

Augsburg-Nuremberg  Engineering 
Co.,  311  ;  oil-driven  ships,  311 

Australia,  navy  of,  xii 

Austria  in  fourteenth  century,  18  ; 
jealousy  of  Prussia,  71 ;  and  Italy, 
go  ;  amount  of  iron  ore  in,  229 

Austro-Hungary,  expenditure  on 
army  and  navy,  250 

Baden  and  the  Zollverein,  235 

Baird,  Admiral,  and  the  review  at 
Spithead,  1889,  106 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  his  article  in  Nord 
und  Sud  on  Anglo-German  prob- 
lem, vi  i,  xiii 

Ballin,  Herr,  architect  of  Hamburg- 
America  line,  222 

Banking  and  credit,  240  et  seq. 

Bardewick,  Martin,  a  Dantzig 
privateer,  38 

Barley,  consumption  of,  248 

Barnet,  Battle  of,  39 

Bavaria  and  the  Zollverein,  235 

Beach  law,  26 

Beaufort,  Cardinal,  34 

Becher,  Johann,  "Political  Dis- 
course on  the  Causes  of  the  Rise 
and  Decline  of  Towns  and 
Countries,"  54,  55 


I   Belgium,  supplies  of  iron  ore,  229 

Beneke,  Paul,  the  Dantzig  priva- 
teer, 6,  38,  40 

Bergen  :  destruction  of  the  Royal 
Court  at,  23 ;  law  as  to  aliens, 
30,  31 

Berlin  in  1600,  51  ;  Admiralty 
founded  at,  59  ;  birth-rate,  220  ; 
metropolis  of  European  vice,  223  ; 
railway  to,  238  ;  banks,  241  ;  de- 
scription of,  249 ;  and  Munich, 
257  ;  growth  of  Socialism,  268, 
269  ;  shipbuilding  school  at,  309 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  Dr.  Von, 
Chancellor,  276 


Bishop's  Gate  and  the  Easterlings, 

.13,  14 

Bismarck :  his  contemplated  canal, 
88  ;  effect  of  his  dismissal,  192  ; 
and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  197  ; 
abandonment  of  free  trade,  242 ; 
and  Roman  Catholicism,  259 

Black  death,  15 

Blohm  and  Voss  :  builders  of  war- 
ships, 313,  314  ;  their  dividends, 
315  ;  period  of  construction  for 
warships,  321  ;  building  slips, 
323,  372  ;  no  foreign  orders,  327  ; 
history  and  details  of,  366,  367, 
372 

Bosworth,  Battle  of,  41 

Brandenburg :  population  of,  in 
1600,  51  ;  navy  established,  55  ; 
war  with  Sweden,  55 

Brande7iburg,  of  the  Majestic  class, 
116 

Brandenburg,  Heinr.  Shipbuilding 
Co.,  details  of.  372 

Bremen  :  a  Hanse  town,  3-5  ;  de- 
feat of  the  Hanseatic  fleet,  20,  21  ; 
the  Cologne  federation,  23  ;  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  50 ;  the 
Vienna  Congress,  71  ;  and  the 
Zollverein,  235  ;  merchant  ship- 
ping  at,  297,  302,  303 ;  State 
docks,  details  of,  372 

Bremer  Vulcan  works,  details  of, 


372 


379 


1 


INDEX 


Adalbert,  Prince  of  Prussia:  father 
of  the  German  Fleet,  74,  79 ;  his 
building  programme,  82  et  seq. 

Adscriptus  glehi  abolished,  236 

African  Colonies.     See  East  Africa 

African  Company,  the,  58  ;  head- 
quarters at  Emden,  59 

Agriculture,  census  of  persons  occu- 
pied in,  245 

Amazon,  navigation  school  ship,  81 

America,  United  States  of,  and  the 
German  Navy,  74 ;  British  in- 
fluence on  Navy  of,  100 ;  and 
the  Dreadnought  controversy, 
132  et  seq, ;  expenditure  on  army 
and  Navy,  250,  251 

Anti-Semite  Movement,  279 

Arguin,  Island  of,  transferred  to 
the  Dutch,  64,  65 

Augsburg-Nuremberg  Engineering 
Co.,  311  ;  oil-driven  ships,  311 

Australia,  navy  of,  xii 

Austria  in  fourteenth  century,  18  ; 
jealousy  of  Prussia,  71 ;  and  Italy, 
go  ;  amount  of  iron  ore  in,  229 

Austro-Hungary,  expenditure  on 
army  and  navy,  250 

Baden  and  the  Zollverein,  235 

Baird,  Admiral,  and  the  review  at 
Spithead,  1889,  106 

Balfour,  A,  J.,  his  article  in  Nord 
und  Si'id  on  Anglo-German  prob- 
lem, viii,  xiii 

Ballin,  Herr,  architect  of  Hamburg- 
America  line,  222 

Banking  and  credit,  240  et  seq. 

Bardewick,  Martin,  a  Dantzig 
privateer,  38 

Barley,  consumption  of,  248 

Barnet,  Battle  of,  39 

Bavaria  and  the  Zollverein,  235 

Beach  law,  26 

Beaufort,  Cardinal,  34 

Becher,  Johann,  "Political  Dis- 
course on  the  Causes  of  the  Rise 
and  Decline  of  Towns  and 
Countries,"  54,  55 


Belgium,  supplies  of  iron  ore,  229 

Beneke,  Paul,  the  Dantzig  priva- 
teer, 6,  38,  40 

Bergen  :  destruction  of  the  Royal 
Court  at,  23 ;  law  as  to  aliens, 
30,  31 

Berlin  in  1600,  51  ;  Admiralty 
founded  at,  59  ;  birth-rate,  220  ; 
metropolis  of  European  vice,  223  ; 
railway  to,  238  ;  banks,  241  ;  de- 
scription of,  249 ;  and  Munich, 
257  ;  growth  of  Socialism,  268, 
269  ;  shipbuilding  school  at,  309 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  Dr.  Von, 
Chancellor,  276 

Bishop's  Gate  and  the  Easterlings, 
13,  14 

Bismarck :  his  contemplated  canal, 
88  ;  effect  of  his  dismissal,  192  ; 
and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  197  ; 
abandonment  of  free  trade,  242 ; 
and  Roman  Catholicism,  259 

Black  death,  15 

Blohm  and  Voss  :  builders  of  war- 
ships, 313,  314  ;  their  dividends, 
315  ;  period  of  construction  for 
warships,  321  ;  building  slips, 
323,  372  ;  no  foreign  orders,  327  ; 
history  and  details  of,  366,  367, 
372 

Bosworth,  Battle  of,  41 

Brandenburg :  population  of,  in 
1600,  51  ;  navy  established,  55  ; 
war  with  Sweden,  55 

Brandenburg,  of  the  Majestic  class, 
116 

Brandenburg,  Heinr.  Shipbuilding 
Co.,  details  of,  372 

Bremen  :  a  Hanse  town,  3-5  ;  de- 
feat of  the  Hanseatic  fleet,  20,  21 ; 
the  Cologne  federation,  23  ;  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  50 ;  the 
Vienna  Congress,  71  ;  and  the 
Zollverein,  235;  merchant  ship- 
ping  at,  297,  302,  303 ;  State 
docks,  details  of,  372 

Bremer  Vulcan  works,  details  of, 
372 


379 


38o 


INDEX 


Bromme,    Karl,    the  first   German 

Admiral,  75,  77,  183 
Bruges,  Wolsey's  firm  policy  at,  43 
Brunswick,    growth    of    the    ZoU- 

verein,  235 
Building,  proportion  of  persons  en- 
gaged in,  245 
Building  slips,  number  of,  323,  372 
Bundesrat,  mail-steamer,  seizure  of, 
119 

Calmar,  Union  of,  22 

Cameroons  :  German  population  in, 
288  ;  imports  and  exports,   289  ; 

CamplDell-Bannerman,  Sir  Henry, 
and  Germany,  182 

Canada  and  the  British  Navy,  xii 

Canal:  North  Sea  Baltic,  88;  Co- 
logne to  Emden,  301 

Caprivi  on  South  Africa  as  a  colony, 

293 
Carolines,  East  and  West,  imports 

and  exports,  289 
Caroliis  ScciDuius,  Spanish  warship, 

capture  of,  56 
Carta  Mercatoria,  29,  34 
Cassens,  C,  shipbuilding  firm,  372 
Cassier's  Magazine,  Count   Revent- 

low's  article  in,  361 
Catholicism,  influence  of,  258  et  seq. 
Centre    party,    the,    259,    et    seq.  ; 

principles  of,  262,  263 
Charles  IV.,  18 
*'  Charters  of  Robbery,"  24 
Chemicals,     244 ;     proportions    of 

persons  employed,  2.45,  246 
China,    her   navy    due    to    British 

influence,  100 
Churchill,  Winston,  First  Lord  of 

the  Admiralty,   on   the  German 

Navy  Act  of  1912,  143  et  seq. 
Clothing,  imports  and  exports,  246 
Coal  production,  230 
Coin  in  1600,  51 
Cologne    and    the    Steelyard,    14  ; 

Confederation  at,  22,  34 ;  ban  of 

"Verhansung"  against,  38,   41; 

canal  to  Emden,  from,  301 
Colonial   enterprise,  failure  of,  60 

et  seq. ;  extent  of,  287  et  seq.  ;  cost 

of,  292 
Commerce,  proportion  of  persons 

employed  in,  245 
Conscription  and  naval  conditions, 

169 
Conservative  party,  261,  272  et  seq. 
Constance,  conference  at,  34 
Copenhagen  plundered  and   burnt 

by  Liibeck,  16,  21  ;  retaken,  23 


Cotton  culture  in  East  Africa  Pro- 
tectorate and  Togo,  291 

Credit  Mobilier,  241 

Cuny,  Jan,  and  the  first  German 
colony,  G2,  63 

Customs  Union,  Treaty  of  1833, 
235 

Dantzic  :  success  of  ships  belonging 
to.  37.  38 ;  and  the  Hanseatic 
League,  41,  44,  308  ;  trade  carried 
on  foreign  bottoms,  50  ;  building 
slip  at,  323,  361 ;  competition  for 
foreign  orders,  325 

Dantzig,  a  paddle  corvette,  83,  84 

Darmstadter  Bank,  241 

Delbriick,  Professor  Hans,  on  the 
German  nation,  257 

Denmark :  war  with  Lubeck,  16 ; 
a  powerful  State,  18  ;  humiliation 
of,  19  et  seq.  ;  closed  against 
English  cloth,  39  ;  treaty  with 
England,  42  ;  and  Henry  VIII. , 
44 ;  war  with  Sweden,  55 ;  her 
fleet  blockade  coasts  of  Prussia, 
72,  86  ;  peace  with  Prussia,  79 ; 
strength  of  her  fleet  in  1863,  86 

Deutsche  Bank,  241 

Deutschland  class  of  warships  de- 
scribed, 124,  125 

Deventer,  conference  at,  35 

Die  Flottg,  Navy  League  paper,  210 

Die  Marine  Rundschau,  monthly 
maG:azine,  203 

Die  Poste  and  the  Empire  party,  276 

Disconto-Gesellschaft,  241 

Douglas,  Admiral  Sir  Archibald, 
assists  the  formation  of  the 
Japanese  fleet,  100 

Douglas,  Erskine,  the  adventurer, 
67,  68 

Dreadnought  class  of  warship,  de- 
scription of,  128  et  seq. 

Dresden  first  railway,  238 

Dresdener  Bank,  241 

Du  Bois,  Governor  of  Gross-Fried- 
richsburg,  62 

East  Africa  Line,  gross  register 
tonnage,  300 

East  African  Colony :  German  popu- 
lation, 288  ;  imports  and  exports, 
2S9  ;  cotton  culture  in,  291 

East  Carolines.     See  Carolines 

Easterlings,  the,  and  Bishop's  Gate, 
13,  14 ;  their  abuse  of  power, 
26 ;  export  of  English  cloth.  41, 
44  ;  Queen  Elizabeth's  expulsion 
order,  45 


INDEX 


381 


Economic  basis  of  German  naval 
policy,  214  et  seq. 

Education  of  naval  ideas  in  schools, 
205  ;  a  "patriotic  basis,"  207 

Edward  I.  issues  the  Carta  Mer- 
catoria  to  the  Steelyard  in  1303^ 
29 

Edward  III.  and  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  18  ;  pawns  crown  jewels 
with  Hanse  citizens,  28 

Edward  IV,  and  the  Steelyard  privi- 
'^gSj  37  ^^  ^^?-  '■  "^'^^  with  the 
Hansa,  and  narrow  escape  of 
capture,  38 

Egells  Works  (Berlin) :  first  marine 
engine  built  by,  308  ;  history  of 
the  works,  369 

Eider  Shipbuilding  Company,  de- 
tails of,  372 

Elbe  River,  use  for  shipping,  300, 
301 

Electrical  industry,  244 

EHzabeth,  Queen,  expels  the  Hanse 
merchants  from  England,  44,  45 

Elphinstone,  Admiral,  and  the 
Russian  Navy,  100 

Emhden,  a  Prussian  privateer  under 
Captain  Wake,  6g 

Emden  :  headquarters  of  the  "  Vic- 
tualling Brothers,"  25;  African 
Company  transferred  to,  59  ;  pro- 
posed canal  to,  301 

Emigration :  decrease  of  German, 
216  ;  influence  of,  295 

"  Empire  party,"  policy  of,  275 

Engineer  officers,  training  of,  166, 
167 

Engineering  newspaper,  description 
of  the  Dreadnought,  130-132 

England :  result  of  rivalry  with 
Germany,  vii  ;  and  the  Hundred 
Years'  War,  17;  foundation  of  the 
Hansa,  17  ;  outrages  on  English 
shipping,  25  ;  the  Hanseatic 
League  and  English  traders,  26 
et  seq.;  and  Prussia,  30;  Hansa 
envoys  in  London,  31  ;  negoti- 
ations and  conflict  with  the 
Hanseatic  League,  34  et  seq. ; 
success  of  English  privateers,  35  ; 
treaty  with  Denmark,  42 ;  eman- 
cipation from  the  Hanseatic 
League,  44,  45  ;  war  with  Spain, 
45  ;  difficulty  with  Germany,  67  ; 
and  the  war  of  1864,  87  ;  her 
influence  on  the  German  Navy, 
97  et  seq. :  review  at  Spithead  in 
1889,  104-107  ;  disposition  of  her 
fleet,   108  ;  strength  of  fleets  in 


1900  compared,  118  ;  influence  of 
South  African  War,  119  ;  her 
submarines,  126 ;  English  and 
German  policies  compared,  126 
etseq.,  141  ;  comparison  of  British 
and  German  guns,  154,  156  ; 
training  of  officers  and  men 
compared,  157  et  seq.;  Emperor 
William's  naval  policy,  177  et 
seq. ;  contrast  of  English  and 
German  populations,  214  etseq.; 
British  and  German  resources, 
227  et  seq. ;  English  and  German 
wealth,  248,  249  ;  expenditure  on 
armaments,  250,  251,  376,  377  ; 
merchant  fleet  compared  with 
Germany,  305  ;  British  predomi- 
nance, 318,  319;  British  and  Ger- 
man shipbuilding  programmes, 
374 ;  gun  and  torpedo  armaments 
compared  March,  1913,  375  ;  ex- 
tent of  British  and  German 
Empires,  378 

Engler,  Professor,  on  coal  deposits 
in  England  and  Germany,  228 

"  Equal  sharers,"  24 

Export  trade  in  Germany,  244, 
246  ;  from  colonies,  289 

Faber,  Captain,  result  of  his  indis- 
cretions, 204 

Falkoping,  Battle  of,  24 

Falster,  island  of,  seizure  of,  23 

Falsterbo  :  headquarters  of  the 
herring  industry,  16;  result  of 
Peace  of  Stralsund,  23  ;  expul- 
sion of  foreigners,  30 

Fechter,  Gustav,  shipbuilding  firm, 
details  of,  372 

Fisher,  Admiral  Sir  John,  now  Lord, 
and  the  Dreadnought  class,  128 

Flensburger  shipbuilding  firm,  de- 
tails of,  372 

Food  values  and  quantities  of  ex- 
ports, 246-248 

France :  and  the  Hundred  Years' 
War,  17 ;  and  the  Island  of 
Arguin,  64,  65  ;  effect  of  the  war 
on  German  Navy,  91  ;  strength 
of  fleet  in  1900,  118;  supplies  of 
iron  ore  compared,  229;  expendi- 
ture on  armaments  compared, 
250,  251 

Frankfort -on- Main  :  national  as- 
sembly at,  71 ;  incorporation  with 
Prussia,  90 ;  and  the  Zollverein, 
235 

Frankfort-on-Oder,    population   of, 

51 


382 


INDEX 


Frederick  William  :  the  Great 
Elector,  49  ct  seq. ;  character  of, 
52  ;  his  dream  of  sea-power,  53  ; 
the  Brandenburg  Navy  estab- 
lished, 55  ;  Admiralty  at  Berlin 
founded,  59  ;  Anglo-German  diffi- 
culty, 67  ;  rule  as  to  neutral  flag 
and  goods,  69 

Free  trade,  Bismarck's  abandon- 
ment of,  242 

Fremantle,  Admiral  the  Hon.  Sir 
Edmund,  "The  Navy  as  I  have 
Known  It,"  107 

Frerichs  and  Co.,  J.,  shipbuilders, 
details  of,  372 

Fiirchtenicht  and  Brock.  See  Vul- 
can Works 

Fiirth,  first  German  railway  to, 
238 

German -American  Petroleum  Co.  : 
gross  register  tonnage  of  fleet, 
300  ;  oil-driven  ships,  311 

German-Australian  Co.,  gross 
register  tonnage,  300 

Germania  yard  (see  Krupp)  :  an 
underwater  boat,  126;  period  for 
construction  of  warship,  320  : 
building  slips,  323 ;  description 
and  number  of  warships  built  by, 
326,  327 ;  history  of,  369-371  ; 
details  of,  372 

Germany :  rivalry  with  England, 
vii  et  seq. ;  the  centenary  of  free- 
dom, viii  ;  maritime  ascendancy 
in  the  past,  i  et  seq. ;  the  Han- 
seatic  League,  2  et  seq. ;  Napoleon 
as  the  founder  of  the  German 
Empire,  3  ;  wars  with  Denmark, 
19  et  seq. ,  86,  87 ;  outrages  on 
English  shipping,  25  ;  Queen 
Elizabeth's  expulsion  of  the 
Hanse  merchants,  45  ;  the  Hansa 
naval  forces,  47  ;  the  first  Hohen- 
zoUern  fleet  and  colonies,  49  et 
seq. ;  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  50  et 
seq.;  the  Elector's  dreams  of  sea- 
power,  53 ;  the  Brandenburg 
Navy  founded,  55  ;  a  naval  de- 
feat, 57;  "Admiralty"  at  Berlin 
founded,  59  ;  failure  of  colonial 
enterprise,  60  et  seq.  ;  Anglo- 
German  difficulty,  67 ;  navy  in 
the  nineteenth  century,  71  et  seq., 
115-118  ;  division  of,  71 ;  a  popu- 
lar naval  movement,  73  ;  auction 
sale  of  warships,  77  ;  "  the  father 
of  the  German  Navy,"  79  ;  her 
naval  policy,  80  et  seq.  ;  develop- 


ment of  Wilhelmshaven,  85 ; 
naval  programme  of  1865,  89  ;  of 
1868,  90,  91  ;  of  1872,  92  ; 
effect  of  French  war,  91  ;  first 
Royal  Review,  93  ;  accession  of 
W^illiam  II.,  94  ;  acquisition  of 
her  colonies,  95  ;  British  influence 
on  the  German  Navy,  97  et  seq. ; 
the  Navy  Acts,  loS  et  seq.,  331  et 
seq.  ;  advent  and  policy  of 
Admiral  Von  Tirpitz,  iii  et  seq.^ 
149,  194  et  seq.,  254;  strength  of 
fleet  in  1900,  118  ;  influence  of 
South  African  War,  119;  birth 
of  the  high  sea  fleet,  123  ;  in- 
creased provision  of  cruisers, 
125  ;  appearance  of  the  Dread- 
nought, 128  et  seq.;  consternation 
in,  139  ;  first  German  Dread- 
noughts, 141  ;  the  Reichstag  and 
naval  policy,  143.  256  et  seq.  ; 
ships,  officers,  and  men,  152  et 
seq.  :  her  English-built  ships, 
153  ;  British  and  German  guns 
compared,  154  ;  training  of 
officers  and  men,  158  et  seq. ;  con- 
scription and  naval  conditions, 
169  ;  work  at  high  pressure,  173  ; 
her  naval  aims,  174  ;  the  German 
Emperor's  policy.  177  et  seq.;  the 
Emperor  and  England,  185  ; 
socialism,  190  ;  Press  bureau, 
201  ct  seq.;  a  "patriotic  basis" 
for  education,  205-207  ;  the  Navy 
League,  206  et  seq.  ;  economic 
basis   of   German    naval   policy, 

214  et  seq.;  contrast  of  popula- 
tions   in    1871     and    1911,     214, 

215  ;  decreased  emigration,  217  ; 
number  of  foreigners  resident  in 
(1871  to  1910),  219  ;  decline  of 
birth-rate,  220;  Jews,  222  ;  effects 
of  prosperity,  223  ;  sport,  224, 
225  ;  British  and  German  re- 
sources, 226  et  seq. ;  petroleum 
and  iron  ore,  229,  230;  coal,  230; 
pig-iron  and  steel,  231  ;  metallic 
ores,  232 ;  causes  of  retarded 
development,  233  ;  growth  of  the 
Zollverein,  234  et  seq.;  serfdom 
of  the  peasantry,  235  ;  trade 
guilds,  236  ;  roads  and  transport, 
236  et  seq.  ;  unification  of  the 
postal  systems,  237  ;  banking, 
240  ;  companies  floated,  242  ; 
export  trade,  244  et  seq. ;  employ- 
ment statistics,  245,  246;  increase 
in  consumption  of  food,  247,  248  ; 
wealth  compared  with  England, 


INDEX 


383 


249  ;  expenditure  on  armaments, 
250,  251  ;  funded  debts,  252,  253  ; 
divisions  of  classes  and  creeds, 
256  et  seq. ;  influence  of  Catholi- 
cism, 258  et  seq. ;  solidarity  of  the 
Centre  party,  262  et  seq.  ;  growth 
of  Socialism,  265  et  seq. ;  Con- 
servative -  Catholic  domination, 
273  ;  policy  of  the  "  Empire 
Party,"  275,  276  ;  strength  of 
Liberalism,  277  ;  the  Anti-Semite 
movement,  279  ;  England's  best 
customer,  283  ;  her  next  struggle, 
285  ;  maritime  interests  and 
colonies,  287  et  seq. ;  extent  of  the 
Colonial  trade,  289  ;  growth  of 
shipping,  293,  294  ;  influence  of 
emigration,  295  ;  her  merchant 
fleet,  298-300 ;  a  proposed  new 
canal,  301  ;  British  and  German 
shipping  compared,  305  ;  pro- 
gress of  machinery,  307  ;  coming 
of  the  oil-driven  ship,  311  ;  the 
blue  riband  of  the  Atlantic,  313  ; 
reduced  shipbuilding  profits,  315  ; 
British  predominance,  318,  319; 
number  of  building  slips,  323  ; 
competition  for  foreign  orders, 
325-327  ;  her  shipbuilding  re- 
sources, 361  et  seq. ;  area,  slips, 
repairing  docks,  etc.,  of  the  chief 
German  shipyards,  372  ;  British 
and  German  shipbuilding  pro- 
grammes, 374  ;  gun  and  torpedo 
armaments  of  British  and  Ger- 
man fleets,  375  ;  naval  expendi- 
ture of  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many, 1901-1014,  376,  377  ;  extent 
of  British  and  German  empires, 
378 
Gijsels,  Admiral,  and  sea-power,  53 
Gneisenau,      Field  -  Marshal,     and 

Prince  Adalbert,  80 
Goltz,    Field- Marshal    Baron    von 
der.  on  German  policy,  121  ;  the 
"Pathfinder''  movement,  225 
Gordon,  Lord  Duffus,  and  the  Rus- 
sian Navy,  100 
Gothland,  island  of,  19,  22 
Grabow,    shipbuilding    school    at, 

309 

Granville,   Lord,   and   Queen    Vic- 
toria, 87,  88 
Great  Britain.     See  England 
Greece,  supply  of  iron-ore  in,  229 
Greigs,  the,  and  the  Russian  Navy, 

100 
Griefswald  Agreement  of  1361,  7  ; 
an  alliance,  17,  20 


Grosser  Kurfi'irst,  armoured  frigate, 

93 
Gross  Friedrichsburg,   fort  of,  49, 

59,  60,  62  ;   sale  of,  63 
Guilds  for  organization  of  trades, 

an  impediment,  236 
Gun    and    torpedo    armament    of 

British  and  German  Fleets,  1913, 

375 

Hakon,  King  of  Norway,  betrothal, 
and  its  result,  19,  20 

Hamburg :  an  Imperial  city,  3 ; 
Hanseatic  privileges,  5 ;  an 
alliance,  17,  20,  23  ;  capture  of 
Emden,  25  ;  successful  negotia- 
tions in  London,  34  ;  success  of 
English  privateers,  35  ;  admit 
merchant  adventurers,  44,  45  ; 
result  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  50, 
294  ;  position  in  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, 71  ;  birth-rate,  220  ;  and  the 
Zollverein,  235  ;  merchant  fleet, 
297  et  seq. 

Hamburg- America  Line:  gross  regis- 
ter tonnage,  300 ;  oil-driven  ships, 
311 

Hamburg-South  America  Company: 
gross  register  tonnage,  300  ;  oil- 
driven  ships,  311 

Hanover,  90  ;  and  the  Zollverein, 
235 

Hansa  Company,  gross  register 
tonnage,  300 

Hansa,  the.    See  Hanseatic  League 

Hanseatic  League:  IX.,  history  of, 
2  et  seq.;  origin,  5;  Parliament, 
7  ;  origin  of  the  Steelyard  in 
London,  9  et  seq.  ;  defeat  of  the 
fleet,  21 ;  Cologne  Confederation, 
22  ;  troubles  with  England,  25- 
27  ;  sends  envoys  to  London,  31 ; 
internal  troubles,  33  ;  conflict  and 
settlement  with  England,  34-41  ; 
Wolsey's  firm  policy  against,  42, 
43 ;  emancipation  of  England  from, 
44  ;  decline  of  power,  46,  47 ; 
naval  forces  of,  47  ;  Emperor 
William's  opinion  of,  182 

Hanse,  meaning  of  term,  10 

Hanse  League,  278 

Hanse  Parliament,  7 

Hardenberg  and_  agrarian  reform, 
236 

Hatzfeldt,  Prince,  276 

Heligoland,  island  of,  taken  over 
by  Germany,  95 

Helsingborg,  21,  23 

Henry  IV.  and  Prussia,  30 


384 


INDEX 


Henry  VI.  confirms  the  Steelyard 
privileges,  34  ;  a  crisis,  35 

Henry  VII.  and  the  Hanseatic 
League,  42 

Henry  VIII.  and  the  Hanseatic 
League,  43,  44 

Herrings,  towns  built  on  trade  of 
catching,  15 

Hesse  and  the  Zollverein,  235 

Hoeven,  Captain  van  der,  Com- 
mander of  the  Dutch  Expedition, 

63 

Ilohenlohe,  Prince  Ernest,  276 
Hohenzollern  :      first     fleet      and 

colonies,  49  et  seq.  ;  ascendancy 

in  Germany,  53 
Holland:  maritime  supremacy  of,  2; 

independence  of,  46 
Hollman,    Admiral   von,    Minister 

of  Marine,    109,    no,    194,   195, 

200 
Holstein,  the  Counts  of,  20,  21,  23 
Holy  Roman  Empire.    See  Roman 

Empire 
Horse-power,  growth  of,  247 
Hoskins,    Sir    Anthony,    and    the 

German  Emperor,  102 
Howaldt    Yard  :    build    oil  -  driven 

ships,  311  ;  period  of  construction 

of  warships,  321  ;  building  slips, 

323,  372;  descriptionof  the  works, 

367.  372 
Hungary,   supply   of  iron   ore  in, 

229 

Imperial  German  Gazette,  new  estab- 
lishment for  fleet,  120 

Imperial  yards  at  Kiel,  312;  descrip- 
tion of,  372 

Iron.     See  Mining 

Iron  ore :  supply  of,  in  various 
countries,  229  ;  production  of,  in 
Germany  and  United  Kingdom, 
230 

Italy  :  principal  shipyard  and  gun 
factory  due  to  England,  100 ; 
strength  of  fleet,  118;  supply  of 
iron  ore,  229 ;  expenditure  on 
armaments,  250,  251 

Jade  Harbour  a  federal  war  harbour, 

90 
Japan  :    what    her    fleet    owes    to 

England,  100  ;  war  with  Russia, 

127 ;  expenditure  on  armaments, 

250,  251 
Jervis,  Sir  John,  and  the  Battle  of 

St.  Vincent,  156,  157 
Jesuit  law,  264,  265 


Johann,  Archduke,  afterwards  Im- 
perial administrator,  80 

Johannsen  and  Co.'s  shipbuilding 
yard,  description  of,  372 

Jutland,  rising  of  the  nobles  of,  23 

Keim,  General,  manager  of  the 
Naval  League,  212,  213 

Kiauchow,  a  German  colony,  popu- 
lation in,  288,  289 

Kiel,  20 ;  Prussia's  right  to,  88 ; 
naval  school  at,  162 ;  Howaldt 
Yard  at,  311  ;  Imperial  yards  at, 
312  et  seq.,  361,  372 

Klawitter's,  J.  V/.,  shipyard,  descrip- 
tion of,  372 

Koch's,  Henry,  shipyard,  descrip- 
tion of,  372 

Kolberg,  20 

Konigsberg,  50 

Kosmos  Company's  shipyard,  gross 
register  tonnage,  300 

Krupp  firm  (see  also  Germania) : 
history  of,  153,  208,  314;  and 
the  Navy  Bill  of  1900,  321;  a 
monopoly,  321 

Kurfurst  Friedrich  Wilhelm,  116 

Laaland,  island  of,  seizure  of,  23 

Lamprecht,  Professor,  his  German 
history,  241 

Lang,  Admiral,  and  the  Chinese 
Navy,  100 

Lang,  Captain,  a  Swedish  ofi&cer, 
78 

Leather,  value  and  quantity  of  ex- 
ports, 246 

Lehmann  -  Felskowski,  Herr,  on 
money  invested  in  German  ship- 
building, 314 

Lehwald,  Field-Marshal,  and  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  66 

Leipzic,  first  railway  to,  238 

Levant  line,  gross  register  tonnage, 
300 

Liberalism,  strength  of,  26«,  277 
et  seq. 

Lichnowski,  Prince,  Imperial  Am- 
bassador  in  London,  276 

Liebert,  General  von,  276 

Lissa  cause  of  an  Anglo-German 
difiiculty,  67-69 

List,  Friedrich,  father  of  German 
economics:  on  federating  Den- 
mark and  Holland,  205,  206;  on 
the  importance  of  railways,  237 

Loewes,  the,  celebrated  for  small 
arms  and  machine  tools,  222 

Lorraine,  ore-beds  of,  243 


INDEX 


385 


Liibeck  :  a  Hanse  town,  3,4;  head- 
quarters of  the  League,  7  ;  builds 
up  the  Hanse  fleet,  14,  47  ;  an 
Imperial  city,  15  ;  war  with  Den- 
mark, 16 ;  alliance  with  Ham- 
burg, 17 ;  Congress  of  Princes 
held  at,  18  ;  Conference  at  Greifs- 
wald,  20 ;  internal  troubles,  33  ; 
privileges  of  the  Steelyard  con- 
firmed, 34  ;  an  acute  crisis,  35, 
36;  and  Henry  VIII.,  44;  after 
the  Thirty  Years'  War,  50  ;  the 
Vienna  Congress,  71  ;  private 
bank,  2^0 

Liihring's,  C,  shipbuilding  yard, 
details  of,  372 

Machinery :  proportion  of  persons 
engaged  in,  245  ;  progress  of, 
soy  et  seq. 

Magnus  of  Sv/eden,  18-20  ;  deposed, 
22 

Mahan,  Admiral,  on  the  Dread- 
nought, 132,  135 

Malay  States,  Federated,  and  the 
British  Empire,  xiii 

Malmo,  23 

Margaret,  Queen :  autocratic  ruler 
of  all  Scandinavia,  24 ;  appeals 
to  Liibeck  for  help,  39 

Maritime  interests,  287  et  seq. 

Marshall  Islands,  imports  and  ex- 
ports, 289 

Meat,  comparative  consumption  in 
England  and  Germany,  248 

Mecklenburg,  Duke  of,  22 

Merchant  shipping,  293  et  seq.  ; 
tonnage  and  dividends  of  fleets, 
300,  304  et  seq. ;  liners  and  stamps, 
303>  313  ;  blue  riband  of  the 
Atlantic,  313  ;  reduced  shipbuild- 
ing profits,  314,  315 

Merry  field,  Captain,  a  privateers- 
man,  adventures  of,  68 

Metal-working,  proportion  of  per- 
sons employed  in,  245 

Meyer's,  Jos.  L.,  shipbuilding  yard, 
details  of,  372 

Miaulis,  Admiral,  organizer  in 
Ministry  of  Marine,  75 

Midshipmen,  training  of,  161  et  seq. 

Milch,  Professor,  on  life  of  coal- 
fields, 228 

Mingaye,  Captain,  on  Prussia's 
opportunity,  80 

Mining  and  Iron :  proportion  of 
persons  engaged  in,  245  ;  increase 
in  horse-power  used,  246  ;  values 
and  quantities  of  exports,  246 


jNIoen,  island  of,  seizure  of,  23 
Moltke,  Count,  and  the  North  Sea 

Baltic  canal,  88 
Monarchists,    the,   and    Socialists, 

267  et  seq. 
Monte  Pcnedo,  an  oil-driven  ship,  311 
More,  Sir  Thom.as,  his  inscriptions 

on  the  Steelyard  lintels,  11 
Munich,  jealousy  of  Berlin,  257 

Napoleon  as  the  founder  of  the 
German  Empire,  3,  2S4  ;  cause  of 
retarded  development,  233 

Nassau,   90 ;    and   the    Zollverein, 

235 

Nassau  class  of  warship,  139  ;  com- 
pared with  Superb  class,  140 

Nauticus,  the  annual  naval  publica- 
tion, 203 ;  gives  expenditure  of 
principal  powers  on  armaments, 
250,  251  ;  details  of  shipbuilding 
yards,  322,  372 

Naval  Album,  210 

Naval  Annual:  appearance  of  the 
Dreadnought.  129 

Naval  expenditure  of  Great  Britain 
and  Germany,  1901  to  1914,  376, 

377 
Naval  legislation : 

Navy  Act,  1889,  148 

,,  1898,  113,  148  ;  text 

of,  328-331 
„  1900,  120,  149  ;  text 

of.  331-335;  memo- 
randum of,  346-360 
„  1906,  text  of,  335 

,,  1908,    141  ;    text  of, 

336 
,,  1912,    149  ;    text   of 

337-345 
Naval  training  of  officers  and  men, 

158  et  seq. 
Navy.     See  Germany 
Navy  League,  campaign  of  the,  x, 

207  et  seq. 
Neptun   Co.   shipyards,  details   of, 

372 
New  Guinea,   German  colony,  im- 
ports and  exports,  289 
New   Zealand  and  naval   defence, 

xii 
Nineteenth   Century,    "The   Kaiser's 

Dreams  of  Sea-Power,"  107  n. 
Nord  und  Siid,  Balfour's  article  on 

Anglo-German  problem,  viii,  xiii 
Norddeutscher  Lloyd,  gross  register 

tonnage  of,  300 
North   German   Lloyd,  dry  docks, 

372 


386 


INDEX 


North  Sea  works,  details  of,  372 
Norway  and  the  Hanseatic  League, 

23  ;  supply  of  ore  in,  229 
Novgorod,  republic  of,  46 
Nuremburg,  railway  to  Furth,  238 
Nymegen,  Peace  of,  64 

Oats,  increase  in  the  per  capita  con- 
sumption of,  248 

Oder  River,  importance  of,  300 

Officers,  training  of  naval,  158  etseq. 

Oil-driven  ships^  3 1 1 

Oldenburg  and  development  of 
Wilhelmshaven,  83 

Palmerston :  Viscount,  his  indiscreet 
note,  76, 183  ;  and  the  war  of  1864, 

87 

Paper,  increase  in  use  of  horse- 
power for  manufacture  of,  246 

Peasantry,  serfdom  of,  235 

Philip  II.  and  expulsion  order  from 
Germany  of  Englishmen,  45 

Poland,  State  of:  defeats  the  Teu- 
tonic Order,  33  ;  closed  to  British 
cloth,  39  ;  extension  to  the  sea, 
46 

Pomerania,  52,  294 

Postal  systems,  unification  of,  237 

Potatoes,  increase  in  the  per  capita 
consumption  of,  248 

Potsdam  railway  to  Berlin,  238 

Potteries,  increased  use  of  horse- 
power in  manufacture,  246 

Prince  Ferdinand,  a  privateer,  her 
captures,  68 

Privateering,  24,  38,  67-69 

Protestantism,  258  et  seq. 

Prussia  {see  also  Germany)  :  defeat 
of  the  Hanseatic  fleet,  21  ;  and 
England,  30  ;  her  fleet,  78,  79,  86, 
88  ;  and  the  Zollverein,  235 

Railways,  commencement  of,  237, 

2^2 
Rathenau,  Herr,  organizer  of  the 

Allgemeine     Electrizitats-Gesell- 

schaft,  222 
Rauch,   von.    War    Minister,    and 

transition  of  steam  from  sail,  80 
Raule,  Benjamin,  Dutch  merchant, 

his   eventful    dealings    with    the 

Elector,  55,  57,  58,  61 
Reichstag    and   naval    policy,    iii- 

113,    143;    influence   of   Roman 

Catholicism,  259 
Reiherstieg   shipyard,   313  ;  details 

of.  372 
Religion,  influence  of,  25S  et  seq. 


Reventlow,  Count  Ernst,  on  ship* 
building  resources,  320,  321,  361 

Richard  Cceur  de  Lion  and  the 
Cologne  merchants,  28 

Richard  of  Cornwall,  "German 
King,"  28 

Richard  II,  and  the  Hanse  privi- 
leges, 31 

Rickmers  Rersmiihlen  Shipbuilding 
Co.,  details  of,  372 

Roads,  state  of,  236,  237 

Roman  Catholics,  their  power  in 
Germany,  258  et  seq. 

Roman  Empire,  Holy,  3,  18 

Roosevelt,  President,  and  the 
Dreadnought  controversy,  132  et 
seq. 

Rostock  alliances,  17,  20  ;  and 
piracy,  24 

Riiscke  and  Co.  shipyards,  details 
of,  372 

Russia,  state  of,  in  1370,  18 ;  in- 
fluence of  English  officers  on  her 
navy,  100  ;  disposal  of  fleets  in 
1888,  109 ;  strength  of  fleet  in 
1898,  118  ;  expenditure  on  arma- 
ments, 250,  251 

St.  Germain,  Treaty  of,  55 
Salzwedel,  population  of,  51 
Samoa   as  a   German   colony,  im- 
ports and  exports,  289 
Saxony  and  the  Zollverein,  235 
Scandinavia,    18  ;     union    of,    22, 

23 

Scania,  23,  31 

Schaafhausenscher  Bankverein 
foundedj  241 

Schichau  shipbuilding  yard :  con- 
structors of  torpedo  craft,  312, 
313  ;  a  private  concern,  314  ; 
rate  of  construction  of  vessels, 
320  ;  number  of  ships,  323,  372  ; 
execution  of  foreign  orders,  325, 
326  ;  description  and  details  of, 

364.  372 

Schlcsien.  battleship,  138 

Schleswig,  Duke  of,  20 

Schleswig-Holstein,  battleship,  138 

Schroder,  Captain :  commands 
Prussian  fleet  against  the  Danes, 
79  ;  appointment  to  Navigation 
School  ship  Amazon,  81 

Schwarm,  Wilhelm,  aged  94,  builder 
of  first  German  warship,  83 

Scott,  Rear-Admiral  Percy,  his  new 
methods  of  training  naval  marks- 
manship, 138 

Seebeck  shipyard,  details  of,  372 


INDEX 


387 


Seehandlung,  formerly  Societe  de 
Commerce  Maritime  State  bank, 
69,  70 

Selborne,  Earl  of,  and  the  appear- 
ance of  the  Dreadnought,  128 

Serfdom  of  peasantry,  235 

Shipbuilding  programmes,  British 
and  German,  374 

Shipyard  and  Machinery  Works 
Co.,  details  of,  372 

Shipyards,  statistics  of,  372 

Sigismund,  "King  of  the  Romans," 

34 
Sims,  Commander,  and  the  Dread- 
nought controversy,    132   et  seq. ; 
tactical       considerations,       135 ; 
cause  of  increased  displacement, 

137 

Skanor,  town  of,  16,  23,  30 

Smaaland,  22 

Socialists,  the,  259  ;  growth  and 
future  of,  266  et  seq. 

Societe  de  Commerce  Maritime. 
See  Seehandlung 

Sombart,  Professor :  on  economic 
condition  of  the  people,  234  ;  on 
the  iron  industry,  243 

Sonderburg,  naval  school  at,  162 

South  African  War,  influence  on 
Germany,  119 

South  Sea  colonies  :  German 
population  in,  288  ;  imports  and 
exports,  289 

Spain  :  war  with  England,  45  ; 
Carolus  secundus  captured,  56  ; 
supply  of  ore  in,  229 

Spithead  Review  in  1S89,  104,  105 

Steel  statistics,  230,  231  ;  Thomas- 
Gilchrist  process,  243 

Steelyard  in  London :  origin  and 
history  of,  g  et  seq. ;  unfair  com- 
petition, 29  ;  privileges  con- 
firmed,  34,  41  ;  acute  crisis,  35 ; 
stormed,  37;  Wolsey's  firm  policy, 
43  ;  Queen  Elizabeth's  expulsion 
order,  45 

Steinmann-Bucher  estimate  of  the 
Empire's  riches,  249,  250 

Stendal  after  the  Thirty  Years'  War, 

51 

Stephenson's  "Rocket,"  first  steam- 
engine,  237 

"  Sterling,"  meaning  of,  2 

Stettin,  20,  50,  66  ;  shipbuilding 
yards,  362,  372 

Stettin-Oder  Works,  details  of,  372 

Stockholm,  24 

Stocks  and  Kolbe  shipbuilding  yard, 
details  of,  372 


Stortebeker,  Claus,  the  freebooter, 

25 
Stosch,  General  von,  and  the  navy, 

93,94.311 
Stralsund,  treaty  of,  17,  23  ;  seizure 

of.  43 

Stiilcken  and  Co.  shipbuilding  yard, 
details  of,  372 

Submarines,  fighting  value  of,  125 

Sugar,  increase  per  capita  in  con- 
sumption of,  248 

Superb  class  compared  with  Nassatt 
class,  140 

Sweden  :  siege  of  Helsingborg,  21  ; 
exhaustion  of,  22,  23  ;  war 
against,  55 ;  supply  of  ore  in, 
229 

Switzerland,  supply  of  ore  in, 
229 

Taccroma,  60 

Tannenberg,  Battle  of,  33 

Taxation,  increase  of,  253 

Tecklenborg,  John  C,  shipbuilding 
yard,  details  of,  372 

Textiles,  statistics,  245 

Thomas-Gilchrist  process  of  making 
steel,  243 

Three  Points,  Cape,  settlement  at, 
60 

Thuringian  States  and  the  Zoll- 
verein,  235 

Thyen,  G.  H.,  shipbuilding  yard, 
details  of,  372 

Tirpitz,  Grand-Admiral  von :  the 
creator  of  the  modern  German 
Fleet,  X,  xi,  95,  96  ;  his  career, 
no  et  seq,;  triumph  over  the 
Reichstag,  112;  reasons  for  aug- 
mentation of  fleet,  113,  114;  a 
pledge  and  the  sequel,  115  ;  his 
policy,  148-151,  284;  a  difficult 
problem,  171 ;  and  William  II., 
177  et  seq.;  a  sailor  and  states- 
man, 195  ;  reverse  of  naval  policy, 
196,  197 ;  his  characteristics,  199  ; 
his  Press  bureau,  201  et  seq, ;  and 
the  Boer  War,  253,  254 

Tobacco,  increase  in  per  capita  con- 
sumption of,  248 

Togo :  German  population,  288 ; 
imports  and  exports,  289 

Transportation,  236  et  seq. 

Treitschke  on  the  European  situa- 
tion in  the  later  thirties,  206 

Tryon,  Sir  George,  and  the  Review 
at  Spithead,  106 

Utrecht,  Treaty  of,  40,  42 


388 


INDEX 


Valdemar  IV.,  King  of  Denmark: 
attack  on  Visby,  19,  20;  defeats 
the  Hanseatic  fleet,  21  ;  humili- 
ation of  Denmark,  23 ;  death, 
24 

Victoria,  Queen,  and  the  war  of 
1864.  87 

"Victualling  Brothers,"  24,  25 

Vienna  Congress,  71 

Visby :  history  of,  19 ;  captured 
and  pillaged,  20  ;  a  stronghold  of 
the  "Victualling  Brothers,"  25 

Vulcan  Shipbuilding  Works :  the 
first  sea-going  steamer,  308  ; 
foreign  orders  for  warships,  312, 
325^  326  ;  passenger  liners,  313  ; 
dividends  paid  from  1903-11,  315, 
317  ;  new  yard  at  Hamburg,  322 ; 
building  ships,  323,  372 ;  first- 
class  battleship  ordered  by  Greek 
Government,  325  ;  history  and 
details  of,  362-364,  372 

Wake,  Captain,  a  Prussian  priva- 
teer, 6g 

Warwick,  Earl  of,  attack  on  Hanse 
vessels,  36,  37 

Wasa,  Gustav,  on  Scandinavia,  26 

IVesenburg,  battleship,  116 

Weser  Shipbuilding  Yard  :  divi- 
dends from  1903-11,  315,  316  ; 
period  of  construction  for  ships, 
320  ;  building  ships,  323,  372 ; 
history  and  details  of,  368,  372 

West  Carolines.     See  Carolines 

Westphalia,  Peace  of,  50 

Wheat,  annual  consumption  of, 
247,  248 

Wickhorst,  J.  H.  N.,  shipbuilding 
yard,  details  of,  372 

Wilhelmshaven  :  acquisition  of,  84  ; 
development  of,  85  ;  Imperial 
yards  at,  312  ef  seq.,  361,  372 

William  I. :  flight  to  England,  189  ; 
lays  foundation-stone  of  Kiel 
Canal,  95  ;  death,  95 


William  II.,  Emperor  of  Germany  : 

and  England,  viii,  185  ;  not  the 
creator  of  naval  expansion,  i  ; 
accession,  95  ;  his  close  acquaint- 
ance with  the  English  Navy,  97 
et  s^q. ;  an  Admiral  of  the  English 
Fleet,  loi ;  the  review  at  Spithead 
in  1889,  104,  105  ;  compels  the 
subordinate  to  exercise  his  own 
initiative,  159 ;  and  his  Naval 
Minister,  177,  194  et  seq. ;  his 
policy,  178  et  seq.,  187;  "Our 
future  lies  on  the  water,"  183; 
effects  of  personal  rule,  188,  189  ; 
and  the  Junkers,  191  ;  and  the 
Reichstag,  192,  193  ;  world  policy 
and  the  school,  204  et  seq. ;  a 
"patriotic  basis"  for  education, 
207 ;  and  the  Navy  League,  208- 
213 

Wismar :  one  of  the  Hanse  towns, 
17  ;  conference  at  GreifswaJd,  20 ; 
issue  of  "charters  of  robbery," 
24  ;  and  Queen  Elizabeth,  45 

Wittelsbach  class  of  warship,  124 

Wittenberg,  Johann,  Burgomaster 
of  Liibeck,  defeated  by  Valdemar, 
21 

Woerman  Shipping  line,  gross 
register  and  tonnage,  300 

Wolsey,  Cardinal,  firm  policy  with 
Hanseatic  League,  43 

Wood,  values  and  quantities  of  ex- 
ports, 246 

Worth  class  of  warship,  the,  115, 
116,  124 

Wiirtteviberg,  a  floating  torpedo 
school,  168 

Wurttemberg   and   the  Zollverein, 

235 
Wynen,  Jan,  defender  of  Arguin, 

65 

Ziese,    Herr    Karl,    owner    of    the 

Schichau  shipyards,  325 
Zollverein,  the  growth  of,  234  et  seq. 


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